Denver-Stapleton

The aircraft was operating as Continental Express flight 2286. During the approach in IFR conditions, the aircraft went below the minimum descent altitude then struck the terrain at 7,180 feet msl. Examination of the aircraft did not disclose any pre-impact failures or system malfunctions. The evidence indicated that the copilot was flying the airplane during the approach. Evaluation of the radar data showed an excessive rate of descent before the collision with terrain. Postmortem toxicological examination showed that the captain had used cocaine prior to this flight. The safety board concluded that this use had adversely affected his ability to monitor the unstabilized approach flown by the copilot. Records of both crewmembers revealed prior traffic violations and accidents, and, in the case of the captain, a previous aircraft accident. Evaluation of the weather conditions indicated that a 10 to 15 knot tailwind condition existed throughout the approach.

Weather conditions were moderate snow and freezing temperatures. Following a 27 minute delay between deicing and departure, on takeoff the aircraft was over-rotated by the first officer. Aircraft control was lost, the aircraft stalled and impacted off the right side of the runway. Company procedures called for repeat deicing when in icing conditions if a delay exceeds 20 minutes. Confusion between the tower and the flight crew due to procedural errors resulted in the delayed takeoff clearance. Both pilots were inexperienced in their respective crew positions. The captain had 33 hours experience as a DC-9 captain. The first officer had 36 hours jet experience, all in the DC-9. First officer demonstrated weak scan in training and had pilot performance problems with previous employers. First officer was on reserve, and had not flown for 24 days. The trip was assigned to the first officer for proficiency. Flight was first officer's 2nd trip as DC-9 first officer. Wing vortices from a landing aircraft on a parallel runway were not a factor in the accident.

Aircraft had been repossessed and was being ferried from Grand Junction, CO, to Chicago, IL, with en route stop at Denver, CO. After takeoff from Denver, landing gear would not retract. Pilot made several attempts without success. He elected to return to Denver. Pilot said that on final approach the right engine began surging and the left engine would not increase power. Aircraft made hard landing on runway, breaking left wing. Investigation revealed both speed levers would not function because engine prop governors and underspeed fuel governor reset arms, splined onto underspeed fuel governor shafts, were positioned on opposite side of speed lever actuating arms. Landing gear functioned normally during swing tests. It was later learned that right main tire had blown on takeoff 3 days earlier and required repair. Maintenance personnel opened the landing gear circuit breakers to preclude inadvertent gear retraction. Pilot said he checked circuit breakers when gear failed to retract. Both occupants escaped uninjured.

Pilot-in-command stated that he waited approximately 90 seconds after a B727 departed on runway 08R due to possible wake turbulence. Pilot continued to state that he used a short field takeoff procedure to climb above the flight path of the B727. He stated that during climbout N3643R began an uncommanded roll to the left at approximately 600 feet. The pilot regained roll control just prior to ground impact. The Piper Aerostar is certificated without a stall warning device. The wind at Stapleton Airport at the time N3643R took off was 170° at 20 knots with gusts to 28 knots. According to the pilot operating handbook, the demonstrated crosswind component is 15 knots. All four occupants were injured, one seriously.

During a cross country flight from WI to CA and return, the non instrument, low experienced private pilot, flew into IMC conditions. The aircraft impacted flat snow-covered ground, destroying the aircraft and fatally injuring his passenger. Examination of wreckage revealed no evidence of pre-accident malfunction of the aircraft or its powerplants. A passenger was killed while three other occupants were injured.

Air US Flight 716 departed Denver-Stapleton, CO at 15:46 for a flight to Gillette, WY. At 15:59 Flight 716 contacted Denver Center to request to maintain FL130, which was approved. In the same area a Cessna TU206 (N4862F, operated by Sky's West Parachute Center) was climbing in a racetrack pattern over Fort Collins/Loveland Municipal Airport to an altitude of FL155. The Cessna had departed this airport at 15:30 for the second parachute jump flight of the day. The Cessna was in a climbing left turn on a north-westerly heading when it was hit by the Air US Jetstream. The No. 1 propeller of the Jetstream cut through the aft fuselage section of the Cessna resulting in immediate loss of control to both aircraft. Two of the skydivers were killed inside the aircraft during the collision. The pilot and three parachutists fell free of the aircraft and parachuted to the ground. The remains of the Cessna descended out of control and crashed in an open field. The Jetstream impacted the ground in a nearly vertical pitch attitude in an open field about 4,000 feet northeast of the Cessna wreckage.

United Airlines Flight 173, departed New York-JFK on a scheduled flight to Portland International Airport (PDX), with an en route stop at Denver (DEN). The DC-8-61 took off from Denver about 14:47. The planned time en route was 2 hrs 26 min. The planned arrival time at Portland was 17:13. There was 46,700 lb of fuel on board the aircraft when it departed the gate at Denver. This fuel included the Federal Aviation Regulation requirement for fuel to destination plus 45 min and the company contingency fuel of about 20 min. At 17:05, Flight 173 called Portland Approach and advised that its altitude was 10,000 ft and its airspeed was being reduced. Portland responded and told the flight to maintain its heading for a visual approach to runway 28. Flight 173 acknowledged the approach instructions and stated, "...we have the field in sight." At 17:07, Portland Approach instructed the flight to descend and maintain 8,000 ft. Flight 173 acknowledged the instructions and advised that it was "leaving ten." At 17:09, Flight 173 received and acknowledged a clearance to continue its descent to 6,000 ft. When the DC-8 was descending through about 8,000 ft, the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, requested the wing flaps be extended to 15 degrees, then asked that the landing gear be lowered. As the landing gear extended, an unusual sound was heard and the aircraft yawed. At 17:12, Portland Approach requested, "United one seven three heavy, contact the tower, one one eight point seven." The flight responded, "negative, we'll stay with you. We'll stay at five. We'll maintain about a hundred and seventy knots. We got a gear problem. We'll let you know." Portland Approach replied, "United one seventy-three heavy roger, maintain five thousand. Turn left heading two zero zero." The flight acknowledged the instructions. At 17:14, Portland Approach advised, "United one seventy three heavy, turn left heading, one zero zero and I'll just orbit you out there 'til you get your problem." Flight 173 acknowledged the instructions. For the next 23 min, while Portland Approach was vectoring the aircraft in a holding pattern south and east of the airport, the flight crew discussed and accomplished all of the emergency and precautionary actions available to them to assure themselves that all landing gear was locked in the full down position. The second officer checked the visual indicators on top of both wings, which extend above the wing surface when the landing gear is down-and-locked. About 17:38, Flight 173 contacted the United Airlines Systems Line Maintenance Control Center in San Francisco. The captain explained to company dispatch and maintenance personnel the landing gear problem and what the flight crew had done to assure that the landing gear was fully extended. He said they were planning to land in about twenty minutes. About 17:44, the captain and the first flight attendant discussed passenger preparation, crash landing procedures, and evacuation procedures. At 17:46, the first officer asked the flight engineer, "How much fuel we got...?" The flight engineer responded, "Five thousand." About 17:50, the captain asked the flight engineer to "Give us a current card on weight. Figure about another fifteen minutes." The first officer responded, "Fifteen minutes?" To which the captain replied, "Yeah, give us three or four thousand pounds on top of zero fuel weight." The flight engineer then said, "Not enough. Fifteen minutes is gonna really run us low on fuel here." Some calculations were made and at 17:52 the flight engineer talked to Portland and discussed the aircraft's fuel state, the number of persons on board the aircraft, and the emergency landing precautions at the airport. A fuel check at 17:57 learned that there were 1,000 lb in each tank, totalling 4,000 lb of fuel. From 17:57 until 18:00, the captain and the first officer engaged in a conversation which included discussions of giving the flight attendants ample time to prepare for the emergency, cockpit procedures in the event of an evacuation after landing, whether the brakes would have antiskid protection after landing, and the procedures the captain would be using during the approach and landing. At 18:01, the flight engineer reported that the cabin would be ready in "another two or three minutes." At 18:02, the flight engineer advised, "We got about three on the fuel and that's it." The aircraft was then about 5 nmi south of the airport on a southwest heading. Portland Approach then asked Flight 173 for a status report. The first officer replied, "Yeah, we have indication our gear is abnormal. It'll be our intention, in about five minutes, to land on two eight left. We would like the equipment standing by. Our indications are the gear is down and locked. We've got our people prepared for an evacuation in the event that should become necessary." At 18:03 Portland Approach asked that Flight 173 advise them when the approach would begin. The captain responded, "...They've about finished in the cabin. I'd guess about another three, four, five minutes." At this time the aircraft was about 8 nmi south of the airport on a southwesterly heading. At 18:06, the first flight attendant entered the cockpit and reported that they were ready in the passenger cabin. At this time the aircraft was about 17 nmi south of the airport on a southwesterly heading. The captain then said, "Okay. We're going to go in now. We should be landing in about five minutes." Almost simultaneous with this comment, the first officer said, "I think you just lost number four ..." followed immediately by advice to the flight engineer, "... better get some crossfeeds open there or something." At 18:06:46, the first officer told the captain, "We're going to lose an engine..." At 18:06:49, the first officer again stated, "We're losing an engine." Again the captain asked, "Why?" The first officer responded, "Fuel." The captain replied, "Why?" Between 18:06:52 and 18:07:06, the CVR revealed conflicting and confusing conversation between flight crewmembers as to the aircraft's fuel state. At 18:07:06, the first officer said, "It's flamed out." At 18:07:12, the captain called Portland Approach and requested, "...would like clearance for an approach into two eight left, now." The aircraft was about 19 nmi south southwest of the airport and turning left. This was the first request for an approach clearance from Flight 173 since the landing gear problem began. Portland Approach immediately gave the flight vectors for a visual approach to runway 28L. The flight turned toward the vector heading of 010 degrees. At 18:09:21, the captain advised Portland Approach, "United, seven three is going to turn toward the airport and come on in." After confirming Flight 173's intentions, Portland Approach cleared the flight for the visual approach to runway 28L. At 18:10:17, the captain requested that the flight engineer "reset that circuit breaker momentarily. See if we get gear lights." The flight engineer complied with the request. At 18:10:47, the captain requested the flight's distance from the airport. Portland approach responded, "I'd call it eighteen flying miles." At 18:12:42, the captain made another request for distance. Portland Approach responded, "Twelve flying miles." The flight was then cleared to contact Portland tower. At 18:13:21, the flight engineer stated, "We've lost two engines, guys." At 18:13:25, he stated, "We just lost two engines - one and two." At 1813:38, the captain said, They're all going. We can't make Troutdale." The first officer said, "We can't make anything." At 18:13:46, the captain told the first officer, "Okay. Declare a mayday." At 18:13:50, the first officer called Portland International Airport tower and declared, "Portland tower, United one seventy three heavy, Mayday. We're--the engines are flaming out. We're going down. We're not going to be able to make the airport." This was the last radio transmission from Flight 173. About 18:15, the aircraft crashed into a wooded section of a populated area of suburban Portland about 6 nmi east southeast of the airport. There was no fire. The wreckage path was about 1,554 ft long and about 130 ft wide. Two crew members and eight passengers were killed, 34 other occupants were injured.

The flight departed Steamboat Springs-Bob Adams Airport at 1855LT on a scheduled flight to Denver-Stapleton, carrying 20 passengers and a crew of two. After takeoff, while climbing, the crew encountered severe icing conditions and was cleared to return when the flight crashed into a mountain at the 10,530 feet level. Rescuers arrived on scene the following morning. A pilot and a passenger died while 20 other occupants were injured, most of them seriously. According to official observations, the weather at Steamboat Springs about 25 minutes before the accident consisted of an estimated 2,000 feet overcast ceiling and 6 miles visibility in freezing rain. According to surviving passengers, after the accident, snow was falling at the crash site and a strong wind was blowing and gusting from the west.

Few minutes after takeoff from Denver-Stapleton Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 12,000 feet, the crew reported hydraulic problems and was cleared to return. Shortly later, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field located 10 miles northeast of Stapleton Airport. A passenger was seriously injured while four other occupants were killed.