Denver-Stapleton

On November 16, 1976, Texas International Flight 987, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-14, N9104, operated as a scheduled passenger flight from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Houston, Texas, with an intermediate stop at Denver, Colorado. The flight was routine to Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado. The flight left the gate at Stapleton International Airport with 81 passengers and 5 crew members aboard. When Flight 987 was cleared to taxi to runway 8R for takeoff, the weather was clear, the wind was from 130° at 7 kns, and the temperature was 40° F. At 1726:33, the tower cleared the flight to take the runway and to hold while two light: aircraft took off from a nearby intersection. At 1729:13, Flight 987 was cleared for takeoff, and at 1729: 15 the flight reported "rolling." The first officer was making the takeoff and, upon receipt of the clearance, he advanced the throttles to a position commanding 1.4 EPR and released the brakes. After the engines stabilized at 1.4 EPR, the first officer advanced the throttles to the takeoff thrust position. Upon reaching this position, he relinquished control of the throttles and placed his left hand on the control yoke. The captain guarded the throttles until rotation speed (VR) was reached. The pilots described the takeoff roll to rotation as "normal." The captain monitored the engine instruments and noted no abnormal readings. He said he called out 100 KIAS, 130 KIAS, V1, VR, V2; the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) readout corroborated his statement. The first officer stated that when the captain called VR, he checked his airspeed indicator before he moved his control column aft and saw 149 or 150 KIAS either at, or just before, he began to rotate the aircraft. He stated that he rotated the aircraft at a normal rate to a target pitch angle of 10° which he determined from his attitude indicator; he estimated that this took about 3 to 4 seconds. About halfway through the rotation--about a 5° pitch angle--the stall warning system's stickshaker activated. The first officer stated that once it began it was continuous. He said he continued the rotation to what he believed to be about 10° and the stickshaker continued to operate. He saw that although the airspeed was beyond 150 KIAS, the aircraft did not lift off. Since it had accelerated to a speed greater than V1, the first officer said that he tried to get it airborne. He could not recall how long he maintained the pitch angle, but he believed it was adequate to get the aircraft off the runway. When he concluded that the aircraft was not going to fly, he rejected the takeoff. The captain stated that rotation was normal and that as rotation was begun there were a couple of "clacks" from the stickshaker. As the rotation continued, the stickshaker began to operate continuously. He saw about 10° pitch angle on his attitude indicator and 152 KIAS on the airspeed indicator. All other instrument indications were normal. The stickshaker continued to operate and he believed that the aircraft would not lift off. At this point, with the airspeed well past V2, he decided to reject the takeoff. His actions to reject the takeoff were simultaneous with those of the first officer. When the first officer began to abort the takeoff, he reached over and, in what he described as one continuous motion, pulled the throttles to idle and applied full reverse thrust. Almost simultaneous with his initiation of the power reduction, he felt the captain's hand on top of his. He said that he had already started to apply forward pressure on the yoke to lower the nose. on his, he realized that the captain was assuming control of the aircraft and he removed his own hand from the thrust levers and placed it on the yoke. He described the lowering of the nosewheel to the runway as rapid, and once it was on the ground he pushed the yoke forward to hold the nosewheel there and applied brakes. The stickshaker had stopped, but neither pilot could recall exactly when. When he felt the captain's hand When the nose was lowered, full reverse thrust and maximum wheel braking were applied; however, the ground spoilers were not deployed. The captain estimated that there was 2,500 to 3,000 ft of runway remaining when the takeoff was rejected. He later noted that they were in the amber lighted area of the runway when the abort began. The first officer said that all he could see were the amber runway edge lights when the nose was lowered. The amber coded runway edge lights on 8R begin 2,000 feet from the eastern threshold of the runway. The captain stated that he steered the aircraft toward the right side of the runway to avoid the approach light stanchions for runway 26L. The aircraft left the runway, continued another 1,050 ft, traversed two drainage ditches, struck approach light stanchions, turned left, and stopped headed in a northerly direction. After the aircraft stopped, the captain ordered the first officer to proceed into the cabin and assist the flight attendants with the passenger evacuation. The captain then cleaned up the cockpit and carried out the emergency engine shutdown procedures. The engines were shut down, the fuel shutoff valves were closed, the engine fire handles were pulled, the fire extinguishing agent was discharged, and battery and ignition switches were turned off. All 86 occupants were evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The takeoff from Denver-Stapleton Airport was completed from runway 35L in poor weather conditions. At that time, a thunderstorm with associated rain showers was moving over the northern portion of the airport. The Thunderstorm was surrounded by numerous other thunderstorms and associated rain showers but none of these were in the immediate vicinity of the airport. After liftoff, the airplane reached an altitude of 100 feet then lost about 41 kt of indicated airspeed in 5 seconds. The aircraft struck the ground 11.6 seconds after the airspeed began to decrease. The aircraft first hit the ground 387 feet south of the departure end of runway 35L and 106 feet to the right of the runway centerline. The aircraft continued northward to a second impact area about 135 feet north of the end of the first area. The main portion of the second area was 55 feet long and 4 feet wide. The aircraft slid northward from this area and came to rest about 1,600 feet north of the departure end of runway 35L and about 160 feet to the right of the extended runway centerline. All 131 occupants were evacuated, 15 of them were injured.

Western Air Lines flight 470 to Casper and Minneapolis departed Denver at 07:03 in the morning. The airplane, on an IFR flight plan, climbed to its cruising altitude of FL220. At 07:36, following a descent to 12,000 feet, the flight crew contacted Casper approach control and advised that the flight was about 12 miles south of the Evansville Intersection. At that time, the controller cleared the flight to use the localizer back course approach for runway 25, to circle to runway 3, or to land straight in. The weather reported to the crew indicated poor visibility with light snow falling and wind 040° at 9 knots. One minute later, the approach controller advised that "runway 7/25 has been plowed. There's about a 1/4-inch of powder snow on it. Braking action reported, Convair 580, as poor. Runway 3/21 is being plowed at this time." At 07:51, Flight 470 reported at the Henning Intersection and was cleared to contact the Casper Tower. The tower controller cleared the flight to land on runway 25 and gave the wind as 030° at 8 knots. The flight was also advised by the controller that a disabled snow blower was "just west of the intersection runway 21, left side runway 25, on the edge ...." At 07:41:42, the first officer called out "thousand to go to the field." At 07:42:09, the first officer called "approaching minimums," and 12 seconds later, he called "just about at minimums." The aircraft then flew level for a few moments a t the minimum descent altitude (MDA). At 07:42:25, the first officer called the runway in sight directly below the aircraft. At that time airspeed was 150 knots and the flaps were at 25°. The first office then set the flaps at 30° as the captain initiated the final descent. The aircraft crossed the threshold at reference speed +15 knots. The aircraft touched down 2,375 feet from the departure end of the runway, about 6,306 feet from the approach end of the runway. The aircraft went off the departure end of the runway to the right of the centerline. After striking several metal stanchions in the first row of terminal bar lights, which were located 200 feet off the end of the runway, the aircraft struck a shallow irrigation ditch 280 feet off the runway end. The aircraft veered farther to the right and stopped about 800 feet beyond the departure end of the runway.

Following an uneventful flight from Denver-Stapleton Airport, the crew started the descent to Mazatlán-General Rafael Buelna Airport. On short final, the airplane struck the ground, lost its undercarriage and came to rest about 1,500 meters short of runway threshold. All 123 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane was chartered by the Wichita State University football team for a special flight from Wichita to Logan with an intermediate stop in Denver, carrying players and supporters. After departure from Denver-Stapleton Airport, the crew went off course and followed a wrong track. While cruising at an altitude of 10,800 feet, the airplane struck trees and crashed on the slope of Mt Trelease (12,447 feet high) located about 10,6 miles west of Silver Plume. Two crew members and 30 passengers were killed while eight other occupants were seriously injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

The approach to Denver-Stapleton was completed in poor weather conditions, below MDA for an ASR approach. At the decision height, the pilot-in-command was unable to locate the runway so he decided to initiate a go-around when the left engine failed. The airplane stalled and crashed short of runway threshold. Two passengers were seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.

Boeing 727-22C N7434U operated Flight 266 from Los Angeles to Denver, CO and Milwaukee, WI. The aircraft had been operating since January 15, 1969, with the No. 3 generator inoperative. This was allowed because according to the Minimum Equipment List, the aircraft is airworthy with only two generators operable provided certain procedures are followed and electrical loads are monitored during flight. Flight 266 was scheduled to depart the gate at 17:55, but was delayed until 18:07 because of the inclement weather and loading problems. The flight commenced its takeoff roll on runway 24 at approximately 18:17. At 18:18:30 the sound of an engine fire warning bell was heard in the cockpit. The crew reported a no. 1 engine fire warning and stated that they wanted to return to the airport. Shortly after shutdown of the No. 1 engine, electrical power from the remaining generator (No. 2) was lost. Following loss of all generator power, the standby electrical system either was not activated or failed to function. Electrical power at a voltage level of approximately 50 volts was restored approximately a minute and a half after loss of the No. 2 generator. The duration of this power restoration was just 9 to 15 seconds. The Boeing descended and struck the sea 11.3 miles west of the airport. The ocean depth at this point is approximately 950 feet.

On December 21, 1967, Frontier Airlines had a backlog of more than 100,000 pounds of air freight which they were attempting to move during the busy pre-holiday period. Because of this, employees and equipment were pressed into service in a maximum effort to move the freight. Although Frontier did not use its DC-3 equipment in all-cargo operations, the passenger seats of N65276 were removed and the DC-3C was assigned to operate as all-cargo Flight 2610, from the Stapleton International Airport at Denver, Colorado to Rapid City, South Dakota, with an en route stop at Scottsbluff, Nebraska. About 1100 MST the aircraft was moved from the company hangar to the airport freight terminal for loading. About 1030, a Frontier radio communicator who knew how to prepare weight manifests was assigned to prepare the manifest for Flight 2610. He was given the operating and pit weight maximums for the aircraft. The dispatch office prepared a dispatch release for the flight. At 1100 and 1400 the employee called the freight office for specific loading information from which to execute the weight manifest. He was told both times that the information was not yet ready and would be furnished to him later. When this employee's shift ended at 1430 he still had not received the information. He then went off duty, neglecting to inform his relief of the status of the situation. In the meantime N65276 was being loaded. An air cargo service employee listed the cargo before it was loaded and tied down and later totalled its weight. No one engaged in the loading could recall that the cargo was placed in the aircraft according to any formal preloading schedule. The first officer came to the air cargo office about the time the cargo listing was being totalled. He was asked if a weight manifest were needed and he replied, "No, we have our release, that's enough." When he reached the aircraft some of the loading remained to be done and he authorized the loaders to use some of the space left in the fuselage for an aisle to accommodate this cargo. The first officer bearded the aircraft, took the left pilot's seat and had started both engines by the time the captain arrived and got aboard. Just before the flight started to taxi out and while the captain was getting settled in his seat, a Frontier station agent began to remove the control battens and landing gear pins. When he started to remove a gear pin before the pilot signalled that hydraulic pressure on the gear was up, another station agent stopped him and took over. The latter agent subsequently stated that there was no batten on the left elevator and he did not check the right one because it was customary to install the device on the left elevator when only one batten was used. He said that after he finished, he gave the crew a departure salute and that at no time did he see any of the controls move or any indication from the first officer that any of the controls were not movable. Flight 2610, appropriately cleared, left the loading area at 1544 and about 1559 began takeoff using runway 35. Weather conditions were: scattered clouds at 5,000 feet, visibility 60 miles and the wind 270 degrees at 16 knots. According to eyewitnesses, the takeoff appeared normal until after the aircraft became airborne. At this time it entered an increasingly steep climb attitude to an estimated deck angle of 50 to 60 degrees. About 300 feet above the surface, the aircraft rolled to its left and entered a steep nose-down left turning descent and crashed off the left side of the runway. The aircraft burst into flames at impact.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Denver-Stapleton Airport. On touchdown, one of the nose wheel tire burst. The landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid on its nose for several yards before coming to rest. All four crew members were uninjured while the aircraft christened 'Mainliner Capt Ralph Jonston was considered as damaged beyond repair.

The crew departed Denver-Stapleton on a local training mission for practicing stalls, single engine and emergency procedures. While in cruising altitude, the aircraft went out of control, entered a dive and crashed in a huge explosion near Brighton. The airplane was destroyed and both pilots were killed.