Cessna 401

The pilot, sole on board, departed Tapachula Airport on a local flight to release Mediterranean flies. A flight plan of four hours was filed, with an altitude of 9,500 feet. The flies should be released in an area corresponding to 60 - 100 NM around the Tapachula VOR. Shortly after takeoff from Tapachula Airport Runway 05, while climbing to an altitude of 1,000 feet, the pilot reported engine problems. The aircraft turned to the right then entered an uncontrolled descent until it crashed in a mango plantation. The airplane was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

After departing runway 23 at Hermosillo-General Ignacio Pesqueira Garcia Airport, the twin engine aircraft entered a slight turn to the right but encountered difficulties to gain height. It struck power cables and crashed in a field located about 7 km west of the airport, bursting into flames. Three passengers were seriously injured while four other occupants including the pilot were killed. Few hours later, two of the three survivors died from their injuries. The undersecretary of Economic Development of Sonora Leonardo Ciscomani seems to be the only survivor.

The pilot, sole on board, departed Tapachula Airport in the early morning. In unknown circumstances, the twin engine aircraft crashed in a prairie located near an agricultural sector in Comitán de Domínguez. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was injured.

At 1541 hrs, the airplane took off from Marl-Lohmühle Airfield with the pilot and 2 passengers on board to a VFR flight to Arnsberg-Menden Airfield which is located approximately 30 NM to the south-east. One of the passengers was seated in the right-hand seat next to the pilot and the other in the passenger seat behind the pilot. The radar recording of the air navigation service provider showed that the airplane climbed up to 2,200 ft AMSL. Ten minutes after take-off, the pilot established radio contact with Dortmund Tower with the request to cross Dortmund Airport control zone via the reporting point WHISKEY towards reporting point ECHO on his way to Arnsberg. At 1552:14 hrs, the tower controller answered: “[…] melden Sie WHISKEY und dann erwarten Sie Durchflug nach Arnsberg oder ECHO, wie Sie möchten, QNH eins null null eins (report WHISKEY and then expect cross flight to Arnsberg or ECHO, as you like, QNH one zero zero one)“. The pilot confirmed QNH and approach point. At 1555:22 hrs, the pilot reported having reached reporting point WHISKEY at 2,200 ft AMSL. The controller approved the flight through the control zone towards the south. The GPS and radar data showed that at 1556 hrs, the airplane turned tight towards 120° to a direct heading to Arnsberg. At 1559 hrs, as the airplane had left the control zone the controller issued the clearance to leave Tower frequency. At 1600 hrs, about 2.5 NM west of the destination aerodrome, the airplane turned left towards the east. About one minute later the airplane intersected the extended runway centre line of runway 23 at a distance of 0.7 NM from the threshold with an eastern heading. At the time, ground speed was approximately 150 kt. At 1601:39 hrs, the airplane turned left towards the final approach of runway 23. At 1602 hrs, about 1 NM from the threshold of runway 23 at about 1,500 ft AMSL, the airplane reached the extended runway centre line. The Flugleiter (A person required by German regulation at uncontrolled aerodromes to provide aerodrome information service to pilots.) stated that during final approach flaps and landing gear of the airplane had been extended. The approach looked normal. For a short time he had no longer observed the airplane because he had made some entries in the computer. His colleague had then addressed him and drew his attention to the speed of the airplane. The Flugleiter saw that the airplane had an upward large pitch angle, then plunged and disappeared from his sight. The airplane impacted the ground and the 3 occupants suffered severe injuries. The Flugleiter stated he had tried in vain to contact the pilot twice and then raised the alarm. His colleague and other first aiders had driven to the accident site immediately.

The twin engine aircraft departed Puerto Plata-Gregorio Luperón Airport at 1718LT on a flight to Santa Cruz de Barahona. En route, the pilot was informed that this airport is closed to all traffic after 1700LT and decided to return to Puerto Plata. A last radio communication was recorded with ATC when the aircraft disappeared from radar screens eight minutes later. Dominican authorities thought the aircraft may have crashed in the septentrional mountain range and SAR operations were initiated. Few hours later, the wreckage was found in a marshy area of the Lake Maracaibo, more than 1,000 km south of Puerto Plata. All three occupants were found alive and arrested while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Venezuelan authorities reported the aircraft and its occupants were engaged in an illegal narcotic flight.

En route from Durango to Acapulco, the twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in the Infiernillo River, in the region of Las Juntas. The wreckage was found inverted and partially submerged in water. All six occupants were killed.

Few minutes after takeoff from Pelagiada, the pilot informed ATC about the failure of the right engine while the left engine lost power. The pilot completed an emergency belly landing in an open field located near Pelagiada, about 20 km north of Stavropol. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and the pilot escaped uninjured.

The commercial pilot and passenger departed on a local flight in the twin-engine airplane. According to a witness, the pilot took off from the private grass runway and departed the area for about 10 minutes. The airplane then returned to the airport, where the pilot performed a low pass over the runway and entered a steep climb followed by a roll. The airplane entered a nose-low descent, then briefly leveled off in an upright attitude before disappearing behind trees and subsequently impacting terrain. The pilot's toxicology testing was positive for ethanol with 0.185 gm/dl and 0.210 gm/dl in urine and cavity blood samples, respectively. The effects of ethanol are generally well understood; it significantly impairs pilot performance, even at very low levels. Federal Aviation Administration regulations prohibit any person from acting or attempting to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft while having 0.040 gm/dl or more ethanol in the blood. While the identified ethanol may have come from sources other than ingestion, such as postmortem production, the possibility that the source of some of the ethanol was from ingestion and that pilot was impaired by the effects of ethanol during the accident flight could not be ruled out. Toxicology also identified a significant amount of diphenhydramine in cavity blood (0.122 µg/ml, which is within or above the therapeutic range of 0.0250 to 0.1120 µg/ml; diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, and central postmortem levels may be about two to three times higher than peripheral or antemortem levels.). Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine that causes more sedation than other antihistamines; this is the rationale for its use as a sleep aid. In a driving simulator study, a single dose of diphenhydramine impaired driving ability more than a blood alcohol concentration of 0.100%. The pilot had been diagnosed with memory loss about 8 months before the accident. It appears that he had some degree of mild cognitive impairment, but whether his cognitive impairment was severe enough to have contributed to the accident could not be determined from the available evidence. However, it is likely that the pilot's mild cognitive impairment combined with the psychoactive effects of diphenhydramine and possibly ethanol would have further decreased his cognitive functioning and contributed to his decision to attempt an aerobatic maneuver at low altitude in a non-aerobatic airplane.

The private pilot reported that, immediately after takeoff in the multi-engine airplane, the right engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot aborted the takeoff; the airplane exited the end of the runway surface, impacted rough terrain, and came to rest upright. Examination of the right engine showed that the magneto distributor drive gears were not turning. Both damaged magnetos were removed and replaced with a slave set of magnetos. The right engine was installed in an engine test cell, and subsequently started and performed normally throughout the test cell procedure. The damaged magnetos from the right engine were disassembled. Both nylon magneto distributor gears exhibited missing gear teeth and brown discoloration. A review of maintenance records showed that the right engine had been operated for about 8 years and an estimated 697 hours since the most recent magneto overhauls had been completed. According to maintenance instructions from the engine manufacturer, the magnetos should be inspected every 500 hours and should be overhauled or replaced at the expiration of five years since the last overhaul. Guidance also indicated that discoloration of the drive gear is an indication that the gear had been exposed to extreme heat and should be replaced.