Piper PA-42 Cheyenne

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in an ambulance flight between Grand Case and Fort-de-France and was carrying a pilot, a nurse, a doctor and a patient, a Greek citizen in honeymoon in Saint Martin who suffered a heart attack. He normally should be transferred to Fort-de-France from Saint Martin-Princess Juliana Airport with another Operator but the aircraft suffered technical problem prior to departure and the patient was transferred to Grand Case Airport. Piper PA-42 left Grand Case-L'Espérance runway 12 at 02H39. One minute later, during initial climb, it lost height and crashed into the Caribbean Sea, some three NM off the airport, off Tintamarre Island. Around 1000LT in the morning, a wheel and some others debris were found floating in water and no trace of the four occupants was found. They were later considered as deceased.

During the takeoff roll on runway 19 at Mercedes Airport, the twin engine aircraft deviated to the right then to the left. Control was lost and the aircraft veered off runway to the left, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in bushed with its left wing partially torn off. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Both passengers were Ricardo Casal, Minister of Justice and Security, and Maria del Carmen Falbo, Attorney.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a positioning flight from Frankfurt-Main Airport to Reichelsheim where the airplane was based. At 1235LT, the twin engine aircraft departed Frankfurt-Main Airport runway 25L and the pilot was instructed to make a left turn and to climb and maintain 1,500 feet. The aircraft climbed to 1,800 feet then descended to 1,400 feet. In rain falls, the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a wooded area located in Königstein im Taunus, about 15 km north of Frankfurt Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot was killed.

The pilot of a MiG 21 and the pilot of a Piper PA-42 Cheyenne III met just prior to the flight to discuss the flight in which the Cheyenne pilot would be taking aerial photos of the MiG. The two pilots established a minimum altitude of 2,500 to 3,000 feet agl and 200 knots as their minimum airspeed. The pilots did not establish a minimum separation distance, as it was not intended to be a formation flight. The MiG pilot reported that after takeoff the aircraft experienced a problem with the landing gear retraction. The pilot recycled the landing gear and a successful gear retraction was indicated. The MiG pilot notified the Cheyenne pilot of the situation and the Cheyenne pilot indicated that they would join up with the MiG, look it over and check-out the landing gear, and let the MiG pilot know what they saw. The MiG pilot flew at 9,000 feet msl in a 30-degree right hand turn at 200 knots (about 90 percent power set) with approach flaps selected (approximately 25 degrees) until the Cheyenne met up with the MiG. The MiG pilot reported that he observed the Cheyenne meet up with him at his 5 o'clock position about 300-400 feet behind him and about the same altitude. In this position, the Cheyenne was in the direct path of the high velocity jet core exhaust from the MiG. The MiG pilot looked forward and when he looked back, he could not see the Cheyenne. The Cheyenne pilot then contacted the MiG pilot and made a comment about the right landing gear or gear door, but the statement was not completed. The MiG pilot did not hear back from the Cheyenne pilot. The MiG pilot then observed smoke rising from the desert terrain and notified air traffic control. The airport manager that was monitoring the conversation between the two aircraft stated that he heard the Cheyenne pilot indicate that he would "drop down and go underneath and let you know how it looks." Wreckage documentation noted that the main wreckage was located in an inverted position on flat terrain. The T-tail, which consisted of the upper half of the vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, and elevator had separated in flight and was located about 1/2 mile south of the main wreckage. Inspection of the upper portion of the aft vertical spar displayed a right bend and twist at the point of separation. No evidence of pre-existing cracks, corrosion or wear was noted to the material. Inspection of the MiG aircraft found no evidence of contact between the two aircraft.

The crew was completing a positioning flight (RUS1050) from Leipzig to Zurich on behalf of FSH Luftfahrtunternehmen but under contract of Cirrus Aviation. On final approach to Zurich-Kloten Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions. Despite the RVR for runway 14 was estimated to be 275 metres (below minimums of 400 metres for a CAT II approach if aircraft and crew are qualified), the crew decided to continue the approach, descended below the MDA until the aircraft struck the ground between both runways 14 and 16. The aircraft rolled for few dozen metres then lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a frosty field. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the vertical visibility was 300 feet, the horizontal visibility was 200 metres with freezing fog, an OAT of -3° C and a dew point of -4° C.

The pilot said he was on the glide slope for an ILS approach. The pilot said, "The autopilot was coupled on to the approach. The autopilot also coupled on to the Glide slope. Approximately 2-1/2 to 3 miles out, we visually had approach lights and runway lights. I then disconnected the autopilot and yaw damper, and hand flew a visual approach using the glide slope indicator as a cross check for a correct glide path to the airport. Continuing visually on the approach, I checked the GS (glide slope) and it indicated we were slightly above glide path, but was corrected, and seconds later hit a pole going through electrical wires, coming to rest short of the approach lights and to the right." An examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies. An examination of the ILS approach to the runway showed the facility operated satisfactorily.