Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Newnan: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 21, 1999 at 0522 LT
Registration:
N27343
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Charlotte - Newnan
MSN:
31-7752163
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2000
Captain / Total hours on type:
250.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8340
Circumstances:
The flight was cleared for a localizer approach to runway 32 at Newnan-Coweta County Airport during dark night conditions. About 8 minutes later the pilot reported to air traffic control that he had missed approach and would like to try another approach. The flight was radar vectored to the final approach course and again cleared for the localizer runway 32 approach. The flight was observed on radar to continue the approach until a point about 4 nautical miles from the airport, at which time radar contact was lost. The last observed altitude was 1,600 feet msl. The aircraft collided with 80-foot tall trees, while established on the localizer for runway 32, about 1.3 nautical miles from the runway. About the time of the accident the weather at the airport was reported as a cloud ceiling 200 feet agl, and visibility .75 statute miles. Post crash examination of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engines, propellers, and systems showed no evidence of pre-crash failure or malfunction.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain the minimum descent altitude while executing a localizer approach. Contributing factors were low ceilings and dark night conditions as well as the trees.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Shrike Commander 500S in Santa Catalina La Tinta: 6 killed

Date & Time: Sep 16, 1999 at 1130 LT
Operator:
Registration:
TG-RBK
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Guatemala City – Santa Catalina La Tinta
MSN:
500-1809-19
YOM:
1968
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
On approach to a private airstrip located near Santa Catalina La Tinta, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances 300 metres short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were poor with low clouds and rain falls. Thunderstorm activity was reported all along the route.

Crash of a Boeing 757-204 in Gerona: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 14, 1999 at 2347 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-BYAG
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cardiff - Gerona
MSN:
26965
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
BAL226A
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
236
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
16700
Captain / Total hours on type:
3562.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1494
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1145
Aircraft flight hours:
26429
Aircraft flight cycles:
9816
Circumstances:
Flight BY226A took off from Cardiff at 20:40 local time for a charter flight to Gerona. The crew contacted Gerona ATC at 23:14 hours. With a thunderstorm in the area, flight conditions were turbulent. ATC offered the option of a runway 20 ILS approach, but the crew decided to fly a VOR/DME procedure to runway 02 considering the prevailing conditions of wet runway, downslope and tailwind. At 23:33, in full landing configuration and just after passing 10 DME, the crew were advised of a change of wind to 200 degrees at 12 knots. Upon becoming visual the aircraft was not adequately aligned with the runway and the change in wind direction now favored the reciprocal runway so a missed approach was carried out. The aircraft was now positioned for an ILS approach to runway 20. During the approach the crew noted that the company minimum amount of fuel for a diversion to Barcelona (2,800 kg) had been reached. At 23:46:58 hrs, at 250 feet above ground level (agl) and on the correct glidepath, the captain disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle. The aircraft began to deviate above the glidepath. Twelve seconds later, at 110 feet agl, the captain briefly pushed the control column almost fully forward before returning it to an approximately neutral position. The aircraft pitched down to -4.5° nose down attitude and then back up to -2.5° nose down attitude. During this period the captain lost his visual reference with the runway because all runway lights had suddenly failed. The GPWS then warned of the excessive sink rate and the thrust levers being retarded to idle. At 21:47:17 the aircraft touched down in a 2° nose down attitude and a recorded peak normal (vertical) acceleration of 3.11 g. The aircraft bounced, the nose pitched up to +3.3°, a roll to the right commenced, both the thrust levers advanced and the power on both engines increased to 1.18 EPR. Full nose down elevator was applied and held until a second touchdown, resulting in a rapid pitch down. The aircraft made the second touchdown 1.9 seconds after the first at -0.5° pitch attitude (nose down), with a pitch rate of 7°/sec nose down and 4.2° of right roll. After a run of approximately 343 meters across flat grassland beside the runway, the aircraft ran diagonally over a substantial earth mound adjacent to the airport boundary, becoming semi-airborne as a result. At the far side of the mound a number of medium sized trees were struck and severed, predominantly by the right wing, and the right engine nacelle struck the boundary fence. The aircraft, yawed considerably to the right of its direction of travel, then passed through the fence, re-landed in a field and both main landing gears collapsed. It came to rest after a 244 meter slide across the field, with the fuselage almost structurally severed at two points.
Probable cause:
It is considered that the most probable cause of the accident was the destabilization of the approach below decision height with loss of external visual references and automatic height callouts immediately before landing, resulting in touchdown with excessive descent rate in a nose down attitude. The resulting displacement of the nose landing gear support structure caused disruption to aircraft systems that led to uncommanded forward thrust increase and other effects that severely aggravated the consequences of the initial event.
Contributory factors were:
- Impairment of the runway visual environment as a result of darkness and torrential rain and the extinguishing of runway lights immediately before landing;
- Suppression of some automatic height callouts by the GPWS 'SINK RATE' audio caution;
- The effect of shock or mental incapacitation on the PF at the failure of the runway lights which may have inhibited him from making a decision to go-around;
- The absence of specific flight crew training in flight simulators to initiate a go-around when below landing decision height;
- Insufficient evaluation of the weather conditions, particularly the movement and severity of the storm affecting the destination airport.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante in Monte Dourado: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 14, 1999 at 2130 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PT-ODK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Belém - Monte Dourado
MSN:
110-002
YOM:
1969
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
10000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1200.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1600
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1200
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Belém-Val de Cans Airport on a cargo flight to Monte Dourado with two pilots on board and a load of 1,636 kilos of limestone grit divided into 36 bags of 45.45 kilos each. After a flight of 1 hour and 18 minutes, the crew was cleared to descend by night to Monte Dourado Airport. On final approach, the crew was able to send a brief message saying the aircraft was crashing. The aircraft was destroyed on impact and both pilots were killed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- The total weight of the aircraft upon departure from Belém Airport was 650 kilos above MTOW,
- The cargo was not stowed in the cabin but simply stored on the floor,
- The left engine was not providing power at impact and the aircraft entered a left turn and then an uncontrolled descent until impact with the ground,
- Failure of the left engine due to the presence of an aluminum part obstructing the fuel pipe. Metallographic analyzes confirmed that this aluminum part likely came from a thread of the fuel pump,
- Complacency of the crew who failed to follow the published procedures of the operator.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo C in San Andros

Date & Time: Sep 9, 1999 at 1915 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N6579L
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nassau – San Andros
MSN:
31-504
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On September 9, 1999, about 1915 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-31-310, N6579L, registered to Webs Planes, Inc., operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, crashed about 50 yards east of San Andros Airport, Andros Island, Bahamas, following an inflight explosion and cockpit fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a VFR flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed by ground fire and the commercially-rated pilot and six passengers were not injured. The flight originated from Nassau, New Providence, about 1910. According to the pilot, at about 15 miles from his destination, San Andros, he heard a loud explosion from under the floor, and then experienced fire in the cockpit. Attempts at extinguishing the fire were negative and he began to lose engine power. He tried to make the runway at San Andros, but impacted mangrove growth east of the airport, instead. He stated he thought the problem may have been a short circuit in electrical wiring under the airplane's floorboards.

Crash of a Douglas DC-9-31 in Nashville

Date & Time: Sep 9, 1999 at 1138 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N993Z
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint Louis - Nashville
MSN:
47082
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
TW600
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
41
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13332
Captain / Total hours on type:
5022.00
Aircraft flight hours:
77374
Aircraft flight cycles:
34177
Circumstances:
The first officer failed to maintain the proper rate of descent (sink rate) resulting in a hard landing on touch down, and separation of the left main landing gear during landing rollout. The pilot-in-command stated he knew the first officer was not going to make a good landing. He did not take any corrective action other than informing the first officer initially to increase power. Examination of the left main landing gear assembly revealed a preexisting crack in the outer cylinder housing.
Probable cause:
A preexisting crack on the left main landing gear outer cylinder housing and the first officer's failure to maintain the proper rate of descent resulting in a hard landing on touchdown, and subsequent total failure and separation of the left main landing gear on landing rollout. Contributing to the accident was the pilot-in-commands improper supervision of the first officer during the approach phase of the landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Caen

Date & Time: Sep 9, 1999
Operator:
Registration:
F-GIAL
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
BB-844
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Caen-Carpiquet Airport in poor weather conditions, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. He increased engine power and asked the copilot to position the flaps in the appropriate angle. By mistake, the copilot raised the flaps. Due to a loss of lift, the aircraft stalled and struck the runway surface. On impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Inadvertent retraction of the flaps while initiating a go-around procedure. Poor crew coordination.

Crash of a De Havilland Dash-7-102 in Port Harcourt

Date & Time: Sep 7, 1999
Operator:
Registration:
5N-EMP
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
49
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
For unknown reasons, the four engine aircraft belly landed at Port Harcourt Airport and was damaged beyond repair. All 15 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is unknown if the mishap was the consequence of a technical issue or crew error.

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Lerwick

Date & Time: Sep 6, 1999 at 1034 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
LN-PBB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kirkwall - Lerwick
MSN:
208B-0302
YOM:
1992
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1780
Captain / Total hours on type:
500.00
Circumstances:
The operating company were involved in a Royal Mail contract to deliver mail from Aberdeen to Shetland Islands each day. The crew involved in the accident had flown LN-PBB from Stauning Airport in Denmark to Aberdeen in preparation for a two week period of duty delivering the mail; they arrived at Aberdeen at 1700 hrs on 5 September 1999. The next morning, the crew arrived for duty at approximately 0540 hrs and completed their normal checks of LN-PBB. Shortly after this, the mail arrived and was escorted to the aircraft by the company ground crew. The mail bags were sorted and loaded into the aircraft by the flight and ground crew under the supervision of the commander; the mail had been weighed by Royal Mail and the commander was given written confirmation of the total weight of 1,196 kg. At the completion of the loading, the commander was satisfied that the load was secure and correctly distributed. Prior to departure for Sumburgh Airport, the commander had checked the weather and was aware that it was 'poor' at Sumburgh but the indications were that it would improve; additionally, the weather at Kirkwall Airport was clear if they needed to divert. The aircraft appeared fully serviceable during start, taxi and take off from Aberdeen at 0640 hrs; for the flight to Sumburgh, the commander was the handling pilot. Cruise was at Flight Level (FL)90and, about half way to Sumburgh, ATC advised the crew of the latest weather at Sumburgh which indicated that they would not be able to land there. However, there was a preceding aircraft heading for the same destination and the commander elected to continue towards Sumburgh. Then, once the preceding aircraft crew had declared that they were diverting to Aberdeen, the commander decided to divert to Kirkwall. The diversion was uneventful and the aircraft landed at 0807 hrs. At Kirkwall, the crew uplifted sufficient fuel to bring the total up to the same with which they had left Aberdeen (1,200lb) and waited for a weather improvement at Sumburgh. By approximately 0930hrs, the crew were advised by Kirkwall ATC that the weather had improved at Sumburgh and they prepared the aircraft for departure. Take off was at 0950 hrs with the co-pilot as handling pilot. Cruise was at FL 70 and was uneventful up to the approach and landing. The airport was using Runway 27 as that is the only runway with full ILS. The ATIS information at 1020 hrs was broadcasting the following information: surface wind 340°/07 kt; 9,000 metres in rain; cloud few at 300 feet, scattered at 1,000 feet and broken at 1,600 feet; temperature 12°, dew point 12°; tempo cloud broken 1,500 feet with a wet runway. In accordance with ATC instructions, the crew commenced their descent to 2,000 feet amsl where they were instructed to intercept the ILS from a heading of 300°. Once fully established on the ILS, the commander noted that the co-pilot was having a little difficulty maintaining the aircraft on both the localizer and glide slope. The co-pilot was not sure of the height at which they broke cloud but the commander estimated that they were at 500 feet agl. At this point, the co-pilot considered that they were slightly high and fast; subsequently, the commander estimated the aircraft airspeed as 140 kt as they became visual with the runway. During the final approach, the air traffic controller gave three separate wind reports of 010°/11 kt, 010°/11 kt and010°/10 kt; these reports were based on the two minute mean surface winds. As the aircraft crossed the runway threshold, the co-pilot called out that he had too much speed and that "it wasn't going to work". With no reply from the commander, the co-pilot took this lack of response as an indication that the commander was content. For his part, the commander was concentrating on the runway aspect and, although he heard a comment from the co-pilot, did not make any response. The crew considered that touchdown was approximately halfway down the runway and the co-pilot was aware of the aircraft bouncing before a second touchdown; neither pilot could recall the speed at touchdown. Both pilots applied full foot braking but with little apparent result in retardation. Then, as the aircraft approached the end of the runway, the commander took control and applied full power; this was because he was aware of the concrete blocks positioned off the end of the runway as a sea defence and wished to clear them. The aircraft was now yawed slightly left and positioned to the left of the runway centreline. It left the runway surface, travelled across grass and a public road and came to rest on the concrete blocks.
Probable cause:
The aircraft overran the end of Runway 27 at Sumburgh following a touchdown which was too fast and well down the runway. There was insufficient runway remaining for the aircraft to stop. The landing resulted from a poor approach and no apparent co-operation between the crew. A positive decision from the co-pilot, or better monitoring and an active input from the commander, should have resulted in a go-around and a further approach or a diversion. While this crew may be unusual, it would be appropriate for the operating company to review their procedures to ensure that their crews are operating in a safe manner. The investigation also reviewed the rules under which the flight was conducted. Examination of the weather information available to the crew indicate doubts as to whether the flight could have been completed within the limitations contained within company manuals. Additionally, Article 32A of the UK ANO is not clear; it could be interpreted as only prohibiting flights when the weather conditions are not met at all of the relevant aerodromes. It would be appropriate for the CAA to review the content of Article 32A to ensure that the intent is clear.
Final Report:

Crash of an Avro 748-501-2B in Kathmandu: 15 killed

Date & Time: Sep 5, 1999 at 1030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9N-AEG
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Pokhara - Kathmandu
MSN:
1806
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
3Z104
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Circumstances:
On approach to Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport under VFR mode, the crew encountered limited visibility due to a low cloud layer. On final, at an altitude of about 6,000 feet, the aircraft collided with a radio antenna (100 feet high) located on the top of a hill and owned by the Nepalese National Broadcasting Company. The aircraft went out of control and crashed seven km short of runway 02. All 15 occupants.
Probable cause:
Collision with obstacle on a VFR approach in limited visibility.