Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante in Cootamundra

Date & Time: Jun 25, 2001 at 1021 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-OZG
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sydney – Griffith
MSN:
110-241
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6850
Captain / Total hours on type:
253.00
Circumstances:
The Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante, VH-OZG, departed from Sydney Kingsford Smith international airport at 0855 on 25 June 2001, on a single-pilot instrument flight rules (IFR) charter flight to Griffith. The nine occupants on board the aircraft included the pilot and eight passengers. At about 0945, while maintaining an altitude of 10,000 ft, the master caution light illuminated. At the same time, the multiple alarm panel ‘GENERATOR 2’ (right generator) warning light also illuminated, indicating that the generator was no longer supplying power to the main electrical bus bar. After resetting the generator and monitoring its output, the pilot was satisfied that it was operating normally. A short time later, the master warning light illuminated again. A number of circuit breakers tripped, accompanied by multiple master alarm panel warnings. The red ‘FIRE’ warning light on the right engine fire extinguisher ‘T’ handle also illuminated, accompanied by the aural fire alarm warning. The pilot reported that after silencing the aural fire alarm, he carried out the engine fire emergency checklist actions. However, he was unable to select the fuel cut-off position with the right fuel condition lever, despite overriding the locking mechanism using his left thumb while attempting to operate the lever with his right hand. He also reported that the propeller lever did not remain in the feathered detent, but moved forward, as if spring-loaded, to an intermediate position. After unsuccessfully attempting to select fuel cut-off with the right fuel condition lever, or feather the right propeller with the propeller lever, the pilot pulled the right ‘T’ handle to discharge the fire bottle. The amber discharge light illuminated and a short time later the fire alarm sounded again. Passengers reported seeing lights illuminated on the multiple alarm panel and heard the sound of a continuous fire alarm in the cockpit. At 0956, the pilot notified air traffic services (ATS) that there was a ‘problem’ with the aircraft, but did not specify the nature of that problem. Almost immediately the pilot transmitted a PAN radio call and advised ATS that there was a fire on board the aircraft. The nearest aerodromes for an emergency landing were not available due to fog, and the pilot decided to divert to Young, which was about 35 NM to the south east of the aircraft’s position at that time. The pilot advised ATS that the fire was extinguished, and that he was diverting the aircraft to Young. Two minutes later, the pilot repeated his advice to ATS stating that a fire in the right engine had been extinguished, and requested emergency services for the aircraft’s arrival at Young. The pilot informed one of the passengers that there was an engine fire warning, and that they would be landing at Young. The passengers subsequently reported seeing flames in the right engine nacelle and white smoke streaming from under the wing. Smoke had also started to enter the cabin in the vicinity of the wing root. The pilot subsequently reported that he had selected the master switch on the air conditioning control panel to the ‘vent’ position, and that he had opened the left direct vision window in an attempt to eliminate smoke from the cabin. When that did not appear to have any effect he closed the direct vision window. The pilot of another aircraft reported to ATS that Young was clear, but there were fog patches to the north. On arrival at Young, however, the pilot of the Bandeirante was unable to land the aircraft because of fog, and advised ATS that he was proceeding to Cootamundra, 27 NM to the south southwest of Young. The crew of an overflying airliner informed ATS that Cootamundra was clear of fog. ATS confirmed that advice by telephoning an aircraft operator at Cootamundra aerodrome. At 1017 thick smoke entered the cabin and the pilot transmitted a MAYDAY. He reported that the aircraft was 9 NM from Cootamundra, and ATS informed him that the aerodrome was clear of fog. The pilot advised that he was flying in visual conditions and that there was a serious fire on board. No further radio transmissions were heard from the aircraft. At 1021, approximately 25 minutes after first reporting a fire, the pilot made an approach to land on runway 16 at Cootamundra. He reported that when he selected the landing gear down on late final there was no indication that the gear had extended. The pilot reported that he did not have sufficient time to extend the gear manually using the emergency procedure because he was anxious to get the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible. Unaware that the right main landing gear had extended the pilot advised the passengers to prepare for a ‘belly’ landing. He lowered full flap, selected the propeller levers to the feathered position and the condition levers to fuel cut-off. The aircraft landed with only the right main landing gear extended. The right main wheel touched down about 260 m beyond the runway threshold, about one metre from the right edge of the runway. During the landing roll the aircraft settled on the nose and the left engine nacelle and skidded for approximately 450 m before veering left off the bitumen. The soft grass surface swung the aircraft sharply left, and it came to a stop on the grass flight strip east of the runway, almost on a reciprocal heading. The pilot and passengers were uninjured, and vacated the aircraft through the cabin door and left overwing emergency exit. Personnel from a maintenance organisation at the aerodrome extinguished the fire in the right engine nacelle using portable fire extinguishers.
Probable cause:
Significant factors:
1. Vibration from the worn armature shaft of the right starter generator resulted in a fractured fuel return line.
2. The armature shaft of the right engine starter generator failed in-flight.
3. Sparks or frictional heat generated by the failed starter generator ignited the combustible fuel/air mixture in the right engine accessory compartment.
4. Items on the engine fire emergency checklist were not completed, and the fire was not suppressed.
5. The operator’s CASA approved emergency checklist did not contain smoke evacuation procedures.
6. The pilot did not attempt to extend the landing gear using the emergency gear extension when he did not to get a positive indication that the gear was down and locked.
7. The aircraft landed on the right main landing gear and slid to a stop on the right main gear, left engine nacelle and nose.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1K Bandeirante in Gabon: 3 killed

Date & Time: Dec 11, 2000
Operator:
Registration:
TR-KNA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Libreville - Tchibanga
MSN:
110-268
YOM:
1980
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances somewhere in Gabon while performing a flight from Libreville to Tchibanga. No trace of the aircraft nor the three occupants was found.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1A Bandeirante in Kaduna

Date & Time: Mar 17, 2000 at 1047 LT
Operator:
Registration:
5N-AXM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Abuja - Jos
MSN:
110-446
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8733
Captain / Total hours on type:
1008.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
200
Aircraft flight hours:
10926
Circumstances:
On the day of the accident, the aircraft was engaged in a charter operation for the Central Bank of Nigeria. The first segment of the flight (Lagos - Abuja) was flown by the Commander. The aircraft departed Lagos about 0630 hours UTC and initially at cruise, the crew had a momentary problem setting power on the starboard engine after which the flight continued normally to Abuja. The aircraft which departed Abuja for Jos at 0900 hours UTC had 6 souls on board, 5 hours endurance with the first officer at the controls. At FL 90 and about 30NM from Abuja, the crew again had problems with the cruise power setting on the starboard engine. The torque remained at 1400. The crew retarded the right power lever to the minimum with the aim of achieving a cruise setting of 1300 but the gear warning came on. The Commander at this stage took over the controls from the first officer. At 0923 hours UTC, the aircraft contacted Kaduna Tower that it would be diverting to Kaduna as against its scheduled destination giving its flight level as 90 at a distance of 61 miles and estimating TMA at 24 miles, 'KC' at 41 miles, 6 souls on board and 5 hours endurance at departure. The tower then gave the aircraft an inbound clearance to 'KC' locator maintaining FL 90 and to expect no delay for a locator approach runway 05. Weather report at 0900 hours UTC was also passed to the aircraft as wind 090/05 knots, QNH 1014 and temperature 30°c. At 0928 hours UTC the airplane at about 42 miles, speed between 150-160 kts, requested descent and was cleared to 4,500H, QNH 1014. At about 0935 hours UTC, the pilots contacted tower that they would make a single engine approach because they were having problems controlling power on the starboard engine and it would be shut down. The tower in response, asked whether they would need fire coverage on landing to which the pilots affirmed. The commander then reviewed the single engine approach with the first officer estimating 4,500 ft at 8NM. Approaching 4,500 ft at 11 NM, the crew initiated right engine shut down after which the speed was decayed from 150 to 140 kts. At 0946 hours UTC, the pilot reported 6nm final and field in sight while the tower requested hire to report 4 miles final. Shortly, the controller reported having the aircraft in sight and subsequently cleared it to land on runway 05 giving wind as north easterly 06 knots. Descending at 500ft/min, the commander requested for 25% of flap when the first officer selected full flap. Shortly, the speed started decaying and bleeding faster. When the aircraft was at 2,700 ft high, the speed had already decayed to between 100 - 110 kts. The crew applied full power on the port engine to arrest the speed decay but to no avail . The pilot was trying to correct the descent rate, speed decay and the asymmetry when the stall warning came on. At this juncture, all effort by the controller to establish further contact with the airplane proved abortive. Suddenly, the controller observed a gust of dust in the atmosphere which gave him an indication that the aircraft had crashed. The aircraft crashed into the new VOR/DME site being constructed about 1175m from the threshold of runway 05. Time of accident was 0947 hours UTC.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of this accident was the poor handling by the crew of the one-engine inoperative approach.
The following findings were identified:
- The aircraft was properly registered and certified in accordance with the Civil Aviation Regulations of Nigeria.
- The commander of the aircraft was certified and qualified to take the flight while the first officer did not have a licence on board on the clay of the accident. The licence had expired and yet to he renewed.
- The proficiency check attended by the GWW was Without some critical manoeuvres such as simulated single engine approach and stalls.
- The aircraft on departure from Abuja was to land at Jos but diverted to Kaduna.
- The crew informed Kaduna Control Tower that they were doing to make a single engine (port) approach since they were having problems controlling power of the starboard engine.
- The pilots did not adhere to the laid down procedures for a one-engine inoperative approach.
- Crew coordination was practically lacking in this flight.
- The Control Tower lost contact with the aircraft at about 4NM to the airfield.
- The Landing Configuration of the aircraft was full flaps, gear up with power only on the poet engine.
- The starboard engine propeller was not feathered.
- The aircraft crashed into the new VOR/DME site being constructed about Urn from the threshold of runway 05.
- The final resting position of the aircraft was about 68m from the first point of impact and almost turning 180° from its initial direction (flight path).
- There was power on the port engine as there was severe flexural damage to the propeller blades (tips chip off).
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P2 Bandeirante in Maputo: 1 killed

Date & Time: Feb 8, 2000 at 1007 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C9-AUH
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Maputo - Manzini
MSN:
110-186
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
16
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Maputo Airport in excellent weather conditions, the aircraft lost height and crashed onto several houses located in the 25th June district near the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all 18 occupants were rescued. Unfortunately, a woman in a house was killed. All passengers were students going back home.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante in Envira

Date & Time: Jan 31, 2000 at 1030 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PP-EAM
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tefé - Eirunepé
MSN:
110-498
YOM:
1990
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
17
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4800
Captain / Total hours on type:
4000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1600
Circumstances:
En route from Tefé to Eirunépé, weather conditions deteriorated and the crew decided to divert to the non controlled Envira Airport. Following a visual approach in heavy rain falls, the aircraft landed 500 metres past the runway threshold. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft encountered aquaplaning conditions and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest 100 metres further in a ravine. The captain was seriously injured, the copilot suffered minor injuries and all 16 passengers escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
The aircraft suffered aquaplaning after landing and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The operator authorized the crew to divert to an unapproved airport with an aircraft weighing more than the limits specified in the operations manual without performing adequate supervision in the execution of the flight;
- Deviations on part of the crew;
- Lack of Crew Resources Management;
- Lack of crew coordination and communication;
- Lack of crew instruction and training on part of the operator;
- Poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls;
- The runway surface was wet and the aircraft suffered aquaplaning;
- The aircraft was overloaded;
- The landing was completed with a tailwind component;
- The crew failed to perform the approach briefing according to published procedures.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1A Bandeirante in Abuja: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 5, 2000 at 1325 LT
Operator:
Registration:
5N-AXL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lagos - Abuja - Ilorin
MSN:
110-455
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
On final approach to Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport runway 22, the crew declared an emergency and reported smoke in the cockpit and cabin. Shortly later, the aircraft stalled and crashed 120 metres short of runway. A passenger and one people on the ground were killed while 12 other occupants were injured.