Colorado

The Part 135 cargo flight was approaching its destination on an IFR flight plan. The pilot had requested the ILS-DME approach to runway 10, but 2 minutes later, he changed his request to the VOR-B approach to runway 28. ARTCC cleared him for the approach to the non-towered airport. The pilot contacted the airport's Unicom, and requested that the ramp personnel be standing by with fuel and oxygen. The airplane was found 5.8 nm from the approach end of runway 28, at 7,900 feet. The approach minimums for the VOR-B was 7,900 feet, which the pilot could descend to at 8.7 nm. The VOR was located 285 degrees at 13.6 nm from the accident site, and the ILS-DME transmitter was located 285 degrees at 5.6 nm from the accident site. The airplane was equipped with a single DME display head, and it had a Nav 1/Nav 2 selector switch.

The pilot was cleared for an ILS DME approach to runway 17L. During the final stage of the approach, the aircraft entered fog and disappeared from view of the control tower personnel. Radar and radio communications were lost also. After searching for 31 minutes, the aircraft was found by airport operations personnel over half way down the runway and 600 feet east of the runway. There was no evidence the aircraft touched down on the runway. The aircraft was configured with the landing gear up and the flaps deployed. Missed approach procedures require the flaps and landing gear to be retracted after initiating the procedure. The decision
height for the approach is 6,384 feet msl (200 feet above ground level) and the required RVR for a 14 CFR Part 135 flight to commence and approach is 2400 (1/2 mile). When on the glide slope, the decision height is 0.4 miles from the runway touchdown zone. Examination of the airplane did not disclose evidence of mechanical malfunction.

The pilot departed Front Range Airport (elevation 5512 feet) at approximately 2008, climbed to 7,000 feet msl, accelerated to 270 knots, and requested his IFR clearance. Weather at the time of N950TT's departure was 500 feet overcast; witnesses reported the tops of the thin cloud condition were 8,500 feet msl and it was very dark on top (no stars or moon). The pilot made several changes in airspeed and climb rate until radar indicated that he had entered an 8,500 fpm decent. The pilot reported to ATC that he had 'stalled' the airplane. Radar indicated that he then climbed at 7,500 fpm until his estimated airspeed was 10 knots, and then subsequently descended again at 8,400 fpm until he impacted the frozen ground. The pilot had flown 4 times for 7 hours in the previous 40 days. Five airline pilots, each of who had 3,000 to 5,000 hours in Swearingens, stated individually that even though the airplane is single pilot certified, they believed that 'its a two pilot airplane--because the work load is too high.'

The airplane departed under visual flight rules (VFR) for a flight over mountainous terrain. It was tracked by radar from the departure area to the accident site. While climbing at the normal rate of climb to 15,400 feet, the airplane abruptly disappeared from radar. The wreckage was located among pine trees and exhibited evidence of a steep flight path angle and damage consistent with a stall/spin event. Investigation revealed no indication of airframe or flight control anomalies, and the powerplant and propeller damage was consistent with engine operation at moderate to high power. Evidence indicated that the airplane was free of airframe ice at impact. Postaccident calculations indicate that the airplane was near the maximum certificated gross weight and aft center of gravity limit. The pilot did not maintain instrument flying currency and reportedly avoided instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Evidence indicated that the pilot did not use oxygen, as required (when flying above 12,000 feet). Ground observations and satellite and Doppler radar imagery indicated widespread cloudiness over the mountains west of Montrose on the day of the accident. Satellite data showed variable cloud tops higher than the airplane's flight altitude in the vicinity of the accident. The radar plot of the aircraft during the climb above 10,000 feet indicated course changes from the southwest to the northwest, back to the southwest and then a sharp turn to the right just prior to the rapid descent.

As the cargo jet was taxiing for takeoff in a non movement area, it was struck by an airport employee shuttle bus. The airplane captain was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and the collision occurred during predawn hours. The bus driver said he stopped at the stop sign, turned on the 4-way flasher lights, and looked both ways. He saw one inbound aircraft to the right that had stopped. He did not see the airplane approaching from the left as he started across the cargo ramp. The airplane crew stated they did not see the bus until seconds before impact. Airplane skid marks, measuring 22 and 24 feet in length, were noted on the taxiway. No bus skid marks were noted on the roadway.

The pilot had made a refueling stop at Vandalia, Illinois. She did not observe the refueling process, but the FBO also operated a King Air and she felt he knew the proper procedure to follow. The airplane was reportedly serviced with 235 gallons of Jet-A fuel (total capacity is 384 gallons). The pilot flew between 7,500 and 10,500 feet. When the airplane was 45 minutes from its destination, the fuel transfer pump lights illuminated, indicating the wing tanks were empty. The nacelle tank gauges registered 3/4 full and the pilot determined she had sufficient fuel to complete the flight. When the airplane was three minutes from its destination, both engines flamed out and the pilot made a wheels up forced landing. When the salvage company recovered the airplane, they reported finding no evidence of fuel aboard. The pilot was provided and used performance charts for the Beech 65-A90 instead of the Beech B90.

The non instrument-rated pilot filed an IFR flight plan, but did not request nor was given a weather briefing. Shortly after taking off into low instrument meteorological conditions, he reported he was returning to the airport, but did not give a reason why. He never declared an emergency. The last transmission was when the pilot said he had 'the problem resolved,' and was continuing on to his destination. Various witnesses said the engines were 'revvying' and 'unsynchronized,' and that the propellers were being 'cycled.' One witness said brownish-black smoke trailed from the right engine. The airplane struck one ridge, then catapulted approximately 1,000 feet before striking another ridge. There was post impact fire. Both propellers bore high rotational damage. Disassembly of the engines, propellers, turbochargers, and various components failed to disclose what may have prompted the pilot to want to return to the airport. Internal components of the right engine, however, were black and, according to a Textron Lycoming representative, were indicative of 'an excessively rich mixture.' A psychiatrist had recently treated the pilot for depression, attention deficit and bipolar disorders. The pilot also had a history of alcohol and drug abuse. Postmortem toxicology protocol disclose the presence of Fluoxetine (an antidepressant), Norfluoxetine (its metabolite), and Hydrocodone (the most commonly prescribed opiate).