Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during a missed approach. Additional factors included the operator's inadequate oversight, the pilot's improper in-flight decision, conditions conducive to pilot fatigue, fog, and night.

The accident was caused by the combination of the following factors:
- The erroneous actions of the flight engineer when trying to lower the landing gear,
- Failure of the flight crew to conduct the necessary (final approach) checks,
- The failure by the crew to check and respond to landing gear warning indications,
- The execution of a flight with an incomplete composition of crew, causing additional workload on the flight engineer during the approach (height and speed call outs),
- Late commands to go around by the air traffic controller,
- On the Yak-40 the landing gear handle moves to the opposite direction for retraction and lowering compared to the Antonov 24 (the flight mechanic had more, and recent, flight experience on the Yakovlev 40 jet),
- The large workload and fatigue of the crew during the recent six days before the incident.

The following findings were identified:
- Dimension and intensity of the storm front and dynamics of the weather conditions,
- Inadequate use of resources in decision-making during the flight (proactive),
- Loss of alternative landing facilities at increasing time pressure (reactive),
- Landing of the aircraft outside the operating area of an aerodrome,
- Collision with the embankment due to the non-detection of an obstacle.
Systemic causes:
- Inadequate information on weather conditions and development before and during the flight,
- Inadequate information on the Werneuchen Special Airfield due to an ambiguous map display as well as misleading or lack of communication,
- Inadequate labeling/marking of the operational and non-operational areas of the airport.

It is estimated that the accident was caused as follows:
The aircraft was being operated on a training flight at Shimoji-Shima Airport, and was making a one-engine-out touch-and-go landing with the right engine simulated inoperative. The touchdown was late and beyond the normal aim point, and on the direction of the instructor, the trainee pilot attempted to go around on only the left engine. However, the trainee mishandled the aircraft, and then, seeing the instructor advance the right engine’s thrust lever, he applied right rudder pedal mechanically. This coincided with an increase in the rotation speed of the left engine, and the aircraft’s attitude suddenly changed towards the right. Because the trainee pilot could not fully correct this and the instructor was late in taking over control, the aircraft veered off the east side of the runway into a grass area and was damaged. Moreover, it is estimated that the following causal factors contributed to the accident:
1) The instructor did not take over when he directed the trainee to go around, or at an earlier stage, because he thought to allow the trainee pilot to handle the aircraft as much as possible, and because he did not sufficiently recognize that a go-around with one-engine simulated inoperative is a difficult maneuver for an inexperienced pilot.
2) Regarding the instructor’s intent to allow the trainee pilot to handle the aircraft as much as possible, the company’s instructional guidelines contained statements meaning that a judgment to go around should be made by the trainee pilot, and that during simulated one-engine-out touch-and-go training landings, the go-around after landing should continue with one engine simulated inoperative.
3) Regarding the instructor’s insufficient recognition of the difficulty of a go-around with one engine simulated inoperative for an inexperienced pilot, the instructor had not been trained to deal with the situation encountered in the accident, and the company’s regulations and manuals did not describe considerations on the difficulty of executing a go-around with one-engine simulated inoperative for an inexperienced pilot or on the effects of the wind on such maneuvers.
4) Regarding the delay in the instructor taking over control of the aircraft, the instructor was not following with his hands on the control wheel and was not in a position to take over immediately if necessary, and when the instructor had changed from being a simulator instructor to a flight instructor, he had not received sufficient training on cautionary matters regarding training in actual aircraft.

The pilot's improper use of flight controls during takeoff, that resulted in the loss of control during takeoff.

The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed above the stall speed while maneuvering to land after the engine ceased operating for undetermined reasons, which resulted in a stall/spin, an uncontrolled descent, and an impact with the ground.

The following findings were identified:
- The elevator trim was not correctly configured to neutral prior to takeoff,
- The pilot failed to abort the takeoff after the first attempted rotation, when the aircraft did not respond normally to elevator command,
- The takeoff was initiated with a tailwind component that was close to the maximum permissible value.

The energy accumulated in the set of tires deflated the tire n°2, reducing the braking effectiveness by 50% due to the loss of the antiskid of that set in the same proportion, and subsequently the loss of 100% of the effectiveness of braking when tires n°3 and 4 burst successively, causing the aircraft to exceed the remaining runway length leading to the accident situation.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The increase in speed of the VRF by the crew that increased the landing length,
- An unstabilized approach completed by the the crew,
- The pressure exerted on the crew due to the public order situation in the city of Florence for the purpose of a possible overnight stay of the aircraft and consequently the crew.

The Accident Investigation Board President found by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the flight mishap was the excessive cargo weight loaded on the mishap aircraft at the Band E Sardeh Dam landing zone. In particular, the weight was substantially more than the crew had planned for, and, as such, the previously planned, and later executed, takeoff speed was insufficient to support a successful takeoff and sustained flight departure by the aircraft. The Board President also found that a substantially contributing factor to the mishap was the current method of cargo weight planning utilized by the deployed ground forces, and accepted by the aircrews, that relies upon the personal estimations of personnel in the field as to the weight of cargo to be loaded on aircraft in a combat environment.