Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

On approach to Three Hills Airport, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions. Too low, the single engine airplane struck the ground, lost its left wing and came to rest in a snow covered field. All three occupants were rescued, among them a passenger was slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The instrument-rated pilot obtained a weather briefing prior to departure that contained surface observations along the route of flight, as well as significant meteorological (SIGMET) and airman's meteorological (AIRMET) information. The briefing also included convective weather advisories, a convective outlook, the area forecast, pilot reports, radar summary, and winds aloft information. The area forecast included overcast ceilings at 1,500 feet mean sea level (msl) with cloud tops at 6,000 feet msl, visibility between 3 and 5 miles, light rain and mist, and isolated thunderstorms with cumulonimbus tops to 35,000 feet msl. After the pilot departed, he established contact with air traffic control; the airplane was initially observed on radar heading toward the destination airport. An analysis of radar from the day of the accident indicated that isolated thunderstorms existed and that, almost 4 minutes after departing, the airplane encountered an area of developing rain showers and vertical updrafts. The airplane began a descending right turn followed by a brief climb, then another descent; its ground speed slowed from 202 knots to 110 knots before the data ended. At that time, the airplane was at 4,500 feet msl. A witness said he heard the airplane but was unable to see it due to the low cloud layer. A few moments later, he saw the airplane exit the cloud layer in a spin before it impacted the ground. A postaccident examination revealed no mechanical deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane and engine.

The instrument-rated private pilot was executing a non precision instrument approach procedure at night in deteriorating weather conditions. According to GPS track data, the pilot executed the approach as published but descended below the missed approach point's minimum altitude before executing a climbing right turn. This turn was not consistent with the published missed approach procedure. The airplane then began a series of left and right ascending and descending turns to various altitudes. The last few seconds of recorded data indicated that the airplane entered a descending left turn. Two witnesses heard the airplane fly overhead at a low altitude and described the weather as foggy. Reported weather at a nearby airport about 26 minutes before the accident was visibility less than 2 miles in mist and an overcast ceiling of 300 feet. A friend of the pilot flew the same route in a similarly equipped airplane and arrived about 30 minutes before the accident airplane. He said he performed the same approach to the missed approach point but never broke out of the clouds, so he executed a missed approach and diverted to an alternate airport. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Federal Aviation Administration Flight Training Handbook Advisory Circular 61-21A cautions that pilots are particularly vulnerable to spatial disorientation during periods of low visibility due to conflicts between what they see and what their supporting senses, such as the inner ear and muscle sense, communicate. The accident airplane's maneuvering flightpath, as recorded by the GPS track data, in night instrument meteorological conditions is consistent with the pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation.

While descending to La Crete Airport, the pilot encountered foggy conditions and the visibility dropped to 100 metres. By night, the single engine aircraft descended too low, impacted ground and crashed in a snow covered field located few km northeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Shortly after a night takeoff from Jacarepaguá Airport, the single engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea. Few debris were found several days later. The pilot's body was found on September 4 on a beach in Barra de Tijuca. The wreckage and the copilot's body were never found. It was reported that the crew did not activate the transponder after takeoff and did not contact ATC for unknown reasons.

A witness reported that the airplane veered left during the takeoff roll and headed toward a large ditch that surrounded the runway. It appeared that the pilot did not attempt to stop the airplane or abort the takeoff. The airplane continued toward the ditch, and, upon reaching the ditch's edge, the airplane rotated and reached an altitude of about 50 feet. The airplane's left wing collided with trees. The airplane rolled left and then right before stalling and crashing. The pilot stated that the airplane seemed to pull left on takeoff, possibly due to a right quartering tailwind, and that he did not realize where he was positioned on the runway. Examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

While delivering the single-engine, turbine-powered airplane to Brazil during a multiple leg trip, the pilot decided to fly direct from his departure airport in Puerto Rico to his destination airport in Grenada instead of following the island chain and staying within power-off gliding distance of the shore. During the cruise portion of the flight, a total loss of engine power occurred over open water in visual meteorological conditions at 27,000 feet, about 119 miles west of a suitable landing area. During the loss of power, the engine torque indication dropped from the cruise power setting to 0 foot-pounds (ft-lbs) of torque, the engine then began to vibrate, and smoke began emanating from the engine. The pilot ditched the airplane, it sank, and it was not recovered. The pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were rescued by a French Navy helicopter. The pilot said that he had decided to take a direct route instead of staying closer to the island chain between the two airports because he had ferried 3 airplanes down to Brazil in the last year and that it was a judgment call and a calculated risk because the engine was reliable. At the airplane’s planned operating altitude of 27,000 feet, the airplane could have glided about 54 miles; if the route had been planned to take advantage of this glide distance, the pilot could have remained off shore island chain and taken a shorter, although not direct, route. Review of fueling documentation, the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), and statements made by the pilot and pilot-rated passenger also revealed that on the accident flight, good operating practices were disregarded. For instance, during fueling, the airplane which was not equipped with fuel heaters, had been topped off with fuel, but no fuel icing additive had been added, even though the pilot was planning to operate the airplane at 27,000 feet. The airplane was also operated in excess of the manufacturer's published weight limitations, and no power setting or performance information was available for climb and cruise operations in excess of these limitations. Furthermore, according to the pilot, before the loss of engine power, the torque was about 937 ft-lbs. According to the pilot-rated passenger, before the failure, the torque gauge was indicating about 980 ft-lbs. Review of the maximum cruise performance chart in the POH and Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) revealed that both of the stated torque settings exceeded the maximum torque setting listed on the chart. Operating the engine beyond the recommended power settings specified in the POH/AFM for a prolonged period will result in accelerated deterioration due to hot section component distress and will affect engine reliability and durability.

On July 24, 2011, about 0920 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N46TW, owned and operated by a private pilot, sustained substantial damage when it impacted powerlines and terrain during takeoff from runway 27 at the Rantoul National Aviation Center Airport-Frank Elliott Field (TIP), near Rantoul, Illinois. A post impact ground fire occurred. The personal flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was on file. The pilot and two passengers sustained fatal injuries. The flight was originating from TIP at the time of the accident and was destined for Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), near Sarasota, Florida. A witness, who worked at the fixed base operator, stated that the pilot performed the preflight inspection of the airplane in a hangar. An estimated 80 pounds. of luggage was loaded behind the airplane's rear seat. The witness said that the pilot's wife told the pilot that she had to use the restroom. The pilot reportedly replied to her to "hurry because a storm front was coming." The witness said that the engine start was normal and that both passengers were sitting in the rear forward-facing seats when the airplane taxied out. A witness at the airport, who was a commercial pilot, reported that he observed the airplane takeoff from runway 27 and then it started to turn to the south. He indicated that the landing gear was up when the airplane was about 500 feet above the ground. The witness stated that a weather front was arriving at the airport and that the strong winds from the northwest appeared to "push the tail of the plane up and the nose down." The airplane descended and impacted powerlines and terrain where the airplane subsequently caught on fire. The witness indicated that the airplane's engine was producing power until impact.

A witness reported and radar data showed the airplane approaching the runway at a higher‐than‐normal speed. As the airplane leveled low over the runway, the propeller began striking the runway surface. The damage from repetitive propeller strikes resulted in a loss of the thrust and airspeed necessary for flight. The airplane impacted the ground and subsequently caught fire. The postaccident examination of the wreckage confirmed that the airplane was configured with the landing gear and flaps retracted. No mechanical anomalies were observed that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Weight and balance estimates of the airplane indicated that the pilot was operating the airplane outside of its certified weight and center of gravity limits. Forensic toxicology performed on the pilot showed the presence of Hydrocodone and Dihydrocodeine, indicative of the pilot using disqualifying sedating cough or pain medications. These medications can impair performance in high workload environments. The level of medication found in the pilot’s blood at the time of the accident could not be determined. Additionally, Nortriptyline was detected in the pilot’s tissues. While the medications could have had degrading effects on the pilot’s performance, the investigation was not able to determine what role they may have played in the accident sequence.

While en route to the destination airport, the pilot was issued a clearance to descend. As the airplane descended to the assigned altitude, radar plots depicted the airplane entering a right turn, climbing rapidly, and then descending rapidly in a spiral-like pattern. The airplane wreckage was found the following day in mountainous terrain. Several tall trees surrounded the perimeter of the wreckage. Many of the trees showed scuff marks down the trunks consistent with the airplane impacting the terrain in a near-vertical descent. All airplane components were accounted for at the accident site. A postaccident examination of the airplane showed no preimpact failures of the airframe or the engine. A weather analysis revealed that the airplane was descending in the immediate vicinity of a stationary front. The weather conditions in the area were conducive to the production of moderate to severe turbulence, mountain wave activity with updraft/downdrafts in excess of 750 feet per minute, and moderate icing. The radar data confirmed that the airplane began its rapid descent shortly after entering cumuliform clouds. The radar information along with the wreckage at the accident site was consistent with the pilot losing control while trying to maneuver the airplane in an area of turbulent weather.