Chicago-O'Hare

The aircraft arrived in Miami at 1240, following a routine flight from Chicago, Illinois The captain of the inbound flight reported that the only mechanical discrepancy was, "the outflow valves being a little sticky merely made it a little difficult to maintain the pressurization in a smooth manner. "These valves were cleaned, and a leaking rivet at the No. 4 reserve fuel tank was plugged when it was noticed by the mechanic. This was the only maintenance performed during the "turnaround". Flight 705 is regularly scheduled from Miami. to Portland, Oregon, with intermediate stops at Chicago, Illinois and Spokane and Seattle, Washington. The computed takeoff gross weight of 175,784 pounds, and center of gravity (e.g.) of 25 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC) were both well within the allowable limits. Prior to departing the ramp at 1325, the crew asked the ground controller about the departure routes being utilized, and he replied that most flights were departing ". . either through a southwest climb or a southeast climb and then back over the top of it. . . "The flight departed Miami with an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) clearance at 1335 In accordance with the pilot's request for a". . . southeast vector "a left turn was rude after takeoff from runway 27L and circuitous routing was utilized in conjunction with radar vectors from Miami Departure Control, to avoid *** of anticipated turbulence associated with thunderstorm activity (See Attachment A). A similar departure pattern had been previously flown by another flight Subsequently, while maintaining 5,000 feet and a heading of 300 degrees, Flight 705 requested clearance to climb to a higher altitude. Following a discussion between the flight and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) radar departure controller about the storm activity, and while clearance to climb was being coordinated with the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), the flight advised "Ah-h we're in the clear now. We can see it out ahead . . . looks pretty bad." At 1343, Flight 705 was cleared to climb to flight level 2/ 250 (FL250). They responded, "OK ahhh, we'll make a left turn about thirty degrees here and climb. . "The controller asked of 270 degree was their selected climbout heading, and they replied that this would take them". . . out in the open again". . Accordingly, clearance was granted. Following some discussion about the severity of the turbulence, which was described as moderate to heavy, the flight advised, "OK, you better run the rest of them off the other way then." At 1345 radar service was terminated and control of Flight 705 was transferred to Miami ARTCC. When the flight did not establish radio communication with ARTCC on the initial frequency, Departure Control provided a secondary frequency, and instructed the flight to turn to a heading of 360 degrees which was acknowledged. When Miami ARTCC requested position and altitude, the flight replied, "We're just out of seventeen five (17,500 feet) and standby on the DME one." This transmission ended at 1348, and was the last known communication with Flight 705 The voice transmissions emanating from the flight were made by the first officer. Witnesses in the area reported that a loud explosion had occurred in the air, and several felt a subsequent ground tremor. They also reported that heavy rain had been failing in the area. One witness, in company with five other persons, was seven miles south of the main wreckage site She heard the sound of an explosion which had no echo. When she looked in that direction she saw an orange ball of flame in the edge of a cloud. As she directed the attention of her companions toward this flame, it dropped straight down, becoming a streak, and disappeared behind trees. Shortly after the disappearance a second sound was heard. Statements were received from the crews of four other flights operating in the Miami area at the approximate time of the accident. The first, in a large jet which approached Miami from the west at 7,000 feet, reported the weather as ". . . in and out of broken clouds and light rain showers with light turbulence. Darker heavy shower activity was observed to the (south) of course. We observed no small cells on our radar scope. . only a broad rain area. . . "Another crew, in a four-engine aircraft, departed Miami at 1318, via a departure pattern similar to that which Flight 705 later followed. They described the worst turbulence as". medium to moderate . . . "from west of the airport to north of the Miami VORTAC .3/ They were maintaining 5,000 feet at the time. A third crew in a 720B was folding southeast of Miami at 13,000 feet. They observed numerous rain cells on radar in the Miami area and encountered light ice at this altitude. The fourth crew, also flying a large jet, taxied out shortly after Flight 705 but delayed takeoff for nearly an hour because of the weather. The weather in the Miami area at the time of the accident was characterized by a pre-frontal squall line approximately 250 miles in length, oriented on a northeast-southwest line immediately northwest of Miami (See Attachment A). The U. S. Weather Bureau (USWB) radar observation at Miami at 1344 indicated a broken area of thunderstorms associated with this line, with cells two to twenty miles in diameter, and tops of detectable moisture at 30,000 feet. The line was moving southeast at eight knots, and moderate rain showers were occurring at the station. The 0600 and 1800 Miami radiosonde ascents showed the freezing level to have been at 11,100 and 12,400 feet m.s.1., respectively. SIGMET 4/ No. 3 prepared by the USWB at Miami, valid from 0900-1300, forecast moderate to severe turbulence 5/ in thunderstorms, with a chance of extreme turbulence in heavier thunderstorms. This advisory was called to the attention of the crew of Flight 705 by the operations agent at Miami, and was attached to their dispatch papers. SIGMET No. 4, valid from 1300-1700, was not received until approximately 1315, after the crew of Flight 705 had left the operations office. It forecast moderate to severe turbulence, but deleted the reference to extreme turbulence indicated in SIGMET No 3. Since the dispatcher for this flight is stationed in Minneapolis, the physical Limitations involved made it difficult to apprise the crew of this latest advisory prior to their taxi time of 1325. The aircraft was completely destroyed by impact forces and all 43 occupants have been killed.

On December 14, 1962, at 2212 P.s.t., a Flying Tiger Line Inc., Super Constellation, N6913C, crashed about 1-1/4 miles west of the Lockheed Air Terminal, Burbank California, during an ILS approach to runway 7. All five persons on board the aircraft and three persons on the ground sustained fatal injuries. The last radio communication with N6913C was the flight's acknowledgement of its radar-observed position two miles from the end of the runway on the localizer course. Twenty seconds later the aircraft crashed Into a fog-shrouded residential/industrial area.

Crashed on landing for unknown reason. There were no injuries among the occupants while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

At approximately 0855 1, the flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 14R. At this time the aircraft was taxing on a westerly heading in the runup area adjacent to runway 14R. Flight 706 acknowledged the clearance, while continuing toward the runway, and made a running takeoff No witnesses were found who observed the actual lift-off. N137US was observed after lift-off, 3,000 to 4,000 feet down the runway at an estimated altitude of 50 to 75 feet and in a normal climb attitude. At the 8,000-foot marker the altitude of the aircraft was estimated to have been approximately 100 feet, which is a slightly lower altitude than Electra aircraft normally attain at this point during takeoff. Five witnesses noted a change in engine sound during this portion of the flight. Between the 8,000 and the 9,000 foot runway marker the aircraft was observed to commence an apparently coordinated right turn with a slowly increasing rate of bank. When the bank angle was 30 to 45 degrees, the crew made a short, garbled transmission. Immediately thereafter, at a bank angle of 50 to 60 degrees, the aircraft began to lose altitude. The minimum altitude attained in the entire turn was 200 to 300 feet. The right wing near the No. 4 engine struck powerlines adjacent to the Chicago Northwestern Railroad tracks, severing the lines at an angle of about 70 degrees from the horizontal, and causing a bright bluish flash. The aircraft then continued in a direction of about 271 degrees magnetic and, when in a bank of about 85 degrees and a nose-down attitude of about 10 degrees, the right wing of the aircraft struck the railroad embankment. Continuing to roll about its longitudinal axis, the aircraft cartwheeled, the nose crashing into the ground 380 feet beyond the point of first Impact, and landed right side up It then slid tall first another 820 feet. The aircraft disintegrated throughout its path, and wreckage was strewn over an area 200 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. Evidence of ground fire was found at various points along this path. Impact occurred on airport property about 3,800 feet abeam and to the right of the end of runway 14R, about 500 feet north of Irving Park Road. After passing beyond the railroad embankment the aircraft was lost to view by most of the eye witnesses because of trees and other obstructions; immediately thereafter a large mushroom of orange-red flame accompanied by heavy black smoke was seen. Time of impact was established as 0857. The aircraft was demolished by impact and fire. All occupants were fatally injured.

On December 16, 1960, at 1033 e.s.t., a collision between Trans World Airlines Model 1049A Constellation, N 6907C, and a United Air Lines DC-8, N 8013U, occurred near Miller Army Air Field, Staten Island, New York. Trans World Airlines Flight 266 originated at Dayton, Ohio. The destination was LaGuardia Airport, New York, with one en route stop at Columbus, Ohio United Air Lines Flight 826 was a non-stop service originating at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, with its destination New York International Airport, New York. Both aircraft were operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Following the collision the Constellation fell on Miller Army Field, and the DC-8 continued in a northeasterly direction, crashing into Sterling place near Seventh Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Both aircraft were totally destroyed. All 128 occupants of both aircraft and 6 persons on the ground in Brooklyn were fatally injured. There was considerable damage to property in the area of the ground impact of the DC-8. TWA Flight 266 departed Port Columbus Airport at 0900, operating routinely under Air Traffic Control into the New York area The New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) subsequently advised that radar contact had been established and cleared the flight to the Linden. Intersection, Control of the flight was subsequently transferred to LaGuardia Approach Control. When the flight was about over the Linden Intersection, LaGuardia Approach Control began vectoring TWA 266 by radar to the final approach course for a landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia. Shortly thereafter TWA 266 was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, and was twice advised of traffic in the vicinity on a northeasterly heading. Following the transmission of this information the radar targets appeared to merge on the LaGuardia Approach Control radar scope, and communications with TWA 266 were lost.United Air Lines Flight 826 operated routinely between Chicago and the New York area, contacting the New York ARTCC at 1012 Shortly thereafter the New York Center cleared UAL 826 to proceed from the Allentown, Pa., very high frequency omni directional radio range station (VOR) direct to the Robbinsville, New Jersey, VOR, and thence to the Preston Intersection via Victor Airway 123. At approximately 1021, UAL 826 contacted Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) to advise their company that the No. 2 receiver accessory unit was inoperative, which would indicate that one of the aircraft's two VHF radio navigational receivers was not functioning. A "fix" is established by the intersection of two radials from two separate radio range stations. With one unit inoperative the cross-bearings necessary can be taken by tuning the remaining receiver from one station to the other. This process consumes considerable time, however, and is not as accurate as the simultaneous display of information on two separate position deviation indicators While UAL 826 advised the company that one unit was inoperative, Air Traffic Control was not advised. At 1025 the New York ARTCC issued a clearance for a new routing which shortened the distance to Preston by approximately 11 miles. As a result, this reduced the amount of time available to the crew to retune the single radio receiver to either the Colt' s Neck, New Jersey, or Solberg, New Jersey, VOR in order to establish the cross-bearing with Victor 123, which would identify the Preston Intersection. In the event the crew would not attempt to retune the single VOR receiver, crossbearings on the Scotland Low Frequency Radiobeacon could be taken with the aircraft direction finding (ADF) equipment. This would be a means of identifying the Preston Intersection but, under the circumstances, would require rapid mental calculation in the interpretation of a display which could be easily misread. Several factors support the conclusion that this occurred. Instructions had been issued to UAL 826 for holding at the Preston Intersection the clearance limit, should holding be necessary. Clearance beyond Preston for an approach to Idlewild Airport would be received from Idlewild Approach Control and the transfer of control of the flight from the New York Center to Idlewild Approach Control would normally take place as the aircraft was approaching Preston. UAL 826 was not receiving radar vectors, but was providing its own navigation. After the flight reported passing through 6,000 feet the New York Center advised that radar service was terminated and instructed the flight to contact Idlewild Approach Control. UAL 826 then called Idlewild Approach Control, stating "United 826 approaching Preston at 5,000." This was the last known transmission from UAL 826. At the time UAL 826 advised it was approaching Preston it had in fact gone on by this clearance limit several seconds before and was several miles past the point at which it should have turned into the holding pattern. This is confirmed by the data obtained from the flight recorder which had been installed in the UAL DC-8, as well as by analysis of the communication tapes At a point approximately 11 miles past the Preston Intersection a collision occurred between TWA 266 and UAL 826. Weather at the altitude of the collision and at the time of the accident was such as to preclude flight by visual means.

The flight was for the purpose of transporting six Crane officials from Chicago, Illinois, to Louisville, Kentucky, to attend a business convention. Departure was from O'Hare-Chicago International Airport on a VFR flight plan (changed en route to IFR) with the Crane Company's Chief Pilot Randolph A. Mulherin in command, and Robert H. Robinette, also a Crane pilot, as copilot. Gross weight upon departure was estimated to be 27,360 pounds; the maximum permissible takeoff weight was 31,000 pounds. Shortly after takeoff the pilot gave a routine report to Chicago radio of his time off as 0908 and his estimated elapsed flight time as one hour and 20 minutes. He did not request weather information at that time. Other radio contacts followed as the flight progressed, the final one being at 1034 over the Jeffersonville intersection. An approach was then started from that point to the Standiford Airport, 6-9/10 miles distant. During this approach the aircraft struck trees and crashed at a point one-half mile north of the Jeffersonville intersection. The airplane was destroyed and all eight occupants have been killed.

Northwest Airlines' Flight 8 departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0148, September 6, 1953, for a nonstop flight to Chicago, Illinois. Gross weight on takeoff was 105,839 pounds; maximum allowable for takeoff was 116,740; maximum allowable for landing was 98.500 pounds. The location of the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. Weather at Seattle-Tacoma Airport during takeoff was: ceiling 200 feet and one-fourth mile visibility. Just after the aircraft became airborne No. 3 propeller oversped. Attempts by the flight engineer to correct this condition were unsuccessful and feathering was started one and one-half minutes later. However, the propeller continued to rotate at about 400 r.p.m. The flight's takeoff alternate was Yakima, Washington (a distance of 122 miles), but due to high terrain en route the captain elected to request clearance to proceed to Portland, Oregon (a distance of 132 miles), at 5,000 feet. This clearance was granted immediately. Using METO 2 power the aircraft reached 5,000 feet, well above the overcast, about 14 minutes after takeoff. Near the end of this climb the oil temperature of No. 4 engine was exceeding limits and the oil supply was being rapidly reduced. The flight engineer attempted to lower the temperature by fully opening the oil cooler flap. Temperature, however, remained high and the oil quantity continued to dwindle fast. Accordingly, the No. 4 propeller was feathered at about 0205 at the order of the captain who then declared an emergency and elected to land at McChord Air Force Base. Radio communication was established with McChord and arrangements made for a GCA approach after a short delay in establishing a frequency. No. 3 propeller had not feathered fully and was still windmilling at approximately 400 r.p.m. Meanwhile the captain had requested "takeoff" flaps, but the flaps would not extend hydraulically, and the copilot went to the cabin to crank them down. He stated that he turned the crank about 15-20 turns, at which point he found that it would no longer turn freely, whereupon he backed it to its original position. He was then called back to the cockpit to assist the captain in controlling the aircraft. Control difficulty had been continuously experienced with the aircraft yawing sharply and dropping a wing. The captain had placed the trim controls approximately in neutral, believing that he had a better feel and control of the aircraft without them at the recommended minimum speed of 130 knots. The aircraft, which had re-entered the overcast at about 2,000 feet, was then several miles from McChord Field under GCA direction on its first approach when its position and heading became such that the GCA operator directed a box pattern be flown to establish a proper approach. The second approach was executed in accordance with the directed pattern and the final approach was in line with Runway 34. The landing gear control was not actuated for gear extension until the aircraft broke out of the overcast at an altitude estimated at between 500 and 800 feet on a GCA controlled straight-in approach to Runway 34. At this time the captain ordered that No. 3 be unfeathered but it would not unfeather and continued to windmill. Only the right main gear extended fully and locked, as Indicated by its green light, but the landing was then committed. Shortly after touchdown retraction of the unlocked nose and left main gears allowed the aircraft to veer off the runway to the left. It then skidded sideways to its right, folding the right main gear inward, and the No. 2 engine was torn free. The aircraft came to rest on a heading of 212 degrees some 3,000 feet from the point of touch and about 7,000 feet short of the far end of the 10,000-foot runway. At about that time a gasoline fire started and spread rapidly over the ground below the airplane. Previously alerted fire apparatus, already standing by, kept the fire from spreading while all passengers and four of the crew left quickly by the main cabin door, the door sill being five or six feet above the ground. The flight engineer and the captain left by the cockpit crew door after ascertaining the cabin to be empty. All 32 occupants ware clear within an estimated two minutes. There were no fatalities although several persons were treated for burns at the McChord Air Force Base Hospital.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Chicago-O'Hare Airport. On final approach, the airplane went out of control and crashed three miles northwest of the airfield. A crew member was killed while two others were injured.