Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Columbus

Date & Time: Aug 6, 1998 at 0450 LT
Registration:
N5MJ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Columbus - Detroit
MSN:
421B-0925
YOM:
1975
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2145
Captain / Total hours on type:
594.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6925
Circumstances:
Upon reaching an altitude of 400 agl after takeoff, the left side door on the nose baggage door opened. The pilot-in- command initiated a left turn to return to the airport. During the turn the stall horn sounded. The airplane then descended and impacted the terrain. Investigation revealed that both pilots did a portion of the aircraft preflight inspection. Both pilots were qualified to act as PIC for the flight and this flight would typically have been a single pilot operation. However, the company who hired the operator to transport their employees requested two pilots. The operator did not have any written procedures regarding the division of duties for a two pilot operation on this type of aircraft.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-commands failure to maintain airspeed and the subsequent stall/mush. Factors associated with the accident were the open baggage door and the inadequate aircraft preflight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-4B5 in Seoul

Date & Time: Aug 5, 1998 at 2201 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HL7496
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tokyo - Jeju - Seoul
MSN:
26400
YOM:
1996
Flight number:
KE8702
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
379
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Originally, the flight was a direct one from Tokyo-Narita to Seoul but due to poor weather conditions at destination, the crew diverted to Jeju. The aircraft departed Jeju Airport at 2107LT on the final leg to Seoul-Gimpo Airport. At destination, weather conditions were still poor with heavy rain falls and wind from 220 gusting to 22 knots. After touchdown on runway 14R, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft deviated to the right and veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All 395 occupants evacuated, among them 20 were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the loss of control after touchdown was the consequence of the captain's misuse of the thrust reverser during the landing roll and his confusion over crosswind conditions. Investigations revealed that after touchdown, the n°1 engine thrust reverser did not deploy because the n°1 engine power lever's position did not allow the reverser to be deployed. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor weather conditions,
- Cross wind component,
- Wet runway surface,
- Poor braking action.

Crash of a Socata TBM-700 in Spearfish: 4 killed

Date & Time: Aug 4, 1998 at 1345 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N69BS
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Lawrence – Madison – Spearfish
MSN:
10
YOM:
1991
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
3150
Aircraft flight hours:
1695
Circumstances:
Witnesses observed the flight enter downwind for runway 30, after it had completed a published approach to runway 12, with a circle to land on runway 30. The witnesses, one of which was a commercial pilot said that there were jagged ceilings at the time about 400 to 500 feet above the ground. He and two other men with him saw the airplane below the clouds. As the airplane proceeded downwind, it momentarily entered a cloud. As the airplane came out of the cloud, it turned left in about a 30 degree turn. The angle of bank increased to about 70 to 80 degrees, the tail of the airplane came up, and the airplane impacted the ground nose first. Several pilots at the airport heard someone from N69BS make a radio transmission on the UNICOM frequency. What was heard by several people was that N69BS had broken out at 2200 feet. They then heard, 'N69BS turning base,' immediately followed by 'lookout' and 'oh ....' All of the eye witnesses agreed that at no time did they see or hear any problems with the engine. They all said that the sounds coming from the engine never changed. The published approach in use at the time of the accident was the GPS (global positioning system) runway 12. The pilot made his initial approach to runway 12, broke off the approach to the right, entered a right downwind for a landing on runway 30. The published circling minimums for the approach were MDA (minimum descent altitude) 4,800 feet, HAT (height above terrain) 869 feet. Using an approach speed of 90 knots, the minimum visibility was 1 mile. Using an approach speed of 120 knots, the minimum visibility was 1 1/4 miles. The field elevation was 3,931 feet. The profile for the GPS runway 12 approach showed that after the IAF (Jesee way point), the course was 204 degrees, at 7,000 feet, to the Dezzi way point, from Dezzi the course was 114 degrees, descend to 5,600, to Sophi way point, after Sophi descend to 4,800 feet to the missed approach point at the Ruste way point. The distance from Dezzi to Ruste was 10 miles.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while turning to base leg. Contributing factors were low ceilings, clouds, and the pilot's failure to adhere to both the published approach procedures and the published minimum descent altitude.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-32 in Kunduz: 5 killed

Date & Time: Aug 2, 1998
Type of aircraft:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
On approach to Kunduz Airport, while on a military supply mission, the crew reported technical problems when control was lost. The aircraft crashed few km short of runway and was destroyed. All five occupants were killed.

Crash of a Dornier DO228-201 in Cochin: 9 killed

Date & Time: Jul 30, 1998 at 1105 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-EJW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Agathi – Cochin – Thiruvananthapuram
MSN:
8075
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
LRR503
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Captain / Total flying hours:
5366
Captain / Total hours on type:
2271.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a flight from Agathi to Thiruvananthapuram with an intermediate stop in Cochin, carrying three passengers and three crew members. After takeoff from runway 17, at a height of about 400 feet, the aircraft pitched up steeply to a near vertical attitude and thereafter appeared to perform a manoeuvre similar to a stall turn to the right and crashed on the roof of the Component Repair Shop (CRS) building of the Naval Aircraft Yard. After impact the aircraft caught fire and was totally destroyed. All six occupants were killed as well as three people in the building. Six others received minor injuries.
Probable cause:
After take off the aircraft pitched up uncontrollably, stalled fell to its right and crashed. The uncontrollable pitch up was caused by sudden uncommanded downward movement of the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer leading edge. This was due to partial detachment of its 'actuator forward bearing support' fitting due non installation of required hi-lok fasteners. Poor aircraft maintenance practices at Short Haul Operations Department contributed to the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III in Barcelona: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 28, 1998 at 0052 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EC-FXD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Palma de Mallorca - Barcelona
MSN:
AC-651
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
SWT704
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4500
Captain / Total hours on type:
4132.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1769
Aircraft flight hours:
14748
Circumstances:
Flight SWT704, a cargo flight from Palma de Mallorca to Barcelona, was to be used by the crew as an instruction flight. The co-pilot, who that day was flying for the first time since 20th March 1998, and who was sitting in the left-hand seat, would thus carry out a refresher flight as "First officer under supervision", in accordance with the operator's procedures. At first, it had been planned that the aircraft should carry out a missed approach with one engine on its arrival at Barcelona Airport. However, for a runway 25 approach this was very difficult and the captain decided to postpone this manoeuvre. It was then decided to carry out a standard approach leaving the glide path a little above and then stopping the engine. They would then raise the landing gear and flaps by increments. The captain added: "As soon as we're without control, we'll restore it" (the engine). The approach to runway 25 was also normal. At 00:47:10 they contacted the Barcelona control tower, which indicated that they were number 1, that they should continue and that they should notify "established in final". Afterwards, they extended the landing gear and flaps. At 22:49:55 h, the captain notified the control tower that they were established in final. The tower indicated that they should continue, that a flight was leaving runway 25 and that it would call them immediately. At that moment, the Metro was at a height of some 1400 feet, at some 6 nm (about 3 minutes at 120 kt) from the runway threshold. At 22:50:03 h, with gear and flaps down, the instructor said "Well, engine stop" to which the copilot replied: "Come on, landing gear up". Contrary to normal practice, the right engine was shut down completely and the prop was feathered. It's usual practice to retard the throttles to idle to simulate zero thrust for that engine. When the co-pilot pushed the wrong pedal, the plane deviated to the right. The captain then tried to start the engine again. This failed however because due to the seizing of the guide rod bushing of the propeller pitch change mechanism, the pitch varying mechanism did not take the blades to the necessary pitch for start-up. The captain then said: "Well, I am taking out the engine again. I've raised the flap for you. Now flap by increments...". A few moments later the copilot asked "I continue with the approach, don't I?" to which the captain replied in the affirmative and added that they had been authorized to land and that they were going to land with one engine. At 22:51:09 he again confirmed "Well, just continue with one engine" and appeared to give general instructions on how to carry out a missed approach or what to do when near the runway. At 22:52:01, the captain said "landing gear", the co-pilot said "landing gear now" and the captain then confirmed "coming down". The stall warning then began to sound. The aircraft turned off to the right of the ILS localizer and adopted a position of almost 90° of roll to the left, then a position of 90° of roll to the right whilst continuing to lose height and then again took up a position of 90° of roll to the left. Finally, the left wing struck the ground and then the aircraft crashed first into the outside barrier of highway B-203 which runs round the edge of the Airport and then the perimeter fence, finally coming to a halt at some 250 m from the threshold of runway 25 and some 100 metres to the right of the runway axis. The wreckage of the aircraft burst into flames.
Probable cause:
It is considered that the probable cause of the accident was the loss of control of the aircraft due to an excessive reduction of speed at low height, after having extended the landing gear, with an intermediate flap position, and with the right engine stopped and its propeller pitch close to feather.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fairchild-Hiller FH-227B in Keflavik

Date & Time: Jul 26, 1998 at 2355 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N564LE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Billund - Aberdeen - Keflavik
MSN:
564
YOM:
1967
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach, when the landing gears were extended, the crew heard loud cracking noise. The landing was aborted and the aircraft passed the tower for visual inspection and one of the crew went to the cabin for visual check of the landing gears where he observed that the right landing gear lock strut rear member had broken loose from the side member assembly and was hanging down. Upon touchdown the gear folded up and the aircraft right propeller, wing tip and bottom of the fuselage touched ground and the aircraft went off the runway in a gentle right turn. The fuselage bottom skin and frame structure sustained extensive damage and the right wing tip, propeller blades, lock strut assembly and drag strut were destroyed. The aircraft operated on a ferry flight from Billund, Denmark to Miami-Opa Locka, Florida, with en route stops at among others Aberdeen and Keflavík.
Probable cause:
Preliminary investigation revealed that no lubricant was found in the lock strut hinge pin that should normally be packed with grease.

Crash of a Cessna 500 Citation I in Rawlins

Date & Time: Jul 24, 1998 at 2208 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FSKC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Winnipeg – Rawlins – Santa Ana
MSN:
500-0018
YOM:
1972
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5750
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
11163
Circumstances:
The captain said the airplane felt 'sluggish' during the takeoff roll. At V1/Vr, the airplane was rotated for liftoff. It climbed 10 feet, 'shuddered,' and sank. The captain elected to abort the takeoff. He landed the airplane on the runway, applied brakes and deployed the drag chute. The drag chute separated and the airplane went off the runway, down a hill, through a fence, across a road and grassy area, across another road, through a chain link fence, and collided with a power pole. The captain said they had calculated the takeoff performance using inappropriate tables, and failed to consider the wet runway and wind shift. The drag chute riser fractured at a point where it passed through a lightning hole. The lightning hole bore no evidence of a nylon grommet having been installed.
Probable cause:
The captain's use of improper airplane performance data, resulting in inadequate takeoff capability. Factors were his decision to abort the takeoff above V1, the separation of the drag chute, a wet runway, a tailwind, and collision with objects that included two fences and a power pole.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-12 at Pushkin AFB

Date & Time: Jul 23, 1998 at 0225 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-11886
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pushkin AFB – Ukhta – Norilsk
MSN:
2 3 403 02
YOM:
1962
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After 33,5 seconds during the takeoff roll, after a distance of 975 metres and at a speed of 210 km/h, the engine n°4 failed and its propeller automatically feathered. For unknown reasons, the crew failed to identify this failure and the pilot-in-command started the rotation (elevator -26°) at an insufficient speed of 238 km/h instead of the recommended 250 km/h. After liftoff, the aircraft started to roll to the right, causing the right wing to struck the ground two seconds after rotation. The went out of control, lost its undercarriage, slid for about 300 metres and came to rest, bursting into flames. All nine occupants escaped with various injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by fire.
Probable cause:
Failure of the engine n°4 due to an incorrect setting of the propeller speed control system.

Crash of a Partenavia P.68B in Wagga Wagga: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 20, 1998 at 1739 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-IXH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Corowa – Albury – Wagga Wagga
MSN:
186
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1014
Captain / Total hours on type:
217.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft operator had been contracted to provide a regular service transporting bank documents, medical pathology samples and items of general freight between Wagga Wagga, Albury and Corowa. On the day of the accident a passenger was accompanying the pilot for the day's flying. The pilot commenced the flight from Corowa to Albury under the Visual Flight Rules, flying approximately 500 ft above ground level. At Albury he obtained the latest aerodrome weather report for Wagga Wagga, which indicated that there was scattered cloud at 300 ft above ground level, broken cloud at 600 ft above ground level, visibility restricted to 2,000 m in light rain and a sea-level barometric pressure (QNH) of 1008 hPa. At 1715 Eastern Standard Time (EST) the aircraft departed Albury for Wagga Wagga under the Instrument Flight Rules. The pilot contacted the Melbourne en-route controller at 1728 and reported that he was maintaining 5,000 ft. Although the aircraft was operating outside controlled airspace, the en-route controller did have a radar surveillance capability and was providing the pilot with a flight information service. However, no return was recorded from the aircraft's transponder and at 1732 the pilot reported that he was transferring to the Wagga Wagga Mandatory Broadcast Zone frequency. This was the pilot's last contact with the controller. Although air traffic services do not monitor or record the Wagga Wagga Mandatory Broadcast Zone frequency, transmissions made on this frequency are recorded by AVDATA for the purpose of calculating aircraft landing charges. This information was reviewed following the accident. The pilot broadcast his position inbound to the aerodrome on the mandatory broadcast zone frequency and indicated that he was conducting a Global Positioning System (GPS) arrival. He established communication with the pilot of another inbound aircraft and at 9 NM from the aerodrome, broadcast his position as he descended through 2,900 ft. Approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds later, the pilot advised that he was passing 2,000 ft but immediately corrected this to state that he was maintaining 2,000 ft. He also stated that it was "getting pretty gloomy" and that according to the latest weather report he should be visual at the procedure's minimum descent altitude. The aircraft would have been approximately 6 NM from the aerodrome at this time. This was the last transmission heard from the pilot. The resident of a house to the south of Gregadoo Hill sighted the aircraft a short time before the accident. He was standing outside his house and stated that the aircraft was visible as it passed directly overhead at what appeared to be an unusually low height. The aircraft then disappeared into cloud that was obscuring Gregadoo Hill, approximately 350 m from where he was standing. Moments later he heard the sound of an impact followed almost immediately by a red flash of light. The noise from the engines appeared to be normal up until the sound of the impact. The aircraft had collided with steeply rising terrain on the southern face of Gregadoo Hill, approximately 40 ft below the crest. The hill is 4 NM from the aerodrome and is marked on instrument approach charts as a spot height elevation of 1,281 ft. The estimated time of the accident was 1739. The pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries.
Probable cause:
The pilot had received an accurate appreciation of the weather conditions in the vicinity of Wagga Wagga prior to departing Albury. At that stage it would have been apparent that low cloud and poor visibility were likely to affect the aircraft's arrival. Under such conditions it would not have been possible to land from the GPS arrival procedure. As the reported cloud base and visibility were both below the minimum criteria, it is difficult to rationalise the pilot's transmission that, according to the latest weather report, he would be visual at the minimum descent altitude. This statement suggests that the pilot had already made the decision to continue his descent below the minimum altitude for the procedure and to attempt to establish visual reference for landing. Based on the report of broken low cloud in the vicinity of the aerodrome, the pilot would have needed to descend to 1,324 ft above mean sea level to establish the aircraft clear of cloud. This is within 50 ft of the last altitude recorded on the GPS receiver. Due to the difference between the actual and forecast QNH, the left altimeter would over-read by approximately 150 ft. At the time of the occurrence an otherwise correctly functioning instrument would have indicated an altitude of approximately 1,400 ft. The pilot had probably set the right altimeter to the local QNH prior to departing Albury. As this setting also corresponded to the actual QNH at Wagga Wagga, that instrument would have provided the more accurate indication of the aircraft's operating altitude. However, because of its location on the co-pilot's instrument panel, it is unlikely that the pilot would have included that altimeter in his basic instrument scan. It was not possible to assess the extent to which illicit drugs may have influenced the pilot's performance during the flight and affected his ability to safely operate the aircraft.
The following factors were identified:
- The pilot was operating the aircraft in instrument meteorological conditions below the approved minimum descent altitude.
- Low cloud was covering Gregadoo Hill at the time of the accident.
Final Report: