Crash of a Harbin SH-5 (Shuishang Hongzha 5) off Qingdao: 5 killed

Date & Time: May 30, 2013
Operator:
Registration:
9113
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Qingdao - Qingdao
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft Harbin SH-5 (Shuishang Hongzha 5) was engaged in a training mission off Qingdao with a crew of five on board. In unknown circumstances, the seaplane crashed in the Jiaozhou Bay few km offshore, killing all five occupants.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2SX in Jyl-Kol: 3 killed

Date & Time: May 24, 2013 at 1002 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-02015
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tash Kumyr - Tash Kumyr
MSN:
1G153-56
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
9818
Captain / Total hours on type:
6518.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4334
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2401
Aircraft flight hours:
10995
Aircraft flight cycles:
34201
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a fumigation mission against locusts over plantation located near Jyl-Kol, in the Jalal-Abad Province. While flying at a height of about 15 metres, the aircraft hit power cables and crashed, bursting into flames. All three occupants were killed and aircraft was destroyed by post crash fire.
Probable cause:
In violation of Section 5.1.15 of the Guidelines for Aviation Chemical Works (ACW), the Aircrew Commander (AC) decided to combine the production flight with followed inspection of the new site, taking a representative of the Customer on board. In violation of Section 5, PPLS, the passenger was seating in the co-pilot seat and this is prohibited. Before making a decision to operate a flight, the Aircrew Commander received an indicative weather forecast from the hydro meteorology experts of Osh International Airport. The revised weather forecast was not drawn up and the crew did not receive it because the flight control officer did not send an actual weather data provided by the crew after take-off, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 8.7.7, APKR-3 . The technology of air traffic controllers’ work at Osh International Airport does not include responsibility for the transfer of information about the actual weather obtained from the crews to base aerodrome meteorological office responsible for forecasting weather and it does not specifically define the actions of air traffic services in obtaining information about an aviation accident. No changes were made in the temperature regime when performing aviation chemical works in accordance with the Guidelines for the Implementation of ACW technology in Agriculture and Forestry” designed by the Civil Aviation Ministry, USSR, and issued on December 30, 1980, Number 668/Y (these instructions were entered into operation by the order of the Director of the Civil Aviation Department under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications on March 20, 2009, number 188/p in the “List of Legislative Acts Regulating the Civil Aviation Activities of the Kyrgyz Republic”). Portable emergency radio beacon, PARM -406, did not function at the time of the accident. The Statute of Aeronautical Search and Rescue Service of the Kyrgyz Republic has no changes related to its reorganization in 2007.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III near Floriston: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 16, 2013 at 1330 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N421W
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
San Jose - Reno
MSN:
421C-0868
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1480
Captain / Total hours on type:
79.00
Aircraft flight hours:
9086
Circumstances:
During a cross-country instrument flight rules (IFR) flight, the air traffic controller cleared the pilot to begin his initial descent for landing and issued a heading change to begin the approach. The pilot acknowledged the altitude and heading change. One minute later, the controller noticed that the airplane's radar track was not tracking the assigned heading. The controller queried the pilot as to his intentions, and the pilot replied that he was in a spin. There were no further communications with the pilot. The wreckage was subsequently located in steep mountainous terrain. A study of the weather indicated widespread cloud cover in the area around the time of the accident. A witness near the accident site reported that he heard an airplane in a dive but could not see it due to the very dark clouds in the area. He heard the engine noise increase and decrease multiple times. It is likely that the pilot entered into the clouds and failed to maintain airplane control. The changes in the engine noise were most likely the result of the pilot's attempt to recover from the spin. About 8 months before the accident, the pilot completed the initial pilot training course in the accident airplane and was signed off for IFR currency; however, recent or current IFR experience could not be determined. Examination of the fragmented airplane and engines revealed no abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain airplane control during descent while operating in instrument meteorological conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R near Chernolesskoye: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 15, 2013 at 1034 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
RA-31403
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chernolesskoye - Chernolesskoye
MSN:
1G197-26
YOM:
1982
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5437
Captain / Total hours on type:
2527.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8523
Aircraft flight cycles:
34391
Circumstances:
The pilot, sole on board, was performing a crop spraying flight on behalf of the 'Svoboda' Agricultural Cooperation in the region of Chernolesskoye. While flying at a height of about 9 metres, trying to get altitude, the single engine aircraft successively collided with power cables and a concrete pylon, continued for about 99 metres then crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post impact fire and the pilot was killed.
Probable cause:
The accident occurred during crop-dusting flight due to late aircraft entry into climb for flying over PTL resulted in aircraft collision with power transmission line tower on a field under cultivation, followed by ground impact and fire. Probably late aircraft entry into climb was caused by PIC performance impairment (final crop dusting in final flight was performed after which PIC had to rest during 1,5 hours and short recreation cycle was disordered during flight operation), and also low-observability of PTL wires without day marking.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Strehaia

Date & Time: May 10, 2013 at 1020 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YR-LRA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Balota - Balota
MSN:
1G195-09
YOM:
1982
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6100
Captain / Total hours on type:
6060.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
400
Aircraft flight hours:
6598
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Balota (Drobeta) Aerodrome at 0930LT on a spraying mission over wooded area on behalf of the Department of Forestry, carrying one passenger and two pilots. About 50 minutes into the flight, after it completed several low passes over the area to be treated, the engine lost power. The crew decided to return to Balota Aerodrome and completed a 180 turn when the engine stopped. The crew attempted an emergency landing in an open field. After landing, the aircraft rolled for about 130 metres when the left main gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest. All three occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Engine failure in flight due to fuel exhaustion. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor flight preparation on part of the crew who did not follow the pre-takeoff checklist,
- The checklist document was printed in an inappropriate format for the purpose for which it was intended,
- The aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to the nature of the terrain where the emergency landing occurred.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker near Chaldovar: 3 killed

Date & Time: May 3, 2013 at 1448 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
63-8877
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Bishkek - Bishkek
MSN:
18725/708
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
On 3 May 2013, at approximately 1448 hours local time (L), a KC-135R, tail number 63-8877, assigned to the 22d Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, 376th Air Expeditionary Wing, Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyz Republic, crashed in the foothills of mountains located 6 miles south of Chaldovar, Kyrgyz Republic. The mishap crew (MC), which consisted of the mishap pilot (MP), mishap co-pilot (MCP), and mishap boom operator (MBO), perished during the accident. The mishap aircraft (MA) exploded inflight, impacted the terrain at three main locations, and burned. The MA was completely destroyed with total loss to government property estimated at $66.3 million. Upon impact, approximately 228 cubic meters of soil were contaminated with jet fuel, and three distinct craters containing a burn pattern were created. The MA’s mission was to refuel coalition aircraft in Afghanistan and then return to the Transit Center at Manas. Immediately after takeoff, the MA experienced an unexpected rapid heading change from the direction of flight known as a crab. During climb, nearly continuous rudder hunting caused the MA’s nose to hunt slowly left and right about one degree in both directions. The MP commented on the lateral control challenges and possible series yaw damper (SYD) malfunction but continued the mission without turning off either the SYD or rudder power. Approximately nine minutes into the flight, the MA began a series of increasing yaw and roll oscillations known as a dutch roll, which was undiagnosed by the MC. The MCP attempted to decrease these oscillations using manual aileron controls, as well as two brief attempts with the autopilot. The manual corrective inputs kept the oscillations from growing. The autopilot use further exacerbated the situation, and the oscillations intensified. After the second autopilot use, the MP assumed control of the MA and used left rudder to start a left turn. A subsequent series of alternating small rudder inputs, caused by the MA’s dutch roll-induced acceleration forces varying the MP’s foot pressure on the rudder pedals, sharply increased the dutch roll oscillations. Within 30 seconds, the MP made a right rudder input to roll out of the turn, exacerbating the dutch roll condition. The cumulative effects of the malfunctioning SYD, coupled with autopilot use and rudder movements during the unrecognized dutch roll, generated dutch roll forces that exceeded the MA’s design structural limits. The tail section failed and separated from the aircraft, causing the MA to pitch down sharply, enter into a high-speed dive, explode inflight and subsequently impact the ground at approximately 1448L.
Crew:
Cpt Victoria Ann Pinckney,
Cpt Mark Tyler Voss,
T/Sgt Herman Mackey III.
Probable cause:
The board president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was the MA’s tail section separating due to structural overstress as a result of the MC’s failure to turn off either the SYD (Series Yaw Damper) or the rudder power and oscillating dutch roll-induced acceleration forces translating through the MP’s feet as the MP used rudder during the unrecognized dutch roll condition. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of evidence, that the dutch roll was instigated by the MA’s malfunctioning Flight Control Augmentation System that caused directional instability or rudder hunting which substantially contributed to this mishap. Other substantially contributing factors include insufficient organizational training programs, crew composition, and cumbersome procedural guidance.
Final Report:

Crash of a Grumman G-44 Widgeon in Catskill: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 2, 2013 at 1629 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N8AS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Copake - Copake
MSN:
1315
YOM:
1943
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5735
Captain / Total hours on type:
411.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2251
Circumstances:
Michael B. Braunstein, aged 72, was the owner of this vintage aircraft built in 1943 and was performing a local flight within the State of New York. Aircraft was destroyed when it impacted the waters of the Hudson River, near Catskill, New York. The certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the local personal flight conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, which departed from B Flat Farm Airport (3NK8), Copake, New York about 1600. Approximately 25 witnesses were interviewed. Witnesses reported observing the twin-engine amphibious airplane flying southbound low above a river and hearing the engine running. The airplane then made a 180-degree left turn, which was consistent with the pilot flying a tight traffic pattern before attempting a water landing. The airplane then descended, leveled off above the water, and suddenly banked left. The airplane’s nose and left pontoon then struck the water, and the airplane nosed over, caught fire, and sank. Postrecovery examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was in the “up” position and that the flaps were extended, which indicates that the airplane had been configured for a water landing. No evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engines was found that would have precluded normal operation. At the time of the accident, a light breeze was blowing, the river was at slack tide, and the water conditions were calm, all of which were conducive to glassy water conditions. It is likely that the glassy water conditions adversely affected the pilot’s depth perception and led to his inability to correctly judge the airplane’s height above the water. He subsequently flared the airplane too high, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack, entering an aerodynamic stall, and impacting the water in a nose-low attitude.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s misjudgment of the airplane’s altitude above the water and early flare for a landing on water with a glassy condition, which led to the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft MC-12W 204 km NE of Kandahar: 4 killed

Date & Time: Apr 27, 2013 at 1243 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
09-0676
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Kandahar - Kandahar
MSN:
FL-676
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
Independence 08
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
1749
Captain / Total hours on type:
242.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2434
Copilot / Total hours on type:
38
Circumstances:
On 27 April 2013, at approximately 1243 local time (L) in Afghanistan, an MC-12W, tail number 09-0676 impacted terrain 110 nautical miles northeast of Kandahar Airfield (KAF) while on a combat intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. The four crewmembers on board were the Mishap Mission Commander (MMC), Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO), and Mishap Tactical Systems Operator (MTSO). The four airmen were killed instantly on impact and the Mishap Aircraft (MA), valued at $19.8 million, was destroyed. The crew and MA were deployed to the 361st expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, 451st Air Expeditionary Wing, KAF, Afghanistan. The MA, callsign Independence 08, departed KAF at 1157L and entered orbit at 1229L. The MA encountered deteriorating weather in the orbit and was climbing from 20,000 to 23,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) at 1241L to fly above the weather when the mishap occurred. In addition, the crew had found an enemy combatant and was in the process of adjusting their orbit to enhance mission success.
Probable cause:
Accident Investigation Board was conducted by USAF Brigadier General Donald J. BACON. His conclusion were as follow:
I find by clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was a stall due to insufficient airspeed, while in a climbing left turn, which developed into a left spin followed quickly by a high-speed spiral, from which the crew was unable to recover. Additionally, I find, by a preponderance of evidence, each of the following three factors substantially contributed to the mishap:
orbit weather that impeded visibility and masked the horizon;
pilot inexperience in the MC-12W;
known MC-12W program risks associated with sustaining required combat capability in theater.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Sainte-Radegonde

Date & Time: Mar 29, 2013 at 1250 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N90KH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bordeaux – Bergerac
MSN:
LJ-542
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2640
Captain / Total hours on type:
300.00
Circumstances:
The pilot and two passengers departed Sarlat-Domme Airport for a training mission over the region of Bordeaux. A precision approach was completed at Bordeaux-Mérignac Airport followed by a go-around procedure. The IFR flight plan was closed and the pilot continued under VFR mode to Bordeaux-Léognan-Saucats Aerodrome where he landed. A passenger deplaned, the engine remained running and the aircraft took off few minutes later to Bergerac where a refueling was planned. Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 2,000 feet, both engines failed. The pilot reduced his altitude, selected gear down and attempted and emergency landing in a vineyard. Upon landing, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Failure of both engines in flight due to fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the pilot took off with 800 lbs of fuel on board, thinking having enough fuel for an hour and a half flight which corresponds to an autonomy with 800 liters. In such conditions, the fuel quantity was not sufficient to complete the flight and there were no required reserves. It is believed that the double engine failure was caused by the fact that the pilot mistook pounds for liters (livres - litres in French). The lack of a preflight visual check of the fuel gauges could did not allow the pilot to notice his mistake.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-6/B2-H4 Turbo Porter at Santa Lucía AFB: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 21, 2013 at 1340 LT
Operator:
Registration:
3303
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Santa Lucía AFB - Santa Lucía AFB
MSN:
883
YOM:
1992
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a local training flight at Santa Lucía AFB when the single engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in an open field near the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.