Crash of an Antonov AN-74-200 in Akola

Date & Time: Apr 14, 2018
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EK-74036
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
365 470 98 965
YOM:
1995
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a humanitarian mission, carrying five crew members and a load of various goods. After landing, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its left main gear and came to rest. All five occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-76TD at Boufarik AFB: 257 killed

Date & Time: Apr 11, 2018 at 0750 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
7T-WIV
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Boufarik – Béchar – Tindouf
MSN:
1043419649
YOM:
1994
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
247
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
257
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged in a troop transport from Boufarik to Tindouf with an intermediate stop in Béchar, west Algeria, and was carrying 247 soldiers and their family members and 10 crew members. Shortly after takeoff from the Boufarik AFB located some 25 km southwest of Algiers, while climbing to a height of about 150 meters, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an agricultural zone located near the airport, bursting into flames. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. It was quickly confirmed by the Algerian Authorities that none of the 257 occupants survived the crash, among them 26 members of the Front Polisario. According to first testimonies, it appears that the left wing (engine?) was on fire when control was lost.

Crash of a Cessna 525 Citation CJ4 in Marion

Date & Time: Apr 2, 2018 at 1709 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N511AC
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jackson - Marion
MSN:
525C-0081
YOM:
2012
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
35437
Captain / Total hours on type:
2537.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2537
Circumstances:
A single-engine airplane was taking off from runway 15 about the same time that a multi-engine business jet landed on a nearly perpendicular runway (runway 22). The single-engine airplane, piloted by a private pilot, was departing on a local flight. The jet, piloted by an airline transport pilot, was rolling down the runway following a straight-in visual approach and landing. The single-engine airplane collided with the empennage of the jet at the intersection of the two runways. Witnesses in the airport lounge area heard the pilot of the single-engine airplane announce on the airport's universal communications (UNICOM) traffic advisory frequency a few minutes before the accident that the airplane was back-taxiing on the runway. The pilot of the jet did not recall making any radio transmissions on the UNICOM frequency and review of the jet's cockpit voice recorder did not reveal any incoming or outgoing calls on the frequency. The pilots of both airplanes were familiar with the airport, and the airport was not tower controlled. The airport had signage posted on all runways indicating that traffic using the nearly perpendicular runway could not be seen and instructed pilots to monitor the UNICOM. A visibility assessment confirmed reduced visibility of traffic operating from the nearly perpendicular runways. The reported weather conditions about the time of the accident included clear skies with 4 miles visibility due to haze. Both airplanes were painted white. It is likely that the pilot of the jet would have been aware of the departing traffic if he was monitoring the UNICOM frequency. Although the jet was equipped with a traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS), he reported that the system did not depict any conflicting traffic during the approach to the airport. Although the visibility assessment showed reduced visibility from the departing and arrival runways, it could not be determined if or at what point during their respective landing and takeoff the pilot of each airplane may have been able to see the other airplane. In addition to the known reduced visibility of the intersecting runways, both airplanes were painted white and there was reported haze in the area, which could have affected the pilots' ability to see each other.
Probable cause:
The failure of both pilots to see and avoid the other airplane as they converged on intersecting runways. Contributing to the accident was the jet pilot's not monitoring the airport's traffic advisory frequency, known reduced visibility of the intersecting runways, and hazy weather condition.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C99 Airliner in Hastings

Date & Time: Mar 16, 2018 at 0750 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N213AV
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Omaha – Hastings
MSN:
U-213
YOM:
1983
Flight number:
AMF1696
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6500
Captain / Total hours on type:
1145.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
853
Copilot / Total hours on type:
21
Aircraft flight hours:
17228
Circumstances:
According to the operator's director of safety, during landing in gusty crosswind conditions, the multi-engine, turbine-powered airplane bounced. The airplane then touched down a second time left of the runway centerline. "Recognizing their position was too far left," the flight crew attempted a go-around. However, both engines were almost at idle and "took time to spool back up." Without the appropriate airspeed, the airplane continued to veer to the left. A gust under the right wing "drove" the left wing into the ground. The airplane continued across a grass field, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane slid to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing. The director of safety reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation system located at the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 110° at 21 knots, gusting to 35 knots. The pilot landed on runway 04. The Beechcraft airplane flight manual states the max demonstrated crosswind is 25 knots. Based on the stated wind conditions, the calculated crosswind component was 19 to 33 knots.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision to land in a gusty crosswind that exceeded the airplane's maximum demonstrated crosswind and resulted in a runway excursion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-6/B2-H2 Turbo Porter in Grenoble

Date & Time: Mar 15, 2018 at 1215 LT
Registration:
F-BTCG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Grenoble - Grenoble
MSN:
551
YOM:
1963
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2000
Captain / Total hours on type:
500.00
Aircraft flight hours:
12260
Circumstances:
The pilot, accompanied by an aircraft mechanic, departed Grenoble-Aples-Isère Airport (saint-Geoirs) to carry out a check flight following a maintenance operation on the airplane. Once in an open area south of the aerodrome, the pilot began the maneuvers provided for in the test program. At the end of a stall maneuver, he found that his actions on the rudder pedals have no effect. However, it maintained control of the ailerons and elevators. He informed the aerodrome controller of the problem and indicated that he was coming back to to land to the paved runway 09. Unable to determined the exact nature of the damage, the pilot chose to land with the flaps retracted. He managed with difficulty to aligne the airplane witn the runway 09 centerline. On final, at an altitude of 300 feet, the pilot changed his mind and decided to land on the unpaved right-hand runway 09 which adjoins the paved runway. On very short final, at flare, while reducing power, at a height of about 1-2 metres, the airplane rolled to the right then to the left, causing the wing tips and the propeller to struck the ground. The aircraft exited the unpaved runway to the left and came to rest on the right edge of the paved runway. Both occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The rudder control broke in flight, causing a significant alteration of the aircraft yaw controllability. This failure considerably increased the pilot's workload and stress. In these conditions, it became difficult for him to keep the airplane aligned with the runway centreline upon landing. Monitoring the alignment of the aircraft was done to the detriment of the speed. It is very likely that the oscillations during the final step resulted from a stall of the aircraft at low speed.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-8-Q402 Dash-8 in Kathmandu: 51 killed

Date & Time: Mar 12, 2018 at 1419 LT
Operator:
Registration:
S2-AGU
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dhaka - Kathmandu
MSN:
4041
YOM:
2001
Flight number:
BS211
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
67
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
51
Captain / Total flying hours:
5518
Captain / Total hours on type:
2824.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
390
Copilot / Total hours on type:
240
Aircraft flight hours:
21419
Aircraft flight cycles:
28649
Circumstances:
On March 12, 2018, a US Bangla Airlines, Bombardier DHC-8-402, S2-AGU, flight number BS211 departed Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, Dhaka, Bangladesh at 06:51 UTC on a schedule flight to Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu, Nepal. The aircraft overflew part of Bangladesh and Indian airspace en-route to Nepal. At 0641, Dhaka Ground Control contacted the aircraft requesting for its Bangladesh ADC number which was recently made mandatory a few weeks ago by Bangladesh authority for all international outbound flights. The crew provided the ADC number as 2177 as provided in the Flight Plan. The Ground Controller again asked the crew if they had the ADC for Bangladesh. At 0642, PIC then contacted the Operations to confirm the Bangladesh ADC number. As per the CVR records, changes in the PIC’s vocal pitch and language used indicated that he was agitated and experiencing high levels of stress at the time while communicating with Dhaka Ground Control and airlines operations. The aircraft finally took off at 0651. As the aircraft was in a climb phase, the PIC overheard a communication between Operations and another US Bangla aircraft regarding the fuel onboard but the PIC without verifying whether the message was meant for him or not, engaged in some unnecessary conversation with the Operations staff. The Captain's vocal pitch and language used indicated that he was very much emotionally disturbed and experiencing high level of stress. The aircraft established its first contact with Kathmandu Control at 0752:04. At 0807:49 the First Officer contacted Kathmandu Control and requested for descent. Kathmandu Control gave descend clearance to FL160 with an estimated approach time of 0826 which was acknowledged by the First Officer. At 0810 the flight was handed over to Kathmandu Approach. At 0811, Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to 13,500 ft and hold over GURAS. The crew inserted the HOLD in the Flight Management System. At 0813:41 Kathmandu Approach further instructed the aircraft to reduce its speed and descend to 12500 ft. At 0816 Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to further descend to 11500 ft., and cleared for VOR approach RWY 02 maintaining minimum approach speed. Both the crew forgot to cancel the hold on the FMS as they were engaged in some unnecessary conversation. Upon reaching GURAS, the aircraft turned left to enter the holding pattern over GURAS, it was noticed by PIC and FO and immediately PIC made correction and simultaneously this was alerted to the crew by Approach Control also. Once realizing the aircraft flying pattern and ATC clearance, the PIC immediately selected a heading of 027° which was just 5° of interception angle to intercept the desired radial of 202° inbound to KTM. The spot wind recorded was westerly at 28kt. The aircraft continued approach on heading mode and crossed radial 202° at 7 DME of KTM VOR. The aircraft then continued on the same heading of 027° and deviated to the right of the final approach course. Having deviated to the right of the final approach path, the aircraft reached about 2-3 NM North east of the KTM VOR and continued to fly further northeast. At 0827, Kathmandu Tower (TWR) alerted the crew that the landing clearance was given for RWY 02 but the aircraft was proceeding towards RWY 20. At 0829, Tower Controller asked the crew of their intention to which the PIC replied that they would be landing on RWY 02. The aircraft then made an orbit to the right. The Controller instructed the aircraft to join downwind for RWY 02 and report when sighting another Buddha Air aircraft which was already on final for RWY 02. The aircraft instead of joining downwind leg for RWY 02, continued on the orbit to the right on a westerly heading towards Northwest of RW 20. The controller instructed the aircraft to remain clear of RWY 20 and continue to hold at present position as Buddha air aircraft was landing at RW 02 (from opposite side) at that time. After the landing of Buddha Air aircraft, Tower Controller, at 08:32 UTC gave choice to BS211 to land either at RW 20 or 02 but the aircraft again made an orbit to the right, this time northwest of RWY 20. While continuing with the turn through Southeastern direction, the PIC reported that he had the runway in sight and requested tower for clearance to land. The Tower Controller cleared the aircraft to land but when the aircraft was still turning for the RWY it approached very close to the threshold for RWY 20 on a westerly heading and not aligned with the runway. At 08:33:27 UTC, spotting the aircraft maneuvering at very close proximity of the ground and not aligned with the RWY. Alarmed by the situation, the Tower Controller hurriedly cancelled the landing clearance of the aircraft by saying, "Takeoff clearance cancelled". Within the next 15-20 seconds, the aircraft pulled up in westerly direction and with very high bank angle turned left and flew over the western area of the domestic apron, continued on a southeasterly heading past the ATC Tower and further continued at a very low height, flew over the domestic southern apron area and finally attempted to align with the runway 20 to land. During this process, while the aircraft was turning inwards and momentarily headed towards the control tower, the tower controllers ducked down out of fear that the aircraft might hit the tower building. Missing the control tower, when the aircraft further turned towards the taxi track aiming for the runway through a right reversal turn, the tower controller made a transmission by saying, "BS 211, I say again...". At 08:34 UTC the aircraft touched down 1700 meters down the threshold with a bank angle of about 15 degrees and an angle of about 25 degrees with the runway axis (approximately heading Southeast) and to the left of the center line of runway 20, then veered southeast out of the runway through the inner perimeter fence along the rough down slope and finally stopped about 442 meters southeast from the first touchdown point on the runway. All four crew members (2 cockpit crew and 2 cabin crew) and 45 out of the 67 passengers onboard the aircraft were killed in the accident. Two more passengers succumbed to injury later in hospital during course of treatment. The aircraft caught fire after 6 seconds of touchdown which engulfed major portions of the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The Accident Investigation Commission determines that the probable cause of the accident is due to disorientation and a complete loss of situational awareness in the part of crewmember. Contributing to this the aircraft was offset to the proper approach path that led to maneuvers in a very dangerous and unsafe attitude to align with the runway. Landing was completed in a sheer desperation after sighting the runway, at very close proximity and very low altitude. There was no attempt made to carry out a go around, when a go around seemed possible until the last instant before touchdown on the runway.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- Improper timing of the pre-flight briefing and the commencement of the flight departure in which the operational pre-flight briefing was given in early morning but the flight departure time was around noon and there were four domestic short flights scheduled in between.
- The PIC, who was the pilot flying, seemed to be under stress due to behavior of a particular female colleague in the company and lack of sleep the preceding night.
- A very steep gradient between the crew.
- Flight crew not having practiced visual approach for runway 20 in the simulator.
- A poor CRM between the crew.

An investigation into the captain's behaviour showed that he had history of depression while serving in the Bangladesh Air Force in 1993 and was removed from active duty after evaluation by a psychiatrist. He was re-evaluated by a psychiatrist in January 2002 and was declared to be fit for flying. Examinations in successive annual medical checks were not focused on his previous medical condition of depression, possibly because this was not declared in the self-declaration form for annual medicals. During the flight the captain was irritable, tensed, moody, and aggressive at various times. He was smoking during the flight, contrary to company regulations. He also used foul language and abusive words in conversation with the junior female first officer. He was engaged in unnecessary conversation during the approach, at a time when sterile cockpit rules were in force. The captain seemed very unsecure about his future as he had submitted resignation from this company, though only verbally. He said he did not have any job and did not know what he was going to do for living.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31P Pressurized Navajo in Laredo: 2 killed

Date & Time: Mar 8, 2018 at 1038 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N82605
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Laredo - Laredo
MSN:
31P-7730010
YOM:
1977
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4243
Copilot / Total flying hours:
194
Aircraft flight hours:
3185
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot and passenger, who held a student certificate, departed runway 18R for a local flight in a multi-engine airplane. The pilot held a flight instructor certificate for single-engine airplane. Just after takeoff, the tower controller reported to the pilot that smoke was coming from the left side of the airplane. The pilot acknowledged, stating that they were going to "fix it," and then entered a left downwind for runway 18R, adding that they didn't need any assistance. The controller subsequently cleared the airplane to land on runway 18L, which the pilot acknowledged. Two witnesses reported seeing the smoke come from the left engine. Still images taken from airport security video show the airplane before making the turn to land with white smoke trailing and the landing gear down. The airplane was then seen in a steep left turn to final approach exceeding 90° of bank, before it impacted terrain, just short of the runway in a near vertical attitude. A postcrash fire ensued. The examination of the wreckage found that the left engine's propeller was not being driven by the engine at the time of impact. The left propeller was not in the feathered position and the landing gear was found extended. The damage to the right engine propeller blades was consistent with the engine operating at high power at impact. The examination of the airframe and engines revealed no evidence of preimpact anomalies; however, the examinations were limited by impact and fire damage which precluded examination of the hoses and lines associated with the engines. The white smoke observed from the left side of the airplane was likely the result of an oil leak which allowed oil to reach the hot exterior surfaces of the engine; however, this could not be verified due to damage to the engine. There was no evidence of oil starvation for either engine. Both the extended landing gear and non-feathered left propeller would have increased the drag on the airplane. Because the pilot's operating procedures for an engine failure in a climb call for feathering the affected engine and raising the landing gear until certain of making the field, it is unlikely the pilot followed the applicable checklists in response to the situation. Further, the change from landing on runway 18R to 18L also reduced the radius of the turn and increased the required angle of bank. The increased left banked turn, the right engine operating at a high-power setting, and the airplane's increased drag likely decreased the airplane airspeed below the airplane's minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc), which resulted in a loss of control.
Probable cause:
An engine malfunction for undetermined reasons and the subsequent loss of control, due to the pilot's improper decision to maneuver the airplane below minimum controllable airspeed and his improper response to the loss of engine power.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 at Hmeimim AFB: 39 killed

Date & Time: Mar 6, 2018 at 1451 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RF-92955
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kuweires – Hmeimim
MSN:
101 07
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
33
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
39
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Kuweires-Rasin El Aboud Airbase on a flight to Hmeimim AFB, carrying 33 passengers and a crew of six. On final approach, the aircraft went out of control and crashed about 500 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. There were no survivors among the 39 occupants. The airplane was registered RF-92955 (52 red). It is believed that the loss of control that occurred on short final was the result of low level windshear.

Crash of a Boeing 737-322 in Lubumbashi

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2018 at 1201 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9S-ASG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kinshasa – Lubumbashi
MSN:
24378/1704
YOM:
1989
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
18700
Captain / Total hours on type:
1100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7400
Copilot / Total hours on type:
710
Aircraft flight hours:
61721
Aircraft flight cycles:
36555
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Kinshasa-N'Djili Airport on a cargo flight to Lubumbashi, carrying five crew members and one passenger. Following an uneventful flight, the crew was cleared to descend and to land at Lubumbashi-Luano Airport. After landing on runway 07, the crew started the braking procedure. At a speed of 80 knots, the aircraft deviated to the left. It veered off runway and while contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest in a grassy area along the left shoulder of the runway after a course of about 200 metres. All six occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following factors were identified:
- Reduction of simulator training hours for economic reasons for someone who has never performed the duties of controlling an aircraft on the ground.
- The runway shoulders at Lubumbashi (Luano) do not have the same characteristics with regard to strength (see Annex 14 and Document 9157 Part 3).
In conclusion, the actions taken on the rudder before it became ineffective must have been the cause of the aircraft's deviation from the runway centreline and the loss of control of the aircraft (LOC-G).
Final Report:

Crash of an Airbus A320-214 in Tallinn

Date & Time: Feb 28, 2018 at 1711 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ES-SAN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tallinn - Tallinn
MSN:
1213
YOM:
2000
Flight number:
MYX9001
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
228
Captain / Total hours on type:
0.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
24046
Copilot / Total hours on type:
40
Aircraft flight hours:
44997
Aircraft flight cycles:
21839
Circumstances:
On 28th February 2018 at 10:021, the Smartlynx Airlines Estonia Airbus A320-214 registered ES-SAN took off from Tallinn airport Estonia to perform training flights with 2 crew members (captain and safety pilot), 4 students and 1 ECAA inspector on board. Following several successful ILS approaches and touch-and-go cycles, at 15:04, after a successful touch down with the runway, the aircraft did not respond as expected to sidestick inputs when reaching rotation speed. After a brief lift-off, the aircraft lost altitude and hit the ground close to the end of the runway. In the impact, the aircraft engines impacted the runway and the landing gear doors were damaged. After the initial impact, the aircraft climbed to 1590 ft from ground level and pitched down again. The pilots were able to stabilize the flight path by using manual pitch trim and engine thrust and make a U-turn back towards the runway. The crew declared an emergency and the aircraft was cleared for an emergency landing. During the approach, the aircraft lost power in both engines. The aircraft landed 150 m before the threshold of runway at 15:11. On landing, aircraft tires burst, and the aircraft veered off the runway and finally came to a stop 15 m left to the runway. The safety pilot and one of the students suffered minor impact trauma in this accident. The aircraft landing gear doors, landing gears, both engine nacelles, engines and aircraft fuselage suffered severe damage in this accident resulting in aircraft hull loss.
Probable cause:
Causal factors:
This accident results from the combination of the following factors:
• The intermittent THSA override mechanism malfunction allowing to cause the loss of pitch control by both ELACs. The repetitive triggering of the ELAC PITCH faults was caused by the non or late activations of the PTA micro-switches, which were due to the OVM piston insufficient stroke. The insufficient OVM stroke was caused by the THSA OVM clutch unit non-standard friction. The oil in the THSA OVM casing appeared to be with a higher viscosity than defined in the CMM. The higher viscosity might have reduced the friction of the OVM clutch unit, causing the THSA OVM nonstandard friction.
• SEC design flaw allowing for a single event, the left landing gear temporary dedecompression, to cause the loss of pitch control by both SECs. The absence of ground spoilers arming for landing in the context of touch and go's training may have contributed to the temporary decompression of the left main landing gear.
• The training instructor`s decision for continuation of the flight despite repetitive ELAC PITCH FAULT ECAM caution messages. The lack of clear framework of operational rules for training flights, especially concerning the application of the MEL, and the specific nature of operations that caused pressure to complete the training program may have impacted the crew decision-making process.

Contributory factors
• Smartlynx Estonia ATO TM does not clearly define the need for arming spoilers when performing touch-and-go training (ATO procedures not in accordance with Airbus SOP). The fact that there is no clear reference in the Smartlynx Estonia ATO TM Touch-And-Go air exercise section to additional procedures that should be used, in combination with lack of understanding of the importance for arming the spoilers during this type of flights contributed to TRI making a decision to disarm the spoilers during touch and go training enabling landing gear bounce on touch down.
• At the time of the event Airbus QRH did not define the maximum allowed number of resets for the flight control computers.
• At the time of the event Airbus FCTM did not require to consider MEL on touch-and-go and stop-and-go training.
• The oil in the THS OVM casing was with higher viscosity than defined in the CMM. The higher viscosity might have reduced the friction of the OVM clutch unit.
• The aircraft maintenance documentation does not require any test of the OVM during aircraft regular maintenance checks.
• Smartlynx Estonia ATO OM does not clearly specify the role in the cockpit for the Safety Pilot. The lack of task sharing during the event caused the ECAM warnings to be left unnoticed and unannounced for a long period.
• The crew not resetting the ELAC 1. The fact that ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT was left unreset lead to the degradation of the redundancy of the system. Considering the remoteness of the loss control of both elevators, there is no specific crew training for MECHANICAL BACKUP in pitch during approach, landing and take-off. This condition of the aircraft occurred for the crew in a sudden manner on rotation and during training flight, where the experienced TRI is not in PF role and cannot get immediate feedback of the aircraft behaviour and condition. Despite these difficult conditions the crew managed to stabilize and land the aircraft with no major damage to the persons on board. The crew performance factors that contributed to the safe landing of the aircraft are the following:
• The TRI followed the golden rule of airmanship (fly, navigate, communicate), by stabilizing the aircraft pitch by using the trim wheel and by keeping the aircraft engine power as long as possible;
• The Safety Pilot started to play a role in the cockpit by assisting the TRI and student by informing them about the status of the aircraft and later on taking the role of the PM.
Final Report: