Surrey

The accident occurred as the aircraft was preparing to land at Fairoaks Airport at the end of a private flight from Ronaldsway Airport on the Isle of Man. On board were the aircraft commander and a passenger who occupied the front right seat. As the aircraft neared Fairoaks, the pilot listened to the Farnborough ATIS broadcast, which reported a visibility of 4,000 m in mist. He and the passenger discussed the visibility, and agreed that they would proceed to Fairoaks while retaining the option to divert to Farnborough Airport (9 nm to the south-west) if a landing was not possible. The visibility at Fairoaks was recorded as 4,500 m, with ‘few’ clouds at 4,000 ft and a surface wind of 3 kt from 240°. Runway 24 was in use with a left-hand circuit. The circuit height, based on the Fairoaks QNH was 1,100 ft (the elevation of Fairoaks Airport is 80 ft amsl). Runway 24 is a hard runway, 813 m long and 27 m wide. The pilot identified the airfield visually, although there was low lying mist in the area. In order to maintain visual contact with the landing area he joined the circuit and flew a downwind leg that was closer to the runway than usual. He recalled carrying out the pre-landing checks while downwind, including lowering the landing gear and extending the flaps to the takeoff position2 . Based on a final approach with flaps at the landing setting, the pilot planned for an initial approach speed of 90 kt, reducing to a final approach speed of 80 kt. The pilot recalled the aircraft being slightly low as it turned from the downwind leg onto its final approach track. He believed he had selected flaps to the landing position, and recalled seeing the airspeed just below 90 kt, which prompted him to increase power slightly. The aircraft flew through the extended runway centreline and the pilot increased the bank angle to regain it. The pilot’s next recollection was of being in a right bank and seeing only sky ahead. He pushed forward on the control column and attempted to correct the bank with aileron. The aircraft then rolled quickly in the opposite direction and he again applied a correction. He became aware of being in an approximately wings-level attitude and seeing the ground approaching rapidly. He responded by pulling back hard on the control column, but was unable to prevent the aircraft striking the ground. He did not recall hearing a stall warning, or any other audio warning, before the loss of control occurred. The aircraft struck flat ground and slid for about 85 m before coming to rest against a treeline, about 500 m from Runway 24 and approximately on the extended centreline. The propeller was destroyed in the accident sequence and the landing gear legs detached, causing damage to the wings which included a ruptured fuel tank. In the latter stages of the slide the aircraft yawed right, coming to rest heading approximately in the direction from which it had come. The pilot and passenger remained conscious but had both suffered injury. The passenger saw flames from the region of the engine and warned the pilot that they needed to evacuate. He went to the rear of the cabin, opened the main door and left the aircraft. The pilot initially attempted to open his side door, but his right arm was injured and he was unable to open the door with only his left. He therefore followed the passenger out of the rear door.

The crew left Sheffield in VP-CKM at 0622 hrs for their flight planned destination of Fairoaks with London Heathrow Airport as an alternate. By 0650 hrs they were in contact with the Aerodrome Flight Information Service Officer (AFISO) at Fairoaks but the AFISO advised the crew not to land until the normal operating time at 0700 hrs when the airfield would have fire cover available. The current weather was reported to the crew by the AFISO as follows: Sky clear; mist with a visibility of 1,200 metres; surface wind 060° less than 5 kt; QNH 1002 mb and QFE 1005 mb. The commander, who was the handling pilot, approached the airfield on a track of 060° using the Fairoaks Non-directional Radio Beacon (NDB) and the aircraft's Flight Management System (FMS), and descended to 1,000 feet agl with the intention of landing on Runway 06. However, neither pilot saw the airfield until they were overhead and, in agreement with the AFISO, decided to make an approach to Runway 24 because of better visibility in that direction. The AFISO switched on the Abbreviated Precision Approach Path Indicators (APAPIs) for Runway 24 and the commander flew a tear drop pattern to the east of the airfield and then established the aircraft on a track of 240° towards the airfield. During the pattern, the gear had been selected down and the flaps set to an intermediate position. At 1.8 nm DME range, the co-pilot saw the APAPIs slightly left of the aircraft nose and pointed them out to the commander; at the time, the co-pilot recalled that the APAPIs were showing 'two whites', the aircraft was at 1,000 feet agl and at 124 kt IAS. By now, the crew had been advised to land at their discretion with the wind calm. Subsequently, full flap was selected and the commander noted his speed on short finals as 104 kt. As VP-CKM approached the threshold, the commander called for the deployment of speedbrakes; as the co-pilot deployed the speedbrakes, he noted the DME range as 0.5 nm and that the FMS indicated a tailwind of 5 kt. The commander considered that touchdown was positive and just beyond the threshold; the co-pilot considered that touchdown was just past the APAPIs. Immediately after touchdown, the commander selected full thrust reverse on both engines and applied moderate wheel braking. Initially, he considered that the retardation seemed adequate but then seemed to reduce. The co-pilot was not aware of retardation and remembered applying maximum brake pedal pressure while noticing that the runway was damp and seemed "shiny". When he realised that he could not stop the aircraft before the end of the runway, the commander stowed the thrust reversers and attempted to close down the engines. During the later part of the landing run, the co-pilot heard a call of "going round" and saw the commander stow the thrust reversers. After leaving the runway, the aircraft travelled for 250 metres before coming to rest. The passenger evacuated through the cabin escape hatch and the co-pilot followed him after an unsuccessful attempt to open the normal cabin door. The co-pilot was then able to open the cabin door from the outside and assist the commander to leave. The commander had sustained back injuries and the copilot had received some cuts and bruises.

The pilot departed Stapleford on a positioning flight to Southampton. He was due to pick up passengers at Southampton and fly to Cambridge where more passengers were to be collected; from Cambridge he would fly to Berlin. Heathrow Approach frequency was fairly busy but by 0653LT, G-SEAS had been identified, and been cleared direct to Ockham not above 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 mb; this clearance was acknowledged by the pilot. The radar recording confirmed the track of STL819 to Ockham and from there the aircraft made a gentle turn onto a track of approximately 185°T; all three radars confirmed the aircraft speed as approximately 160 knots and at a level altitude of 1,500 feet amsl until a few seconds before 0705LT. At that point the aircraft started a high rate of descent with increasing speed but maintaining a fairly constant southerly track. Radar contact was lost 2.6 seconds after 0705LT. The last radar contact was within 250 metres of the crash site and at that point the aircraft was at 1,000 feet amsl, the crash site is approximately 400 feet amsl.

The HS-125-600B jet aircraft was making a demonstration flight at Dunsfold and took-off on runway 07 at 1611 hrs with two pilots and seven passengers on board. Until the aircraft started its takeoff run no birds had been noticed which could have been a hazard to the aircraft but nevertheless, in accordance with normal bird strike precautionary procedures, the aircraft took-off with its landing lights as well as strobe and navigation lights on. At the moment the aircraft started to roll eye-witnesses saw a large flock of birds rise from the grass verge north of and towards the eastern end of the runway, apparently having been disturbed by an incoming Harrier aircraft as it taxied west along the perimeter track after landing. This track lies about 120 metres north of and parallel to the runway at this point. These birds rose into the air in a fairly dense formation and wheeled south across the runway just as the HS-125 became airborne. Other witnesses noticed a second bird flock rise from the centre of the aerodrome at the same time and fly north. The aircraft became airborne shortly before the halfway point of the runway and the commander had just reduced power from 100% to between 98 and 96% and ordered the undercarriage raised when the aircraft, then at a height of 50 to 100 feet and a speed of approximately 150 knots, met either or both of the bird flocks. The commander heard and felt a series of bangs as birds hit the aircraft. The ground witnesses describe hearing the engines at high power prior to the aircraft encountering the birds, and then hearing a succession of noises (between one to three), variously described as a muffled explosion, bang, thump, boom or whoof followed by the cessation of the high power engine noise. At the same time balls of flame, lasting between one to three seconds, appeared at the rear of each engine. Some witnesses also saw birds falling away from the aircraft, and after the accident the remains of 11 dead birds identified as Lapwings (Vanellus vanellus) were found at a point about 1,170 metres from the commencement of the runway, i.e. a little over half way. The largest of the dead birds weighed 303g and had a wingspan of 61cm. Although neither pilot noticed any instrument indications following the bird strike the commander sensed an immediate decrease in acceleration which he considered was due to a complete loss of power on both engines; he also thought that some of the bangs were caused by the engines surging. He therefore decreased the climb attitude to maintain flying speed, partially reduced the throttle setting, and then re-opened to full throttle, but as far as he was aware there was no increase in thrust from either engine. He therefore decided to make a forced landing straight ahead and called for the undercarriage to be extended and for full flaps; simultaneously he closed the throttles and lowered the nose of the aircraft to assume the appropriate attitude for an approach to land. The aircraft touched down on the mainwheels about 180 metres before the end of the runway at a speed the commander estimated as approximately 120 knots; after lowering the nosewheel onto the ground he applied full wheel brakes which he maintained throughout the whole of the landing run. The aircraft overran the end of the runway and continued in a straight line across grass fields and through hedges before striking a ditch on the west side of the A281 road, about 285 metres beyond the end of the runway; the impact with the ditch ruptured and initiated the detachment of the entire undercarriage. The aircraft then bounced across the road at an estimated speed of 85 knots and in so doing struck and demolished a passing private Ford Cortina motor car; all six occupants of the car were killed. The aircraft continued on it underside for about 150 metres across a field on the far side of the road. Shortly before it came to a stop the commander closed the high pressure fuel cocks. Noticing light behind him the commander assumed the aircraft was on fire and ordered an immediate evacuation; the forward entry door was opened when the aircraft came to a stop and all nine occupants safely evacuated it before the fire spread.

The crew was engaged in a local test flight at Wisley Airport. After a 2,5 hours flight, the instructor gave his seat to the copilot to carry out 2 familiarisation circuits and landings. On final approach, the airplane was slightly below the glide and struck the ground in a slight nose-down attitude, bounced to a height of 20 feet then struck the runway surface a second time. It bounced to a height of 50 feet then the nose gear struck the ground first and collapsed. Out of control the airplane skidded on runway, lost its right main gear and came to rest. All five crew members were uninjured while the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was advised that the western part of the aerodrome was waterlogged and so landed the aircraft close to the eastern boundary. On touchdown the starboard main wheel sank into soft ground and the undercarriage leg collapsed. All three occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following a major overhaul, the crew (pilots and engineers) left London-Heathrow Airport in the morning for a post-maintenance check flight. Ten minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 1,000 feet, the right wing failed and detached. Out of control, the airplane dove into the ground and crashed in a field located in Frimley. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all six occupants were killed.

The crew (two pilots and seven engineers of Handley Page) departed Woodley Airport to take part to the Farnborough Airshow. Enroute, the right engine caught fire. The crew decided to reduce his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in a field located in Godalming. The airplane crash landed in a field and came to rest in flames. While all nine occupants were able to evacuate the cabin, the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Few minutes after takeoff from Croydon, while on a local training flight, the crew encountered poor weather conditions. Apparently, the pilot reduced his altitude in an attempt to establish a visual contact with the ground when the airplane clip trees and crashed in a wooded area located in Titsey Hill, about 7 miles southeast of Croydon Airport. Two crew members were rescued while two others were killed, among them S/Ldr Archibald Reginald Gerald Jackson.

The aircraft suffered an undercarriage failure while taxiing at RAF Fairoaks. There were no casualties but the aircraft was not repaired.