Douglas DC-10

Following an uneventful flight from Caracas, the crew started the descent to Buenos Aires-Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport but encountered poor weather conditions with ceiling down to 800 feet, heavy rain falls and windshear. The aircraft landed 750-800 metres past the runway threshold and was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 35 is 2,800 metres long). It overran and while contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest 180 metres further. All 123 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the runway surface was wet and the braking action was reduced.

At the time flight AA102 landed at DFW Airport, it was raining and there were numerous thunderstorms in the area. Shortly after touchdown on runway 17L, the pilot loss directional control when the airplane began to weathervane and the captain failed to use sufficient rudder control to regain the proper ground track. The airplane eventually departed the right side of the runway. At the time of landing the wind (a cross wind) was blowing at 15 knots with gusts approximately 5 knots above the steady wind speed. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and all 202 occupants were evacuated, among them 40 were injured, two seriously.

At 0552LT, the aircraft departed Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport on a charter flight to Faro. The flight had been delayed for 40 minutes due to n°2 engine reverser problems. After a flight of 2 hours and 17 minutes, the crew was cleared to descend to FL070. Shortly afterwards Faro Approach Control provided the crew with the following weather: wind 15°/18 knots; 2,500 metres visibility, thunderstorms with 3/8 clouds at 500 feet, 7/8 clouds at 2,300 feet and 1/8 cumulonimbus at 2,500 feet, OAT 16° C. Clearance to descend to 1,220 metres was given at 0820LT, followed by a clearance to 915 metres and 650 metres 4, respectively 6 minutes later. At 0829LT the crew were informed that the runway was flooded. At an altitude of 303 metres and at a speed of 140 knots, the aircraft became unstable and at 177 metres the first officer switched the autopilot from CMD (command mode) to CWS (control-wheel steering). One minute later it was switched from CWS to manual and the airspeed began falling below approach reference speed. About 3-4 seconds short of touchdown, elevator was pulled to pitch up and engine power was increased. When the n°3 and 5 spoilers extended, the aircraft banked to the right to an angle of 25°. The right main gear struck the the runway surface with a rate of descent of 900 feet per minute and at a speed of 126 knots. With a nose up attitude of 8,79° and a roll angle of 5,62°, the aircraft touched down with a positive acceleration of 1,95 g. Upon impact, the right wing separated while the aircraft slid down the runway and came to rest 1,100 metres from the runway 11 threshold and 100 metres to the right of the centreline, bursting into flames. Two crew members and 54 passengers were killed while 284 other occupants were evacuated, among them 106 were seriously injured.

The DC-10 departed N'Djamena Airport at 1313LT bound for Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport. Forty-six minutes later, while cruising at an altitude of 35,000 feet over Niger, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens and the crew did not send any distress call. It was quickly understood that the aircraft exploded in mid-air and crashed somewhere in the desert. SAR operations were initiated and the wreckage was found a day later in the Ténéré Desert, about 650 km north of N'Djamena, northeast from the Termit Mountain Range. Debris scattered on 100 km2 and none of the 170 occupants survived the crash.

The approach to Tripoli Intl Airport was completed in below weather minima as the visibility was varying between 100 and 800 feet and the ILS on runway 27 was unserviceable. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the roof of a house, stalled and crashed in a residential area located 2,4 km short of runway. Three crew members and 72 passengers were killed as well as six people on the ground. 124 people in the aircraft were injured as well as few dozen on the ground.

United Flight 232 departed Denver-Stapleton International Airport, Colorado, USA at 14:09 CDT for a domestic flight to Chicago-O'Hare, Illinois and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. There were 285 passengers and 11 crew members on board. The takeoff and the en route climb to the planned cruising altitude of FL370 were uneventful. The first officer was the flying pilot. About 1 hour and 7 minutes after takeoff, at 15:16, the flightcrew heard a loud bang or an explosion, followed by vibration and a shuddering of the airframe. After checking the engine instruments, the flightcrew determined that the No. 2 aft (tail-mounted) engine had failed. The captain called for the engine shutdown checklist. While performing the engine shutdown checklist, the flight engineer observed that the airplane's normal systems hydraulic pressure and quantity gauges indicated zero. The first officer advised that he could not control the airplane as it entered a right descending turn. The captain took control of the airplane and confirmed that it did not respond to flight control inputs. The captain reduced thrust on the No. 1 engine, and the airplane began to roll to a wings-level attitude. The flightcrew deployed the air driven generator (ADG), which powers the No. 1 auxiliary hydraulic pump, and the hydraulic pump was selected "on." This action did not restore hydraulic power. At 15:20, the flightcrew radioed the Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and requested emergency assistance and vectors to the nearest airport. Initially, Des Moines International Airport was suggested by ARTCC. At 15:22, the air traffic controller informed the flightcrew that they were proceeding in the direction of Sioux City; the controller asked the flightcrew if they would prefer to go to Sioux City. The flightcrew responded, "affirmative." They were then given vectors to the Sioux Gateway Airport (SUX) at Sioux City, Iowa. A UAL DC-10 training check airman, who was off duty and seated in a first class passenger seat, volunteered his assistance and was invited to the cockpit at about 15:29. At the request of the captain, the check airman entered the passenger cabin and performed a visual inspection of the airplane's wings. Upon his return, he reported that the inboard ailerons were slightly up, not damaged, and that the spoilers were locked down. There was no movement of the primary flight control surfaces. The captain then directed the check airman to take control of the throttles to free the captain and first officer to manipulate the flight controls. The check airman attempted to use engine power to control pitch and roll. He said that the airplane had a continuous tendency to turn right, making it difficult to maintain a stable pitch attitude. He also advised that the No. 1 and No. 3 engine thrust levers could not be used symmetrically, so he used two hands to manipulate the two throttles. About 15:42, the flight engineer was sent to the passenger cabin to inspect the empennage visually. Upon his return, he reported that he observed damage to the right and left horizontal stabilizers. Fuel was jettisoned to the level of the automatic system cutoff, leaving 33,500 pounds. About 11 minutes before landing, the landing gear was extended by means of the alternate gear extension procedure. The flightcrew said that they made visual contact with the airport about 9 miles out. ATC had intended for flight 232 to attempt to land on runway 31, which was 8,999 feet long. However, ATC advised that the airplane was on approach to runway 22, which was closed, and that the length of this runway was 6,600 feet. Given the airplane's position and the difficulty in making left turns, the captain elected to continue the approach to runway 22 rather than to attempt maneuvering to runway 31. The check airman said that he believed the airplane was lined up and on a normal glidepath to the field. The flaps and slats remained retracted. During the final approach, the captain recalled getting a high sink rate alarm from the ground proximity warning system (GPWS). In the last 20 seconds before touchdown, the airspeed averaged 215 KIAS, and the sink rate was 1,620 feet per minute. Smooth oscillations in pitch and roll continued until just before touchdown when the right wing dropped rapidly. The captain stated that about 100 feet above the ground the nose of the airplane began to pitch downward. He also felt the right wing drop down about the same time. Both the captain and the first officer called for reduced power on short final approach. The check airman said that based on experience with no flap/no slat approaches he knew that power would have to be used to control the airplane's descent. He used the first officer's airspeed indicator and visual cues to determine the flightpath and the need for power changes. He thought that the airplane was fairly well aligned with the runway during the latter stages of the approach and that they would reach the runway. Soon thereafter, he observed that the airplane was positioned to the left of the desired landing area and descending at a high rate. He also observed that the right wing began to drop. He continued to manipulate the No. 1 and No. 3 engine throttles until the airplane contacted the ground. He said that no steady application of power was used on the approach and that the power was constantly changing. He believed that he added power just before contacting the ground. The airplane touched down on the threshold slightly to the left of the centerline on runway 22 at 16:00. First ground contact was made by the right wing tip followed by the right main landing gear. The airplane skidded to the right of the runway and rolled to an inverted position. Witnesses observed the airplane ignite and cartwheel, coming to rest after crossing runway 17/35. Firefighting and rescue operations began immediately, but the airplane was destroyed by impact and fire. The accident resulted in 111 fatal, 47 serious, and 125 minor injuries. The remaining 13 occupants were not injured.

A rejected takeoff was attempted when the slat disagree light illuminated and the takeoff warning horn sounded at 166 knots (V1). The pilot aborted the takeoff, but the aircraft accelerated to 178 knots ground speed before it began to decelerate. The deceleration was normal until 130 knots where an unexpected rapid decay in the deceleration occurred. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway at 95 knots, the nose gear collapsed, and the aircraft came to a stop 1,100 feet beyond the end of the runway. Eight of the ten brake sets failed. Post-accident exam of the brakes revealed that excessive brake wear occurred during the rejected takeoff. Testing showed that dc-10 worn brakes have a much greater wear rate during an rto. The faa does not require worn brake testing. Douglas did not use brake wear data from rto certification tests to set more conservative brake wear replacement limits. New brakes were used for those tests. All 254 occupants were evacuated, among them eight were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.