Oceania

Following an uneventful flight from Lae, the crew started the approach to Madang Airport runway 25. The visibility was limited by night and poor weather conditions. In heavy rain falls, the captain realized that all conditions were not met to land and decided to initiate a go-around. Following a short holding pattern, he started the approach to runway 07. The aircraft landed 300 metres past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in a ravine. Due to torrential rain, all 39 occupants preferred to stay in the aircraft and were evacuated few dozen minutes later only. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Sole on board, the pilot was engaged in a crop spraying mission in the region of Taupo. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing at low height, the pilot initiated a right turn when the aircraft lost height and crashed in a pasture about 11 km northeast of Taupo. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was seriously injured.

The aircraft was on a scheduled freight service from Darwin via Tindal, Alice Springs, and Adelaide to Sydney under the IFR. The flight from Darwin to Tindal was apparently normal, and the aircraft departed Tindal slightly ahead of schedule at 1834 CST. The pilot in command occupied the left cockpit seat. At 1925, the aircraft reported at position DOLPI (200 miles north of Alice Springs) Flight Level 330, to Melbourne Control. Another Westwind aircraft was en route Darwin–Alice Springs and was more than 40 miles ahead of VH-AJS. Information from the aircraft cockpit voice recording confirmed that the pilot in command was flying the aircraft. At about 1929, he began issuing instructions to the co-pilot to program the aircraft navigation system in preparation for a locator/NDB approach to Alice Springs. The pilot in command asked the co-pilot to enter an offset position into the area navigation (RNAV) system for an 11-mile final for runway 12. The co-pilot entered the bearing as 292 degrees Alice Springs. (This was the outbound bearing from Alice Springs NDB to Simpson’s Gap locator indicated on the locator/NDB approach chart.) The pilot in command stated that he had wanted the bearing with respect to the runway, 296 degrees, entered but said that the setting could be left as 292 degrees. He then instructed the co-pilot to set Alice Springs NDB frequency on ADF 1, Simpson’s Gap locator on ADF 2, and to preset the Temple Bar locator frequency on ADF 2 so that it could be selected as soon as the aircraft passed overhead Simpson’s Gap. He indicated his intention to descend to 4,300 feet until overhead Simpson’s Gap, and said that the co-pilot should then set 3,450 feet on the altitude alert selector. On passing Temple Bar, the co-pilot was to set 2,780 feet on the altitude alert selector which the pilot in command said would be used as the minimum for the approach. At 1940, the co-pilot contacted Adelaide Flight Service (FIS) and was given the Alice Springs weather, including the local QNH. At 1945, he advised Adelaide FIS that the aircraft was leaving Flight Level 330 on descent. At about 30 miles from Alice Springs, the pilot in command turned the aircraft right to track for the offset RNAV position 292 degrees/11 miles Alice Springs. The crew set local QNH passing 16,000 feet and then completed the remaining transition altitude checks. These included selecting landing and taxi lights on. At 1949, the co-pilot advised Adelaide FIS that the aircraft was transferring frequency to the Alice Springs MTAF. At 1953, the aircraft passed Simpson’s Gap at about 4,300 feet and the copilot set 3,500 feet in the altitude alert selector. About 15 seconds later, the pilot in command told the co-pilot that, after the aircraft passed overhead the next locator, he was to set the ‘minima’ in the altitude alert selector. At 1954 , the pilot in command called that the aircraft was at 3,500 feet. A few seconds later, the co-pilot indicated that the aircraft was over the Temple Bar locator and that they could descend to 2,300 feet. The pilot in command repeated the 2,300 feet called by the co-pilot and asked him to select the landing gear down. The crew then completed the pre-landing checks. Eleven seconds later, the co-pilot reported that the aircraft was 300 feet above the minimum descent altitude. This was confirmed by the pilot in command. About 10 seconds later, there were two calls by the co-pilot to pull up. Immediately after the second call, the aircraft struck the top of the Ilparpa Range (approximately 9 kilometres north-west of Alice Springs Airport), while heading about 105 degrees at an altitude of about 2,250 feet in a very shallow climb. At approximately 1950, witnesses in a housing estate on the north-western side of the Ilparpa Range observed aircraft lights approaching from the north-west. They described the lights as appearing significantly lower than those of other aircraft they had observed approaching Alice Springs from the same direction. The lights illuminated buildings as the aircraft passed overhead and then they illuminated the northern escarpment of the range. This was followed almost immediately by fire/explosion at the top of the range.

The twin engine aircraft belly landed at Lae-Nadzab Airport. It slid down the runway for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft departed Hamilton Airport runway 36 on a scheduled service to New Plymouth on behalf of Eagle Airways. Six minutes after takeoff, while climbing to an altitude of 5,000 feet, the crew informed ATC about the failure of the left engine and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. Four minutes later, the right turn failed as well. The airplane lost height and crashed in an open field located 9 km from Hamilton Airport. All six occupants were killed.

The pilot reported that the flight departed from an agricultural strip located in a valley surrounded by hills. The aircraft carried a full load of superphosphate to be spread on a property approximately one mile from the strip. The pilot had previously surveyed the property and the flight path. He had selected a route that took him up through a valley between hills and then over a low ridge to the property. After take off the pilot set climb power and selected climb flap in order to follow his predetermined route to the property. The pilot advised that as the aircraft flew towards the low ridge it appeared to be descending rather than climbing. He elected to carryout a partial dump and to apply extra flap to clear a clump of trees. The speed deteriorated to 60 knots from the initial climb speed of 70 knots. The pilot did not increase power. Some 300 metres later another partial dump was carried out to clear another tree. As that tree was cleared the pilot again initiated a partial dump and turned to the right in an endeavour to escape from a rapidly deteriorating situation. Immediately the turn was initiated the right wing dropped and the aircraft stalled, impacting the ground onto the right wing and cartwheeled to a stop some 50 metres from the initial impact. The company chief pilot examined the accident site and advised that the flight path through the valley was in a classic false horizon situation whereby the surrounding hills caused the pilot to consider that the flight path was over flat terrain whilst in reality the terrain was rising approximately 5 degrees up to the ridge. The chief pilot also advised that the aircraft would not have been able to outclimb the terrain at high gross weight with only cruise power set.

Shortly after takeoff from Mangakino, while climbing, the single engine aircraft collided with power cables and crashed in a field. The pilot was injured.

The crew was engaged in a local training flight at Bili Airfield. During the takeoff roll on a grassy airstrip, the crew lost control of the airplane that veered off runway, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft departed Sydney for Melbourne International airport at 0130 on 21 December 1994. En-route cruise was conducted at flight level 140. Melbourne Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) indicated a cloud base of 200 feet for the aircraft's arrival and runway 27 with ILS approaches, was in use. Air Traffic Control advised the pilot of VH-UZB, another company MU2 that was also en-route from Sydney to Melbourne, and the pilot of VH-IAM while approaching the Melbourne area, that the cloud base was at the ILS minimum and that the previous two aircraft landed off their approaches. VH-UZB was slightly ahead of VH-IAM and made a 27 ILS approach and landed. In response to an inquiry from the Tower controller the pilot of VH-UZB then advised that the visibility below the cloud base was 'not too bad'. This information was relayed by the Tower controller to the pilot of VH-IAM, who was also making a 27 ILS approach about five minutes after VH-UZB. The pilot acknowledged receipt of the information and was given a landing clearance at 0322. At 0324 the Approach controller contacted the Tower controller, who had been communicating with the aircraft on a different frequency, and advised that the aircraft had faded from his radar screen. Transmissions to VH-IAM remained unanswered and search-and-rescue procedures commenced. Nothing could be seen of the aircraft from the tower. A ground search was commenced but was hampered by the darkness and reduced visibility. The terrain to the east of runway 27 threshold, in Gellibrand Hill Park, was rough, undulating and timbered. At 0407 the wreckage was found by a police officer. Due to the darkness and poor visibility the policeman could not accurately establish his position. It took approximately another 15-20 minutes before a fire vehicle could reach the scene of the burning aircraft. The fire was then extinguished.

The aircraft was operating from an agricultural airstrip 600 feet above mean sea level, spreading superphosphate over moderately steep undulating terrain. The duration of each flight was 6-7 minutes. The accident flight was the seventh and probably intended to be the last for the day. A witness, who was situated under the flight path, reported that the aircraft was tracking east-north-east in what appeared to be normal flight. Her attention was distracted for a few moments and when she next saw the aircraft it was in a near vertical dive with the upper surface of the wings facing her. The aircraft then struck the hillside and burst into flames. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any pre-existing defect which may have contributed to the accident. Impact marks on the propeller indicated that the engine was operating at impact. The superphosphate load remained in the hopper and the emergency dump system actuating lever was in the closed position. Inspection indicated that the dump system was serviceable prior to impact. Calculations indicated that at the time of the accident the aircraft, although heavily loaded, was operating within the flight manual maximum weight limitation. A light north-easterly wind was observed at the airstrip. However, at the accident site, which was about 250 feet higher, the wind was a moderate west-north-westerly. Sky conditions were clear with a visibility of 30 km. The aircraft probably experienced windshear and turbulence as it encountered a quartering tailwind approaching the ridgeline. The result would have been a reduction in climb performance and it is likely that the pilot attempted to turn the aircraft away from the rising terrain. During the turn it appears that the aircraft stalled and that the pilot was unable to regain control before it struck the ground.