Alaska Airlines

About 0738LT on April 5, 1976, Alaska Airlines, Inc., Flight 60, a B-727-81, N124AS, departed Juneau, Alaska, on a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Seattle, Washington; an en route stop was scheduled for Ketchikan International Airport, Ketchikan, Alaska. There were 43 passengers and a crew of 7 on board. Anchorage air route traffic control center (ARTCC) cleared Flight 60 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan to the Ketchikan International Airport; the flight was routine en route. At 0805, Anchorage ARTCC cleared Flight 60 for an approach to runway 11 at Ketchikan. At 0807, the flight was 30 DME miles from the airport. At 0811, Flight 60 reported out of 10,000 feet and was cleared to contact Ketchikan Flight Service Station (FSS); the FSS advised the flight that the 0805 weather was: ceiling 800 ft., obscured, visibility 2 mi, light snow, fog, wind 330° at 5 kt. The FSS also advised the flight that braking action on runway 11 was poor; this report was based on braking tests performed by the airport manager. The captain testified that he did not recall hearing the braking condition report. Upon receipt of the clearance, the crew of Flight 60 began an ILS approach to Ketchikan. Near the 17-mile DME fix, as the flight descended through 4,000 feet, the crew acquired visual contact with the ground and water. As the flight approached Guard Island, the captain had the Island in sight and decided to abandon the ILS approach and to continue the approach visually. The captain testified that he established a 'visual glide slope of my own' at an altitude of about 1,000 feet, and stated that his eyes were '... the most reliable thing I have.' Visual contact with the approach lights was established about 2 miles from the runway threshold. The airport was visible shortly thereafter. The captain did not recall the airspeed at touchdown, but estimated that he touched down about 1,500 feet past the threshold of runway 11. He also testified that he did not see the yellow, 1,000-foot markers on the runway; he further testified that the runway '... was just wet.' A passenger on Flight 60, who was seated in seat 5A (just forward of the wing's leading edge), stated that the yellow runway marks were visible to him. The first officer has no recollection of the sequence of events leading to the accident; however, the second officer testified that airspeeds and descent rates were called out during the last 1,000 feet. The captain could not recall the flap setting either on approach or at touchdown. However, the second officer testified that after the landing gear was extended the first officer remarked, 'We're high,' and lowered the flaps from 30° to 40°. None of the cockpit crew remembered the airspeeds, descent rates, or altitudes of the aircraft during the approach and touchdown. Reference speed was calculated to be 117 kns with 40° flaps and 121 kns with 30° flaps. The captain testified that after touchdown he deployed the ground spoilers, reversed the engines, and applied the wheel brakes. Upon discovering that the braking action was poor, he decided to execute a go-around. He retracted the ground spoilers, called for 25° flaps, and attempted to obtain takeoff thrust. The thrust reverser mechanism did not disengage fully and the forward thrust could not be obtained. He then applied full reversing and quickly moved the thrust levers to 'idle.' This attempt to obtain forward thrust also was not successful. The captain then reapplied reverse thrust and again deployed the ground spoilers in an attempt to slow the aircraft. When he realized that the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway, he turned the aircraft to the right, raised the nose, and passed over a gully and a service road beyond the departure end of the runway. The aircraft came to rest in a ravine, 700 feet past the departure end of runway 11 and 125 feet to the right of the runway centerline. Flight attendants reported nothing unusual about the approach and touchdown, except for the relatively short time between the illumination of the no-smoking sign and the touchdown. The two flight attendants assigned to the rear jumpseats and the attendant assigned to the forward jumpseat did not have sufficient time to reach their assigned seats and had to sit in passenger seats. None of the flight attendants felt the aircraft decelerate or heard normal reverse thrust. Many passengers anticipated the accident because of the high speed of the aircraft after touchdown and the lack of deceleration. Two ground witnesses, who are also pilots, saw the aircraft when it was at an altitude of 500 to 700 feet and in level flight. The witnesses were located about 7,000 feet northwest of the threshold of runway 11. They stated that the landing gear was up and that the aircraft seemed to be 'fast' for that portion of the approach. When the aircraft disappeared behind an obstruction, these witnesses moved to another location to continue watching the aircraft. They saw the nose gear in transit and stated that it appeared to be completely down as the aircraft crossed over the first two approach lights. The first two approach lights are located about 3,000 feet from the runway threshold. A witness, who was located on the fifth floor of the airport terminal, saw the aircraft when it was about 25 feet over the runway. The witness stated that the aircraft was in a level attitude, but that it appeared 'very fast.' He stated that the aircraft touched down about one-quarter way down the runway, that it bounced slightly, and that it landed again on the nose gear only. It then began a porpoising motion which continued until the aircraft was past midfield. Most witnesses placed the touchdown between one-quarter and one-half way down the runway and reported that the aircraft seemed faster-than-normal during the landing roll. Witnesses reported varying degrees of reverse thrust, but most reported only a short burst of reverse thrust as the aircraft passed the airport terminal, about 3,800 feet past the threshold of runway 11.

Alaska Airlines, Flight 1866 (AS66) was a scheduled passenger flight from Anchorage (ANC), to Seattle (SEA), with intermediate stops at Cordova (CDV), Yakutat (YAK), Juneau (JNU), and Sitka (SIT). The IFR flight departed Anchorage at 09:13 and landed at Cordova at 09:42. AS66 departed Cordova at 10:34 after a delay, part of which was attributable to difficulty in securing a cargo compartment door. The flight landed at Yakutat at 11:07. While on the ground, AS66 received an air traffic control clearance to the Juneau Airport via Jet Route 507 to the Pleasant Intersection, direct to Juneau, to maintain 9,000 feet or below until 15 miles southeast of Yakutat on course, then to climb to and maintain FL230. The flight departed Yakutat at 11:35, with 104 passengers and seven crew members on board. At 11:46, AS66 contacted the Anchorage ARTCC and reported level at FL230, 65 miles east of Yakutat. The flight was then cleared to descend at the pilot's discretion to maintain 10,000 ft so as to cross the Pleasant Intersection at 10,000 feet and was issued a clearance limit to the Howard Intersection. The clearance was acknowledged correctly by the captain and the controller provided the Juneau altimeter setting of 29.46 inches and requested AS66 to report leaving 11,000 ft. At 11:51, AS66 reported leaving FL230. Following this report, the flight's clearance limit was changed to the Pleasant Intersection. At 11:54, the controller instructed AS66 to maintain 12,000 feet. Approximately 1 minute later, the flight reported level at 12,000 feet. The changes to the flight's original clearance to the Howard Intersection were explained to AS66 by the controller as follows: "I've got an airplane that's not following his clearance, I've got to find out where he is." The controller was referring to N799Y, a Piper Apache which had departed Juneau at 11:44 on an IFR clearance, destination Whitehorse, Canada. On two separate occasions, AS66 acted as communications relay between the controller and N799Y. At 11:58, AS66 reported that they were at the Pleasant Intersection, entering the holding pattern, whereupon the controller recleared the flight to Howard Intersection via the Juneau localizer. In response to the controller's query as to whether the flight was "on top" at 12,000 feet, the captain stated that the flight was "on instruments." At 12:00, the controller repeated the flight's clearance to hold at Howard Intersection and issued an expected approach time of 12:10. At 12:01, AS66 reported that they were at Howard, holding 12,000 feet. Six minutes later, AS66 was queried with respect to the flight's direction of holding and its position in the holding pattern. When the controller was advised that the flight had just completed its inbound turn and was on the localizer, inbound to Howard, he cleared AS66 for a straight-in LDA approach, to cross Howard at or below 9,000 feet inbound. The captain acknowledged the clearance and reported leaving 12,000 feet. At 12:08 the captain reported "leaving five thousand five ... four thousand five hundred," whereupon the controller instructed AS66 to contact Juneau Tower. Contact with the tower was established shortly thereafter when the captain reported, "Alaska sixty-six Barlow inbound." (Barlow Intersection is located about 10 nautical miles west of the Juneau Airport). The Juneau Tower Controller responded, "Alaska 66, understand, ah, I didn't, ah, copy the intersection, landing runway 08, the wind 080° at 22 occasional gusts to 28, the altimeter now 29.47, time is 09 1/2, call us by Barlow". No further communication was heard from the flight. The Boeing 727 impacted the easterly slope of a canyon in the Chilkat Range of the Tongass National Forest at the 2475-foot level. The aircraft disintegrated on impact. The accident was no survivable.

The approach to Kotzebue-Wien Memorial Airport was completed in whiteout conditions with a very limited visibility. Following a 'normal' approach, the airplane belly landed and slid for few hundred yards before coming to rest. All 32 occupants were evacuated while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Flight CKA779 was a Military Air Transport Service (MATS) contract flight. It originated at Everett-Paine AFB, WA (PAE), on July 20, 1961, and proceeded to Fairfield-Travis AFB, CA (SUU). At Travis AFB 25,999 pounds of cargo was loaded. The flight then departed Travis and flew non-stop to Anchorage, Alaska. At Anchorage, the crew received weather and NOTAM information for the flight to Shemya AFB, AK (SYA), which did not include the approach or field lighting deficiencies. The stop at Shemya was for the purpose of servicing the aircraft before proceeding to Tachikawa AB, Japan for refueling. The flight took off from Anchorage at 19:40 and proceeded routinely toward Shemya. The flight made contact with Shemya Radio at 00:45. It was flying at FL100 between layers of clouds. At 01:28 the crew reported 100 miles east of Shemya, estimating Shemya at 01:55. Shemya Radio cleared the flight inbound to Shemya Homer and to descend and maintain 5,500 feet. At 01:45, the flight contacted Shemya GCA and radar contact was made approximately 18 miles north-northeast of Shemya, at 5,500 feet. The GCA controller transmitted the following weather information: "Indefinite ceiling 200 feet; sky obscured, visibility one mile in fog; new altimeter 29.86." According to the GCA controller, the DC-6 intercepted the glide path for runway 10 properly and maintained a good course. When two miles from touchdown, it dropped approximately 10 to 25 feet below the glide path. At one mile out, the flight went an estimated 30 to 40 feet below the glide path, which was still well above the minimum safe altitude for the approach. When the flight, was over the approach lights, it started to descend rapidly. The aircraft struck an embankment, approx. 200 feet short of the threshold in a nearly level attitude, the nose wheel touching first, about 18 feet below the crest, very nearly aligned with the centerline of the runway. The aircraft slid up the embankment during impact and when it reached the crest, broke in two at the leading edge of the wings. The fuselage, wings, and tail section stopped and settled back on the slope. The powerplants, nose section, and the bulk of the cargo slid varying distances toward the runway and up on it for a distance of about 100 yards. Fire followed impact and the majority of the wreckage was consumed.

The crew was performing a positioning flight from Anchorage International Airport to Elmendorf AFB. The approach was completed in marginal weather conditions with a limited visibility due to fog. On final, the four engine aircraft was too low and struck the ground 1,200 feet short of runway threshold. All four crew members were rescued while the aircraft was written off.

Alaska Airlines, Inc., is an air carrier certificated to conduct scheduled operations within the Territory of Alaska and between Alaska and the continental United States. Flight 100 of March 2 originated at Fairbanks, Alaska, as a regularly scheduled nonstop flight to Seattle, Washington. The aircraft, N 90449, had arrived from Seattle at 0717 March 2 as Trip 101/1. Two minor discrepancies reported by the inbound crew were corrected during a turnaround inspection and by 0930 that morning the aircraft was ready for the return flight to Seattle. The crew assigned to Flight 100, Captain Lawrence F. Currie, Copilot Lyle O. Edwards, and Stewardess Elizabeth Goods, arrived at operations and made the normal routine preparations for the flight. The pilots discussed the flight with the station agent and all necessary flight papers were completed. Weather for the route was given to the pilots. The weight and balance were determined and both were well within allowable limits. The aircraft was serviced with 2,380 gallons of fuel. The following IFR flight plan was filed with Fairbanks ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control): Alaska 100, a DC-4, departing 10,000 feet Amber 2 Snag, 12,000 Blue 79 Haines, 10,000 Blue 79 Annette, 9,500 direct Port Hardy, 10,000 Amber 1 Seattle; airspeed 185; estimating 7 hours, 44 minutes en route; proposing 0955. At 0940 the two passengers and crew boarded the aircraft. Takeoff was made in VFR weather conditions at 0958. Shortly thereafter Fairbanks center called N 90449 and relayed the ATC clearance, approving the flight plan as filed. The weather conditions at Fairbanks and en route were forecast to be generally good and the flight proceeded in the clear as planned, making routine position reports as it progressed. At 1240, when over Haines, Alaska, at 12,000 feet, Flight 100 canceled its instrument flight plan and informed ARTC that they would proceed VFR to Annette and would file DVFR 2 (Defense Visual Flight Rule) after Annette and before entering the CADIZ (Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone). Thereafter the flight proceeded, reporting its position as DVFR at 1,000 feet. The flight was observed at Patricia Bay, British Columbia, at an estimated 3,000 feet m. s. l. by a tower operator. It was also observed leaving the CADIZ. At 1717 the Alaska Airlines Seattle dispatch office received the following position report by radio from Flight 100: "Dungeness at 16 VFR estimating Seattle at 34." This was the last contact with the flight, which crashed shortly thereafter. All five occupants were killed. N 90449 crashed in heavily timbered mountainous terrain March 2 and was not located until March 3, 1957. The crash occurred approximately in the center of the "on course" zone of the northwest leg of the Seattle low frequency radio range, about 11 nautical miles southeast of the Dungeness fan marker. This leg of the Seattle range defines the center of Amber Airway 1 between the Dungeness intersection and the range station. The minimum instrument en route altitude for this segment is 5,000 feet. Because of adverse weather and inaccessibility of the location, CAB investigators were unable to reach the scene until March 6. The investigators noted that the wreckage had been disturbed prior to their arrival; some components were missing, presumably carried away by persons unknown. The path of the aircraft during the final seconds of flight was clearly defined in the heavy timber growing on the steep slope against the aircraft smashed. The aircraft’s first contact with the trees was at a point 650 feet from the wreckage. From this point it cut a level swath on a heading of 106 degrees magnetic, the width of its wing span, into the steeply rising wooded slope at an elevation of approximately 1,500 feet m. s. l. The terrain immediately ahead of the aircraft‘s path rose to an altitude of 2,000. 2,100 feet MSL.

While flying about 25 miles northwest of McGrath in marginal weather conditions, the aircraft hit the slope of a mountain. As it failed to arrive, SAR operations were conducted and the wreckage was found few hours later. Both crew members were killed in the crash.

Flight 8 took off from Naknek, Alaska, 200 miles southwest of Homer at 1805 on January 20 with a crew consisting of Captain R. D. Land, Copilot Robert Nelson Stevens, and Stewardess Lucina Nims. An instrument flight plan had been filed with Air Traffic Control to proceed to Anchorage, Alaska, via Homer and Kenai. Though the weather was forecast over this route to be clear and unlimited, an instrument plan was filed since an instrument flight plan was required for all night flights by the carrier’s operating certificate. At 1921 the flight reported over the Anchor Point Intersection, 28 miles west of Homer, and also advised the Homer radio, “We will be VFR from Homer to Kenai to Elmendorf” (Anchorage). This information was immediately transmitted to Anchorage where it was delivered at 1925 to the Alaska Airlines’ dispatcher. Flight 8 landed at Homer at 1935 without incident. Takeoff was accomplished from Homer at 1950 with the same crew, three passengers, 2,270 pounds of cargo and 2,400 pounds of fuel. Total airplane weight was 21,430 pounds which was within the certificated limit, and the load was properly distributed. Just before takeoff the flight advised Homer Tower that it would proceed to Kenai in accordance with visual flight rules. This information was received by the Alaska Airlines’ dispatcher in Anchorage at 1954. At 1957 the flight was advised by Kenai radio that there were no passengers or cargo at Kenai, and for this reason Flight 8 replied: “Will not land at Kenai.” Approximately eight minutes after this communication at 2005, the flight struck the south side of Ptarmigan Head at an elevation of 2,800 feet, nine miles east of the center line of the airway to Kenai. Five of the six occupants were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed.

The flight arrived over the Seattle radio range station at 3,000 feet on its initial approach to the Boeing Airport at 1357. Shortly before Captain Farris had reported to Seattle Radio that he had 2 rough engines, but he did not declare an emergency. The condition of engine roughness is discussed below. Weather at Boeing Field, Seattle, Washington, was reported to be ceiling indefinite 500 feet visibility one mile. An instrument approach for landing at Boeing Field was made, but not completed because of the low ceiling and visibility, so the flight returned to an altitude of 1,500 feet on the northwest course of the Seattle radio range. During this time Copilot Whitting remained in the left seat and flew the airplane. The second instrument approach was made for a landing at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport, sometimes referred to as the Bow Lake Airport, which is located 4 miles south of the Seattle radio range station. The airplane was flown inbound on the northwest course of the range. Then, after passing over the range station at 1,500 feet, a heading of 193 degrees toward the airport was flown, and a descent made for landing. The aircraft was first observed at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport when approximately 500 feet above the approach and of Runway 20, 5,611 feet long, at which time it was flying at an angel to the left of the runway. An "S" maneuver and rapid decent were made. A right turn was entered and held until the airplane was again over Runway 20, then it turned left. When the airplane first made contact with the runway it was in the left turn, and the left wing was so low that those who observed the landing thought that it would strike the ground. The first point of touchdown was made 2,748 feet beyond the approach end of the runway. The airplane progressed over the remaining distance of the runway without apparent deceleration. Captain Farris, who had taken over the controls of the airplane when it was in the left turn, stated that he allowed the airplane to slow down of its run accord to 50 or 60 miles per hour before applying brakes, and that he released the emergency air bottle 1,000 feet from the end of the runway. Before passing over the end of the runway an attempt was made to groundloop the airplane to the left by applying power to engine 4. Nevertheless, the airplane traveled almost straight ahead. It went off the end of the runway, crossed 229 feet of wet ground, and then rolled down a 24-foot embankment. At the bottom of the embankment it struck a ditch which sheared off the left lending gear and the left wing. The aircraft continued on to the intersection of the Des Moines Highway and South 188th Street where it collided with a moving automobile. Spilled gasoline was ignited, and the wreckage was enveloped in flames. The Weather Bureau at tie Seattle-Tacoma Airport made an observation immediately following the crash and reported an indefinite ceilings, 400-foot overcast, visibility variable one-half to one mile, and light rain and fog.

In unknown circumstances, the single engine aircraft crashed in the region of the Kuskokwim River. While the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire, all five occupants, a pilot and four passengers, were injured.