Takeoff (climb)

The Beechcraft Queen Air and Rockwell Aero Commander were being used by a company to conduct private category passenger-carrying flights to transport its workers from Leonora to Laverton in Western Australia. The Aero Commander had departed and was established in the Leonora circuit area when the Queen Air took off. The pilot and one of the passengers of the Queen Air reported the take-off roll appeared normal until the aircraft crossed the runway intersection, when they felt a bump in the aircraft. The pilot reported hearing a loud bang and noticed that the inboard cowl of the right engine had opened. He also reported that he believed he had insufficient runway remaining to stop safely, so he continued the takeoff. The cowl separated from the aircraft at the time, or just after the pilot rotated the aircraft to the take-off attitude. He reported that although the aircraft had left the ground after the rotation, it then would not climb. The aircraft remained at almost treetop level until the pilot and front-seat passenger noticed the side of a tailings dump immediately in front of the aircraft. The pilot said that he pulled the control column fully back. The aircraft hit the hillside parallel to the slope of the embankment, with little forward speed. The impact destroyed the aircraft. Although the occupants sustained serious injuries, they evacuated the aircraft without external assistance. There was no post-impact fire. The aircraft-mounted emergency locator transmitter (ELT) did not activate.

The Learjet departed from an uncontrolled airport about 2 minutes before the accident on a on a VFR climb and was not talking to ATC. The Extra EA-300S departed VFR from a controlled airport and requested and received a frequency change from the control tower 2 minutes after departure. Review of radar data revealed that the Extra climbed to 2,500 feet on a heading of 346 degrees before descending to 2,400 at 1141:25. The Learjet was observed on radar in a right crosswind departure passing through 700 feet on a heading of 242 degrees at 1141:02. At 1141:16, the Learjet was at 1,400 feet heading 269. At 1141:30, the Extra is observed on radar at 2,400 feet, in a right turn heading 360 degrees. The Learjet is observed on radar at 1141:28 in a climbing left turn passing through 2,300 feet. The last radar return on both aircraft was at 1141:30.

The de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) floatplane, serial number 841, departed Hotnarko Lake, British Columbia, at about 1630 Pacific daylight time. The pilot and six passengers were on board, with fishing gear and fish. Soon after take-off, the pilot entered a left turn. Before the turn was completed, the aircraft rolled, without command, further left to about 40 degrees of bank and the nose dropped. The aircraft did not respond to initial pilot inputs and continued in a left, diving turn toward the trees at the edge of the lake. The pilot tried to get the aircraft back onto the lake. The aircraft started to recover from the bank and the nose started to come up; however, the aircraft struck the lake surface before a level attitude could be regained. It broke apart on contact with the water and sank soon after. The pilot and four of the passengers managed to free themselves from the wreckage, but only three passengers and the pilot managed to swim to shore. One passenger slipped below the water surface before reaching the shore and drowned. Two passengers remained in the aircraft below the water surface, one secured by his seat belt, and drowned.

On June 2, 2000, about 1240 Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 401, Dominican Republic registration HI-696CT, registered to and operated by Air Century, crashed shortly after takeoff from La Romana International Airport, La Romana, Dominican Republic, while on an instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft was destroyed. The commercial-rated pilot received fatal injuries. The commercial-rated second pilot received serious injuries. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. Civil aviation authorities stated that the flight was an instructional flight. Shortly after takeoff on runway 12, the pilot simulated the failure of the left engine. Control of the aircraft was lost and the aircraft crashed 350 meters from the runway. Examination of the aircraft and engines showed no mechanical anomalies.

The aircraft collided with the ground in a steep nose down descent angle while maneuvering to return to the runway during the takeoff initial climb from the airport. Pilot and mechanic witnesses on the airport described the engine sounds during the takeoff as abnormal. The takeoff ground roll was over 3,000 feet in length, and the airplane's climb out angle was much shallower than usual. Two other witnesses said the engine sounded "like a radial engine," and both believed that the power output was lower than normal. One mechanic witness said the engine was surging and not developing full power; he believed the symptoms could be associated with a fuel feed problem, a turbocharger surge, or an excessively lean running condition. The ground witnesses located near the impact site said the airplane began a steep left turn between 1/4- and 1/2-mile from the runway's end at a lower than normal altitude. The bank angle was estimated by the witnesses as 45 degrees or greater. The turn continued until the nose suddenly dropped and the airplane entered a spiraling descent to ground impact. The majority of these witnesses stated that they heard "sputtering" or "popping" noises coming from the airplane. Engineering personnel from the manufacturer developed a performance profile for a normal takeoff and climb under the ambient conditions of the accident and at gross weight. The profile was compared to the actual aircraft performance derived from recorded radar data and the witness observations. The ground roll was 1,300 feet longer than it should have been, and the speed/acceleration and climb performance were consistently well below the profile's predictions. Based on the radar data and factoring in the winds, the airplane's estimated indicated airspeed during the final turn was 82 knots; the stall speed at 45 degrees of bank is 82 knots and it increases linearly to 96 knots at 60 degrees of bank. No evidence was found that the pilot flew the airplane from December until the date of the accident. The airplane sat outside during the rainy season with only 10 gallons of fuel in each tank. Comparison of the time the fueling began and the communications transcripts disclosed that the pilot had 17 minutes 41 seconds to refuel the airplane with 120 gallons, reboard the airplane, and start the engine for taxi; the maximum nozzle discharge flow rate of the pump he used is 24 gallons per minute. Review of the communications transcripts found that a time interval of 3 minutes 35 seconds elapsed from the time the pilot asked for a taxi clearance from the fuel facility until he reported ready for takeoff following a taxi distance of at least 2,000 feet. During the 8 seconds following the pilot's acknowledgment of his takeoff clearance, he and the local controller carried on a non pertinent personal exchange. The aircraft was almost completely consumed in the post crash fire; however, extensive investigation of the remains failed to identify a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure in the engine or airframe systems. The pistons, cylinder interiors, and spark plugs from all six cylinders were clean without combustion deposits. The cockpit fuel selector lever, the intermediate linkages, and the valve itself were found in the OFF position; however, an engineering analysis established that insufficient fuel was available in the lines forward of the selector to start, taxi, and perform a takeoff with the selector in the OFF position.

On 25 and 26 May 2000 aircraft HB-LTC was used for a commercial flight from Zurich to Béziers (F) and back. To this end, the pilot made a positioning flight from Geneva to Zurich on 24 May 2000. The reconstruction of the following events is based on recorded radio conversations and witness statements. On 25 May 2000 at approx. 07:20 hrs, the pilot placed a telephone order with the refuelling service of Jet Aviation Zurich AG. According to statements from aircraft refuelling attendant A concerned, the pilot asked for the aircraft to be fully refuelled with aviation gasoline (AVGAS) for a flight to France. When aircraft refuelling attendant A arrived at the aircraft, the pilot was present. The refuelling attendant saw the winglets on the HB-LTC and asked the pilot whether the machine had been modified and therefore needed jet kerosene. Before the pilot could even answer, the refuelling attendant realised, from the square engine housings, that the machine was equipped with reciprocating engines. The pilot confirmed that HB-LTC had been modified but pointed out that this modification involved only the airframe and that the aircraft had not been converted to turboprop operation. Refuelling attendant A then filled the HB-LTC’s four fuel tanks with 372 l of AVGAS 100LL (low lead). The aircraft was therefore fully refuelled and at that time had 726 l of fuel. Refuelling attendant A later reported that he had not noticed markings which described the types of fuel permitted for this aircraft, either on the wing or on the tank seals. During the refuelling operation, which ended at approx. 07:30 hrs, the pilot was in the cockpit. Nobody observed him draining the tanks after refuelling. The seven passengers for the flight to Béziers (F) arrived on 25 May 2000 at about eight o’clock in the morning at the General Aviation Centre (GAC) at Zurich airport. At 08:18:42 hrs the pilot received start-up clearance from Zurich Apron (ZRH APR) and at 08:26:25 hrs indicated that he was ready to taxi. Taxi clearance was granted without delay and the aircraft taxied to the holding point of runway 28. Several passengers later stated that the pilot carried out a run up of the engines while the following time of waiting. At 08:32:01 hrs HB-LTC indicated to aerodrome control (Zurich Tower – ZRH TWR) that it was ready to take off. The aircraft was queued in the traffic and was cleared for take-off at 08:45:27 hrs. The aircraft landed in Béziers (F) some two hours later. On 26 May 2000 between 15:35 and 15:45 hrs HB-LTC was refuelled in Béziers with 107 l of AVGAS 100LL. The aircraft then flew with the same passengers from Béziers (F) back to Zurich, where it landed at 19:10 hrs. Before the flight back to Geneva, the pilot obviously decided to refuel. According to the statements of aircraft refuelling attendant B at approx. 19:45 hrs the pilot ordered “Kraftstoff JET-A1” by telephone. Unlike the telephone conversations of air traffic control at Zurich airport, incoming and outgoing telephone calls made to and from the refuelling service of Jet Aviation Zurich AG were not recorded. The precise wording of the pilot’s fuel order cannot therefore be established with certainty. Aircraft refuelling attendant B then forwarded the order by radio to his colleague, aircraft refuelling attendant C. A third aircraft refuelling attendant D heard on his radio how aircraft refuelling attendant B gave the instruction to aircraft refuelling attendant C to refuel aircraft HB-LTC with JET A-1 fuel. Then aircraft refuelling attendant C drove tanker FL 7 to HB-LTC, which was parked in GAC Sector 1. According to his statements, he positioned the tanker with its right-hand side in front of the aircraft so that he could reach the filler caps on both wings using the hose affixed to that side of the tanker. Then aircraft refuelling attendant C, still next to the tanker, began to complete the delivery note, while the pilot came up to him and indicated the desired quantity of fuel in English. The pilot gave him a credit card and aircraft refuelling attendant C then explained to him that after refuelling he would have to complete the transaction in the office. The pilot remarked that he had a slot. Aircraft refuelling attendant C later stated that this gave him to understand that the pilot did not have much time. The aircraft refuelling attendant replied to the pilot that he would only need an additional two or three minutes. Because it had started to rain shortly before refuelling, the pilot evidently withdrew into the aircraft after his conversation with aircraft refuelling attendant C. According to his partner, the pilot conducted a brief conversation with her from his mobile telephone during this phase. As the investigation showed, this telephone call took place between 19:50:06 and 19:51:28 hrs. In the meantime, aircraft refuelling attendant C had connected HB-LTC to the tanker and then pumped 50 l of JET A-1 fuel into each of the two inboard main cells. The aircraft refuelling attendant later stated that he had not noticed markings or labels which described the permitted types of fuel for this aircraft, either on the tank seals or in the vicinity of the tank openings. He then drove the tanker to the office, debited the credit card and returned it with the receipt and the delivery note to the aircraft. He presented the debit slip and the delivery note to the pilot for signature. In the process the aircraft refuelling attendant asked the pilot what aircraft type HB-LTC was. The pilot answered that his aircraft was a modified PA31. The aircraft refuelling attendant then entered “PA31” on the delivery note and then gave the pilot the carbon copy. At 20:08:44 hrs the pilot made radio contact with Zurich Clearance Delivery (ZRH CLD) air traffic control and received departure clearance with the instruction to change to the ZRH APR frequency for start-up clearance. The apron gave HB-LTC start-up clearance at 20:10:00 hrs. Three minutes and 50 seconds later the pilot requested taxi clearance and was then instructed to taxi to the holding point of runway 28. After the transfer to ZRH TWR at 20:15:02 hrs the pilot stated he was ready for take off at 20:17:30 hrs. A short time after this he was able to line up runway 28 and at 20:20:58 hrs ZRH TWR gave him take-off clearance. According to witness statements, HB-LTC took off normally and went into a climb. In the region of runway intersection 28/16 and at an altitude of approx. 50 m AGL the aircraft stopped climbing, maintained level flight briefly and began to descend slightly. At the same time, HB-LTC began to make a gentle right turn and overflew the woods to the north of runway 28. Because of this unusual flight pattern, the duty aerodrome controller (ADC) at 20:22:08 hrs asked the pilot whether everything was normal: “Tango Charlie, normal operations?” The pilot replied in the negative: “(Ne)gative, Hotel Tango Charlie!” In this phase, the aircraft began to make a left turn with a high bank angle and witnesses observed that the landing gear was lowered. At 20:22:21 hrs the pilot radioed that he was in an emergency situation: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, Hotel Tango Charlie”. During the first 90° of the turn, HB-LTC descended only slightly. After crossing the extended centerline of runway 28 the aircraft increasingly lost height in the tight left turn. When the aircraft had almost completed the full turn, its bank attitude began to reduce. At a height of approx. 10 m AGL HB-LTC collided with the trees in a copse. The aircraft passed through the copse and came to rest upside down in the “Glatt” river. The pilot was fatally injured on impact. Coordinates of the final position of the wreck: 682 700/256 700, elevation 420 m AMSL corresponding to 1378 ft AMSL.

Shortly after liftoff from Point Mugu NAS, the aircraft collided with a flock of pelicans. The crew attempted an emergency landing and the aircraft belly landed before coming to rest. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from the Bapi grassy runway 14/32 which is 495 metres long, the twin engine aircraft collided with trees and crashed, bursting into flames. All four occupants were killed. It is believed that the pilot completed the rotation too late.

Shortly after takeoff from Pepa Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft collided with a flock of birds that struck both engines. The aircraft lost height and crashed past the runway end, bursting into flames. All 24 occupants were killed, among them several officers from the Rwanda Army, one major, two captains, two lieutenants and some soldiers who were returning to Kigali after taking part to a presidential ceremony.

During the takeoff climb, the airplane turned sharply right, went into a steep bank and collided with terrain. The airplane began a right turn immediately after departure and appeared to be going slow. A witness was able to distinguish the individual propeller blades on the right engine, while the left engine propeller blades were indistinguishable. The airplane stopped turning and flew for an estimated 1/4-mile at an altitude of 100 feet. The airplane then continued the right turn at a steep bank angle before disappearing from sight. Then the witness observed a plume of smoke. White and gray matter, along with two ferrous slivers, contaminated the chip detector on the right engine. The airplane had a rudder assist system installed. The rudder assist provided additional directional control in the event of a loss of power on either engine. The NATOPS manual specified that the rudder assist switch should be in the ON position for takeoff, landing, and in the event of single-engine operation. The rudder boost switch was in the off position, and the rudder boost actuator in the empennage was in the retracted (off) position. The owner had experienced a problem with the flight controls the previous year and did not fly with the rudder assist ON. The accident flight had the lowest acceleration rate, and attained the lowest maximum speed, compared to GPS data from the seven previous flights. It was traveling nearly 20 knots slower, about 100 knots, than the bulk of the other flights when it attempted to lift off. The airplane was between the 2,000- and 3,000-foot runway markers (less than halfway down the runway) when it lifted off and began the right turn. Due to the extensive disintegration of the airplane in the impact sequence, the seating positions for the three occupants could not be determined. One of the occupants was the aircraft owner, who held a private certificate with a single-engine land rating, was known to have previously flown the airplane on contract flights from both the left and right seats. A second pilot was the normal copilot for all previous contract flights; his certificates had been revoked by the FAA. The third occupant held an airline transport pilot certificate and had never flown in the airplane before. Prior to the accident flight, the owner had told an associate that the third occupant was going to fly the airplane on the accident flight.