Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

The pilot of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, serial number 31-7752151, encountered an area of heavy snow and reduced visibility while on a visual flight rules flight from Bear Valley, British Columbia, logging camp to Tsay Keh. The pilot was unable to maintain visual references and executed a 180-degree turn in an attempt to regain visual flight. Shortly after completing the turn, at about 1055 Pacific standard time, the aircraft collided with the ice on the Peace Reach Arm of Williston Lake, British Columbia. The pilot was the sole occupant of the aircraft and received serious injuries. There was no fire. The aircraft was destroyed during the collision.

The aircraft was departed Khartoum for a flight to Mwanza where it was supposed to pick up a cargo of 38 tonnes of fish fillet from Vick Fish Processors for delivery in Europe. When it went dark en route to Mwanza, the radio altimeter integral light was found to be unserviceable. The crew were not able to fix the problem and the continued using the FMS. The crew contacted Mwanza tower at 16:58 and were being advised that there was no power at the airport and that efforts were being made to use a standby generator. Further information passed on the crew reportedly included VOR, DME and NDB all unserviceable, weather: wind calm, 8 km visibility, temperature 25deg C and QNH 1015. After holding for 10 minutes, the airport generator came on and the runway lights went on. The first officer, who was pilot flying, started a visual runway 12 approach. When well established on finals with full landing configuration, the captain told the f/o that he was too low, and a few seconds later he told the f/o he was too high. Both the captain and the flight engineer then told the f/o to go around. The f/o overshot and climbed to 5500 feet on the downwind leg. Turning on the left base the captain remarked that the turn was too tight: ".. I will do a 360-degree turn to the right and position you finals". The captain thus took over control and started a right turn at 4400 feet. Just before completing the turn, the f/o said: "do not go down anymore, the altimeter is reading 4100 feet". Almost aligned with the runway, the f/o took over control again. At that same moment the aircraft bounced 2 or 3 times yawing to the left and came down to a halt in the middle of the lake.

On February 2, 2000, about 1407 eastern standard time, a Beech D18S, N122V, registered to South Florida Aircraft Leasing, Inc., operated by Florida Air Cargo, Inc., was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean, approximately 47 miles east of Bimini, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 135 non-scheduled, international, cargo flight. The airplane was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot was not injured, one passenger sustained minor injuries. The flight originated about 1305 from the Opa Locka Airport, Opa Locka, Florida. The pilot stated that the flight departed with all five fuel tanks full of fuel and departed with the left fuel selector positioned to the "main tank" position. The flight continued and approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, he switched the left fuel selector to the auxiliary position and remained on that tank for approximately 35 minutes. When the flight was approximately 20 miles east of Bimini, he switched the left fuel selector to the main tank position where it remained for 5 minutes before he added climb power. While about 45 miles east of Bimini, climbing through 2,300 feet with a good rate of climb, the left manifold pressure dropped to 27 inches and the propeller rpm dropped to 1,300. He turned to fly to Bimini, broadcast a mayday call, and reported no unusual vibration; the fuel pressure and oil pressure gauges indicated normal. He repositioned the fuel selector but the left engine would not restart. He then feathered the left propeller and secured the engine but was unable to maintain altitude with full power applied to the right engine. The airplane was ditched in a slight left wing low attitude and the left engine separated from the airframe. Both occupants exited the airplane, remained in the water for 47 minutes, then were spotted by a U.S. Coast Guard Falcon airplane. They were rescued by a pleasure boat and transported to the east coast of Florida.

On January 31, 2000, about 1621 Pacific standard time, Alaska Airlines, Inc., flight 261, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California. The 2 pilots, 3 cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. Flight 261 was operating as a scheduled international passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Lic Gustavo Diaz Ordaz International Airport, Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington, with an intermediate stop planned at San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The aircraft took off at 0929 utc from Tripoli-Intl Airport with two flight crew, one cabin crew and 38 passengers of which three children and one infant with 3,200 lbs of fuel on board. The aircraft flew on the route Tripoli - Beniwalid - Tilal direct to Marsa Brega. During flight, the crew have noticed fuel imbalance so they did a cross feeding until fuel balanced at 11:17:12 utc. At 11:25:51 utc, the aircraft started to descend from FL070 at 40 nm from Marsa Brega. At 11:36:57 utc, the left engine flamed out and the captain asked his f/o to confirm left engine failure at 11:37:27 utc. The f/o confirmed the left engine failure at 11:37:28 utc. The right engine flamed out at 11:37:39 utc. The captain asked his f/o to inform soc operation at Marsa Brega about the two engines failure and his decision to ditch at 11:37:57 utc. The captain asked his f/o to relight the engine at 11:38:05 utc. The GPWS activated since the aircraft was in an unsafe situation. At 11:38:34 utc, the aircraft ditched in the sea at 30 23.457 N 019 28.953 E. Both pilots and 17 other occupants were rescued while 22 other people including the cabin crew were killed. The aircraft was destroyed. Most of the passengers were employees of the Sirte Oil Company and working at the Marsa Brega Oil Complex. On board were 15 Libyans (among them both pilots), 13 British, two Canadians, three Indians, three Croatians, three Philippines, one Pakistan and one Tunisian, the cabin crew. Operated by the Libyan Sirte Oil Company, the aircraft was owned by Avisto, a Swiss operator.

On a ferry flight from Kiev to Tehran, while in cruising altitude over the Black Sea, the crew reported an unexpected situation and requested a clearance to divert to Ankara Airport. Shortly later, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed in the sea about 50 km off Inebolu. Few debris were found floating on water but the wreckage was not found. All six occupants were killed.

Witnesses reported that following takeoff from a river, the aircraft climbed to approximately 100 to 400 feet above the water, then initiated a left turn of approximately 45 degrees bank. The majority of the witnesses reported that after the aircraft had turned about 180 degrees, its nose abruptly dropped and it impacted the water. Witnesses did not report observing any evidence of problems with the aircraft before impact, and did not report hearing any abnormal engine sounds or sudden changes in engine pitch. Upon water impact, the aircraft went inverted and its cabin submerged. Efforts by witnesses to gain entry to the aircraft cabin to render assistance were unsuccessful due to aircraft damage. Rescue divers found all occupants deceased in the aircraft upon arrival, but were able to remove the two rear-seat victims without removing any passenger restraints. Autopsies disclosed that all four aircraft occupants had drowned. Investigators did not find any evidence of pre-impact aircraft or engine malfunctions during post-accident examinations of the wreckage, but did find that a cabin entry door was jammed shut due to impact damage, and that the range of travel of both pilot doors was restricted by damaged aircraft components.

The pilot/owner was performing a post maintenance check flight about 20 miles off shore. He was receiving visual flight advisories from a terminal radar approach facility while in level flight about 4,900 feet msl. Subsequently, the airplane started slowing then descending in a right spiral, and radar contact was lost about 1,000 feet msl. The pilot's body was recovered from the ocean. According to the autopsy report, the pilot had experienced sudden cardiac death secondary to an acute myocardial infarction due to atherosclerotic coronary artery disease. Tramadol, a painkiller not approved by the FAA for flight, was detected in a drug screen and may have masked the chest pain.

Shortly after being cleared for takeoff on runway 18 (3,899 feet by 150 feet, dry concrete) at Merrill C. Meigs Field, Chicago, Illinois, the airplane impacted into Lake Michigan, approximately 300 feet south of the end of the runway. The tower controller said that at the 3/4 field point, the airplane had not rotated. 'All I can see are lights [from the airplane]. At the point where he would have been at the end of the runway, [I] lost the lights.' A witness on the airport said that when the airplane went by, it 'didn't sound like most King Airs do at that point.' There was a pulsating sound, but it was not heavy. The witness said that the airplane was 'bouncing up and down on the [gear] struts, and wasn't coming off the ground.' NTSB Materials examination of the pilot's control yoke showed that there were small distortions in the holes of the column and the rod where the control lock would be inserted. A small crack was observed around 1/4 of the control lock rod hole. The control lock was a substitute for the original airplane equipment. The examination of the control lock showed 'several shiny scratches ... parallel to the length of the pin.' A small deformation was observed near the top of the pin part of the control lock. The company flight department's third pilot said that when they flew the airplane, they always placed the control lock in the pilot's side cockpit wall pocket, along with a car key and a remote hanger door opener. The car key and the door opener were found in the wall pocket during the on-scene investigation. The control lock was
recovered from the lake, 7 days later.

EgyptAir Flight 990 departed Los Angeles International Airport, destined for Cairo, with a scheduled intermediate stop at New York-JFK. The aircraft landed at JFK about 23:48 EDT and arrived at the gate about 00:10 EDT. Two designated flight crews (each crew consisting of a captain and first officer) boarded the aircraft at JFK. The aircraft taxied to runway 22R and was cleared for takeoff at 01:19. Shortly after liftoff, the pilots of EgyptAir flight 990 contacted New York Terminal Radar Approach (and departure) Control (TRACON). New York TRACON issued a series of climb instructions and, at 01:26, instructed the flight to climb to FL230 and contact New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). At 01:35, New York ARTCC instructed EgyptAir flight 990 to climb to FL330 and proceed directly to DOVEY intersection. About 01:40 the relief first officer suggested that he relieve the command first officer at the controls. The command first officer agreed and left the flightdeck. The airplane leveled at FL330 four minutes later. At 01:48, the command captain decided to go to the toilet and left the flightdeck. At 01:48:30, about 11 seconds after the captain left the cockpit, the CVR recorded an unintelligible comment. Ten seconds later, the relief first officer stated quietly, "I rely on God." There were no sounds or events recorded by the flight recorders that would indicate that an airplane anomaly or other unusual circumstance preceded the relief first officer's statement. At 01:49:18, the CVR recorded the sound of an electric seat motor and 27 seconds later the autopilot was disconnected. At 01:49:48, the relief first officer again stated quietly, "I rely on God." At 01:49:53, the throttle levers were moved from their cruise power setting to idle, and, one second later, the FDR recorded an abrupt nose-down elevator movement and a very slight movement of the inboard ailerons. Subsequently, the airplane began to rapidly pitch nose down and descend. Between 0149:57 and 0150:05, the relief first officer quietly repeated, "I rely on God," seven additional times. During this time, as a result of the nose-down elevator movement, the airplane's load factor decreased from about 1 to about 0.2 G (almost weightlessness). Then the elevators started moving further in the nose-down direction. Immediately thereafter the captain entered the flightdeck and asked loudly, "What's happening? What's happening?". As he airplane's load factor reached negative G loads (about -0.2 G) the relief first officer stated for the tenth time, "I rely on God." At 01:50:08, as the airplane exceeded its maximum operating airspeed (0.86 Mach), a master warning alarm began to sound and the relief first officer stated quietly for the eleventh and final time, "I rely on God," and the captain repeated his question, "What's happening?" At 0150:15, as the airplane was descending through about 27,300 feet the airplane's rate of descent began to decrease. About 6 seconds later the left and right elevator surfaces began to move in opposite directions. The engine start lever switches for both engines then moved from the run to the cutoff position. At 01:50:24 the throttle levers started to move from their idle position to full throttle, and the speedbrake handle moved to its fully deployed position. The captain again asked "What is this? What is this? Did you shut the engine(s)?" At 01:50:26, the captain stated, "Get away in the engines ... shut the engines". The relief first officer replied "It's shut". Between 01:50:31 and 01:50:37, the captain repeatedly stated, "Pull with me." However, the elevator surfaces remained in a split condition (with the left surface commanding nose up and the right surface commanding nose down) until the FDR and CVR stopped recording. at 0150:36.64 and 0150:38.47, respectively. The height estimates based on primary radar data from the joint use FAA/U.S. Air Force (USAF) radar sites indicated that the airplane's descent stopped about 01:50:38 and that the airplane subsequently climbed to about 25,000 feet msl and changed heading from 80º to 140º before it started a second descent, which continued until the airplane impacted the ocean.