Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the aircraft stalled and crashed near the runway end. Both pilots and four passengers were killed while 15 other occupants were injured.

The approach to Ilaga Airport was completed in poor weather conditions due to heavy rain falls. After landing on a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest down an embankment. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot said that after climbing about 500 feet after takeoff, at 120 knots with the gear retracted, the left engine lost power. He feathered the propeller, lowered the nose to the horizon, and began a shallow left turn back to the airport. He left the flaps at 20° and noted a descent of 200 feet to 300 feet per minute in the turn. After clearing trees, the pilot extended the landing gear, banked the aircraft to the right to align it with the runway and lowered flaps to 40°. After touchdown, he applied single engine reversing. The aircraft went off right side of runway and into a ditch, collapsing the right main and nose gear. Examination of the engine revealed the torque sensor housing had failed, resulting in loss of drive to the fuel pump. Metallurgical exam of the housing arm of the torque sensor revealed it had failed from fatigue. On 9/14/79, a service bulletin (SB) was issued for replacement of the torque sensor housing with an improved housing. The manufacturer overhauled the engine on 12/1979, but SB was not complied with. SB indicated a history of resonant vibration causing cracks in the housing arm of original torque sensor and gear assemblies, and that the housing should be replaced, no later than during next part exposure. Investigation revealed pilot did not comply with engine failure procedures and airspeeds. Flight manual cautioned not to use 40° of flaps during single engine landings.

Following an uneventful charter flight from Chailley, the aircraft landed on runway 33 at 1942LT with two passengers and two pilots on board. Just behind the Falcon 10 landed on same runway 33 a Boeing 727-223 registered EI-HCD and operated by Hunting Cargo Airlines. With four people on board, the B727 completed a cargo flight from Porto. Both aircraft vacated the runway at taxiway K-1 but the Falcon 10 used a taxiway parallel to the one which EI-HCD was using while heading for the apron. At the intersection of taxiways A-8 and M-8 both aircraft collided. While the B727 suffered minor damages, the Falcon 10 was damaged beyond repair and its four occupants escaped uninjured, among them the French actor Gérard Depardieu.

The approach and landing to Ngau Airport were completed in poor weather conditions with fog and rain falls. After landing on a wet grassy runway, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (the runway is 760 metres long). It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen metres further. All five occupants escaped injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Schönhagen Airport, the twin engine aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area short of runway. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Bahía Tortugas to Ensenada, carrying a load of 8 tons of lobsters. At takeoff, the aircraft encountered difficulties to gain height, stalled and crashed, bursting into flames. All five occupants were killed.

The pilot had flown this route in make and model airplane for nearly 4 years. He calculated 900 pounds of fuel were required for the flight, and saw 956 pounds on the fuel totalizer. The pilot was told by the ground controller of weather delays to his destination that ranged up to 2.5 hours. En route he was issued holding instructions with an EFC of 50 minutes later. After released from holding, 52 minutes after takeoff, the pilot was told that he was being vectored for a 35 mile final approach. The pilot then told the controller that he was fuel critical and the controller vectored him ahead of other airplanes. Ten minutes later, 84 minutes after takeoff, the controller asked his fuel status, and the pilot responded 'pretty low, seems like I'm losing oil pressure.' The pilot then advised the controller, 85 minutes after takeoff, that he shut down the right engine. He then declared an emergency and advised that he was not going to make the airport. Examination of the wreckage revealed the fuel tanks were intact, the fuel caps were secured, and the amount of fuel recovered from both tanks was 1.5 gallons, which was less than the specified unusable quantity. Company records showed that similar flights took about 48 minutes, and the airplane's average fuel flow was 580 pounds per hour.

After takeoff, the pilot transmitted to ATC controllers that he had lost power in an engine. He made a steep turn to the left back toward the airport, then a right turn toward the runway. The aircraft's nose dropped in the right turn, and the aircraft crashed nose first on a taxiway. Post crash examination of the aircraft structure and flight control systems revealed no preimpact failure or malfunction. The left propeller was found in the feathered position, and the right propeller was found in a high blade angle. The right propeller had damage consistent with the engine operating. Teardown examination of the engines and propellers showed no findings that would have resulted in engine or propeller malfunction or failure. At the time the aircraft was purchased by the pilot in March 1996, he had not flown for about 10 years. Since purchasing the aircraft, he had logged 2.5 hours of transition/checkout in the airplane and had flown it for a total of about 22 hours, mostly on 'sightseeing flights.'

The airplane was at FL 330 when the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to Newburgh/Stewart International Airport and landed. The airplane was destroyed by fire after landing. The fire had burned for about 4 hours after after smoke was first detected. Investigation revealed that the deepest and most severe heat and fire damage occurred in and around container 06R, which contained a DNA synthesizer containing flammable liquids. More of 06R's structure was consumed than of any other container, and it was the only container that exhibited severe floor damage. Further, 06R was the only container to exhibit heat damage on its bottom surface, and the area below container 06R showed the most extensive evidence of scorching of the composite flooring material. However, there was insufficient reliable evidence to reach a conclusion as to where the fire originated. The presence of flammable chemicals in the DNA synthesizer was wholly unintended and unknown to the preparer of the package and shipper. The captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to call for checklists or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required checklist items. The Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations do not adequately address the need for hazardous materials information on file at a carrier to be quickly retrievable in a format useful to emergency responders.