Nevada

Following a Red Flag exercice from Tinker AFB, the aircraft was returning to Nellis AFB. Upon landing, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid on the runway for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All 32 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Just after the airplane's landing gear was retracted during takeoff for a retardant drop mission, a ball of fire was observed coming out of the left jet engine before the airplane rolled steeply to the left and descended into the terrain. Prior to takeoff, the captain said he would make the takeoff and provided a takeoff briefing concerning the runway to be used and his intentions should an emergency develop. Shortly thereafter, the captain informed the co-pilot that this would actually be his (the co-pilot's) takeoff. On the cockpit voice recorder, the co-pilot stated "Same briefing (sound of laughter)". The co-pilot did not give an additional takeoff briefing beyond the one given by the captain and the captain did not ask the co-pilot to give one. During the initial climb, the captain said he detected a fire on the left side of the airplane and the copilot responded that he was holding full right aileron. At no point did either pilot call for the jettisoning of the retardant load as required by company standard operating procedures, or verbally enunciate the jet engine fire emergency checklist. Recorded data showed that the airplane's airspeed then decayed below the minimum air control speed, which resulted in an increased roll rate to the left and impact with terrain. The 11th stage compressor disc of the left jet engine failed in fatigue, which caused a catastrophic failure of the compressor section and the initiation of the engine fire. Metallurgical examination of the fracture identified several origin points at scratches in the surface finish of the disk. The scratches were too small to have been observed with the approved inspection procedures used by the company. A review of the FAA sanctioned Approved Aircraft Inspection Program, revealed no shortcomings or anomalies in the performance or documentation of the program. A post-accident examination of the airframe and three remaining engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operations.

During climb a few minutes after takeoff, a fire erupted in the airplane's right engine compartment. About 7 miles from the departure airport, the pilot reversed course and notified the air traffic controller that he was declaring an emergency. As the pilot was proceeding back toward the departure airport witnesses observed fire beneath, and smoke trailing from, the right engine and heard boom sounds or explosions as the airplane descended. Although the pilot feathered the right engine's propeller, the airplane's descent continued. The 12-minute flight ended about 1.25 miles from the runway when the airplane impacted trees and power lines before coming to rest upside down adjacent to a private residence. A fuel-fed fire consumed the airframe and damaged nearby private residences. The airplane was owned and operated by an airplane broker that intended to have it ferried to Korea. In preparation for the overseas ferry flight, the airplane's engines were overhauled. Maintenance was also performed on various components including the engine-driven fuel pumps, turbochargers, and propellers. Nacelle fuel tanks were installed and the airplane received an annual inspection. Thereafter, the broker had a ferry pilot fly the airplane from the maintenance facility in Ohio to the pilot's Nevada-based facility, where the ferry pilot had additional maintenance performed related to the air conditioner, gear door, vacuum pump, and idle adjustment. Upon completion of this maintenance, the right engine was test run for at least 20 minutes and the airplane was returned to the ferry pilot. During the following month, the ferry pilot modified the airplane's fuel system by installing four custom-made ferry fuel tanks in the fuselage, and associated plumbing in the wings, to supplement the existing six certificated fuel tanks. The ferry pilot held an airframe and powerplant mechanic certificate with inspection authorization. He reinspected the airplane, purportedly in accordance with the Piper Aircraft Company's annual inspection protocol, signed the maintenance logbook, and requested Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval for his ferry flight. The FAA reported that it did not process the first ferry pilot's ferry permit application because of issues related to the applicant's forms and the FAA inspector's workload. The airplane broker discharged the pilot and contracted with a new ferry pilot (the accident pilot) to immediately pick up the airplane in Nevada and fly it to California, the second ferry pilot's base. The contract specified that the airplane be airworthy. In California, the accident pilot planned to complete any necessary modifications, acquire FAA approval, and then ferry the airplane overseas. The discharged ferry pilot stated to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator that none of his airplane modifications had involved maintenance in the right engine compartment. He also stated that when he presented the airplane to the replacement ferry pilot (at most 3 hours before takeoff) he told him that fuel lines and fittings in the wings related to the ferry tanks needed to be disconnected prior to flight. During the Safety Board's examination of the airplane, physical evidence was found indicating that the custom-made ferry tank plumbing in the wings had not been disconnected. The airplane wreckage was examined by the NTSB investigation team while on scene and following its recovery. Regarding both engines, no evidence was found of any internal engine component malfunction. Notably, the localized area surrounding and including the right engine-driven fuel pump and its outlet port had sustained significantly greater fire damage than was observed elsewhere. According to the Lycoming engine participant, the damage was consistent with a fuel-fed fire originating in this vicinity, which may have resulted from the engine's fuel supply line "B" nut being loose, a failed fuel line, or an engine-driven fuel pumprelated leak. The fuel supply line and its connecting components were not located. The engine-driven fuel pump was subsequently examined by staff from the NTSB's Materials Laboratory. Noted evidence consisted of globules of resolidified metal and areas of missing material consistent with the pump having been engulfed in fire. The staff also examined the airplane. Evidence was found indicating that the fire's area of origin was not within the wings or fuselage, but rather emanated from a localized area within the right engine compartment, where the engine-driven fuel pump and its fuel supply line and fittings were located. However, due to the extensive pre- and post-impact fires, the point of origin and the initiating event that precipitated the fuel leak could not be ascertained. The airplane's "Pilot Operator's Handbook" (POH), provides the procedures for responding to an in-flight fire and securing an engine. It also provides single-engine climb performance data. The POH indicates that the pilot should move the firewall fuel shutoff valve of the affected engine to the "off" position, feather the propeller, close the engine's cowl flaps to reduce drag, turn off the magneto switches, turn off the emergency fuel pump switch and the fuel selector, and pull out the fuel boost pump circuit breaker. It further notes that unless the boost pump's circuit breaker is pulled, the pump will continuously operate. During the wreckage examination, the Safety Board investigators found evidence indicating that the right engine's propeller was feathered. However, contrary to the POH's guidance, the right engine's firewall fuel shutoff valve was not in the "off" position, the cowl flaps were open, the magneto switches were on, the emergency fuel pump switches and the fuel selector were on, and the landing gear was down. Due to fire damage, the position of the fuel boost pump circuit breaker could not be ascertained. Calculations based upon POH data indicate that an undamaged and appropriately configured airplane flying on one engine should have had the capability to climb between 100 and 200 feet per minute and, at a minimum, maintain altitude. Recorded Mode C altitude data indicates that during the last 5 minutes of flight, the airplane descended while slowing about 16 knots below the speed required to maintain altitude.

The Hawker and the glider collided in flight at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above mean sea level about 42 nautical miles south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada, which was the Hawker's destination. The collision occurred in visual meteorological conditions in an area that is frequently traversed by air carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also popular for glider operations because of the thermal and mountain wave gliding opportunities there. Before the collision, the Hawker had been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for several miles, and the glider was in a 30-degree, left-banked, spiraling climb. According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the glider pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or less before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine and other systems; however, the flight crew was able to land the airplane. The damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and parachuted to the ground. Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not possible to determine at which points each aircraft may have been within the other's available field of view. Although Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights operated under instrument flight rules, when visibility permits), a number of factors that can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were evident in this accident. For example, the high closure rate of the Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider pilot only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the closure rate would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to detect the glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made it difficult for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of cockpit tasks, such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to adversely affect scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the flying pilot, and the first officer reported that they were looking out the window before the collision. However, the captain saw the glider only a moment before it filled the windshield, and the first officer never saw it at all.

The airplane descended into the ground during takeoff-initial climb on a local fire reconnaissance flight. Witnesses reported that airplane became airborne, but was not climbing, and it continued down the runway in a nose-up attitude in ground effect until impacting terrain about 600 feet southeast from the departure end of the runway. The ambient temperature was about 107 degrees Fahrenheit, and the density altitude was calculated at 5,878 feet mean sea level. On scene examination found the flaps in the 30-degree position, which also corresponded to the flap actuator position. The cockpit indicator for the flaps also showed a 30-degree extension. A subsequent bench test of the combined flap/gear selector valve was conducted. During the initial inspection, both the gear selector and the flap selector valves were bent, but otherwise operational. The "stop-pin" on the flap selector lever was missing. There was no leakage of fluid during this test. Examination of both engines revealed no abnormalities, which would prevent normal operations. The aircraft flight manual specifies that the flaps should be set at 1/4 down (10 degrees) for normal takeoff.

The passenger flying the airplane made a hard landing after the pilot had experienced an incapacitating cardiac event. Shortly after takeoff the pilot turned the plane around to return to the departure airport. He started coughing and then went unconscious. The passenger in the right seat, who had no piloting experience, took control of the airplane and made several landing attempts. During the fourth landing attempt he stalled the airplane at a low altitude. The airplane impacted terrain, landing flat on its belly a few hundred feet short of the runway. The autopsy report attributed the pilot's cause of death to arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease.

The airplane impacted mountainous terrain in an extreme nose-down attitude following a departure from controlled flight. The purpose of the flight was to check the weather conditions for passenger tour flights that day. The pilot reported about 20 minutes prior to the accident that the ceiling was 6,500 feet mean sea level (msl). Radar data showed that following this weather report, the airplane's radar track continued eastbound and upon its return westbound, at an altitude of about 6,000 feet msl, the airplane entered a series of altitude fluctuations approximately 1 mile west of a ridge that was the location of the accident, descending at 4,000 feet per minute while turning northbound, and then climbing at 3,900 feet per minute while traveling eastbound, prior to disappearing from the radar. The airplane impacted on the eastern side of the ridge. There were no monitored distress calls from the aircraft and no known witnesses to the accident. Prior to the accident, there were reports of vibrations during flight on this aircraft, although many went unreported to maintenance personnel. The day (and flight) prior to the accident, a pilot experienced a vibration during flight with passengers and it was not reported to maintenance personnel because it was logged improperly in the operator's maintenance tracking system. No corrective actions were taken. During the post accident examinations, no portions of the right elevator and trim tab were identified in the wreckage, or at the accident site. The bracket attachment to the right elevator was found loose within the wreckage and was torsionally twisted counterclockwise (aft). Ground and aerial searches for the missing parts based on a trajectory study were unsuccessful. This aircraft was equipped with a foam cored elevator trim tab that was installed during aircraft manufacture. A service difficulty report (SDR) query showed that 47 reports had been issued on elevator trim tab corrosion and many included reports of vibrations during flight. On January 20, 2005, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-05-27, which addressed potential problems with foam-filled elevator trim tabs in the accident make/model airplane, and Cessna 206 and 210 series airplanes. The SAIB indicated that the foam-filled elevator trim tabs, manufactured until 1985, were reported to have corrosion between the tab and the foam. The SAIB further said, in part, "When the skin of the trim tab becomes thin enough due to the corrosion, the actuator can pull the fasteners through the skin and disconnect. When this occurs, the tab can flutter." Some reports indicated prior instances of "vibrations in the tail section and portions of the elevator tearing away with the trim tab." Prior to the issuance of the SAIB, Cessna Aircraft Company issued a Service Bulletin (SB) SEB85-7 on April 5, 1985, that addressed elevator and trim tab inspection due to corrosion from moisture trapped in the foam cored trim tabs. Based on a review of the airplane's logbooks, the SB was not complied with, nor was the operator required to do so based on the FAA approved maintenance specifications.

The airplane overran the runway after landing on runway 7. The passenger stated that he felt that the approach was "fast" and that the pilot was "behind the power curve" because of high
minimum en route altitudes in the area and that they had to "hustle down" during the descent. The passenger indicated that the flight crossed the runway threshold "maybe a bit more" that 10 knots above Vref and touched down about 10 knots above Vref. He said it was not a stabilized approach. Landing distance calculations and other evidence suggest that the lift dump panels did not extend after landing; however, the investigation did not determine the reason(s) for the lack of lift dump. No evidence was found of any failures affecting the lift dump or braking systems. Evidence and interview statements reveal that the pilot flew an unstabilized approach to the runway and landed well above target speed. The high landing speed was result of the pilot's excessive airspeed on the approach and a tailwind component of about 8 knots. Although the pilot landed the airplane within the touchdown area, the airplane's speed upon touchdown was about 17 knots above the prescribed speed. The flight's unstabilized approach and excessive speed should have prompted the pilot to initiate a missed approach.

The Air Force Materiel Command Beech 1900 crashed while on a routine support mission from a remote classified airstrip on the Nellis range to the Tonopah Test Range. It departed at 03:43 for Tonopah. After reporting the runway lights in sight, the pilot configured the airplane for the approach and initiated a circling maneuver to the right for a visual straight-in approach to runway 32. During the turn the pilot suffered a sudden cardiac death. Half way through the turn the airplane began a gradual descent until it impacted the ground. The airplane broke up and burst into flames. Investigation revealed that the pilot had violated federal policy and directives, wilfully deceived flight medical examiners, suppressed significant medical information and ingested inappropriate medications for a deteriorating and dangerous health condition. The pilot had high blood pressure and failed to report it, and denied taking medications to his Federal Aviation Administration flight physical examiners.

During an instrument approach, upon descending to the prescribed minimum descent altitude, about 1/2 mile from the missed approach point, the pilot failed to maintain flying airspeed. The airplane stalled, rolled left, and in an uncontrolled descent collided with a commercial building 0.96 nm from the runway's displaced threshold. The accident occurred during the return portion of a round trip flight, while on final approach to the pilot's alternate airport due to a weather-induced diversion. Moderate intensity snow showers and freezing fog existed. During the initial approach, the reported visibility was 1 1/2 miles. About the time the pilot passed the final approach fix, the visibility decreased to 1/2 mile, but the pilot was not informed of the decrease below his 1-mile minimum requirement. The pilot had maintained the recommended 140-knot approach speed in the icing conditions until about 3 1/2 miles from the runway. Thereafter, the airplane's speed gradually decreased until reaching about 75 knots. After the airplane started vibrating, the pilot increased engine power, but his action was not timely enough to avert stalling. Company mechanics maintained the airplane. On previous occasions overheat conditions had occurred wherein the environmental ducting melted and heat was conducted to the adjacent pneumatic tube that provides deice air to the empennage boots. During the accident investigation, the deice tube was found completely melted closed, thus rendering all of the empennage deice boots dysfunctional.