Colorado Springs

The pilot reported that he performed the takeoff with the airplane at gross weight and with the flaps up and the engine set for maximum power, which he verified by reading the instruments. During the takeoff, the airplane accelerated and achieved liftoff about 65 to 70 mph and then climbed a couple hundred feet before the pilot began to lower the nose to accelerate to normal climb speed (90 to 100 mph). The airplane then stopped climbing and would not accelerate more than 80 mph. While the pilot attempted to maintain altitude, the airplane decelerated to 70 mph with the engine still at the full-power setting. With insufficient runway remaining to land, the pilot made a shallow right turn toward lower terrain and subsequently made a hard landing in a field. The pilot likely allowed the airplane to climb out of ground effect before establishing a proper pitch attitude and airspeed for the climb, which resulted in the airplane inadvertently entering a “region of reversed command” at a low altitude. In this state, the airplane may be incapable of climbing and would require either more engine power or further lowering of the airplane’s nose to increase airspeed. Because engine power was already at its maximum and the airplane was at a low altitude, the pilot was unable to take remedial action to fly out of the region of reversed command.

On 1 July 2012, at approximately 1738 Local time, a C-130H3, Tail Number 93-1458, assigned to the 145th Airlift Wing, North Carolina Air National Guard, Charlotte Douglas International Airport (KCLT), Charlotte, North Carolina, crashed on public land managed by the United States Forest Service (USFS), while conducting wildland firefighting operations near Edgemont, South Dakota. At the time of the mishap all members of the Mishap Crew (MC) were assigned or attached to the 156th Airlift Squadron, based at KCLT. The Mishap Crew (MC) consisted of Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1), Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2), Mishap Navigator (MN), Mishap Flight Engineer (ME), Mishap Loadmaster 1 (ML1) and Mishap Loadmaster 2 (ML2). For the mishap sortie, MP1 was the aircraft commander and pilot flying in the left seat. MP2 was in the right seat as the instructor pilot. MN occupied the navigator station on the right side of the flight deck behind MP2. ME was seated in the flight engineer seat located between MP1 and MP2, immediately aft of the center flight console. ML1 and ML2 were seated on the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) unit, near the right paratroop door. ML1 occupied the aft MAFFS control station seat and ML2 occupied the forward MAFFS observer station seat. MP1, MP2, MN and ME died in the mishap. ML1 and ML2 survived the mishap, but suffered significant injuries. The mishap aircraft (MA) and a USFS-owned MAFFS unit were destroyed. The monetary loss is valued at $43,453,295, which includes an estimated $150,000 in post aircraft removal and site environmental cleanup costs. There were no additional fatalities, injuries or damage to other government or civilian property.

According to the pilot, passenger, and several witnesses, during takeoff the light jet became airborne momentarily, and then banked aggressively to the left. It impacted the runway in a left wing low attitude and cartwheeled down the runway. An examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies. Approximately 1.5 minutes before the airplane was cleared for takeoff, a De Havilland Dash 8 (DH-8) airplane departed. A wake turbulence study conducted by an NTSB aircraft performance engineer concluded that even slight movement in the atmosphere would have caused the circulation of the vortices near the accident site to decay to zero within two minutes, that is, before the time accident jet would have encountered the wake from the DH-8. The study states, in part: "Given the time of day of the accident, consistent reports of easterly surface wind speeds on the order of 6 to 7 knots, higher wind speeds aloft, and the mountainous terrain near Colorado Springs, it is unlikely that the atmosphere was quiescent enough to allow the wake vortices near the Sport-Jet to retain any significant circulation after two minutes. Furthermore, easterly surface winds would have blown the wake vortices well to the west of the runway by the time of the accident. Consequently, while in smooth air the wake vortices from the DH-8 that preceded Sport-Jet off of the runway may have retained enough circulation after two minutes to produce rolling moments on Sport-Jet on the order of the rolling moment available from the Sport-Jet's ailerons, it is most likely that the wake vortices were neither strong enough nor close enough to the Sport-Jet to cause the violent roll to the left reported by the pilot and witnesses to the accident."

The Part 135 cargo flight was approaching its destination on an IFR flight plan. The pilot had requested the ILS-DME approach to runway 10, but 2 minutes later, he changed his request to the VOR-B approach to runway 28. ARTCC cleared him for the approach to the non-towered airport. The pilot contacted the airport's Unicom, and requested that the ramp personnel be standing by with fuel and oxygen. The airplane was found 5.8 nm from the approach end of runway 28, at 7,900 feet. The approach minimums for the VOR-B was 7,900 feet, which the pilot could descend to at 8.7 nm. The VOR was located 285 degrees at 13.6 nm from the accident site, and the ILS-DME transmitter was located 285 degrees at 5.6 nm from the accident site. The airplane was equipped with a single DME display head, and it had a Nav 1/Nav 2 selector switch.

The pilot was cleared for an ILS DME approach to runway 17L. During the final stage of the approach, the aircraft entered fog and disappeared from view of the control tower personnel. Radar and radio communications were lost also. After searching for 31 minutes, the aircraft was found by airport operations personnel over half way down the runway and 600 feet east of the runway. There was no evidence the aircraft touched down on the runway. The aircraft was configured with the landing gear up and the flaps deployed. Missed approach procedures require the flaps and landing gear to be retracted after initiating the procedure. The decision
height for the approach is 6,384 feet msl (200 feet above ground level) and the required RVR for a 14 CFR Part 135 flight to commence and approach is 2400 (1/2 mile). When on the glide slope, the decision height is 0.4 miles from the runway touchdown zone. Examination of the airplane did not disclose evidence of mechanical malfunction.

After departure from Boise-Gowen Field, en route to Peterson AFB in Colorado Springs, the crew encountered technical problems with the engine n°2. The crew declared an emergency and elected to divert to Mountain Home AFB. About 20 minutes into the flight, the engine n°2 compressor disintegrated. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed 12 miles north of Bliss. All six crew members were killed.
Crew:
Lt Col Robert Buckout, Commander
1st Lt Lance Daugherty, pilot,
Cpt Geoffery Boyd, navigator,
CMSgt Jimmy Vail, flight engineer,
M/Sgt Jay Kemp, loadmaster,
S/Sgt Michael Scheideman, loadmaster.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported he had 'a problem...an overboost situation,' and wanted to return for landing. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, so the pilot was cleared for the ILS runway 26 approach. A witness saw the airplane emerge from the low overcast in a wings level descent, then pitch over to a near vertical attitude and impact a shopping center sign. The left turbocharger wastegate was found in the open (low boost) position, and the right turbocharger wastegate was found in the closed (high boost) position. The right turbocharger butterfly valve was severely eroded, the pin was missing, and the valve was free to rotate on the shaft. A hole was burnt through the right engine number 1 cylinder exhaust valve. Both propellers were in the low pitch-high rpm range. Both engines and turbochargers were original equipment and had not been overhauled in 21 years. A toxicology test showed 0.564 mcg/ml of sertraline (antidepressant) in the pilot's blood. Sertraline was not approved for use while flying an aircraft.

On March 3, 1991, a United Airlines Boeing 737, registration number N999UA, operating as flight 585, was on a scheduled passenger flight from Denver, Colorado, to Colorado Springs, Colorado. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and the flight was on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Numerous witnesses reported that shortly after completing its turn onto the final approach course to runway 35 at Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, about 0944 mountain standard time, the airplane rolled steadily to the right and pitched nose down until it reached a nearly vertical attitude before hitting the ground in an area known as Widefield Park. The airplane was destroyed, and the 2 flight crewmembers, 3 flight attendants, and 20 passengers aboard were fatally injured.

At 1042 mdt, the flight reported moderate turbulences at FL240, but elected to remain at that altitude. At 1055, they were cleared to descend at pilot's discretion to maintain 12,000 feet. Approximately 8 minutes later, shortly after beginning a descent, the flight was instructed to change frequency; but 21 seconds later, they replied 'standby please,' then radio and radar contact were lost. Wreckage was found approximately 26 miles east of the destination airport in mountains. An examination revealed the empennage had separated in flight; pieces of it were found up to one mile away with indication of overload failure. There was evidence that: engines were not operating at ground impact, ignition switches were engaged; left engine start switch was in the 'air' start position and right switch was beyond the 'ground' start position; right propeller was feathered; pax oxygen masks were deployed, indicating cabin had depressurized above 15,000 feet. Weather info indicated cloud bases at 10,000 feet with IMC and turbulences to 25,000 feet, mixed icing from 20,000 feet to 25,000 feet, light rain/snow showers, widely scattered thunderstorms; approximately 15 miles south, 4 inches to 5 inches of hail fellat approximately that time. TPE331 engines had history of flameouts due to ice ingestion caused by impossible use of anti-ice/ignition. All six occupants were killed.

Few minutes after takeoff from Oklahoma City Airport, from climb to cruise, the crew encountered bad weather condition with thunderstorm activity. In severe turbulences, the airplane suffered a general disintegration and crashed in Calumet. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.