United States Air Force - USAF (since 1947)

The crew was completing a local training flight at Pope AFB. For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed very hard, causing the nose gear to collapse. The aircraft was stopped on the runway and all 11 occupants escaped uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft departed Milwaukee-General Billy Mitchell Airport on a flight to Howard AFB, Panama City, with an intermediate stop in Tegucigalpa, carrying 10 crew members and a load consisting of foods and electronics. At Tegucigalpa-Toncontin Airport, the aircraft landed 2,000 feet past the runway threshold in a 50° flaps down configuration. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, it overran and crashed on a road and a bridge, bursting into flames. Three crew members were killed and seven others were injured.

Based upon digital flight data recorded (DFDR) information, the mishap aircraft departed Portland IAP at 1720 PST on 22 Nov 96 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight en route to North Island Naval Air Station. The purpose of the sortie was to conduct an overwater navigation evaluation. King 56 began the sortie with a normal takeoff, departure and climbout. One hour and 24 minutes after takeoff in level flight at FL 220 the mishap sequence began with the engineer commenting on a torque flux on the number 1 engine. Nothing on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), the DFDR, or the survivor’s testimony suggested any unusual events prior to the engineer’s comment. Over the next three minutes, the operations of all four engines became unstable and eventually failed. Crew actions during these critical three minutes are known only by verbal comments on the CVR and the survivor’s testimony. The following discusses what we know of those actions. The engineer called for n°1 propeller to be placed in mechanical governing. This would normally remove electrical inputs to the propeller through the synchrophaser. The pilot then called for all four propellers to be placed in mechanical governing. This action was consistent with treating this emergency as a four-engine rollback. There is no indication on the DFDR or the CVR as to whether or not the crew selected mechanical governing on any of the remaining three propellers. At the same time the crew was analyzing the emergency, they also declared an in-flight emergency with Oakland ARTCC and turned the mission aircraft east to proceed toward Kingsley Field, Klamath Falls, OR, approximately 230 miles away and approximately 80 miles from the coast. The Radio Operator radioed the USCG Humboldt Bay Station and notified them of the in-flight emergency. During the turn toward the shore the number 3 and number 4 engines once briefly recovered most of their torque. These increases are recorded by the flight data recorder. When the RPM on number 3 (the aircraft’s last functioning engine) finally decreased below 94% RPM the last generator producing electrical power dropped off line due to low frequencies. As a result, at 1846 Pacific Standard Time all electrical power was lost. After a brief period, power was restored to the equipment powered by the battery bus. From this point on, the aircraft glided to the attempted ditching. There is no record of that portion of the flight, except the survivor’s testimony.The outboard wing sections and all four engines separated from the center wing section that in turn separated from the fuselage. Subsequently, the engines and fuselage went straight to the ocean floor at a depth of approximately 5500 feet. The outer wing and the center wing sections floated on the surface for several days and sank more than 50 nm from the impact location. The radio navigator was rescued while 10 other crew members were killed.

The aircraft departed Jackson Hole Airport at 2245LT on a flight to New York-JFK, carrying eight crew members and a U.S. Secret Service agent. The purpose of the flight was to transport a U.S. Secret Service communications vehicle to New York after President Bill Clinton spent some vacations in Jackson Hole. Five minutes after takeoff, while climbing by night, the four engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt Sleeping Indian (Mt Sheep - 3,427 metres high) located about 18 km southeast of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all nine occupants were killed.

A United States Air Force Boeing T-43A (USAF designation for the Boeing 737-200) was destroyed after impacting a hillside during an NDB approach to Dubrovnik Airport, Croatia. All 35 on board were killed. The aircraft was engaged in a mission to fly United States Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and a delegation of industry executives around the region for visits. The party was to be flown from Zagreb to Tuzla and Dubrovnik before returning to Zagreb. Operating with a call sign of IFO21, the accident aircraft departed Zagreb at 06:24 hours. The crew landed at Tuzla at 07:15 after an uneventful flight. The passengers deplaned, and the aircraft was then repositioned to Split because of insufficient ramp space at Tuzla to park the aircraft for the duration of the visit. At 12:47, the aircraft landed at Tuzla, where the passengers reboarded. The accident flight departed Tuzla for Dubrovnik at 13:55. After crossing Split at 14:34 the flight was cleared to descend from FL210 to FL140. Further descent clearance was given to FL100. After the aircraft reached FL100 at 14:45, south of Split VOR, Zagreb Center transferred control to Dubrovnik Approach/Tower. The controller cleared IFO21 direct to the Kolocep (KLP) NDB. After opposite-direction traffic had been cleared, IFO21 was cleared to descend to 5000 feet. At 14:52, the crew told Dubrovnik Approach/Tower that they were 16 NM from the airport. They were cleared to descend to 4,000 feet and told to report crossing the KLP beacon. At 14:53, the aircraft crossed KLP, which was the Final Approach Fix (FAF), at 4100 feet and began the approach without approach clearance from Dubrovnik Tower. At that point the aircraft was slightly high and fast and not completely configured for the approach, as it should have been. At 14:54, the copilot of IFO21 called Dubrovnik Approach/Tower and said, "We’re inside the locator, inbound." IFO21 was then cleared for the NDB approach to runway 12. The aircraft tracked a course of 110 degrees after crossing KLP, instead of tracking the published course of 119 degrees. The aircraft maintained this track from KLP to the point of impact. The accident aircraft descended to 2200 feet which was consistent with the published minimum descent altitude of 2,150 feet. At 14:57, the aircraft impacted a rocky mountainside approximately 1.7 NM to the left (northeast) of the extended runway centerline and 1.8 NM north of the approach end of runway 12 at Dubrovnik Airport.

The aircraft was dispatched out from Elmendorf AFB on an AWACS survey mission under call sign Yukla 27, carrying 20 passengers and four crew members. Shortly after takeoff from runway 05, while in initial climb, the aircraft collided with a flock of Canada geese that struck both left engines n°1 and 2. The aircraft climbed to a maximum height of about 250 feet when the engine n°1 failed and the engine n°2 exploded. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled left roll, causing the left wing to struck trees. Out of control, it crashed in a huge explosion in a wooded area located about a mile from the runway end. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 24 occupants were killed. Numerous dead geese were found at the crash site.

After departure from Boise-Gowen Field, en route to Peterson AFB in Colorado Springs, the crew encountered technical problems with the engine n°2. The crew declared an emergency and elected to divert to Mountain Home AFB. About 20 minutes into the flight, the engine n°2 compressor disintegrated. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed 12 miles north of Bliss. All six crew members were killed.
Crew:
Lt Col Robert Buckout, Commander
1st Lt Lance Daugherty, pilot,
Cpt Geoffery Boyd, navigator,
CMSgt Jimmy Vail, flight engineer,
M/Sgt Jay Kemp, loadmaster,
S/Sgt Michael Scheideman, loadmaster.

The C-21A, a USAF designation of the Learjet 35A was assigned to the 332nd Airlift Flight at Randolph AFB, Texas. The aircraft would depart Randolph AFB as flight Kiowa 71 to Wright-Patterson AFB, Andrews AFB and then back to Randolph. The aircraft was landed at Andrews AFB at 10:57. The crew requested a full load of fuel and told Serv-Air maintenance technicians that they had been unable to transfer fuel from the wing tanks to the fuselage tank. A Serv-Air maintenance technician removed the fuel-control panel from the aircraft and replaced the fuselage-tank transfer/fill switch. The maintenance technician told the crew that replacement of the fuselage-tank switch had not corrected the problem and that he was going to try to correct the problem by replacing the fuel-control relay panel. This was a time consuming job. The crew decided to continue back to Randolph without the repairs. The fuselage fuel tank was full and they had not had trouble earlier in the day getting fuel out of the fuselage tank. The aircraft departed from Andrews AFB at 16:38. The aircraft was in cruise flight at FL390 at 17:53 when the crew began to transfer fuel from the fuselage tank to the wing tanks. The crew did not know that the right standby fuel pump was operating and was preventing fuel from being transferred from the fuselage tank to the right wing. Bearings in the right standby pump were in a deteriorated condition and the pump had required higher-than-normal electrical current for rotation. The higher-than-normal electrical current had caused progressive damage to two contacts in the fuel control relay panel and eventually had caused the contacts to bond together. This caused the pump to run continuously throughout the flight and to prevent fuel transfer from the fuselage tank to the right wing. The aircrew noticed that the left wing-tip tank had become 800 pounds [363 kilograms] heavier than the right wing-tip tank during the transfer, and they attempted to analyse the malfunction and correct the imbalance. A fuel-imbalance during-fuel-transfer malfunction however was not included in the Air Force training syllabus, nor was the procedure contained in the C-21A checklist. At 17:56, the copilot told the Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (Atlanta Center) controller, "Sir, we need to revise our flight plan. We’re having a problem getting some fuel out of one of our wings. Can we get vectors to Maxwell Air Force Base? And we’re going to need to dump fuel for about five minutes." The crew at 18:00 began to dump fuel from the left wing-tip tank. However, they still had an imbalance in the wing tanks themselves of about 200 pounds (91 kilograms). At 18:03 the flight was cleared to descend from FL350. The crew then observed that fuel quantity was decreasing rapidly in the right wing tank, that the left wing tank was full and that the left wing-tip tank had begun to fill with fuel. At 18:07, the copilot told the Atlanta Center controller, "Sir, we’d like to declare an emergency at this time for a fuel problem and, ah, get to Maxwell quick as we can." They were cleared direct to Maxwell AFB and cleared to descend to 17,000 feet, and later to 11,000 feet. At 18:15, the copilot told Atlanta Center, "We need to change the airfield, to get to the closest piece of pavement we can land on." The controller said, "Kiowa 71, we got an airport at 12 o’clock and 12 miles. It’s Alexander City." The crew accepted this and began their emergency descent into Alexander City airport. At 18:16 the copilot took over control since the captain did not have the airfield in sight and the copilot did. The aircraft was northeast of the airport at 8,800 feet and was descending at 5,600 feet per minute with the wing-lift spoilers extended when the copilot told Atlanta Center that they were on a left base for the runway. The crew attempted to fly a visual traffic pattern to runway 18 but were in a poor position to complete the approach and landing. They subsequently elected to enter a left downwind leg for runway 36. As airspeed was reduced, aileron authority diminished and, because of the fuel imbalance, the aircraft became difficult to control. The copilot, flying from the right seat, did not have a good view of the runway and asked the aircraft commander for help in positioning the aircraft on downwind and in beginning the turn toward the runway. The captain wanted to get the gear down but the copilot had difficult controlling the plane already: "Don’t put anything down," the copilot said. "Nothing down, nothing down." The aircraft was at 2,030 feet when the gear-warning horn sounded. The captain said, "Gear down. Gear down." The copilot said, "No. Stand by. Stand by." "Gear down," the captain said. "Gear down, man." "No, not yet, not yet," the copilot said. The copilot then asked the aircraft commander to "push the power up a little bit for me." Power was increased and the gear was extended. The aircraft was at about 1,500 feet and was one mile southwest of the runway at 18:19 when the copilot began a left turn. Approximately halfway through the final turn and one mile due south of runway 36, the aircraft abruptly rolled out, flew through the extended runway centerline and continued in an east, northeasterly direction approximately 800 feet above the ground. The copilot had rolled out of the turn to regain lateral control of the aircraft. At this time the right engine was operating at a reduced thrust setting in an attempt to counteract the effects of the fuel imbalance. The captain, to center the ball in the slip indicator, applied pressure on the left rudder, against pressure that was being applied on the right rudder by the copilot. The captain said, "Step on the rudder. Step on the rudder." The copilot said, "Paul, no. Paul, don’t." The application of left rudder caused the aircraft to roll left rapidly. It rolled inverted entered the trees and struck the ground.