Alaska

The pilot had been advised by the Federal Aviation Administration flight service station (FSS) specialist to remain clear of the destination airport until the specialist could issue a special visual flight rules clearance. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the airport, with a strong southeasterly wind. About 8 minutes after initial contact, the FSS specialist attempted to contact the pilot to issue the clearance but received no response. A witness about 0.5 mile southeast of the accident site said he saw the accident airplane flying very low over the treetops. He said the weather conditions consisted of low clouds, rain, and gusty southeasterly wind estimated at 30 to 40 knots. He said that, as the airplane passed overhead, it turned sharply to the left. As he watched the airplane, the wings rocked violently from side to side, and the nose pitched up and down. As the airplane passed low over hilly, tree-covered terrain, it rolled to the right, the right wing struck a large tree and separated, and the airplane descended behind a stand of trees. Pilots flying in the accident area reported strong wind with significant downdrafts and turbulence. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not disclose any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. Given the lack of mechanical deficiencies and the reports of turbulence and downdrafts, as well as the witness’ account of the airplane’s physical movements, it is likely that the pilot encountered significant terrain-induced turbulence and downdrafts while flying at low altitude. The area surrounding the accident site and portions of the pilot's earlier flight path were bordered by large areas of open and protected water, several of which were suitable for landing the float-equipped airplane.

The commercial pilot was taking off on a passenger flight in conjunction with a remote lodge operation under Title 14, CFR Part 91. The pilot said he picked up passengers in the float-equipped airplane on a beach, and water-taxied out into the lake for takeoff. He said he taxied out about 1,200 feet, reversed course into the wind, and initiated a takeoff. He said when the airplane reached his predetermined abort point, the airplane was still on the water, and might not lift off in time to avoid the terrain ahead. The pilot said rather than abort the takeoff he elected to apply full power and continue the takeoff. He said the airplane collided with the bank, and nosed over. The pilot said there were no preaccident mechanical anomalies with the airplane. The owner of the company said the lake was about 1 mile wide where the pilot elected to takeoff. He said the airplane received substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. He also said the passengers related to him that the engine sounded fine, but they did not think the pilot taxied out very far into the lake.

The airline transport pilot was taking off on a passenger flight under Title 14, CFR Part 135, when the accident occurred. He reported that during takeoff the wind was reported from 290-300 degrees, at 15 knots, gusting to 27 knots. He chose to make an intersection takeoff on runway 25 at its intersection with runway 29, rather than use the full length of runway 29. He said his airspeed did not develop as quickly as he had anticipated, and that with his airspeed lagging and poor climb performance, he realized the airplane was not going to clear the ridge at the end of the runway. He said he initiated a right descending turn to maintain his airspeed, but impacted trees alongside the runway. He reported that the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage when it impacted trees. He said there were no mechanical problems with the airplane prior to the accident.

The crew departed on a commercial cargo flight during dark night, visual meteorological conditions on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The departure end of the runway is adjacent to an ocean bay, and wind gusts up to 26 knots were reported. Local residents north of the airport reported stronger wind, estimated between 50 and 60 knots. A fuel truck operator, who was familiar with the crew’s normal routine, reported that, before the airplane taxied to the runway, it remained on the ramp for 6 or 8 minutes with both engines operating, which he described as very unusual. There were no reports of radio communications with the flight crew after the airplane departed. The airplane crashed about 1 mile offshore, and the fragmented wreckage sank in ocean water. Because of the fragmented nature of the wreckage and ocean current, the complete wreckage was not recovered. The cockpit area forward of the wings was extensively fragmented, thus the validity of any postaccident cockpit and instrument findings was unreliable. Likewise, structural damage to the airframe precluded determining flight control continuity. Both propellers had witness marks consistent with operating under engine power and within their normal operating range. A postaccident examination of the engines and recovered components did not disclose any evidence of a mechanical malfunction. Due to the lack of mechanical deficiencies of the engines and propellers, and the extensive airframe fragmentation consistent with a high-speed water impact, it is likely that the crew had an in-flight loss of control of an unknown origin before impact.

The airline transport pilot was on a Title 14, CFR Part 135 passenger flight. The pilot said during cruise flight he heard a loud bang, and the engine started running rough. He said he diverted to the nearest airport, but the engine quit completely, and he was unable to reach the runway. The airplane subsequently collided with terrain, sustaining substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage. An examination of the engine revealed that a locking screw had backed out of one of the anti-vibration counterweights on the crankshaft, scoring the interior back surface of the engine case. The unsecured counterweight then moved from its position in the crankshaft, and was likely struck by the engine's master rod, which shattered the weight, and liberated it from its normal location. The liberated counterweight was struck by internal moving parts, creating several component failures, and ultimately an engine seizure.

The commercial pilot was on a Title 14, CFR Part 91, other work use flight when the accident occurred. As he approached his destination airport, he said he saw a large rain squall moving over the airport, and he elected to remain south of the airport to allow time for it to move. He reported that while maneuvering the airplane at 1,000 feet msl, all engine power was lost. Unable to restore engine power, the pilot selected a marshy tree-covered area as a forced landing site. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage during the forced landing. The NTSB discovered no mechanical problems with the engine during a postaccident teardown and examination.

The private pilot was taking off in the float plane from the lake's west waterway. The airplane was on step, gaining airspeed, and the takeoff run seemed normal to the pilot. The airplane was nearing takeoff speed, and proceeding directly down the waterway, when it encountered a right quartering tailwind gust that lifted up the right wing and float. The airplane veered to the left toward a steep bank, and the pilot was unable to correct the deviation with the rudder. He did not feel that he could reduce power as he would slam into the bank. The airplane lifted off, but the float collided with the top of the bank. The airplane cartwheeled about 160 degrees to the left before coming to rest on its right side. It sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and floats. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures. Reported wind at the airport approximately 3 minutes after the accident was from 020 degrees magnetic at 3 knots, with no recorded gusts.

The certificated flight instructor was familiarizing the second pilot with ski operations in a ski-equipped airplane during an instructional flight. The flight instructor reported that he took the flight controls from the second pilot to demonstrate a touch-and-go landing on a frozen, snow-covered lake. After landing to the east, the instructor said that he kept the tail of the airplane up and the airspeed just below flying speed in order to make ski tracks on the lake to check the snow conditions. About midway along the lake the instructor added full engine power and the airplane became airborne but failed to climb sufficiently to avoid colliding with an area of rising, tree-covered terrain at the departure end of the lake. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage. Postaccident examination revealed no preaccident mechanical anomalies. The instructor noted that after the accident he noticed occasional strong gusts of wind from the west.

The scheduled commuter flight was about 10 miles north of the destination airport, operating under a special visual-flight-rules clearance, and descending for landing in instrument meteorological conditions. According to the pilot he started a gradual descent over an area of featureless, snow-covered, down-sloping terrain in whiteout and flat light conditions. During the descent a localized snow shower momentarily reduced the pilot’s forward visibility and he was unable to discern any terrain features. The airplane collided with terrain in an all-white snow/ice field and sustained substantial damage. At the time of the accident the destination airport was reporting visibility of 1.5 statute miles in light snow and mist, broken layers at 900 and 1,600 feet, and 3,200 feet overcast, with a temperature and dew point of 25 degrees Fahrenheit. The pilot reported that there were no pre accident mechanical problems with the airplane and that the accident could have been avoided if the flight had been operated under an instrument-flight-rules flight plan.

The airline transport pilot was on an approach to land on Runway 30 at the conclusion of a visual flight rules (VFR)scheduled commuter flight. Through a series of radio microphone clicks, he activated threshold warning lights for vehicle traffic on a roadway that passes in front of the threshold of Runway 30. Gates that were supposed to work in concert with the lights and block the runway from vehicle traffic were not operative. On final approach, the pilot, who was aware that the gates were not working, noticed a large truck and trailer stopped adjacent to the landing threshold. As he neared the runway, he realized that the truck was moving in front of the threshold area. The pilot attempted to go around, but the airplane's belly struck the top of the trailer and the airplane descended out of control to the runway, sustaining structural damage. The truck driver reported that, as he approached the runway threshold, he saw the flashing red warning lights, but that the gates were not closed. He waited for about 45 seconds and looked for any landing traffic and, seeing none, drove onto the road in front of the threshold. As he did so, he felt the airplane impact the trailer, and saw it hit the runway. The accident truck's trailer is about 45 feet long and 13 feet tall. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Facility Directory/Alaska Supplement recommends that pilots maintain a 25-foot minimum threshold crossing height. The NTSB's investigation revealed that the gate system had been out of service for more than a year due to budgetary constraints, and that there was no Notice to Airman (NOTAM) issued concerning the inoperative gate system. The FAA certificated airport is owned and operated by the State of Alaska. According to the Airport Certification Manual, the airport manager is responsible to inspect, maintain, and repair airport facilities to ensure safe operations. Additionally, the airport manager is responsible for publishing NOTAM's concerning hazardous conditions. A 10-year review of annual FAA certification and compliance inspection forms revealed no discrepancy listed for the inoperative gates until 16 days after the accident.