Training

The pilot-in-command seated in the right seat was providing familiarization in the multiengine airplane to the left seat pilot during a flight to a nearby airport for fuel. Shortly after takeoff, one of the pilots reported an engine problem and advised that they were diverting to a nearby airport. A witness along the route of flight reported hearing the engines accelerating and decelerating and then popping sounds; several witnesses near the accident site reported hearing no engine sounds. The airplane impacted a building and terrain about 10 minutes after takeoff. Very minimal fuel leakage on the ground was noted and only 23 ounces of aviation fuel were collected from the airplane’s five fuel tanks. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted for either engine or propeller; the damage to both propellers was consistent with low-to-no power at impact. Since the pilot could not have visually verified the fuel level in the center fuel tank because of the low quantity of fuel prior to the flight, he would have had to rely on fuel consumption calculations since fueling based on flight time and the airplane’s fuel quantity indicating system. Although the fuel quantity indications at engine start and impact could not be determined postaccident from the available evidence, if the fuel quantity reading at the start of the flight was accurate based on the amount of fuel required for engine start, taxi, run-up, takeoff, and then only to fly the accident flight duration of 10 minutes, it would have been reading between 8 and 10 gallons. It is unlikely that the pilot, who was a chief pilot of a cargo operation and tasked with familiarizing company pilots in the airplane, would have knowingly initiated the flight with an insufficient fuel load for the intended flight or with the fuel gauge accurately registering the actual fuel load that was on-board. Examination of the tank unit, or fuel quantity transmitter, revealed that the resistance between pins A and B, which were the ends of the resistor element inside the housing, fell within specification. When monitoring the potentiometer pin C, there was no resistance, indicating an open circuit between the wiper and the resistor element. X-ray imaging revealed that the conductor of electrical wire was fractured between the end of the lugs at the wiper and for pin C. Bypassing the fractured conductor, the resistive readings followed the position of the float arm consistent with normal operation. Visual examination of the wire insulation revealed no evidence of shorting, burning or damage. Examination of the fractured electrical conductor by the NTSB Materials Laboratory revealed that many of the individual wires exhibited intergranular fracture surface features with fatigue striations in various directions on some individual grains. It is likely that the many fatigue fractured conductor strands of the electrical wire inside the accident tank unit or fuel transmitter resulted in the fuel gauge indicating that the tanks contained more fuel than the amount that was actually on board, which resulted in inadequate fuel for the intended flight and a subsequent total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. The inaccurate fuel indication would also be consistent with the pilot’s decision to decline additional fuel before departing on the accident flight. While the estimated fuel remaining since fueling (between 15 and 51 gallons) was substantially more than the actual amount on board at the start of the accident flight (between 8 and 10 gallons), the difference could have been caused by either not allowing the fuel to settle during fueling, and/or the operational use of the airplane. Ultimately, the fuel supply was likely completely exhausted during the flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of power to both engines. Given the circumstances of the accident, the effects from the right seat pilot’s use of cetirizine and the identified ethanol in the left seat pilot, which was likely from sources other than ingestion, did not contribute to this accident.

The pilot was receiving a checkride from a designated pilot examiner for his single-pilot type rating in a turbine airplane. After a series of maneuvers, emergencies, and landings, the examiner asked the pilot to complete a no-flap landing. The pilot reported that he performed the Before Landing checklist with no flaps and believed that he had put the gear down. During touchdown, the pilot felt a "thump" and thought a tire had blown; however, he saw that the landing gear handle was in the "up" position, and he noted that the landing gear warning horn did not sound because he had performed a no-flaps landing. The examiner confirmed that the landing gear handle was in the "up" position. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector who examined the airplane reported that the landing gear handle was in the "up" position and that the fuselage had sustained substantial damage. The landing gear was lowered and locked into place without issue after the airplane was lifted from the runway.

On 27 January 2020, at approximately 1309 hours local time (L), an E-11A, tail number (T/N) 11-9358, was destroyed after touching down in a field in Ghanzi Province, Afghanistan (AFG) following a catastrophic left engine failure. The mishap crew (MC) were deployed and assigned to the 430th Expeditionary Electronic Combat Squadron (EECS), Kandahar Airfield (KAF), AFG. The MC consisted of mishap pilot 1 (MP1) and mishap pilot 2 (MP2). The mission was both a Mission Qualification Training – 3 (MQT-3) sortie for MP2 and a combat sortie for the MC, flown in support of Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. MP1 and MP2 were fatally injured as a result of the accident, and the Mishap Aircraft (MA) was destroyed. At 1105L, the MA departed KAF. The mission proceeded uneventfully until the left engine catastrophically failed one hour and 45 minutes into the flight (1250:52L). Specifically, a fan blade broke free causing the left engine to shutdown. The MC improperly assessed that the operable right engine had failed and initiated shutdown of the right engine leading to a dual engine out emergency. Subsequently, the MC attempted to fly the MA back to KAF, approximately 230 nautical miles (NM) away. Unfortunately, the MC were unable to get either engine airstarted to provide any usable thrust. This resulted in the MA unable to glide the distance remaining to KAF. With few options remaining, the MC maneuvered the MA towards Forward Operating Base (FOB) Sharana, but did not have the altitude and airspeed to glide the remaining distance. The MC unsuccessfully attempted landing in a field approximately 21 NM short of FOB Sharana.

On 14 December 2019, at 1046 Eastern Standard Time, an Angel Aircraft Corporation Model 44 aircraft, registered VH-IAZ, commenced taxiing at Mareeba Airport, Queensland. On board the aircraft were two pilots. The pilot in the left seat (‘the pilot’) owned the aircraft and was undertaking a flight review, which was being conducted by the Grade 1 flight instructor in the right seat (‘the instructor’). The planned flight was to operate in the local area, as a private flight and under visual flight rules. As the aircraft taxied towards the runway intersection, the pilot broadcast on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) that VH-IAZ was taxiing for runway 28. The pilot made another broadcast when entering and backtracking the runway, then at 1058, broadcast that the aircraft had commenced the take-off roll. Witnesses who heard the aircraft during the take-off reported that it sounded like one of the engines was hesitating and misfiring. An aircraft maintainer who observed the aircraft take off, reported seeing black sooty smoke trailing from the right engine. The maintainer then watched the aircraft climb slowly and turn right towards the north. Another witness who heard the aircraft in flight soon afterwards, reported that it sounded normal for that aircraft, which had a distinctive sound because the engines’ exhaust gases pass through the propellers. Once airborne, the pilot broadcast that they were ‘making a low-level right-hand turn and then climbing up to not above 4,500 [feet] for the south-west training area.’ About 2 minutes later, the instructor broadcast that they were just to the west of the airfield in the training area at 2,500 ft and on climb to 4,000 ft, and communicated with a helicopter pilot operating in the area. After 8 minutes in the training area, the pilot broadcast that they were inbound to the aerodrome. At 1112, the aircraft’s final transmission was broadcast by the pilot, advising that they were joining the crosswind circuit leg for runway 28. Witnesses then saw the aircraft touch down on the runway and continue to take off again, consistent with a ‘touch-and-go’ manoeuvre, and heard one engine ‘splutter’ as the aircraft climbed to an estimated 100–150 ft above ground level. At about 1115, the aircraft was observed overhead a banana plantation beyond the end of the runway, banked to the right in a descending turn, before it suddenly rolled right. Witnesses observed the right wing drop to near vertical and the aircraft impacted terrain in a cornfield. Both pilots were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The crew (one instructor aged 58 and one pilot under supervision aged 28) departed Surasi Air Base around 0900LT on a training flight. En route, in unknown circumstances, the single engine airplane crashed near Moo 2 (Sai Yok district). The aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were killed.

The twin engine airplane departed Chaklala-Nur Khan AFB with five crew members on board for a local training flight. In flight, it went out of control and crashed onto several houses located in the suburb of Mora Kalu, about 10 km south of Chaklala-Nur Khan AFB, Islamabad, bursting into flames. The aircraft and several houses were destroyed. All five crew members as well as 14 people on the ground were killed.

The Cessna 551 Citation II/SP corporate jet took off at 13:30 local time from Reichelsheim Airfield, Germany, for a training flight at Siegerland Airport. It was a training flight to acquire the type rating for the aircraft. The right pilot's seat was occupied by the pilot in command, who was deployed on this flight as a flight instructor. The student pilot, as co-pilot, sat on the left pilot seat and was the pilot flying. For the co-pilot it was the second flight day of his practical training program on the Cessna 551 Citation II/SP. The day before, he had already completed about three flying hours on the plane. At Siegerland Airport, three precision approaches to runway 31 were carried out with the help of the Instrument Landing System (ILS). After the third landing, the tower, due to the changed wind, turned the landing direction to runway 13. The cockpit crew therefore rolled the aircraft to the end of the runway, turned and took off at 14:34 from runway 13. This was followed by a left-hand circuit at an altitude of 3,500 ft AMSL. The approach to runway 13 took place under visual flight conditions. According to both pilots, the checklists were processed during the circuit and the aircraft was prepared for landing on runway 13. In the final approach, the landing configuration was then established and the landing checklist performed. The copilot reported that shortly before the landing the speed decreased, the aircraft flew too low and the approach angle had to be corrected. He pushed the engine thrust levers forward to the stop. The pilot in command supported this action by also pushing the engine thrust levers forward with his hand. However, according to the pilot in command, the remaining time to touch down on the runway was no longer sufficient for the engines to accelerate to maximum speed in order to deliver the corresponding thrust. He also described that the aircraft had been in the stall area at that time. However, he had not noticed a stall warning. At 14:42, with the landing gear extended, the aircraft touched down in the grass in front of the asphalt area of runway 13. The left main landing gear buckled and damaged the tank of the left wing. The right main landing gear also buckled, the tank on the right side remained undamaged. The kerosene escaping from the left wing ignited and a fire broke out. The aircraft burned and slipped along runway 13 on the folded landing gear, the underside of the airframe and the extended landing flaps until it came to a standstill after a distance of approx. 730 m from runway threshold 13. After the plane had come to a standstill on the runway, the copilot noticed flames on the left side of the plane. The pilot switched off both engines. Then both pilots left the plane via the emergency exit door on the right side. The pilots were not injured.

On February 6, 2019, about 1530 Pacific standard time, a Piper PA 46-350P, N997MA, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Aurora, Oregon. The private pilot and flight instructor were seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to practice commercial pilot maneuvers. After practicing slow flight, chandelles, lazy eights, and eights on pylons, they returned to the airport and discussed how to conduct a practice a power-off 180° landing as they entered the traffic pattern. When the airplane was abeam the 1,000-foot runway markings, the pilot reduced the power to idle and started a left turn toward the runway. He stated that he realized that the airplane was “probably not going to make the runway” and that the airplane was “not on final course.” He recalled the airplane turning sharply to the left as he was pulled up on the control yoke and added right rudder. He could not recall whether he applied power. The pilot did not report any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the airplane. A video of the event showed the airplane in a left turn as it descended toward the runway. The airplane’s left bank decreased to a wings-level attitude before the airplane entered a steeper left bank, followed immediately by a right bank as the airplane descended into the ground short of the runway. The airplane’s right wing and fuselage sustained substantial damage.

The twin engine airplane departed Strausberg Airport at 1100LT on a local training flight, carrying one instructor and one pilot under supervision. About 50 minutes later, while cruising in clouds at an altitude of 1,300 feet, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field located 7,5 km northwest of the airport. The airplane disintegrated on impact and both occupants were killed.

The crew was completing a training mission at Chaklala-Nur Khan AFB in Islamabad. Upon touchdown, a tyre burst. Control was lost and the airplane veered off runway to the right and collided with a concrete wall before coming to rest, burstin into flames. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire. It is believed that the landing was hard.