Boise

The aircraft was cleared direct and to climb to 14,000 feet. During the climb out, the controller inquired several times as to the flights altitude. The pilot's response to the controllers queries were exactly 10,000 feet lower than what the controller was indicating on radar. Eventually the controller instructed the pilot to stop altitude squawk, which he did. During the last communication with the pilot, he reported that he was level at 14,000 feet. During the next approximately 45 minutes, the aircraft was observed proceeding generally in the direction of its destination. When the controller observed the flight track turn approximately 45 degrees to the right and headed generally northwest, he attempted to contact the pilot without a response. The tracking then turned about 90 degrees to the left for a few minutes, then turned 180 degrees to the right. The aircraft dropped from radar coverage shortly thereafter. On site investigation revealed that the aircraft broke-up in flight as the wreckage was scattered generally east-to-west over the mountainous terrain for approximately .3 nautical miles. Further investigation revealed that the right wing separated at the wing root in an upward direction. Separation points indicated features typical of overload. The right side horizontal stabilizer separated upward and aft. The left side horizontal stabilizer remained attached however, it was twisted down and aft. The aft fuselage was twisted to the left. Both engines separated in flight from the wings. Post-crash examinations of the airframe and engines did not reveal evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction. Both altimeters were too badly damaged to test. Autopsy and toxicology results indicated that the pilot had severe coronary artery disease with greater than 95% narrowing of the left anterior descending coronary artery by atherosclerotic plaque. The coroner also reported that superimposed upon this severe narrowing was complete occlusion of the lumen by brown thrombus. Toxicology results indicated a moderate level of diabetes. The pilot's actions leading up to the accident were consistent with an incapacitation due to hypoxia. The role of a possible heart attack was unclear, since it is possible that it occurred as a result of the hypoxia.

The airplane impacted a ridgeline about 1.5 miles from the runway and approximately 7 to 14 seconds after the pilot reported a dual engine flameout. The airplane's altitude was about 400 feet agl when the pilot reported the flameout. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preexisting anomalies. Icing conditions were forecast and PIREPS indicated that light to moderate rime/mixed icing conditions existed along the route of flight. The Continuous Ignition switches were found in the OFF position. The Approach procedures listed in the Airplane's Flight Manual stated, 'CONTINUOUS IGNITION SHALL BE SELECTED TO ON DURING APPROACH AND LANDING WHILE IN OR SHORTLY FOLLOWING FLIGHT IN ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL ICING CONDITIONS.' The aircraft manufacturer had issued a Service Bulletin in 1995 for the installation of an auto-ignition system to '... reduce the possibility of engine flame-out when icing conditions are encountered and the continuous ignition is not selected.' The operator had not installed the non-mandatory service bulletin. On May 5, 2000, the FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive that required the installation of an auto-ignition system. The toxicology test detected extremely high levels of dihydrocodeine in the pilot's blood. The pilot received a special issuance second-class medical certificate on August 22, 1995, after receiving treatment for a self disclosed history of drug abuse. The drug testing that this pilot underwent as a consequence of his previous self disclosed history of drug abuse would not have detected these substances.

After extending the gear for landing, the down-and-locked indication (green light) for the left main gear was not illuminated. The crew performed the emergency checklist procedures for abnormal gear extension with no success. The aircraft subsequently landed with the left main landing gear retracted. Inspection of the landing gear revealed that the pin (part number MY20248-001), which is part of the forward gear door lock, was corroded and cracked at the point of rotation, preventing proper movement of the gear door uplock.

Radar data indicated that the aircraft completed a figure-eight maneuver at about 3,000 feet AGL, with an estimated airspeed of 140 knots and approximate 40 degree bank angle before leveling out at the completion of the maneuver. The radar data then indicated level flight before a rapid descent. A witness reported observing the aircraft in visual conditions and flying at a high altitude and that it 'appeared fast.' The witness stated that he observed the aircraft make a wide, shallow left turn, then turn back the other way. The nose of the aircraft then started to gradually lower, and the airplane eventually came straight down and started to spin. The witness lost sight of the airplane behind hilly terrain and he did not see the impact. Postaccident examination of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft collided with the terrain in a slight nose-down attitude, located in a gully with approximate 30 degree bank angle. The aircraft then slid downhill to the right and came to rest with the fuselage upright and the empennage was twisted to the right and inverted. No evidence was found to indicate a mechanical failure or malfunction.

The DC-3C took off on runway 10L and immediately executed a right turn followed by a left turn back toward the airport declaring a fire aboard. Dark night visual meteorological conditions existed. Witnesses observed 'flames' or an 'orange glow' coming from the right engine. A small number of aluminum fragments identified from the aft edge of the right engine accessory cowling were found along the ground just short of the ground impact site. These fragments displayed signs of heat distress but no significant melting. An examination of the right engine and accessory section revealed no evidence of a preimpact fire, and sooting and metal splatter on the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer was minimal. Spectral analysis of radio transmissions revealed no evidence of significant divergence of engine RPM between the two engines. Postcrash propeller examination revealed approximate blade pitch angles of 18-19° and 30-32° for the right and left propellers respectively upon impact. Propeller slash mark dimensions associated with the right propeller resulted in propeller RPM of approximately 1,750 to 2,570 over a range of 68 to 100 knots respectively. The first officer advised the PIC (broadcasting over the tower frequency) 'we're gonna stall' approximately 10 seconds before the impact. The aircraft was in a left turn back toward runways 28 left and right when the right wing struck the ground and the aircraft cartwheeled to a stop. A postcrash fire destroyed the cockpit area and inboard right wing.

After departure from Boise-Gowen Field, en route to Peterson AFB in Colorado Springs, the crew encountered technical problems with the engine n°2. The crew declared an emergency and elected to divert to Mountain Home AFB. About 20 minutes into the flight, the engine n°2 compressor disintegrated. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed 12 miles north of Bliss. All six crew members were killed.
Crew:
Lt Col Robert Buckout, Commander
1st Lt Lance Daugherty, pilot,
Cpt Geoffery Boyd, navigator,
CMSgt Jimmy Vail, flight engineer,
M/Sgt Jay Kemp, loadmaster,
S/Sgt Michael Scheideman, loadmaster.

The pilot had been charged with 'lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor.' He was jailed on Friday and released on bond on Saturday. During a meeting with a friend in the pilot's car on Sunday evening, he was drinking beer. The friend said the pilot made comments referring to intentionally crashing the aircraft and that 'he didn't want to die, but didn't know of any other way.' He had a gun in the car and told the friend 'don't call the police or I'll kill myself sooner.' The pilot departed Twin Falls at about 2230 on Sunday night in his PA-46. He flew to Boise, ID (via Ely, NV) before turning back toward Twin Falls. After passing over Boise, intermittent radio contact was made between the airplane and approach control. Radar vectors and descent were issued. Radar contact was lost during descent and pilot announced descending thru 11,000 feet; 38 seconds later, he reported at 6,000 feet. Ground impact was at 4,650 feet. Toxicology tests of the pilot's lung and muscle tissue showed an alcohol level of 175 & 117 mg/dl (0.175% & 0.117%). No preimpact failure of the aircraft was found.

Left seat pilot was receiving a flight check for ATP and CV-240 type rating; right seat pilot was FAA OPS inspector. Following a simulated single-engine approach the airplane landed wheels up. Left seat pilot had received a total of 1.4 hrs left seat training in CV-240 prior to this flight; log book not endorsed.

The pilot announced he had an engine failure during initial climb at 300-400 feet agl after takeoff on a VFR night cargo flight. The tower controller cleared the flight to return to the airport and land on any runway. The aircraft entered a right descending turn, impacted the ground one mile from the airport, and ignited in flames. Evidence indicated the right engine was not operating at impact. The landing gear was down and the right propeller was in the high pitch position. Exam of the right engine revealed blocked fuel injectors, incorrect size fuel injectors, fuel pump out of adjustment, and burned/pitted breaker points in a magneto. Both occupants were killed.

Weather conditions were moderate snow and freezing temperatures. Following a 27 minute delay between deicing and departure, on takeoff the aircraft was over-rotated by the first officer. Aircraft control was lost, the aircraft stalled and impacted off the right side of the runway. Company procedures called for repeat deicing when in icing conditions if a delay exceeds 20 minutes. Confusion between the tower and the flight crew due to procedural errors resulted in the delayed takeoff clearance. Both pilots were inexperienced in their respective crew positions. The captain had 33 hours experience as a DC-9 captain. The first officer had 36 hours jet experience, all in the DC-9. First officer demonstrated weak scan in training and had pilot performance problems with previous employers. First officer was on reserve, and had not flown for 24 days. The trip was assigned to the first officer for proficiency. Flight was first officer's 2nd trip as DC-9 first officer. Wing vortices from a landing aircraft on a parallel runway were not a factor in the accident.