Douglas DC-10

The airplane was at FL 330 when the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to Newburgh/Stewart International Airport and landed. The airplane was destroyed by fire after landing. The fire had burned for about 4 hours after after smoke was first detected. Investigation revealed that the deepest and most severe heat and fire damage occurred in and around container 06R, which contained a DNA synthesizer containing flammable liquids. More of 06R's structure was consumed than of any other container, and it was the only container that exhibited severe floor damage. Further, 06R was the only container to exhibit heat damage on its bottom surface, and the area below container 06R showed the most extensive evidence of scorching of the composite flooring material. However, there was insufficient reliable evidence to reach a conclusion as to where the fire originated. The presence of flammable chemicals in the DNA synthesizer was wholly unintended and unknown to the preparer of the package and shipper. The captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to call for checklists or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required checklist items. The Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations do not adequately address the need for hazardous materials information on file at a carrier to be quickly retrievable in a format useful to emergency responders.

During the takeoff roll at Fukuoka-Itazuke Airport runway 16, at a speed of 158 knots, the captain started the rotation. During initial climb, at a height of about 3 metres, the right engine suffered a loss of power after a fan blade located on the 1st stage of the high pressure compressor disk separated. The N1 dropped to 23,7% and five seconds later, the flight engineer informed the crew about the failure of the engine n°1. The captain decided to abort the takeoff and landed back on runway. The aircraft contacted ground with a vertical acceleration of 2,1 g then thrust reversers were deployed and ground spoilers were extended. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, crossed a road, skidded for about 620 metres before coming to rest in an open field, bursting into flames. Three passengers were killed.

Following an uneventful flight from Caracas, the crew started the descent to Buenos Aires-Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport but encountered poor weather conditions with ceiling down to 800 feet, heavy rain falls and windshear. The aircraft landed 750-800 metres past the runway threshold and was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 35 is 2,800 metres long). It overran and while contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest 180 metres further. All 123 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the runway surface was wet and the braking action was reduced.

At the time flight AA102 landed at DFW Airport, it was raining and there were numerous thunderstorms in the area. Shortly after touchdown on runway 17L, the pilot loss directional control when the airplane began to weathervane and the captain failed to use sufficient rudder control to regain the proper ground track. The airplane eventually departed the right side of the runway. At the time of landing the wind (a cross wind) was blowing at 15 knots with gusts approximately 5 knots above the steady wind speed. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and all 202 occupants were evacuated, among them 40 were injured, two seriously.

At 0552LT, the aircraft departed Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport on a charter flight to Faro. The flight had been delayed for 40 minutes due to n°2 engine reverser problems. After a flight of 2 hours and 17 minutes, the crew was cleared to descend to FL070. Shortly afterwards Faro Approach Control provided the crew with the following weather: wind 15°/18 knots; 2,500 metres visibility, thunderstorms with 3/8 clouds at 500 feet, 7/8 clouds at 2,300 feet and 1/8 cumulonimbus at 2,500 feet, OAT 16° C. Clearance to descend to 1,220 metres was given at 0820LT, followed by a clearance to 915 metres and 650 metres 4, respectively 6 minutes later. At 0829LT the crew were informed that the runway was flooded. At an altitude of 303 metres and at a speed of 140 knots, the aircraft became unstable and at 177 metres the first officer switched the autopilot from CMD (command mode) to CWS (control-wheel steering). One minute later it was switched from CWS to manual and the airspeed began falling below approach reference speed. About 3-4 seconds short of touchdown, elevator was pulled to pitch up and engine power was increased. When the n°3 and 5 spoilers extended, the aircraft banked to the right to an angle of 25°. The right main gear struck the the runway surface with a rate of descent of 900 feet per minute and at a speed of 126 knots. With a nose up attitude of 8,79° and a roll angle of 5,62°, the aircraft touched down with a positive acceleration of 1,95 g. Upon impact, the right wing separated while the aircraft slid down the runway and came to rest 1,100 metres from the runway 11 threshold and 100 metres to the right of the centreline, bursting into flames. Two crew members and 54 passengers were killed while 284 other occupants were evacuated, among them 106 were seriously injured.

The DC-10 departed N'Djamena Airport at 1313LT bound for Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport. Forty-six minutes later, while cruising at an altitude of 35,000 feet over Niger, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens and the crew did not send any distress call. It was quickly understood that the aircraft exploded in mid-air and crashed somewhere in the desert. SAR operations were initiated and the wreckage was found a day later in the Ténéré Desert, about 650 km north of N'Djamena, northeast from the Termit Mountain Range. Debris scattered on 100 km2 and none of the 170 occupants survived the crash.

The approach to Tripoli Intl Airport was completed in below weather minima as the visibility was varying between 100 and 800 feet and the ILS on runway 27 was unserviceable. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the roof of a house, stalled and crashed in a residential area located 2,4 km short of runway. Three crew members and 72 passengers were killed as well as six people on the ground. 124 people in the aircraft were injured as well as few dozen on the ground.