Takeoff (climb)

Flight Type:

Positioning

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Denver - Denver

MSN:

404-0813

YOM:

1981

Flight number:

LYM182

Location:

Denver-Centennial

Colorado

Country:

United States of America

Region:

North America

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

2566

Captain / Total hours on type:

624.00

Aircraft flight hours:

16681

Circumstances:

The pilot was conducting an early morning repositioning flight of the cargo airplane. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported to air traffic control that he had “lost an engine” and would return to the airport. Several witnesses reported that the engines were running rough and one witness reported that he did not hear any engine sounds just before the impact. The airplane impacted trees, a wooden enclosure, a chain-linked fence, and shrubs in a residential area and was damaged by the impact and postimpact fire. The airplane had been parked outside for 5 days before the accident flight and had been plugged in to engine heaters the night before the flight. It was dark and snowing lightly at the time of the accident. The operator reported that no deicing services were provided before the flight and that the pilot mechanically removed all of the snow and ice accumulation. The wreckage and witness statements were consistent with the airplane being in a right-winglow descent but the airplane did not appear to be out of control. Neither of the propellers were at or near the feathered position. The emergency procedures published by the manufacturer for a loss of engine power stated that pilots should first secure the engine and feather the propeller following a loss of engine power and then turn the fuel selector for that engine to “off.” The procedures also cautioned that continued flight might not be possible if the propeller was not feathered. The right fuel selector valve and panel were found in the off position. Investigators were not able to determine why an experienced pilot did not follow the emergency procedures and immediately secure the engine following the loss of engine power. It is not known how much snow and ice had accumulated on the airplane leading up to the accident flight or if the pilot was successful in removing all of the snow and ice with only mechanical means. The on-scene examination of the wreckage and the teardown of both engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. While possible, it could not be determined if water or ice ingestion lead to the loss of engine power at takeoff.

Probable cause:

The loss of power to the right engine for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examination and teardown and the pilot’s failure to properly configure the
airplane for single-engine flight.

Final Report:

Crash of a Gulfstream GIII in Biggin Hill

Date & Time: Nov 24, 2014 at 2030 LT

Type of aircraft:

Gulfstream GIII

Operator:

World Heir

Registration:

N103CD

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Biggin Hill - Gander

MSN:

418

YOM:

1984

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

4120

Captain / Total hours on type:

3650.00

Circumstances:

On 24 November 2014 the crew of Gulfstream III N103CD planned for a private flight from Biggin Hill Airport to Gander International Airport in Canada. The weather reported at the airport at 2020 hrs was wind ‘calm’, greater than 10 km visibility with fog patches, no significant cloud, temperature 5°C, dew point 4°C and QNH 1027 hPa. At 2024 hrs, the crew was cleared to taxi to Holding Point J1 for a departure from Runway 03. After the crew read back the taxi clearance, the controller transmitted: “we are giving low level fog patches on the airfield, general visibility in excess of 10 km but visibility not measured in the fog patches. it seems to be very low, very thin fog from the zero three threshold to approximately half way down the runway then it looks completely clear”. The crew acknowledged the information. At 2028 hrs, the aircraft was at the holding point and was cleared for takeoff by the controller. The aircraft taxied towards the runway from J1 but lined up with the runway edge lights, which were positioned 3 m to the right of the edge of the runway. The aircraft began its takeoff run at 2030 hrs, passing over paved surface for approximately 248 m before running onto grass which lay beyond. The commander, who was the handling pilot, closed the thrust levers to reject the takeoff when he realized what had happened and the aircraft came to a halt on the grass having suffered major structural damage. The crew shut down the engines but were unable to contact ATC on the radio to tell the controller what had happened. The co-pilot moved from the flight deck into the passenger cabin and saw that no one had been injured. He vacated the aircraft through the rear baggage compartment and then helped the commander, who was still inside, to open the main exit door. The commander and the five passengers used the main exit to vacate the aircraft. The controller saw that the aircraft had stopped but did not realize that it was not on the runway. He attempted to contact the crew on the radio but, when he saw the lights of the aircraft switch off, he activated the crash alarm, at 2032 hrs, declaring an aircraft ground incident. At 2034 hrs the airport fire service reached the aircraft and declared an aircraft accident, after which the airport emergency plan was activated.

Probable cause:

This was a private flight which could not depart in conditions of less than 400 m RVR. RVR cannot be measured at the threshold end of Runway 03 but the prevailing visibility was reported as being more than 10 km. The crew reported that there was moisture on the windscreen from the mist and they could see a “glow” around lights which were visible to them. They were also aware while taxiing that there was some patchy ground fog on the airfield. The ATC controller transmitted that visibility had not been measured in the fog patches but there seemed to be ‘very low, very thin fog from the zero three threshold to approximately half way down the runway’. With hindsight, this piece of information is significant but, at the time, the crew did not consider the fog to be widespread or thick; operating under FAR Part 91 in the United States, they were used to making their own judgments as to whether the visibility was suitable for a takeoff. However, after the aircraft came to a halt following its abortive takeoff attempt, the controller could only see the top of the fuselage and tail above the layer of fog. It is likely, therefore, that the visibility was worse than the crew appreciated at the time N103CD taxied from Holding Point J1. The route from J1 to the runway The information on the aerodrome chart used by the crew, and the source of information in the UK AIP, suggested that the aircraft would be required to taxi in a straight line from J1 to the runway and then make a right turn onto the runway heading. In fact, in order to taxi from J1 onto the runway, an aircraft must: taxi in a straight line; follow a curve to the right onto runway heading but still displaced to the right of the runway itself; turn left towards the runway; and then turn right again onto runway heading. The UK AIP states that there is no centreline lighting on Runway 03, and that the pavement width at the beginning of the runway is twice the normal runway width. It recognizes the potential for confusion and urges crews to ensure that they have lined up correctly. This information was not available to the crew on their aerodrome charts and both crew members believed that the runway had centreline lighting. Further, the light from those left-side runway edge lights covered in fog would have been scattered, making it harder for the crew to perceive them as a distinct line of lights. The situation is likely to have been made worse by the bright lights reflecting off the top of the fog layer, making the underlying runway lights even harder to see, or swamping them completely as shown in Figure 5. The CCTV images in Figure 5 show that peripheral lighting can interact with low fog layers to reduce the visibility of underlying aerodrome lighting. Current standards associated with apron lighting only address the minimum light levels required to make the areas safe and there are no standards relating to light spilling into other areas.
Human and environmental factors Five of the factors identified by the ATSB as being present in misaligned takeoffs were present in this accident:
1. It was dark.
2. It was potentially a confusing taxiway environment given that the aerodrome chart did not reflect the actual layout of the taxiways. Pilots had previously reported having difficulty when vacating the runway near the Runway 03 threshold because of a lack of taxiway lighting.
3. There was an additional paved area (the ORP) near the runway.
4. There was no runway centreline lighting and the runway edge lights before the displaced threshold were recessed.
5. There was reduced visibility.
It appeared that the information available to the crew caused them to develop an incorrect expectation of their route to the runway. Both crew members believed that the runway had centreline lighting and, when the first right turn almost lined the aircraft up with some lights, their incorrect expectation was reinforced and they believed that the aircraft was lined up correctly. Cues to the contrary, such as runway edge lights on the other side of the runway, or the fact that the first three lights ahead of the aircraft were red (indicating that they were edge lights before the displaced threshold), did not appear to have been strong enough to make the crew realize that they had lost situational awareness. Figure 8 indicates that the apparent intensity of the white left-side runway edge lights was significantly less than that of the right-side lights, when viewed from the position where the aircraft lined up. This, along with other visual issues relating to contrast and the fog, is a plausible explanation as to why they were not noticed by the crew. The aircraft began its takeoff roll from a location beyond the first red runway edge light and approximately 46 m short of the next light, as shown in Figure 1. Aircraft structure only obscures approximately the first 13 m of pavement ahead of pilots within a Gulfstream III aircraft and therefore these lights would not have been obscured by the aircraft. However, it is likely that the recessed nature of the red edge lights before the displaced threshold made them less compelling than the elevated white edge lights beyond, which would explain why their significance – that they could only have been runway edge lights – was not appreciated by the flight crew.

Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 401A in Fulton

Date & Time: Nov 17, 2014 at 1720 LT

Type of aircraft:

Cessna 401

Operator:

Heartland Air

Registration:

N401ME

Flight Phase:

Executive/Corporate/Business

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

Beechcraft 200 Super King Air

Schedule:

Fulton – Little Rock

MSN:

401A-0085

YOM:

1969

Location:

Fulton

Missouri

Country:

United States of America

Region:

North America

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

2949

Captain / Total hours on type:

304.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

8675

Copilot / Total hours on type:

1850

Aircraft flight hours:

6434

Circumstances:

The private pilot reported that, immediately after takeoff in the multi-engine airplane, the right engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot aborted the takeoff; the airplane exited the end of the runway surface, impacted rough terrain, and came to rest upright. Examination of the right engine showed that the magneto distributor drive gears were not turning. Both damaged magnetos were removed and replaced with a slave set of magnetos. The right engine was installed in an engine test cell, and subsequently started and performed normally throughout the test cell procedure. The damaged magnetos from the right engine were disassembled. Both nylon magneto distributor gears exhibited missing gear teeth and brown discoloration. A review of maintenance records showed that the right engine had been operated for about 8 years and an estimated 697 hours since the most recent magneto overhauls had been completed. According to maintenance instructions from the engine manufacturer, the magnetos should be inspected every 500 hours and should be overhauled or replaced at the expiration of five years since the last overhaul. Guidance also indicated that discoloration of the drive gear is an indication that the gear had been exposed to extreme heat and should be replaced.

Probable cause:

A failure of the right engine magneto distributor drive gears, which resulted in a total loss of engine power during takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the operator's failure to inspect and maintain the magnetos in accordance with the engine manufacturer's specifications.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B200 Super King Air in Wichita: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 30, 2014 at 0948 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Gilleland Aviation

Registration:

N52SZ

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Ferry

Survivors:

Site:

Wichita-Dwight D. Eisenhower (Mid-Continent)

Schedule:

Wichita – Mena

MSN:

BB-1686

YOM:

1999

Location:

Kansas

Country:

United States of America

Region:

North America

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

3139

Aircraft flight hours:

6314

Aircraft flight cycles:

7257

Circumstances:

The airline transport pilot was departing for a repositioning flight. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and stated that the airplane "lost the left engine." The airplane climbed to about 120 ft above ground level, and witnesses reported seeing it in a left turn with the landing gear extended. The airplane continued turning left and descended into a building on the airfield. A postimpact fired ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane. Postaccident examinations of the airplane, engines, and propellers did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Neither propeller was feathered before impact. Both engines exhibited multiple internal damage signatures consistent with engine operation at impact. Engine performance calculations using the preimpact propeller blade angles (derived from witness marks on the preload plates) and sound spectrum analysis revealed that the left engine was likely producing low to moderate power and that the right engine was likely producing moderate to high power when the airplane struck the building. A sudden, uncommanded engine power loss without flameout can result from a fuel control unit failure or a loose compressor discharge pressure (P3) line; thermal damage prevented a full assessment of the fuel control units and P3 lines. Although the left engine was producing some power at the time of the accident, the investigation could not rule out the possibility that a sudden left engine power loss, consistent with the pilot's report, occurred. A sideslip thrust and rudder study determined that, during the last second of the flight, the airplane had a nose-left sideslip angle of 29°. It is likely that the pilot applied substantial left rudder input at the end of the flight. Because the airplane's rudder boost system was destroyed, the investigation could not determine if the system was on or working properly during the accident flight. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the pilot failed to maintain lateral control of the airplane after he reported a problem with the left engine. The evidence also indicates that the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures for an engine failure during takeoff, which included retracting the landing gear and feathering the propeller. Although the pilot had a history of anxiety and depression, which he was treating with medication that he had not reported to the Federal Aviation Administration, analysis of the pilot's autopsy and medical records found no evidence suggesting that either his medical conditions or the drugs he was taking to treat them contributed to his inability to safely control the airplane in an emergency situation.

Probable cause:

The pilot's failure to maintain lateral control of the airplane after a reduction in left engine power and his application of inappropriate rudder input. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to follow the emergency procedures for an engine failure during takeoff. Also contributing to the accident was the left engine power reduction for reasons that could not be determined because a postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation and thermal damage precluded a complete examination.

Final Report:

Crash of a Short 360-200 off Sint Maarten: 2 killed

Date & Time: Oct 29, 2014 at 1840 LT

Type of aircraft:

Short 360

Operator:

Registration:

N380MQ

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Cargo

Survivors:

Site:

Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

Schedule:

Sint Maarten - San Juan

MSN:

3702

YOM:

1986

Flight number:

SKZ7101

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

5318

Captain / Total hours on type:

361.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

1040

Copilot / Total hours on type:

510

Aircraft flight hours:

25061

Aircraft flight cycles:

32824

Circumstances:

On October 29, 2014, at about 1840 Atlantic Standard Time, a Shorts SD3-60, United States registered N380MQ was destroyed when it crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff from Runway 28 at Princess Juliana International Airport, Sint Maarten, Dutch Antilles, Kingdom of the Netherlands. The two crewmembers on board sustained fatal injuries. The aircraft was operated by SkyWay Enterprises Inc. on a scheduled FedEx contract cargo flight to Luis Munoz Marin International Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico. At 1839 local, Juliana Tower cleared the aircraft for takeoff Runway 28 - maintain heading 230 until passing 4000 feet. At 1840 local, Tower observed the aircraft descending visually and the radar target and data block disappeared. There were no distress calls. Night conditions and rain prevailed at the time of the accident. Coast Guard search crews discovered aircraft debris close to the shoreline about 1 ½ hours later. The Sint Maarten Civil Aviation Authority initiated an investigation in accordance with ICAO Annex 13. Local investigation authority personnel were joined by Accredited Representatives and advisors from the following states: the USA (NTSB/FAA), United Kingdom (AAIB and Shorts Brothers PLC), and Canada (TSB, TC, PWC). Organization of the investigation included the following groups: Operations, Accident Site and Wreckage, Powerplants, Aircraft Maintenance, Air Traffic Services, Meteorology, and GPS Study. The operator made available personnel for interviews but deferred to participate in the groups. Flight recorders were not installed nor required on this cargo configured aircraft. The original FDR and CVR were removed following conversion to cargo only operations. A handheld GPS recovered from submerged wreckage was successfully downloaded. Data revealed the aircraft past the departure runway threshold on takeoff and attained a maximum GPS recorded altitude of 433 feet at 119 knots groundspeed at 18:39:30. The two remaining data points were over the sea and recorded decreasing altitude and increasing airspeed. The wreckage was recovered from the sea and examined by technical experts. Assessment of the evidence concluded there were no airframe or engine malfunctions that would have affected the airworthiness of the aircraft. The experts concluded that the aircraft struck the sea while under normal engine operation. Operations and human performance investigators evaluated the evidence and analyzed extensive interviews. The investigation concluded that the aircraft departed from the expected flight path in an unusual attitude. The pilot flying most likely experienced a somatographic illusion as a result of a stressful takeoff and acceleration from flap retraction. The pilot’s reaction to pitch down while initiating a required heading change led to an extreme unusual attitude. Circumstances indicate the pilot monitoring did not perceive/respond/intervene to correct the flight path and recover from the unusual attitude. The aircraft exceeded the normal maneuvering parameters, the crew experienced a loss of control, and lacking adequate altitude for recovery, the aircraft crashed into the sea.

Probable cause:

The investigation believes the PF experienced a loss of control while initiating a turn to the required departure heading after take-off. Flap retraction and its associated acceleration combined to set in motion a somatogravic illusion for the PF. The PF’s reaction to pitch down while initiating a turn most likely led to an extreme unusual attitude and the subsequent crash. PM awareness to the imminent loss of control and any attempt to intervene could not be determined. Evidence show that Crew resource management (CRM) performance was insufficient to avoid the crash. Contributing factors to the loss of control were environmental conditions including departure from an unfamiliar runway with loss of visual references (black hole), night and rain with gusting winds.

Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 35A in Tamanrasset

Date & Time: Oct 25, 2014 at 1513 LT

Type of aircraft:

Learjet 35

Operator:

Registration:

D-CFAX

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Ambulance

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Tamanrasset – Bata

MSN:

35-135

YOM:

1977

Location:

Tamanrasset

Country:

Algeria

Region:

Africa

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

The airplane was completing an ambulance flight (positioning) from Europe to Bata, Equatorial Guinea, with an intermediate stop in Tamanrasset, carrying a medical team of two doctors and two pilots. During the takeoff roll from Tamanrasset-Aguenar Airport, the crew heard a loud noise and decided to abort. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest. All four occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I in the Laguna de Tres Palos

Date & Time: Oct 24, 2014 at 1600 LT

Type of aircraft:

Cessna 208A Caravan

Operator:

Registration:

XA-WET

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Positioning

Survivors:

Site:

Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

Schedule:

Laguna de Tres Palos - Acapulco

MSN:

208-0294

YOM:

1998

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

5240

Captain / Total hours on type:

201.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

23837

Aircraft flight hours:

1760

Aircraft flight cycles:

1105

Circumstances:

The crew departed Laguna de Tres Palos on a positioning flight to the Acapulco-General Juan N. Álvarez International Airport. During the takeoff procedure, the seaplane started to oscillate from left to right. At a speed of about 45 knots, the crew abandoned the takeoff procedure when the aircraft nosed down, plunged into water and came to rest, inverted and submerged. Both pilots evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Probable cause:

Loss of control of the aircraft during a takeoff run from a watery surface due to cross winds.

Final Report:

Crash of a Dassault Falcon 50EX in Moscow-Vnukovo: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 20, 2014 at 2357 LT

Type of aircraft:

Dassault Falcon 50

Operator:

Registration:

F-GLSA

Flight Phase:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

Rockwell Gulfstream 690C Jetprop 840

Schedule:

Moscow - Paris

MSN:

348

YOM:

2006

Flight number:

LEA074P

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

6624

Captain / Total hours on type:

1266.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

1478

Copilot / Total hours on type:

246

Aircraft flight hours:

2197

Aircraft flight cycles:

1186

Circumstances:

During the takeoff run on runway 06 at Moscow-Vnukovo Airport, the three engine aircraft hit a snowplow with its left wing. The aircraft went out of control, rolled over and came to rest upside down in flames. All four occupants were killed, three crew members and Mr. Christophe de Margerie, CEO of the French Oil Group Total, who was returning to France following a meeting with the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. At the time of the accident, the RVR on runway 06 was estimated at 350 meters due to foggy conditions. The pilot of the snow-clearing vehicle was slightly injured.

Probable cause:

The accident occurred at nighttime under foggy conditions while it was taking off after cleared by the controller due to collision with the snowplow that executed runway incursion and stopped on the runway. Most probably, the accident was caused by the combination of the following contributing factors:
- lack of guidance on loss of control over an airdrome vehicle and/or situational awareness on the airfield in pertinent documents defining the duties of airdrome service personnel (airdrome shift supervisor and vehicle drivers);
- insufficient efficiency of risk mitigation measures to prevent runway incursions in terms of airdrome peculiarilies that is two intersecling runways;
- lack of proper supervision from the airdrome service shift supervisor, alcohol detected in his organism, over the airfield operations: no report to the ATM or request to the snowplow driver as he lost visual contact with the snowplow;
- violation by the airdrome service shift supervisor of the procedure for airdrome vehicles operations, their entering the runway (RWY 2) out of operation (closed for takeoff and landing operations) without requesting and receiving clearance from the ground controller;
- violations by the medical personnel of Vnukovo AP of vehicle driver medical check requirements by performing formally (only exterior assessment) the mandatory medical check of drivers after the duty, which significantly increased the risk of drivers consuning alcohol during the duty. The measures and controls applied at Vnukovo Airport to mitigate the risk of airdrome drivers doing their duties under the influence of alcohol were not effective enough;
- no possibility for the snowplow drivers engaged in airfield operations (due to lack of pertinent equipment on the airdrome vehicles) to continuously listen to the radio exchange at the Departure Control frequency, which does not comply with the Interaction Procedure of the Airdrome Service with Vnukovo ATC Center.
- loss of situational awareness by the snowplow driver, alcohol detected in his organism, while perfonning airfield operations that led to runway incursion and stop on the runway in use.
His failure to contact the airdrome service shift supervisor or ATC controllers after situational awareness was lost;
- ineffective procedures that resulted in insufficiently trained personnel using the airfield surveillance and control subsystem A3000 of A-SMGCS at the Vnukovo ATC Center, for air traffic management;
- no recommendation in the SOP of ATM personnel of Vnukovo ATC Center on how to set up the airfield surveillance and control subsystem A3000, including activation and deactivation of the Reserved Lines and alerts (as a result, all alerts were de-activated at the departure controller and ground controller's working positions) as well as how to operate the system including attention allocation techniques during aircraft takeoff and actions to deal with the subsystem messages and alerts;
- the porting of the screen second input of the A3000 A-SMGCS at the ATC shift supervisor WP for the display of the weather information that is not envisaged by the operational manual of the airfield surveillance and control subsystem. When weather information is selected to be displayed the radar data and the light alerts (which were present during the accident takeoff) become un available for the specialist that occupies the ATC shift supervisor's working position;
- the ATC shift supervisor's decision to join the sectors at working positions of Ground and Departure Control without considering the actual level of personnel training and possibilities for them to use the information of the airfield surveillance and control system (the criteria for joining of sectors are not defined in the Job Description of ATC shift supervisor, in particular it does not take into account the technical impossibility to change settings of the airfield surveillance and control system);
- failure by the ground controller to comply with the SOPs, by not taking actions to prevent the incursion of RWY 2 that was closed for takeoff and landing operations by the vehicles though having radar information and alert on the screen of the airfield surveillance and control system;
- failure by the out of staff instructor controller and trainee controller (providing ATM under the supervision of the instructor controller) to detect two runway incursions by the snowplow on the runway in use, including after the aircrew had been cleared to take off (as the clearance was given, the runway was clear), provided there was pertinent radar information on the screen of the airfield surveillance and control subsystem and as a result failure to inform the crew about the obstacle on the runway;
- lack of recommendations at the time of the accident in the Operator's (Unijet) FOM for flight crews on actions when external threats appear (e.g. foreign objects on the runway) during the takeoff;
- the crew failing to take measures to reject takeoff as soon as the Captain mentioned «the car crossing the road». No decision to abort takeoff might have been caused by probable nonoptimal psycho-emotional status of the crew (the long wait for the departure at an unfamiliar airport and their desire to fly home as soon as possible), which might have made it difficult for them to assess the actual threat level as they noticed the snowplow after they had started the takeoff run;
- the design peculiarity of the Falcon 50EX aircraft (the nose wheel steering can only be controlled from the LH seat) resulting in necessity to transfer aircraft control at a high workload phase of the takeoff roll when the FO (seated right) performs the takeoff.

Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell 690C Jetprop 840 off Los Roques

Date & Time: Oct 10, 2014 at 1000 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Registration:

YV1315

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors: