Crash of a Boeing 767-2J6ER in Busan: 129 killed

Date & Time: Apr 15, 2002 at 1121 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-2552
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Beijing - Busan
MSN:
23308
YOM:
1985
Flight number:
CA129
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
155
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
129
Captain / Total flying hours:
6497
Captain / Total hours on type:
6287.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5295
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1215
Aircraft flight hours:
39541
Aircraft flight cycles:
14308
Circumstances:
On April 15, 2002, about 11:21:17, Air China flight 129, a Boeing 767-200ER, operated by Air China International (Air China hereinafter), en route from Beijing, China to Busan, Korea, crashed during a circling approach, on Mt. Dotdae located 4.6 km north of runway 18R threshold at Busan/Gimhae International Airport (Gimhae airport hereinafter), at an elevation of 204 meters. The flight was a regularly scheduled international passenger service flight operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) within Korean airspace, according to the provisions of the Korean Aviation Act and Convention on International Civil Aviation. One captain, one first officer and one second officer, eight flight attendants, and 155 passengers were on board at the time of the accident. The aircraft was completely destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Of the 166 persons on board, 37 persons including the captain and two flight attendants survived, while the remaining 129 occupants including two copilots were killed.
Probable cause:
3.1 Findings Related to Probable Causes:
1. The flight crew of flight 129 performed the circling approach, not being aware of the weather minima of widebody aircraft (B767-200) for landing, and in the approach briefing, did not include the missed approach, etc., among the items specified in Air China’s operations and training manuals.
2. The flight crew exercised poor crew resource management and lost situational awareness during the circling approach to runway 18R, which led them to fly outside of the circling approach area, delaying the base turn, contrary to the captain’s intention to make a timely base turn.
3. The flight crew did not execute a missed approach when they lost sight of the runway during the circling approach to runway 18R, which led them to strike high terrain (mountain) near the airport.
4. When the first officer advised the captain to execute a missed approach about 5 seconds before impact, the captain did not react, nor did the first officer initiate the missed approach himself.
Final Report:

Crash of a Harbin Yunsunji Y-12 II in Sam Neua

Date & Time: Feb 14, 2002 at 1200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RDPL-34118
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sam Neua - Vientiane
MSN:
0043
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
QV702
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Just after liftoff, while climbing to a height of about two metres, the twin engine aircraft encountered downdraft. It struck the runway surface, went out of control and veered off runway. It then collided with a fence and came to rest on a road located 17 metres below. All 15 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the wind was blowing at 8 knots but apparently changed rapidly and became stronger shortly after rotation.

Crash of a Tupolev TU-154M near Khorramabad: 119 killed

Date & Time: Feb 12, 2002 at 0755 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-MBS
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Tehran - Khorramabad
MSN:
91A871
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
IRB956
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
107
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
119
Aircraft flight hours:
12701
Aircraft flight cycles:
5516
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Tehran, the crew started the descent to Khorramabad Airport runway 11 in bad weather conditions. In poor visibility, the crew failed to realize he was off course when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located few km northeast from the city of Sarab-e Dowreh, about 25 km northwest from the runway 11 threshold. The wreckage was found few hours later on a snow covered rock wall. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 119 occupants were killed, among them four Spanish citizens.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew failed to follow the approach procedures and the company SOP's. This caused the aircraft to deviate from the approach path by 3 nm to the north when it struck the mountain that was shrouded in clouds. The lack of visibility due to poor weather conditions was a contributing factor.

Crash of a Boeing 727-134 on Mt El Cumbal: 94 killed

Date & Time: Jan 28, 2002 at 1024 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HC-BLF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Quito - Tulcán - Cali
MSN:
19692
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
EQ120
Country:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
87
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
94
Captain / Total flying hours:
12091
Captain / Total hours on type:
8263.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7058
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3457
Aircraft flight hours:
64001
Aircraft flight cycles:
49819
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport runway 17 at 1001LT on a flight to Cali with an intermediate stop in Tulcán, carrying 87 passengers and 7 crew members. The flight was completed at an altitude of 18,000 feet on airway G-675 towards Ipiales, south Colombia. At a distance of 29 NM from Tulcán, the crew was cleared to descend to 14,000 feet and was briefed about the last weather conditions at destination. For unknown reasons, the crew failed to comply with the company SOP's and started the descent at an excessive speed of 230 knots while the approach procedure called for a speed of 180 knots. Also, the crew was not following the proper approach track for the Tulcán-Teniente Coronel Luis A. Mantilla Airport. In poor visibility due to clouds, at an altitude of 14,700 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt El Cumbal located about 30 km northwest of Ipiales. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 94 occupants were killed. The wreckage was found 1,400 feet below the summit.
Probable cause:
The probable cause was:
- The decision of the instructor captain and his crew to initiate and continue the operation towards Tulcán Airport below minima weather conditions as established in the company's SOPs.
- Inadequate navigation and operation of the aircraft by the pilot-in-command and directed by the instructor captain, consisting of entering the holding pattern of the Tulcán radio beacon with a speed of 230 knots (IAS) and with a banking of 15° exceeding the maximum stipulated speed limit of 180 knots during the entire procedure including the holding pattern and using a banking below the recommended range of 25° to 30°, thus exceeding the lateral navigation and obstacle protection limits of the holding pattern, leading this operation to the collision with Mt El Cumbal.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-3Q8 in Yogyakarta: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jan 16, 2002 at 1200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-GWA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mataram-Jogjakarta
MSN:
24403
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
GA421
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
54
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Aircraft flight hours:
27701
Aircraft flight cycles:
24139
Circumstances:
On January 16, 2002, at approximately 09:24 UTC, a Boeing 737-300, PK-GWA, ditched into the waters of the Bengawan Solo River, Central Java during a forced landing, following loss of power on both engines as the aircraft was descending through 19,000 ft. The dual engine flame out occurred shortly after the aircraft entered severe cumulonimbus cloud formations with turbulence and heavy rain and ice. The aircraft, owned and operated by PT Garuda Indonesia as Flight GA 421, had departed Ampenan at 08:32 UTC, on a regular scheduled commercial flight with destination Yogyakarta. At departure VMC conditions prevailed. The flight from Ampenan was reported uneventful until its arrival in the Yogyakarta area. The crew stated that they observed cumulonimbus cloud formations on their weather radar. The aircraft descended from cruise altitude of 31,000 ft to 28,000ft as instructed by BALI ATC at 09.08 UTC due to traffic on eastbound at FL290. As they began their descent from FL 280 at 09.13 UTC, prior to entering the clouds at 23,000 feet, the crew noted at the radar screen red cells with two green and yellow areas to the left and right of their intended flight path. The Pilot Flying decided to take the left opening above PURWO NDB. The flight crew prepared to enter turbulence by setting turbulence speed at 280 knots, seatbelt on, engine ignitions on FLT and anti-ice on. Then the Pilot Flying requested to BALI ATC to descend to FL 190 and was cleared by Semarang APP at 09.13 UTC. Shortly after the aircraft entered the area covered by Cumulonimbus cells, the crew noted severe turbulence and heavy precipitation. According to the flight crew interview, the crew noted aircraft electrical power generators loss and they were only having primary engine instrument indications and captain flight instruments, which finally identified both engines flame-out. While in the precipitation, the flight crew attempted at least two engine relights, and one attempt of APU start. As the APU start was initiated, the crew noted total electrical loss of the aircraft. The aircraft descended into VMC conditions at about 8,000 ft altitude. The PIC spotted the Bengawan Solo River and decided to land the aircraft on the river. The crew announced to the flight attendant to prepare emergency landing procedure. The aircraft landed successfully between two iron bridges in the upstream direction, and came to a stop with its nose pointing to the right of the landing path. The aircraft settled down on its belly, with the wings and control surfaces largely intact, and was partially submerged. The evacuation following the landing was successful. Twelve passengers suffered injuries, the flight crew and two flight attendants were uninjured, one flight attendant suffered serious injuries, and another flight attendant was found in the waters of the river and fatally injured.
Probable cause:
The NTSC determines that the probable causes of the accident were the combination of:
1) The aircraft had entered severe hail and rain during weather avoidance which subsequently caused both engines flame out;
2) Two attempts of engine-relight failed because the aircraft was still in the precipitation beyond the engines’ certified capabilities; and
3) During the second attempt relight, the aircraft suffered run-out electrical power.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-291 in Pekanbaru

Date & Time: Jan 14, 2002 at 1015 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-LID
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pekanbaru - Batam
MSN:
20363
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
JT386
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
96
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17266
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3700
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2500
Aircraft flight hours:
68133
Aircraft flight cycles:
66998
Circumstances:
The flight was a second route of four routes on a first day of two days schedule flight for the crew. All crew have flight schedule on the previous day and returned to Jakarta. The first flight was from Jakarta to Pekanbaru with departure schedule on 08.00 LT (01.00 UTC). All crew did the pre-flight check completely but did not check the audio warning and departed Jakarta on schedule. The flight was normal and landed in Pekanbaru on schedule. There was no problem reported. Transit in Pekanbaru for about 30 minutes and the flight was ready to continue the next flight to Batam. At 10.15 LT (03.05) the boarding process has been completed and all flight documents have ready. First Officer asked for start clearance and received weather information in Syarif Kasim Airport. The weather was fine, wind calm and clear. After start completed, the aircraft taxi to the beginning of runway 18. Flight crews have set the V1, VR, V2 and V2+15 speed bugs according to the load sheet. Take off power decide to use “reduced take off power” with assumed temperature 35o C while the actual temperature was 27° C. flight Attendant have completed the passenger briefing includes rearrange seat for the seats near the “over wing exit windows”. The checklist was done, but flight crews were not sure the indication of flap setting. When ready for take off, flight crew gave a warning to the flight attendants to take their seats. First Officer acted as “Pilot Flying”. PIC opened the power and adjusted to the required take off power setting. The aircraft rolled normal and there was no abnormal indication. PIC called “V1” and “ROTATE” at speed bugs value setting, and the First Officer rotated the control column and set to 150 ANU (Aircraft Nose Up) pitch. The aircraft’s nose was lifted up but the aircraft did not airborne. Flight attendant who was sitting at the rear felt that the nose was higher than normal. Officer also felt stick shaker, warning for approaching stall. First Officer suddenly noticed a warning light illuminated and cross-checked. He found than the warning came from the problem on the air conditioning system. Both pilots also felt pain in the ear. Recognizing this situation, PIC decided to continue the take off and called to the First Officer “disregard”. Realized that the aircraft did not airborne PIC added the power by moving power levers forward. The speed was increasing and passed the speed bug setting for V2+15 ( ± 158 KIAS) but the aircraft did not get airborne. PIC noticed that the runway end getting closer and he thought that the aircraft would not airborne, he decided to abort the take off and called “STOP”. PIC retarded the power levers to idle and set to reverse thrust, extended the speed brake and applied brake. Nose of the aircraft went down hard and made the front left door (L1) opened and 2 trolleys at front galley move forward and blocked the cockpit door. Flight crew turns the aircraft slightly to the right to avoid approach lights ahead. The aircraft moved out or the runway to the right side of the approach lights. After hit some trees the aircraft stopped at ± 275 meters from the end of runway on heading 285°. One passenger had serious injury and the rest had minor injury, all crew were safe and not injured. No one killed in this accident, while the aircraft considered total loss.
Probable cause:
Findings:
1. The flight crews have proper qualification to fly the aircraft.
2. The aircraft did not exceed its Maximum Take-Off Weight limitation specified in the AOM.
3. Cockpit area microphone did not function at the time of the accident. Therefore, the only sounds/conversations recorded were only when there were radio transmissions.
4. FDR data show that the engines operated normally.
5. FDR data show similar trajectory with an aircraft of the type and loading condition tried to take-off with zero flap.
6. The aircraft flap system was found to function normally. Therefore, should the flap selector moved to non-zero position, the flap should move to the selected position.
7. The crew did not perform Before Take-off Checklist as stated in the Boeing 737-200 Pilot’s Handbook, Chapter Normal Operating Procedures.
8. The aural warning system, except its circuit breaker, function normally. Therefore, the cause of the absence of take-off warning is the wear out latch on the CB that caused it to open.
9. The food trolley safety lock and food trolley safety strap on the front galley did not function properly that the trolley loose upon impact and blocking the cockpit door.
10. The escape slides fail to deploy. All the slides have no expiration date or marked last inspection date-as regulated in CASR 121.309.
11. Shear pins on the engines mounting function properly to separate the engine from the wing and therefore minimize the risk of fire in the accident.
Final Remarks:
Since there is no indication that flaps system failure or flap asymmetry contributes in the failure of flap to travel to take-off configuration, the most probable cause for the failure is the improper execution of take-off checklist. Failure of the maintenance to identify the real problem on the aural warning CB, causes the CB to open during the accident and therefore is a contributing factor to the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2B-26 Islander in Bremerhaven: 8 killed

Date & Time: Dec 26, 2001 at 1013 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
D-IAAI
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bremerhaven - Wangerooge
MSN:
2167
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
The departure from Bremerhaven to the Wangerooge Island was delayed for 30 minutes due to snow showers over the airport. Prior to departure, the pilot manually removed snow from the windshield, leading edge and wings. After takeoff from runway 34, the twin engine aircraft climbed slowly to a height of about 195 feet then stalled and crashed in the Weser River. The crew of a ferry was quickly on the scene to rescue a passenger while eight other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the snow over the wings was not properly removed prior to takeoff, causing a loss of lift and disturbing the airflow. There were no defined procedures about deicing in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual of the operator.

Crash of a Let L-410UVP-E near Medellín: 16 killed

Date & Time: Dec 16, 2001 at 1025 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-4175X
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Medellín – Quibdó
MSN:
86 16 18
YOM:
1986
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
14
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
16
Captain / Total flying hours:
10482
Captain / Total hours on type:
2340.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
250
Copilot / Total hours on type:
42
Aircraft flight hours:
1863
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Medellín-Enrique Olaya Herrera Airport runway 01, the crew initiated a turn to the right and continued to climb. In poor visibility due to clouds, at an altitude of 9,200 feet, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt El Silencio near San Antonio de Prado. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 16 occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather was poor with towering cumulus and rain falls.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew failed to comply with the departure route and the company standard operating procedures.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAe 3101 Jetstream 31 in Skien

Date & Time: Nov 30, 2001 at 1828 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-LGA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bergen - Skien
MSN:
636
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
EXC204
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6590
Captain / Total hours on type:
600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1700
Copilot / Total hours on type:
390
Aircraft flight hours:
14074
Aircraft flight cycles:
16666
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on its way to Skien with a crew of two and 11 passengers. During the flight, ice was observed on the aircraft’s wings, but the ice was considered to be too thin to be removed. During descent towards runway 19 at Geiteryggen the aircraft’s ground proximity warning system (GPWS) sounded a total of three times. The aircraft was then in clouds and the crew did not have visual contact with the ground. The warnings, combined with somewhat poorly functioning crew coordination, resulted in the crew forgetting to actuate the system for removing ice from the wings. The subsequent landing at 1828 hrs was unusually hard, and several of the passengers thought that the aircraft fell the last few metres onto the runway. The hard landing caused permanent deformation of the left wing so that the left-hand landing gear was knocked out of position, and the left propeller grounded on the runway. The crew lost directional control and the aircraft skewed to the left and ran off the runway. The aircraft then hit a gravel bank 371 metres from the touchdown point. The collision with the gravel bank was so hard that the crew and several of the passengers were injured and the aircraft was a total loss. It was dark, light rain and 4 °C at Geiteryggen when the accident occurred. The wind was stated to be 120° 10 kt. The investigation shows that it is probable that ice on the wings was the initiating factor for the accident. The AIBN has not formed an opinion on whether the ice resulted in the high sink rate after the first officer reduced the power output of the engines, or whether the aircraft stalled before it hit the runway. Investigation has to a large extend focused on the crew composition and training. A systematic investigation of the organisation has also taken place. In the opinion of the AIBN, the company has principally based its operations on minimum standards, and this has resulted in a number of weaknesses in organisation, procedures and quality assurance. These conditions have indirectly led to the company operating the route Skien – Bergen with a crew that, at times, did not maintain the standard that is expected for scheduled passenger flights. The investigation has also revealed that procedures for de-icing of the aircraft wings could be improved.
Probable cause:
Significant investigation results:
a) The decision was made to wait to remove the ice from the wings because, according to the SOP, it should only be removed if it had been “typically half an inch on the leading edge”. This postponement was a contributory factor in the ice being forgotten.
b) At times, the relationship between the flight crew members was very tense during the approach to Skien. This led to a breakdown in crew coordination.
c) Among the consequences of the warnings from the GPWS was a very high workload for the crew. In combination with the defective crew coordination, this contributed to the ice on the wings being forgotten.
d) It is probable that the aircraft hit the runway with great force because the wings were contaminated with ice. The AIBN is not forming a final opinion on whether the wings stalled, whether the aircraft developed a high sink rate due to ice accretion or whether the hard landing was due to a combination of the two explanatory models.
e) The company could only provide documentary evidence to show that the Commander had attended an absolute minimum of training after being employed within the company. Parts of the mandatory training had taken place by means of self-study without any form of formal verification of achievement of results.
f) The company’s operation was largely based on minimum solutions. This reduced the safety margins within company operations.
g) The company’s quality system contributed little to ensuring ‘Safe Operational Practices’ in the company.
h) Authority inspection of the company was deficient.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan near Quepos: 3 killed

Date & Time: Nov 29, 2001 at 1148 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HP-1405APP
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
San José – Quepos – Puerto Jiménez
MSN:
208B-0788
YOM:
1999
Flight number:
LRS1625
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Copilot / Total flying hours:
800
Aircraft flight hours:
1955
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed San José Airport on a schedule flight to Puerto Jiménez with an intermediate stop in Quepos, carrying six passengers (3 Americans, 2 Germans and one Dutch) and two pilots. While descending in clouds to Quepos Airport, the aircraft collided with trees and crashed on the slope of a wooded mountain located about 13 km from Quepos Airport. Both pilots and one passenger were killed while five other passengers were seriously injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces.
Probable cause:
Collision with terrain after the captain failed to ensure that the vertical, horizontal and lateral separation was sufficient to fly over the mountains while descending under VMC conditions. Also the crew failed to take appropriate corrective actions to prevent the aircraft to continue the descent until it impacted ground, resulting in a controlled flight into terrain. The following contributin factors were identified:
- Momentary loss of situational awareness on the part of the flight crew,
- Inadequate supervision by the pilot-in-command,
- Non-compliance with standard operating procedures published by the operator,
- Use of flight procedures neither written down in manuals nor approved by the authority,
- Violation of safety rules,
- Non-application of visual flight rules by the flight crew,
- Shortcomings in the crew resources management,
- Adverse weather conditions.
Final Report: