Capital Airlines (USA)

While cruising at an altitude of 8,000 feet in foggy and icing conditions, both engines number three and four failed. The crew elected to restart the engines, without success. The airplane went out of control and plunged before crashing in a wooded area, striking the ground in a level attitude, with no forward velocity. The airplane was destroyed and all 50 occupants were killed.

Flight 75 taxied away from the terminal at 1520, 20 minutes late. The last-minute delay occurred when Captain Paddack found an error in the aircraft gross weight computation and questioned the weight for the existing runway restriction. At 1455 the flight radioed for runway temperature. The senior operations agent came aboard and he and the captain rechecked the computations to make sure the weight was correct and below maximum allowable for the runway length, the existing surface wind, and temperature. The problem was satisfied and it was determined that the gross weight was 60,507 pounds, 103 pounds less than the maximum allowable of 60,610 pounds. During taxi Flight 75 was issued an instrument clearance according to an instrument flight rules flight plan filed earlier. At 1529 a no takeoff from runway 22 was observed. Executing the clearance, Flight 75 made numerous radio communications in the New York area and proceeded uneventfully to its assigned cruising altitude. 14,000 feet, and onto the assigned airway Victor 3. Regular position reports were made as the flight progressed. At 1602 Flight 75 contacted the Washington Center. It reported that it was over Westchester on the hour, 1600, at 14,000, estimating Westminster at 1617, with Herndon next. In the same message it advised, ". . . ah, we've got a pretty good string of thunderstorms along that course . . . ah, if we could stay in the clear and stay a little bit south of Westminster, is that O. K. with you?" The center controller replied "Capital 75, that'll be all right and report passing Westminster." The flight acknowledged. At 1610 the flight advised, "Ah, Washington Center, this is Capital 75, we've reduced to one seven zero knots account rough air." This was the last message from the flight on the center recorders and the last which could be determined as having been made. The aircraft entered a near vertical dive, partially disintegrated at an altitude between 3,000 and 7,000 feet and eventually crash in Chase, two miles northeast of Martin Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 31 occupants were killed.

Capital Airlines Flight 983 of May 12, 1959, a Constellation model L-049, N 2735A, following a landing at 1529 e.s.t., on a wet runway, was intentionally ground looped and during the maneuver skidded and slid down a steep embankment beyond the boundary of the airport at Charleston, West Virginia. One of the 38 passengers and one of the six crew members died in the fire which followed; one passenger was seriously burned amd all others on board the aircraft escaped with little or no injury; the aircraft was destroyed. The aircraft was landed within the first third of the runway and the captain said that finding braking to be ineffective, he chose to ground loop the aircraft rather than risk going down a sharp declivity at the far end of the runway. The aircraft left the runway about 600 feet from the far end. Investigation revealed operational deficiencies in the conduct of the approach and touchdown, and that crew coordination throughout the emergency was poor. Because of crew statements, the brakes were believed to have been capable of functioning in a normal manner; however, water on the runway would have permitted the aircraft to aquaplane and thus make them ineffective.

A Capital Airlines DC-3 crashed and burned near Martinsburg Airport, Martinsburg, West Virginia, at 1358 on June 4, 1958, injuring the three occupants-an instructor and two pilot-trainees. One trainee, who was flying the aircraft at the time of the accident, died the following day of severe burns. The aircraft was on a training flight from Washington National Airport and was practising takeoffs and landings at Martinsburg Airport. During the pilot's attempt to climb out after abandoning a single-engine approach to runway 8, the aircraft stalled and crashed in a wooded area. A crew member was killed while two other occupants were injured.

On may 20, 1958, about 1129 e. d. t., a Capital Airlines Viscount, N 7410 and a Maryland Air National. Guard T-33, 35966, collided in the air about four miles east-northeast of Brunswick, Maryland. Seven passengers and the crew of four aboard the Viscount were killed. A passenger in the T-33 was killed but the pilot, although severely burned, parachuted safely. Both aircraft were totally destroyed by in-flight collision, ground impact, and the ensuing fire. The collision occurred at an altitude of about 8,000 feet on Victor Airway lilt while the Viscount was descending en route from Pittsburgh to Baltimore-Friendship Airport. It was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan but in visual flight rules weather conditions. The T-33 pilot was on a VFR proficiency flight from Martin Airport, Baltimore, Maryland. Just before the collision the aircraft were observed in the area west of Brunswick flying parallel easterly courses with the T-33 some distance behind and to the left of the Viscount. The T-33 quickly overtook the Viscount and made a gentle right turn, during which it struck the forward left side of the fuselage of the Viscount. Both aircraft were being operated in visual flight rules weather conditions and it was therefore the responsibility of each crew to provide separation from other aircraft by visual reference. The right-of-way rules contained in the Civil Air Regulations clearly set out the pilot's responsibility in the overtaking situation. It is the Board's aim to provide for a positive control system of air-craft separation which will not depend upon the "see and be seen" principle to prevent the occurrence of collision accidents. The Board has been actively engaged for some time in the development of such a program. Its full implementation is several years away and will be dependent on additional technical improvements in equipment and on the expansion of the air traffic control facilities to accommodate the ever increasing amount of traffic. Since the accident the USAF and Capital Airlines, along with other carriers, in an effort to reduce collision hazards, have required, in general, that all aircraft on airways above 10,000 feet be operated in accordance with IFR.

At 2306, four minutes after takeoff, the flight, pursuant to clearance instructions, reported to Flight tower that it was at 3,600 feet and was departing the Flint outer marker. At this time the tower requested the estimated time of arrive at Tri-City and was advised that it was 2315. Flight 67 was then given the following clearance: "ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control) clears Capital 67 to hold north of the Saginaw omni range, one minute pattern, right turn, maintain 3,600 feet. Expect further clearance 2320, change to company frequency for this clearance." This clearance was acknowledged and, as per instructions, the frequency was changed to that of the company at Detroit. At 2310, Capital at Detroit relayed the following clearance to the flight: "ARTC clears Flight 67 for approach at Saginaw (Tri-City) Airport. Report time on the ground to Saginaw radio." These instructions were verified. The flight then called Saginaw ATCS (Air Traffic Communication Station) and was given the local 2300 weather observation and the runway in use, No. 5. The Tri-City Airport does not have a traffic control tower. The 2300 Saginaw weather was reported as: Measured ceiling 900 feet, overcast, visibility 3 miles, light snow showers, temperature 34; dewpoint 33; wind north-northeast 18, peak gusts to 27 knots; altimeter 29.48, comments--drizzle ended and snow showers began at 2225. At 2316 Trip 67 advised Saginaw radio that it was over the airport. A short time later, ground witnesses observed the lights of the aircraft when it was on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. The aircraft was seen to make a left turn onto base leg and at this time the landing lights of the aircraft were observed to come on. During this portion of the approach the aircraft was flying beneath the overcast, estimated to be 900 feet, and appeared to be descending. When turning on final, Trip 67 flew a short distance beyond the extended centerline of the runway and the turf was seen to steepen for realignment with the runway. Soon after this the aircraft was observed to level off and then to descend steeply and strike the ground. A large fire immediately erupted. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 47 occupants have been killed.

Training flight H-3 was scheduled by Capital (Capital Airlines) flight training department for Captain Carl R. Burke, instructor, and two Copilots, Henry A. Podgurski and Robert K. Thomas. This was the second of a series of six flights being made for the purpose of giving Messrs. Podgurski and Thomas flight instruction to prepare them for upgrading from copilot to captain. The flight was dispatched in accordance with visual flight rules to operate in an area northwest, north, and northeast of Washington, D. C. This area was used by Capital as its local practice area for training flights. The aircraft was fully serviced with 820 gallons of fuel. Its gross takeoff weight was less than the max allowable and the center of gravity was within allowable limits. The weather was clear and was not a factor in thin accident. Takeoff was made at 0625. At 0631 the flight advised the company by radio of the trip number, time of takeoff, fuel aboard, and flight duration. There were no other radio contacts with the flight. At approximately 0745, N88835 was observed in the vicinity of Clarksburg, Maryland, by many people who saw it during several tea of flight and in its plunge to the ground.

The DC-4 was on a simulated ILS approach to Pittsburgh when the copilot established visual reference with the runway. The approach was continued visually but the rate of descent was excessive. The captain applied power, but before recovery was complete, the right main gear struck an embankment short of runway. Full power was applied and a go-around was carried out. Severe buffeting and a number three engine fire were experienced as the DC-4 circled for another approach. The landing was carried out safely and all 55 occupants were evacuated. The aircraft was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

Capital Airlines flight 141 of February 20, 1956, originated at Willow Run Airport, Detroit, Michigan, and was a regularly scheduled flight to Chicago. The crew consisted of Captain Roger Harrison Taylor, First Officer George Richard Hanst and Stewardesses Jacqueline V. Sadowski and Gloria Galloway. Captain R. E. Gilliland, the fifth assigned crew member, was deadheading to Chicago and rode in the passenger cabin. Following a weather briefing, which included a review of en route and terminal weather forecasts, a VFR flight plan was filed. Departure from Detroit was at 0700. The gross takeoff weight of the air- craft was 54,701 pounds, which was below the specified limit; the load was distributed properly with respect to the center of gravity of the aircraft. The flight to the vicinity of Chicago was routine. Near Chicago Flight 141 reported to the Chicago tower that it was over the shoreline. The flight later reported passing Kedzie and was cleared to land on runway 31R. The flight was observed to make a right turn to final approach and appeared to descend in a normal manner until over the west side of Cicero Avenue (the eastern boundary of the airport) at an altitude of 25 to 50 feet above the ground. At this point the airplane appeared to decelerate and descend rapidly. The aircraft was further observed to strike the ground in a slightly nose-up attitude several hundred feet short of the threshold of threshold of the runway, and the top of the fuselage was seen to break open adjacent to the wing spar to fuselage attachment. As the aircraft proceeded down the runway the landing gear retracted and the aircraft then slid on its belly until it came to rest to the left of the runway, 1,626 feet beyond the point of initial impact. All occupants left the aircraft through emergency exits or the main cabin door. The fire department, having been called by tower personnel, arrived at the scene before all persons had evacuated the aircraft. However, there was no fire. The Chicago weather at 0720 was reported as: Sky clear, visibility 6 miles; smoke; wind north-northwest.

Capital Airlines Flight 500 originated in Memphis, Tenn., December 12, 1949, and proceeded in a routine manner to Norfolk, Va. No difficulties of any kind were experienced. At Norfolk a new crew consisting of Captain William J. Davis, Copilot Lloyd L. Porter, and Flight Attendant Joseph W. Buell were assigned to the flight for the remainder of the trip to Newport News, Va., and Washington, D. C. Before takeoff from Norfolk, Captain Davis studied all weather data in the Capital Airlines office, and called the company’s dispatcher in Washington who advised him that weather conditions would remain above landing limits until after midnight. Flight 500 took off from Norfolk at 1816; arrived at Newport News, Va., at 1836; and seven minutes later, at 1843, was again in the air en route to Washington by way of Richmond, Va., at a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet. On board were 20 passengers, the crew of three, 792 pounds of cargo and 3,000 pounds of fuel. Total aircraft weight was 25,472 pounds, which was 126 pounds in excess of the certificated aircraft weight. The load was distributed so that the center of gravity of the aircraft was within the certificated limits. The trip continued without incident. It reported over Richmond at 1910, and was then cleared by Air Route Traffic Control to proceed at 8,000 feet to the Clifton Intersection, which is 32 miles southwest of the Washington National Airport. By the time that the flight arrived over Clifton, however, ceiling and visibility at Washington were below landing minimums, so instructions were given to the flight to “hold.” Approximately 410 gallons of fuel remained on board, and weather conditions at the al-ternate airports of Richmond and Norfolk were remaining well above landing minimums. At 2025, a weather observer stationed at the south end of runway 36 at the National Airport reported that the ceiling was 400 feet variable, and that the visibility was 3/4 of a mile. Since landing minimums were now indicated, the control tower cleared one aircraft to land and the Capital flight to descend to 3,500 feet in the holding pattern. The air-craft which had been cleared to land completed its landing at 2033 without incident using the instrument landing system (ILS). At 2033 another runway observation was made, reporting the ceiling to be 400 feet variable, and the visibility 1 1/2 miles restricted by light rain and fog. Immediately following the transmission of this observation, clearance was given to Capital’s Flight 500 to descend to 1,500 feet and to commence its landing approach. Flight 500 acknowledged. Five minutes later, at 2038, the flight reported leaving the outer marker, five miles south of the end of runway 36, at which time it was cleared by the tower to land. From the holding pattern to the outer marker the aircraft was observed in the ground control approach (GCA) radar scopes which are in the Washington National Tower. Nothing unusual was noted. As the flight passed over the outer marker at 1,500 feet, entering its ILS approach, the GCA operator advised that the approach would be monitored. This message, as is customary, was not acknowledged, so it is not known whether either the pilot or the copilot was listening to GCA. In the GCA radar scopes, the flight path and descent at first appeared to be normal. When the aircraft was 4 1/2 miles from its point of landing, it was 200 feet to the right of the intended track, an extended center line of the runway, and the glide was good. When it was three miles from intended point of touchdown, it was 50 feet to the right and the glide was still good. When two miles out, the aircraft was on the center line, and only 25 feet above the glide path. One and one-half miles out, it was on the center line, and on the glide path. Then, the flight began to deviate to the right from the center line. The GCA operator in his monitoring conversation advised the flight that it was drifting sharply to the right, and followed by saying that it had gone 1,500 feet off course. The flight then appeared to turn left, proceeding back to the center line, but when within 1,000 feet of the center line and only 1/2 mile from the end of the runway, it disappeared entirely from the scopes. The aircraft was neither seen nor heard by any of the control tower operators, nor by the weather observer stationed at the end of runway 36. A few minutes after the accident, the runway observer reported the ceiling to be 400 feet variable and visibility to be 3/4 of a mile. There was light rain and fog, and the wind was from the south-southwest at nine miles per hour. The aircraft struck the water, left wing and nose first, in a steep nose down, left turning attitude. Both pilots and four passengers were killed. The aircraft was lost.