Scheduled Revenue Flight

Following an uneventful flight from Tshikapa, the pilot initiated the approach to Kamako Airfield in relative good conditions. On final, the wind component suddenly changed. The aircraft lost height and impacted ground 16 metres short of runway 12. Upon impact, the undercarriage were partially torn off and the aircraft slid before coming to rest 37 metres past the runway threshold. All six occupants, one pilot and five passengers, escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful night schedule service from Guangzhou, the crew was cleared for an ILS approach to runway 19L at Bangkok-Suvarnabhumi Airport. Following a smooth landing, the crew started the braking procedure when, after a course of about 1,000 metres, the aircraft deviated to the right then veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed, the aircraft sank in earth and came to rest with both engines in flames. All 302 occupants were rescued, among them 14 passengers were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful flight from Potosí, the crew started the descent to Sucre-Juana Azurduy de Padilla Airport Runway 05 in good weather conditions. After touchdown, at a speed of about 50 knots, the aircraft deviated to the left then pivoted 90° left, veered off runway and rolled for about 50 metres before coming to rest in a rocky ditch. There was no fire. All 10 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 19 August 2013, a Buffalo Airways Ltd. Douglas DC-3C (registration C-GWIR, serial number 9371) was operating as a scheduled passenger flight from Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, to Hay River, Northwest Territories. After lift-off from Runway 16 at 1708 Mountain Daylight Time, there was a fire in the right engine. The crew performed an emergency engine shutdown and made a low-altitude right turn towards Runway 10. The aircraft struck a stand of trees southwest of the threshold of Runway 10 and touched down south of the runway with the landing gear retracted. An aircraft evacuation was accomplished and there were no injuries to the 3 crew members or the 21 passengers. There was no post-impact fire and the 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter did not activate.

Few minutes after takeoff from Vilyuisk Airport, on a schedule service (flight n° PI9977) to Kyubeinde-Ugulet, while cruising at an altitude of about 400 metres, the engine overheated and lost power while the oil pressure dropped. The crew decided to return to Vilyuisk when the engine failed shortly later. The captain attempted an emergency landing in a swampy area located 26 km northwest of Vilyuisk (at N63°54.584" E121°18.048"). The main wheels got stuck in soft ground, the engine was ripped off, and the aircraft came to rest, bursting into flames. Both pilots and all 9 passengers escaped uninjured and the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.

As the airplane was on final approach, the captain, who was the pilot monitoring (PM), realized that the flaps were not configured as had been briefed, with a setting of 40 degrees for the landing. Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) indicate that the captain set the flaps to 40 degrees as the airplane was descending through about 500 ft altitude, which was about 51 seconds from touchdown. When the airplane was between 100 to 200 ft altitude, it was above the glideslope. Concerned that the airplane was too high, the captain exclaimed repeatedly "get down" to the first officer about 9 seconds from touchdown. About 3 seconds from touchdown when the airplane was about 27 ft altitude, the captain announced "I got it," indicating that she was taking control of the airplane, and the first officer replied, "ok, you got it." According to FDR data, after the captain took control, the control column was relaxed to a neutral position and the throttles were not advanced until about 1 second before touchdown. The airplane touched down at a descent rate of 960 ft per minute and a nose-down pitch attitude of -3.1 degrees, resulting in the nose gear contacting the runway first and a hard landing. The airplane came to a stop on the right side of the runway centerline about 2,500 ft from its initial touchdown. The operator's stabilized approach criteria require an immediate go-around if the airplane flaps or landing gear were not in the final landing configuration by 1,000 ft above the touchdown zone; in this case, the flaps were not correctly configured until the airplane was passing through 500 ft. Further, the airplane's deviation about the glideslope at 100 to 200 ft would have been another opportunity for the captain, as the PM at this point during the flight, to call for a go-around, as indicated in the Southwest Airlines Flight Operations Manual (FOM). Accident data suggest that pilots often fail to perform a go-around or missed approach when stabilized approach criteria are not met. A review of NTSB investigated accidents by human factors researchers found that about 75% of accidents were the result of plan continuation errors in which the crew continued an approach despite cues that suggested it should not be continued. Additionally, line operations safety audit data presented at the International Air Safety Summit in 2011 suggested that 97% of unstabilized approaches were continued to landing even though doing so was in violation of companies' standard operating procedures (SOPs). The Southwest FOM also states that the captain can take control of the airplane for safety reasons; however, the captain's decision to take control of the airplane at 27 ft above the ground did not allow her adequate time to correct the airplane's deteriorating energy state and prevent the nose landing gear from striking the runway. The late transfer of control resulted in neither pilot being able to effectively monitor the airplane's altitude and attitude. The first officer reported that, after the captain took control of the airplane, he scanned the altimeter and airspeed to gain situational awareness but that he became distracted by the runway "rushing" up to them and "there was no time to say anything." The captain should have called for a go-around when it was apparent that the approach was unstabilized well before the point that she attempted to salvage the landing by taking control of the airplane at a very low altitude. In addition, the captain did not follow SOPs at several points during the flight. As PM, she should have made the standard callout per the Southwest FOM when the airplane was above glideslope, stating "glideslope" and adding a descriptive word or words to the callout (for example, "one dot high"). Rather than make this callout, however, the captain repeatedly said "get down" to the first officer before stating "I got it." The way she handled the transfer of airplane control was also contrary to the FOM, which indicates that the PM should say "I have the aircraft." The flight crew's performance was indicative of poor crew resource management.

On July 6, 2013, about 1128 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 777-200ER, Korean registration HL7742, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California. Three of the 291 passengers were fatally injured; 40 passengers, 8 of the 12 flight attendants, and 1 of the 4 flight crewmembers received serious injuries. The other 248 passengers, 4 flight attendants, and 3 flight crewmembers received minor injuries or were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 214 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Incheon International Airport, Seoul, Korea, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight was vectored for a visual approach to runway 28L and intercepted the final approach course about 14 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold at an altitude slightly above the desired 3° glidepath. This set the flight crew up for a straight-in visual approach; however, after the flight crew accepted an air traffic control instruction to maintain 180 knots to 5 nm from the runway, the flight crew mismanaged the airplane’s descent, which resulted in the airplane being well above the desired 3° glidepath when it reached the 5 nm point. The flight crew’s difficulty in managing the airplane’s descent continued as the approach continued. In an attempt to increase the airplane’s descent rate and capture the desired glidepath, the pilot flying (PF) selected an autopilot (A/P) mode (flight level change speed [FLCH SPD]) that instead resulted in the autoflight system initiating a climb because the airplane was below the selected altitude. The PF disconnected the A/P and moved the thrust levers to idle, which caused the autothrottle (A/T) to change to the HOLD mode, a mode in which the A/T does not control airspeed. The PF then pitched the airplane down and increased the descent rate. Neither the PF, the pilot monitoring (PM), nor the observer noted the change in A/T mode to HOLD. As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain the desired glidepath; these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. When the main landing gear and the aft fuselage struck the seawall, the tail of the airplane broke off at the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane slid along the runway, lifted partially into the air, spun about 330°, and impacted the ground a final time. The impact forces, which exceeded certification limits, resulted in the inflation of two slide/rafts within the cabin, injuring and temporarily trapping two flight attendants. Six occupants were ejected from the airplane during the impact sequence: two of the three fatally injured passengers and four of the seriously injured flight attendants. The four flight attendants were wearing their restraints but were ejected due to the destruction of the aft galley where they were seated. The two ejected passengers (one of whom was later rolled over by two firefighting vehicles) were not wearing their seatbelts and would likely have remained in the cabin and survived if they had been wearing their seatbelts. After the airplane came to a stop, a fire initiated within the separated right engine, which came to rest adjacent to the right side of the fuselage. When one of the flight attendants became aware of the fire, he initiated an evacuation, and 98% of the passengers successfully self-evacuated. As the fire spread into the fuselage, firefighters entered the airplane and extricated five passengers (one of whom later died) who were injured and unable to evacuate. Overall, 99% of the airplane’s occupants survived.

On Thursday June 13, 2013 at approximately 1750UTC (1:50pm local time), a fixed wing, twin turboprop regional airliner, was involved in an accident as a result of a runway excursion while landing during heavy rain showers at Marsh Harbor Int’l Airport, Marsh Harbor, Abaco, Bahamas. The aircraft, a SAAB 340B aircraft was operated by SkyBahamas Airlines and bore Bahamas registration C6-SBJ, serial number 316. C6-SBJ departed Fort Lauderdale Int’l Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida in the USA as Tropical Sky 9561. The airline, SkyBahamas Airline is a Bahamas Air Operator Certificate Holder with approved scheduled operations to and from Fort Lauderdale International Airport, Florida USA (KFLL) and Marsh Harbor Int’l Airport, Marsh Harbor, Abaco in the Bahamas. The crew received weather information and IFR route clearance from KFLL Control Tower. This passenger carrying flight departed KFLL at 1706UTC (1:06pm local) on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The point of intended landing was Marsh Harbor International Airport, Abaco, Bahamas (MYAM). The crew selected runway 09 at MYAM for landing. At 17:45:30, the aircraft leveled off at 1,500 feet ASL on a heading of 096 degrees magnetic, with airspeed of 236 knots indicated (KIAS). The flaps were extended to 15 degrees at 17:47:18 with the aircraft level at 1,300 feet ASL, approximately 4.2 nm on the approach. The autopilot was disconnected at 17:47:26 with the aircraft level at 1,300 feet ASL, approximately 3.8 nm on the approach. Heading was 097 degrees magnetic and airspeed was 166 KIAS. The Landing Gear was extended and in the down and locked position by 17:48:01 as the aircraft descended through 730 feet ASL. At 17:48:03, the flaps were extended to landing flap 20 degrees with the aircraft approximately 1.9 nm from the runway on the approach. At 17:48:47, as the aircraft approached the threshold, the power levers were retarded (from 52 degrees) and the engine torques decreased from approximately 20%. Approximately one second later, the aircraft crossed the threshold at a radio altitude of 50 feet AGL on a heading 098 degrees magnetic and airspeed of 171 KIAS. The crew encountered rain showers and a reduction in visibility. The aircraft initially touched down at 17:49:02 with a recorded vertical load factor of +2.16G, approximately 14 seconds after crossing the threshold. There were no indications on the runway to indicate where the initial touchdown had occurred. Upon initial landing however, the aircraft bounced and became airborne, reaching a calculated maximum height of approximately 15 feet AGL. The aircraft bounced a second time at 17:49:07 with a recorded vertical load factor of +3.19* G. During this second bounce, the pitch attitude was 1.8 degrees nose down, heading 102 degrees magnetic and airspeed 106 KIAS. The aircraft made consecutive contact with the runway approximately three times. The third and final bounce occurred at 17:49:14 with a recorded vertical load factor of +3.66G*. During the third bounce, the pitch attitude was 2.2 degrees nose down, heading 099 degrees magnetic and airspeed 98 KIAS. As a result of the hard touchdown, damage was sustained to the right wing and right hand engine/propeller. The right hand engine parameters recorded a rapid loss of power with decreasing engine speed and torque, and subsequent propeller stoppage. The aircraft veered off to the right at approximate time of 17:49:20 on a heading of 131 degrees magnetic at a point approximately 6,044 feet from the threshold of runway 09. The recorded airspeed was 44 KIAS with the left hand engine torque at 26 % and the right hand engine torque at 0%. The aircraft came to a full stop at approximate time 17:49:25 on a heading of 231 degrees magnetic. When the aircraft came to a stop, the flight and cabin crew and twenty-one (21) passengers evacuated the aircraft. The evacuation was uneventful using the main entrance door. Due to the damage sustained by the right wing and engine, evacuation on the right side was not considered. The evacuation occurred during heavy rainfall. No injuries were reported as a result of the accident or evacuation process. The airplane sustained substantial damage as a result of the impact sequence. The elevation of the accident site was reported as approximately 10 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) uncovered that this crew used no crew resource management or adherence to company standard operating procedures. During the final seconds of the flight, there was complete confusion on the flight deck as to who was in control of the aircraft. After failure of the windshield wiper on the left side of the aircraft, the captain continued to maneuver the aircraft despite having no visual contact of the field due to heavy rain. Sterile Cockpit procedures were not adhered to by this crew as they continued with non-essential conversation throughout the flight regime from engine start up in KFLL up until the “before landing checklist” was requested prior to landing.

On 10 June 2013, at 6:55 local time, Myanma Airways MA-60 (XY-AIP) departed from Yangon to Mawlamyine- Kawthaung and back with 4 crews and 27 passengers. During climbing, hydraulic pressure low warning (LEDPL), intermittently illuminated and aircraft returned back to Yangon. After snag rectification, aircraft departed to Mawlamyine at about 10:15 local time. During final approach, while landing gear down hydraulic pressure low warning illuminated and disappeared at aircraft parking. At about 11:10, aircraft departed from Mawlamyine with 4 crews and 60 passengers. During the route Mawlamyine to Kawthaung, no warning light illuminated. While approaching to Kawthaung RW, PIC check hydraulic quantity and flap down to 5°, landing gear down and final turn to runway 02. During final approach, LEDPL warning light was come again. PIC set flaps 15° to 30° respectively, but he noticed flaps position was not fully extended. As soon as aircraft touch down, PIC apply reverse power at about 2,500 ft from runway end. After recognition of aircraft swing, PIC changed power lever to GI position and applied brake and changed nose wheel to taxi mode and steering. Aircraft cannot able to steer and veer off left side of runway at about 3,200 ft. Firstly aircraft stroke two fence pillars with propellers and nose wheel, then aircraft turned 90° to left and stopped after striking to tree with left wing. There was no injury to crews and passengers due to accident. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 10 June 2013, a Xi ‘An MA60 aircraft registered PK-MZO was being operated by PT. Merpati Nusantara Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight as MZ 6517. The aircraft departed from Bajawa Airport (WATB) Nusa Tenggara Timur, at 0102 UTC to El Tari (WATT) Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur. On board this aircraft were 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants with 46 passengers consisted of 45 adults and 1 infant. The flight was the second sectors for the aircraft and the crew on that day. The first flight was from Kupang to Bajawa Airport. During the flight the Second in Command (SIC) acted as the Pilot Flying (PF) and the Pilot in Command (PIC) as the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The flight from the departure until commencing for approach was un-eventful. At 0122 UTC, the pilot made first communication with El Tari Control Tower controller (El Tari Tower) and reported their position was on radial 298° 110 Nm from KPG VOR and maintaining 11,500 ft. The pilot received information that the runway in use was 07 and the weather information (wind 110° 11 kts, visibility 10 km, weather NIL, cloud few 2,000 ft, temperature 30° C, dew point 22° C, QNH 1010 mbs and QFE 998 mbs). At 0133 UTC, the aircraft was on radial 297° 68 Nm from KPG VOR and the pilot ready to descend and approved by El Tari Tower to descend to 5,000 ft. At 0138 UTC, the pilot reported the aircraft was passing 10,500 ft and stated that the flight was on Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC). At 0150 UTC, the aircraft position was on left base runway 07 at 5 Nm from KPG VOR. The El Tari Tower had visual contact with the aircraft and issued a landing clearance with additional information that the wind condition was 120° at 14 kts, QNH 1010 mbs. At 0151 UTC, the pilot reported that their position was on final and the El Tari Tower re-issued the landing clearance. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) recorded that the left power lever was in the range of BETA MODE while the aircraft altitude was approximately 112 ft and followed by the right power lever at 90 ft until hit the ground. At 0154 UTC, the aircraft touched down at about 58 meters and halted on the runway at about 261 meters from the beginning of runway 07. The vertical deceleration recorded on FDR was 5.99 G and followed by - 2.78 G. After the aircraft stopped, the flight attendants assessed the situation and decided to evacuate the passengers through the rear main entrance door. One pilot and four passengers who seated on row number three, seven and eight suffered serious injury. On 11 June 2013, the aircraft was evacuated from the runway and moved to the Air Force hangar at 2100 UTC.