Pennsylvania

On May 21, 2000, about 1128 eastern daylight time (EDT), a British Aerospace Jetstream 3101, N16EJ, operated by East Coast Aviation Services (doing business as Executive Airlines) crashed
about 11 miles south of Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP), Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a post crash fire, and 17 passengers and two flight crewmembers were killed. The flight was being conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight for Caesar’s Palace Casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight from Atlantic City International Airport (ACY) to AVP. The captain checked in for duty about 0800 at Republic Airport (FRG) in Farmingdale, New York, on the day of the accident. The airplane was originally scheduled to depart FRG at 0900 for ACY and to remain in ACY until 1900, when it was scheduled to return to FRG. While the pilots were conducting preflight inspections, they received a telephone call from Executive Airlines’ owner and chief executive officer (CEO) advising them that they had been assigned an additional flight from ACY to AVP with a return flight to ACY later in the day, instead of the scheduled break in ACY. Fuel records at FRG indicated that 90 gallons of fuel were added to the accident airplane’s tanks before departure to ACY. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) records, the flight departed at 0921 (with 12 passengers on board) and arrived in ACY at 0949. According to passenger statements, the captain was the pilot flying from FRG to ACY. After arrival in ACY, the flight crew checked the weather for AVP and filed an IFR flight plan. Fuel facility records at ACY indicated that no additional fuel was added. The accident flight to AVP, which departed ACY about 1030, had been chartered by Caesar’s Palace. According to ATC records, the flight to AVP was never cleared to fly above 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl). According to ATC transcripts, the pilots first contacted AVP approach controllers at 1057 and were vectored for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 4. The flight was cleared for approach at 1102:07, and the approach controller advised the pilots that they were 5 nautical miles (nm) from Crystal Lake, which is the initial approach fix (IAF) for the ILS approach to runway 4. The pilots were told to maintain 4,000 feet until established on the localizer. At 1104:16, the approach controller advised that a “previous landing…aircraft picked up the airport at minimums [decision altitude].” The pilots were instructed to contact the AVP local (tower) controller at 1105:09, which they did 3 seconds later. The airplane then descended to about 2,200 feet, flew level at 2,200 feet for about 20 seconds, and began to climb again about 2.2 nm from the runway threshold when a missed approach was executed (see the Airplane Performance section for more information). At 1107:26 the captain reported executing the missed approach but provided no explanation to air traffic controllers. The tower controller informed the North Radar approach controllers of the missed approach and then instructed the accident flight crew to fly runway heading, climb to 4,000 feet, and contact approach control on frequency 124.5 (the procedure published on the approach chart). The pilots reestablished contact with the approach controllers at 1108:04 as they climbed through 3,500 feet to 4,000 feet and requested another ILS approach to runway 4. The flight was vectored for another ILS approach, and at 1110:07 the approach controller advised the pilots of traffic 2 nm miles away at 5,000 feet. The captain responded that they were in the clouds. At 1014:38, the controller directed the pilots to reduce speed to follow a Cessna 172 on approach to the airport, and the captain responded, “ok we’re slowing.” The flight was cleared for a second approach at 1120:45 and advised to maintain 4,000 feet until the airplane was established on the localizer. At 1123:49 the captain transmitted, “for uh one six echo juliet we’d like to declare an emergency.” At 1123:53, the approach controller asked the nature of the problem, and the captain responded, “engine failure.” The approach controller acknowledged the information, informed the pilots that the airplane appeared to be south of the localizer (off course to the right), and asked if they wanted a vector back to the localizer course. The flight crew accepted, and at 1124:10 the controller directed a left turn to heading 010, which the captain acknowledged. At 1124:33, the controller asked for verification that the airplane was turning left. The captain responded, “we’re trying six echo juliet.” At 1124:38, the controller asked if a right turn would be better. The captain asked the controller to “stand by.” At 1125:07, the controller advised the pilots that the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) in the area was 3,300 feet. At 1125:12, the captain transmitted, “standby for six echo juliet tell them we lost both engines for six echo juliet.” At that time, ATC radar data indicated that the airplane was descending through 3,000 feet. The controller immediately issued the weather conditions in the vicinity of the airport and informed the flight crew about the location of nearby highways. At 1126:17, the captain asked, “how’s the altitude look for where we’re at.” The controller responded that he was not showing an altitude readout from the airplane and issued the visibility (2.5 miles) and altimeter setting. At 1126:43, the captain transmitted, “just give us a vector back to the airport please.” The controller cleared the accident flight to fly heading 340, advised the flight crew that radar contact was lost, and asked the pilots to verify their altitude. The captain responded that they were “level at 2,000.” At 1126:54, the controller again advised the flight crew of the 3,300-foot MVA and suggested a 330° heading to bring the airplane back to the localizer. At 1127:14 the controller asked, “do you have any engines,” and the captain responded that they appeared to have gotten back “the left engine now.” At 1127:23, the controller informed the pilots that he saw them on radar at 2,000 feet and that there was a ridgeline between them and the airport. The captain responded, “that’s us” and “we’re at 2,000 feet over the trees.” The controller instructed the pilots to fly a 360° heading and advised them of high antennas about 2 nm west of their position. At 1127:46, the captain transmitted, “we’re losing both engines.” Two seconds later the controller advised that the Pennsylvania Turnpike was right below the airplane and instructed the flight crew to “let me know if you can get your engines back.” There was no further radio contact with the accident airplane. The ATC supervisor initiated emergency notification procedures. A Pennsylvania State Police helicopter located the wreckage about 1236, and emergency rescue units arrived at the accident site about 1306. The accident occurred in daylight instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The location of the accident was 41° 9 minutes, 23 seconds north latitude, 75° 45 minutes, 53 seconds west longitude, about 11 miles south of the airport at an elevation of 1,755 feet msl.

While operating in IMC, the pilot was vectored to the final approach course for an ILS approach. Weather at the airport was ceiling 200 feet and visibility 3/4 mile in mist. The pilot was cleared for the approach, which he acknowledged. No other transmissions were received from the accident airplane. Radar data showed the airplane intercept the final approach course, then track inbound. The airplane crossed the outer marker 420 feet below the glide slope. The last radar return showed the airplane at 440 feet agl, 3.9 miles from the runway. The airplane impacted the ground at a shallow angle about 1 mile north of the airport on the opposite side of the missed approach procedure. The elevation of the accident site was approximately 40 feet lower than the airport. The pilot had about 350 hours of total flight
experience. No pre-impact failures were identified with the airframe, engines, flight controls, or flight instruments.

After a 5-hour flight, the Westwind jet began its descent to the airport. Air traffic control instructed the flight crew to cross a VOR at 18,000 feet. The flight crew was then instructed to cross an intersection at 6,000 feet. The flight crew needed to descend the airplane 12,000 feet, in 36 nautical miles, to make the crossing restriction. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance, and no further transmissions were received from the airplane. The airplane struck treetops and impacted the ground in a wooded area. The accident flight was the airplane's first flight after maintenance. Work that was accomplished during the maintenance included disassembly and reassembly of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator. Examination of the actuator at the accident site revealed that components of the actuator were separated and that they displayed no damage where they would have been attached. Examination of the actuator by the Safety Board revealed that the actuator had not been properly assembled in the airplane. A similar actuator was improperly assembled and installed in a static airplane for a ground test. When the actuator was run, the jackscrews of the actuator were observed backing out of the rod end caps within the first few actuations of the pitch trim toward the nose-down position. As the pitch trim continued to be actuated toward the nose-down position, the jackscrews became disconnected from the rod end caps, and the horizontal stabilizer became disconnected from the actuator. The passenger was Peter Lahaye, founder and owner of the Lahaye Laboratories and the aircraft.

The airplane departed at night after maintenance was performed on the left engine. The pilot attempted to return to the airport and while on base leg struck the ground inverted and nose down. The left engine propeller was found feathered. On the left engine, the # 5 cylinder was off the engine and the # 5 piston with the connecting rod still attached were found nearby. Interviews revealed that during maintenance, the # 1,3,5,and 6 cylinders had been removed and reinstalled; however, the # 5 cylinder had not been tightened. Several people had worked on the airplane at various stages of the work. The maintenance facility did not have a system to pass down what had been accomplished, and the FAA did not require the tracking of work accomplished in other than 14 CFR Part 121, or 14 CFR Part 145 facilities.

Shortly after the airplane took off, a witness about 1 mile from the airport observed the airplane about 150 feet above the ground in a left turn, before it disappeared into the clouds. A witness across from where the airplane crashed stated he was in his shed when he heard the sound of an airplane overhead. When the sound faded and returned, like the airplane had circled above the shed, he stepped outside and looked for the airplane. He saw the airplane exit the clouds in a near vertical position and impact the ground. He described the engine noise as loud and smooth. The airplane impacted in a field about 3/4 miles from the departure airport and was consumed by a post crash fire. Streaks of oil were observed on the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer extending to its upper and lower surfaces. Disassembly of both engines did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. A weather observation taken after the accident reported included a visibility of 2 miles with light drizzle and mist, and the ceiling was 400 foot overcast. Witnesses described the weather at the accident site as '...pretty foggy,' and worse than the conditions reported at the airport.

The pilot initiated an ILS approach with rain and fog. Approach flaps were maintained until the runway was sighted, and then landing flaps were set. The airplane landed long, overran the runway, struck the ILS localizer antenna on the departure end of the runway, and came to rest at the edge of a mobile home park. The airplane and two mobile homes were destroyed by fire. Vref had been computed at 110 Kts. The PIC reported a speed on final of 130 Kts, while the SIC said it was 140 Kts. Radar data revealed a 160 knots ground speed from the outer marker until 1.8 miles from touchdown. The airplane passed the control tower, airborne, with 2,500 feet of runway remaining on the 6,500 foot long runway. Performance data revealed that the airplane would require about 2,509 feet on a dry runway, and 5,520 feet on a wet runway. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or anti-skid brakes. The PIC was the company president, and the SIC was a recent hire who had flown with the PIC three previous times. The PIC was qualified for single-pilot operations in the airplane, and had been trained to fly stabilized approaches.

During preflight, the pilot noticed a discrepancy between his requested fuel load and what the fuel gauges indicated. He decided the right fuel quantity gauge was accurate and the left fuel quantity gauge was inaccurate, and started a multiple leg flight. Based on the right fuel gauge indication at an away airport, the pilot elected to not refuel prior to starting his return flight. About 50 miles from the destination, the left and right low fuel quantity lights illuminated, and the right fuel gauge indicated 390 pounds of fuel onboard. The pilot elected to continue to his destination. A few minutes later, both engines lost power. A forced landing was made in an open school field. Before coming to rest, the left wing struck a football training device, and the outboard 4 feet of the wing was separated from the airplane. Post accident investigation revealed, both fuel tanks, collector tanks, fuel lines, and filters were empty. When electric power was applied, the left fuel gauge indicated '0' and the right fuel gauge indicated 290 pounds of fuel remaining. The pilot reported that he should have monitored his fuel supply closer and landed at the first sign of any inconsistencies in fuel quantity readings.

The pilot/owner of an air tanker was dispatched to drop a load of retardant on a fire burning up a valley wall. The pilot made radio contact with the firefighters on the ground, who requested that the pilot deliver the entire load on the first drop. A helicopter pilot who was dropping water on the fire positioned himself about a mile away to allow the air tanker to make its drop. The winds were from the northwest at 15 knots and gusting to 20 knots, and the helicopter pilot reported turbulence in the area. The helicopter pilot watched as the air tanker came from the northeast, overflew the fire, and made a descending counterclockwise turn. The airplane flew towards the fire parallel to the valley ridge, and the helicopter pilot observed the air tanker drop its retardant. During the drop, the airplane flew through smoke, and its right wing impacted trees on the upslope side of the valley. The airplane then rolled 90 degrees and descended into the steeply inclined wooded terrain. A review of the pilot's FAA medical records revealed that he lacked color vision.

The pilot had flown this route in make and model airplane for nearly 4 years. He calculated 900 pounds of fuel were required for the flight, and saw 956 pounds on the fuel totalizer. The pilot was told by the ground controller of weather delays to his destination that ranged up to 2.5 hours. En route he was issued holding instructions with an EFC of 50 minutes later. After released from holding, 52 minutes after takeoff, the pilot was told that he was being vectored for a 35 mile final approach. The pilot then told the controller that he was fuel critical and the controller vectored him ahead of other airplanes. Ten minutes later, 84 minutes after takeoff, the controller asked his fuel status, and the pilot responded 'pretty low, seems like I'm losing oil pressure.' The pilot then advised the controller, 85 minutes after takeoff, that he shut down the right engine. He then declared an emergency and advised that he was not going to make the airport. Examination of the wreckage revealed the fuel tanks were intact, the fuel caps were secured, and the amount of fuel recovered from both tanks was 1.5 gallons, which was less than the specified unusable quantity. Company records showed that similar flights took about 48 minutes, and the airplane's average fuel flow was 580 pounds per hour.

During an attempted takeoff, the airplane collided with a taxiway sign, a fence, a light pole and came to rest between two buildings. According to the pilot in command (seated in the right seat), a preflight and run-up inspection was completed successfully. He stated that a pilot rated passenger (in the left front seat) was following along with a placard checklist. He stated that the airplane was accelerated for takeoff on runway 7, and at 500 feet down the 2700 foot long runway with the airspeed at redline, rotation was initiated and the airplane veered to the right. He stated that shortly thereafter the right engine surged and he noted the matched power levers, but he did not record the engine power instruments. A passenger (seated in a forward facing seat behind the pilot in command) reported that the pilot rated passenger's hand was on the throttle(yellow-knobbed handles) at the time of the accident The reported visibility was 1/8 mile in fog. The prescribed takeoff minimums for that airport is 400 feet and 1 mile visibility. Post accident examination of the engines and their systems revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction.