Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Shortly after takeoff from Bogotá-Guaymaral Airport, while climbing, the pilot declared an emergency after the failure of the right engine. He attempted an emergency landing in an open field when the aircraft crashed in a prairie located near the Los Andes hippodrome, some 5 km northeast of Guaymaral Airport, bursting into flames. A passenger was seriously injured while both other occupants were killed.

G-BYCP was planned to operate a non-commercial flight from Stapleford Aerodrome to RAF Brize Norton with two company employees on board (including the pilot) to pick up two passengers for onward travel. The pilot (the aircraft commander) held a Commercial Pilot’s Licence (CPL) and occupied the left seat and another pilot, who held an Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence (ATPL), occupied the right. The second occupant worked for the operator of G-BYCP but his licence was valid on Bombardier Challenger 300 and Embraer ERJ 135/145 aircraft and not on the King Air. The pilot reported for work at approximately 0715 hrs for a planned departure at 0815 hrs but he delayed the flight because of poor meteorological visibility. The general weather conditions were fog and low cloud with a calm wind. At approximately 0850 hrs the visibility was judged to be approximately 600 m, based on the known distance from the operations room to a feature on the aerodrome. At approximately 0915 hrs, trees were visible just beyond the end of Runway 22L, indicating that visibility was at least 1,000 m and the pilot decided that conditions were suitable for departure. At 0908 hrs, the pilot called the en-route Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) on his mobile phone to ask for a departure clearance. He was instructed to remain clear of controlled airspace when airborne and call London Tactical Control Northeast (TCNE) on 118.825 MHz. The planned departure was to turn right after takeoff and intercept the 128° radial from Brookman’s Park VOR (BPK) heading towards the beacon, and climb to a maximum altitude of 2,400 ft amsl to remain below the London TMA which has a lower limit of 2,500 ft amsl. The aircraft took off at 0921 hrs and was observed climbing in a wings level attitude until it faded from view shortly after takeoff. After takeoff, the aircraft climbed on a track of approximately 205°M and, when passing approximately 750 ft amsl (565 ft aal), began to turn right. The aircraft continued to climb in the turn until it reached 875 ft amsl (690 ft aal) when it began to descend. The descent continued until the aircraft struck some trees at the edge of a field approximately 1.8 nm southwest of the aerodrome. The pilot and passenger were both fatally injured in the accident, which was not survivable. A secondary radar return, thought to be G-BYCP, was observed briefly near Stapleford Aerodrome by London ATC but no radio transmission was received from the aircraft. A witness was walking approximately 30 m north-east of where the aircraft struck the trees. She suddenly heard the aircraft, turned towards the sound and saw the aircraft in a nose‑down attitude fly into the trees. Although she saw the aircraft only briefly, she saw clearly that the right wing was slightly low, and that the aircraft appeared to be intact and was not on fire. She also stated that the aircraft was “not falling” but flew “full pelt” into the ground.

On 2 October 2015, at approximately 0016LT, the airplane crashed after takeoff from runway 31 at Jalalabad Airfield, on the second scheduled leg of a contingency airlift mission. The mishap aircraft was assigned to the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. The mishap crew (MC) was from the 774th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron. The MC consisted of the mishap pilot (MP), the mishap copilot (MCP), and two mishap loadmasters. Also on board were two fly-away security team (FAST) members and five contractors travelling as passengers. Upon impact, all eleven individuals onboard the aircraft died instantly. The aircraft struck a guard tower manned by three Afghan Special Reaction Force (ASRF) members, whom also died. The MA and cargo load were destroyed, and a perimeter wall and guard tower were damaged.

Following an uneventful skydiving mission over the Dubai Drop Zone, the pilot was returning to his base. Upon landing on runway 06, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway to the left, struck an embankment and came to rest with the right wing torn off. The pilot was uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On the day of the accident, the crew of four was deployed for flights from Luxembourg (LUX) via Saarbrucken (SCN) to Hamburg (HAM) and back again via Saarbrucken to Luxembourg with a Bombardier DHC-8-402. The crew stated that they had met at about 0530 hrs for pre-flight preparations. The flights up until the take-off in Saarbrucken had occurred without incident. All in all the working atmosphere had been good and relaxed and they had been ahead of schedule. Saarbrucken was the destination airport for 14 passengers. The remaining 16 passengers’ destination airport was Luxembourg. According to the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), and the radio communication recordings, the engine start-up clearance was issued at 1009:47 hrs approximately 25 minutes ahead of schedule. At 1015:03 hrs while taxiing on taxiway C take-off clearance was issued. The Into Position Check was conducted at 1015:33 hrs on runway 09. The Pilot in Command (PIC) was Pilot Flying (PF) and the co-pilot Pilot Non Flying (PNF). The plan was to conduct take-off with reduced engine thrust (81%). During take-off the following callouts were made:
1016:24 PF take off, my controls
1016:25 PNF your controls
1016:27 PNF spoiler is closed
1016:30 PNF autofeather armed
1016:33 PF looks like spring
1016:35 PNF yeah, power is checked
1016:36 PNF 80 knots
1016:37 PF checked
1016:40 PNF V1, rotate
1016:42 Background click sound, probably gear lever UP
1016:43 PNF upps, sorry
During the rotation phase with approximately 127 KIAS and a nose-up attitude of approximately 5°, the landing gear retracted. At 1016:44 hrs the airplane’s tail had the first ground contact (tail strike). The tail strike warning light illuminated. Approximately 875 m after the initial ground contact the airplane came to a stop after it had bounced three times and skidded on the fuselage. The cabin crew stated that due to smoke and fume development in the cabin the airplane was evacuated right away. All passengers and the crew were uninjured and left the severely damaged airplane without help.

On the morning of 25 September 2015, the captain and copilot of a Cessna 550 aircraft (Citation Bravo), registered VH-FGK, prepared to conduct a private flight from Lismore Airport to Baryulgil, about 40 NM south-west of Lismore, New South Wales. The aircraft had been parked at the northern end of the airport overnight, with engine covers and control locks on. After arriving at the airport, the flight crew conducted a pre-flight inspection, with no abnormalities identified. They then commenced the normal pre-start checks, which included the disengagement of the flight control locks. The crew elected to use runway 15 for take-off, and used the Cessna simplified take-off performance criteria (see Take-off performance simplified criteria) to determine the thrust settings and take-off reference speeds. The resultant reference speeds were 105 kt for the decision speed (V1) and 108 kt for the rotation speed (VR). At about 1300 Eastern Standard Time, the flight crew started the engines and performed the associated checks, with all indications normal. The crew reported that they completed the after start checks, and the captain then taxied the aircraft to the holding point for runway 15, less than 200 m from where the aircraft was parked. While stopped at the holding point, the crew completed the taxi and pre-take-off checks, the copilot broadcast the standard calls on the common traffic advisory frequency, and the captain communicated with air traffic control (ATC). The captain taxied the aircraft onto the runway, and turned left onto the runway centreline to commence the take-off run from the intersection. While rolling along the runway, the captain advanced the thrust levers to the approximate take-off setting. The captain then called ‘set thrust’, and the copilot set the thrust levers to the more precise position needed to achieve the planned engine thrust for the take-off. As the aircraft accelerated, the copilot called ‘80 knots’ and crosschecked the two airspeed indicators were in agreement and reading 80 kt. The copilot called ‘V1’ and the captain moved their hands from the thrust levers to the control column in accordance with the operator’s normal procedure. A few seconds later, the copilot called ‘rotate’ and the captain initiated a normal rotate action on the control column. The crew reported that the aircraft did not rotate and that they did not feel any indication that the aircraft would lift off. The copilot looked outside and did not detect any change in the aircraft’s attitude as would normally occur at that stage. The captain stated to the copilot that the aircraft would not rotate, and pulled back harder on the control column. The copilot looked across and saw the captain had pulled the control column firmly into their stomach. Although the aircraft’s speed was then about 112 kt, and above VR, the crew did not detect any movement of the attitude director indicator or the nose wheel lifting off the ground, so the captain rejected the take-off; applied full brakes, and set the thrust levers to idle and then into reverse thrust. The aircraft continued to the end of the sealed runway and onto the grass in the runway end safety area (RESA), coming to rest slightly left of the extended centreline, about 100 m beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and the flight crew, who were the only occupants of the aircraft, were uninjured. The nose landing gear separated from the aircraft during the overrun, and there was significant structural damage to the fuselage and wings. The right wheel tyre had deflated due to an apparent wheel lockup and flat spot, which had progressed to a point that a large hole had been worn in the tyre.

The Buffalo Airways Curtiss C-46A (C-GTXW) was operating as flight 525 from Yellowknife, NT (YZF) to Norman Wells, NT (YVQ). While en route, approximately 140 nautical miles southeast of Norman Wells at 6500 feet above sea level, the crew noticed a drop in the right engine oil quantity indicator in conjunction with a propeller overspeed. The propeller pitch was adjusted to control the overspeed however, oil quantity indication continued to drop rapidly. A visual confirmation of the right engine nacelle confirmed that oil was escaping via the engine breather vent at an abnormally high rate. The right propeller speed became uncontrollable and the crew completed the "Prop overspeed drill". However, the propeller did not feather as selected. Several additional attempts were made to feather the propeller before it eventually feathered. The engine was secured and the shutdown checklist completed. The crew elected to divert to Tulita, NT (ZFN), but quickly determined that the descent rate would not permit that as an option. The only other option for diversion was Déline, NT (YWJ) where weather was reported at half a mile visibility and 300 feet ceiling. An emergency was declared with Déline radio. BFL525 was able to land at Déline however, the landing gear was not selected down to prevent further loss of airspeed resulting in a belly landing approximately midpoint of runway 08. The aircraft continued off the end of the runway coming to a stop approximately 700 feet beyond the threshold. The crew evacuated the aircraft sustaining no injuries however, the aircraft was destroyed.

The commercial pilot was conducting a personal flight. He reported that he did not recall what happened the day of the accident. One witness, who was former pilot, reported that he saw the airplane fly over his house and that the engines sounded as if they were "out of sync." A second witness, who lived about 5 miles away from the airport, reported that she saw the airplane flying unusually low. She added that the engines sounded terrible and that they were "popping and banging." A third witness, who was holding short of the runway waiting to take off, reported that he saw the airplane approaching the runway about 75 ft above ground level (agl). He then saw the airplane descend to about 50 ft agl and then climb back to about 75 ft agl, at which point the airplane made a hard, right turn and then impacted terrain. Although a postaccident examination of both engines revealed no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation, the witnesses' described what appeared to be an engine problem. It is likely that one or both of the engines was experiencing some kind of problem and that the pilot subsequently lost airplane control. The pilot reported in a written statement several months after the accident that, when he moved the left rudder pedal back and forth multiple times after the accident, neither the torque tubes nor the rudder would move, that he found several of the rivets sheared from the left pedal, and that he believed the rudder had failed. However, postaccident examination of the fractured rivets showed that they exhibited deformation patterns consistent with overstress shearing that occurred during the accident sequence. No preimpact anomalies with the rudder were found.

At 1817 Central Daylight Time, the Keystone Air Service Ltd. Piper PA-31-350 (registration C-FXLO, serial number 31-8052022) departed Runway 06 at Thompson Airport, Manitoba, on an instrument flight rules flight to Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson International Airport, Manitoba, with 2 pilots and 6 passengers on board. Shortly after rotation, both engines began to lose power. The crew attempted to return to the airport, but the aircraft was unable to maintain altitude. The landing gear was extended in preparation for a forced landing on a highway southwest of the airport. Due to oncoming traffic, the forced landing was conducted in a forested area adjacent to the highway, approximately 700 metres south of the threshold of Runway 06. The occupants sustained varying serious injuries but were able to assist each other and exit the aircraft. The emergency locator transmitter activated, and there was no fire. Emergency services were activated by a 911 call and by the Thompson flight service station. Initial assistance was provided by sheriffs of the Manitoba Department of Justice after a crew member flagged down their vehicle on the highway.

The airline transport pilot was conducting a cross-country aerial observation flight in the multiengine airplane. The pilot reported that the airplane was on the final leg of the traffic pattern when he reduced the power levers for landing and noticed that the right engine sounded like the propeller was moving toward the beta position. The pilot increased the engine power, and the sound stopped. As the airplane got closer to the runway, he decreased the engine power, and the sound returned. In addition, the airplane began to yaw right. The pilot applied left aileron and rudder inputs to remain above the runway centerline without success. While over the runway, the pilot reduced the engine power to idle, and the airplane continued to yaw right. The pilot applied full power in an attempt to perform a go-around; however, the airplane yawed about 30 degrees off the runway centerline, touched down in the grass, and impacted trees before coming to rest. The right wing, right engine, and right propeller assembly were impact-separated. The right engine propeller came to rest about 50 ft forward of the main wreckage, and it was found in the feathered position. A review of maintenance records revealed that the right propeller had been overhauled and reinstalled on the airplane 2 days before the accident and had operated 9 hours since that time. Subsequent testing of the right propeller governor revealed that it functioned without anomaly; however, the speed settings were improperly configured. Further, the testing revealed that the beta valve travel from the neutral position was out of tolerance. Although this could have let oil pressure port to one side of the spool or the other and, thus, changed the propeller blade angle, it could not be determined whether this occurred during the accident landing. Impact damage precluded examination of the right propeller governor control linkage; therefore, it could not be determined if it was inadequately installed or rigged, which could have resulted in the propeller moving into the beta position. The investigation could not determine why the right propeller moved toward the beta position as engine power was reduced, as reported the pilot.