Socata TBM-700

The airline transport pilot was landing at the destination airport after a cross-country flight in visual meteorological conditions. The tower controller stated that the airplane's landing gear appeared to be extended during final approach and that the airplane landed within the runway's touchdown zone. The tower controller stated that, although the airplane made a normal landing, he heard a squealing noise that continued longer than what he believed was typical. The pilot subsequently transmitted "go-around." The tower controller acknowledged the go-around and cleared the pilot to enter a left traffic pattern. The tower controller stated that he heard the engine speed accelerate while the airplane maintained a level attitude over the runway until it passed midfield. He then saw the airplane pitch up and enter a climbing left turn. The tower controller stated that the airplane appeared to enter an aerodynamic stall before it descended into terrain in a left-wing-down attitude. Another witness reported that he saw the airplane, with its landing gear extended, in a steep left turn before it descended rapidly into terrain. A postaccident examination did not reveal any evidence of flight control, landing gear, or engine malfunction. An examination of the runway revealed numerous propeller slash marks that began about 215 ft past the runway's touchdown zone; however, there was no evidence that any portion of the airframe had impacted the runway during the landing. Additionally, measurement of the landing gear actuators confirmed that all three landing gear were fully extended at the accident site. Therefore, the pilot likely did not adequately control the airplane's pitch during the landing, which allowed the propeller to contact the runway. Due to the propeller strikes, the propeller was likely damaged and unable to provide adequate thrust during the go-around. Further, based on the witness accounts, the pilot likely did not maintain adequate airspeed during the climbing left turn, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.

The single engine aircraft departed Cannes-Mandelieu Airport at 1040LT bound for Courtrai-Wevelgem Airport, Belgium, with four passengers and one pilot on board. About one hour and 40 minutes into the flight, while cruising in IMC conditions at FL240, the aircraft start a quick descent to the right until FL149. Speed increased and the overspeed warning sound came on. Forty-five seconds after the start of the quick descent, the airplane initiated a climb with a rate of 10,000 feet per minute until it stalled at FL201, still in IMC conditions. The airplane then entered a dive and went into a flat attitude when it went out of clouds at an altitude estimated between 1,000 and 2,000 feet. This altitude was insufficient to the pilot to regain control and without external visual references, he lost control of the airplane that crashed in a wooded area. The pilot and a passenger were killed while three other passengers were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

About 3 months before the accident, the pilot received about 9 hours of flight instruction, including completion of an instrument proficiency check, in the airplane. The accident flight was a personal cross-country flight operated under instrument flight rules (IFR). Radar track data depicted the flight proceeding on a west-southwest course at 15,800 ft mean sea level (msl) as it approached the destination airport. The flight was cleared by the air traffic controller for a GPS approach, passed the initial approach fix, and, shortly afterward, began a descent as permitted by the approach procedure. The track data indicated that the flight became established on the initial approach segment and remained above the designated minimum altitude of 12,000 ft msl. Average descent rates based on the available altitude data ranged from 500 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,000 fpm during this portion of the flight. At the intermediate navigation fix, the approach procedure required pilots to turn right and track a north-northwest course toward the airport. The track data indicated that the flight entered a right turn about 1 mile before reaching the intermediate fix. As the airplane entered the right turn, its average descent rate reached 4,000 fpm. The flight subsequently tracked northbound for nearly 1-1/2 miles. During this portion of the flight, the airplane initially descended at an average rate of 3,500 fpm then climbed at a rate of 1,800 fpm. The airplane subsequently entered a second right turn. The final three radar data points were each located within 505 ft laterally of each other and near the approximate accident site location. The average descent rate between the final two data points (altitudes of 10,100 ft msl and 8,700 ft msl) was 7,000 fpm. About the time that the final data point was recorded, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane was in a spin and that he was attempting to recover. No further communications were received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted the surface of a reservoir at an elevation of about 6,780 ft and came to rest in 60 ft of water. A detailed postaccident examination of the airframe, engine and propeller assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The available meteorological data suggested that the airplane encountered clouds (tops about 16,000 ft msl or higher and bases about 10,000 ft msl) and was likely operating in IFR conditions during the final 15 minutes of the flight; however, no determination could be made regarding whether the clouds that the airplane descended through were solid or layered. In addition, the data suggested the possibility of both light icing and light turbulence between 12,000 ft msl and 16,000 ft msl along the flight path. Although the pilot appeared to be managing the flight appropriately during the initial descent, it could not be determined why he was unable to navigate to the approach fixes and maintain control of the airplane as he turned toward the airport and continued the descent.

The airplane departed Annecy-Meythet Airport at 1033LT on a flight to Toussus-le-Noble, carrying five passengers and one pilot. The flying time was approximately one hour under IFR mode. At 1111LT, while cruising at FL180 near Auxerre, heading to EBOMA, the pilot informed ATC he was ready for the descent. He was cleared to descend to FL120 when the aircraft started to drift to the left of the airway. Two minutes later, ATC informed the pilot about the deviation and the pilot acknowledged and initiated a turn to the right when control was lost. The airplane entered a dive and reached an excessive vertical speed until it crashed in an open field. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all six occupants were killed.

The single engine airplane departed Budel-Kempen Airport on a flight to Cannes-Mandelieu, carrying four passengers and one pilot. During initial climb, the pilot selected gear up and was attempting to retract the flaps when the engine failed. The aircraft lost height and crash landed in an open field, coming to rest on its belly 1,500 metres from the runway end. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The single engine aircraft departed Kiel-Holtenau Airport in the morning, carrying two passengers and two pilots, bound for Rotenburg, Lower Saxony, where two additional passengers should embark before continuing to Friedrichshafen to take part to the Aero 2013 Airshow. On approach to Rotenburg-Wümme Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with a cloud base at 500 feet and a visibility limited to 2 km. On final approach, the aircraft impacted ground and came to rest in an open field, bursting into flames. The burnt wreckage was found 2,3 km short of runway 08 and 570 metres to the left of its extended centerline. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed.

The pilot took off at around 14 h 45 from Maribo aerodrome (Denmark) bound for Cuers. He filed an IFR flight plan that he cancelled(2) at 17 h 15 near the St Tropez VOR (83). He explained that he had overflown the installations at Cuers at 1,500 ft and started an aerodrome circuit via the north for runway 11. He was visual with the ground and noted the presence of snow showers. He reckoned that these conditions made it possible to continue the approach. At about 600 ft, he went into a snow shower. At about 400 ft, he noticed that the horizontal visibility was zero and that he had lost all external visual references. He tried to make a go-around but didn’t feel any increase in engine power. At about 200 ft, he saw that he was to the right of the runway and decided to make an emergency landing. The aeroplane struck the ground on the right side of the runway. It slid for 150 metres and swung around before stopping. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.