Private

Following an uneventful flight from Cannes-Mandelieu Airport, the pilot initiated the approach to Barcelonnette-Saint-Pons Airport Runway 27. Following an unstabilized approach, the aircraft landed hard, causing the left main gear to collapse. The aircraft veered off runway to the left, lost its right main gear and came to rest. There was no fire. All five occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

According to the pilot, he checked the fuel gauges before departure and believed he had enough fuel for the flight. As he approached his destination airport, he was instructed by an air traffic controller to enter a 2-mile left base. About 3 miles from the airport, the controller advised him to intercept a 6-mile final. About 1 1/2 miles from the runway, the left engine “quit.” The pilot repositioned the fuel valve to the left inboard fuel tank and was able to restart the engine, but, shortly after, the right engine “quit.” He then attempted to reposition the right fuel valve to the right inboard fuel tank to restart the right engine, but the left engine “quit” again, and the pilot subsequently made a forced landing in a field. An examination of the engine and airplane systems revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left wing fuel tanks were found empty. The right wing was found separated from the fuselage. No evidence of fuel was noted in the right wing fuel tanks, and no evidence of fuel leakage was found at the accident site. The pilot reported that he saw fuel leaking out of the right wing fuel vent after the accident; it is possible that a small quantity of the airplane’s unusable fuel for the right tank could have leaked out immediately after the accident. Although the pilot believed that the airplane had enough fuel onboard for the flight, his assessment was based on his calculations of the airplane’s fuel burn during several short flights he made after having the airplane topped off with fuel the night before the accident; he did not visually check the fuel level in the tanks before departing on the accident flight. The lack of fuel in the fuel tanks, the lack of evidence of fuel leakage, the loss of engine power in both engines, and the lack of mechanical anomalies are consistent with fuel exhaustion.

The pilot stated that the flight was conducted at night and he used his GPS track to align with the runway. When the pilot activated the runway lights, the airplane was about 1/4 mile to the left of the runway and 1/2 mile from the approach end. The pilot made an aggressive right turn then hard left turn to make the runway for landing. While maneuvering on short final, at 50 feet above ground level (agl), the airplane's right wing impacted the tops of a number of trees that lined the southeast side of the runway. The airplane descended rapidly and landed hard, collapsing the landing gear and spinning the airplane around 180 degrees laterally, where it came to rest against some trees. The right wing's impact with trees and the hard landing resulted in substantial damage. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The non-instrument-rated pilot departed on a cross-country flight in a twin-engine turboprop airplane on an instrument flight plan. As the pilot neared his destination airport, he received heading and altitude vectors from air traffic control. The controller cleared the flight for the approach to the airport; shortly afterward, the pilot radioed that he was executing a missed approach. The controller then issued missed approach instructions, which the pilot acknowledged. There was no further communication with the pilot. The airplane collided with terrain in a near-vertical angle. About the time of the accident, the automated weather reporting station recorded a 300-foot overcast ceiling, and 5 miles visibility in mist. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, both engines displayed signatures consistent with the production of power at the time of impact. The pilot's logbook indicated that he had a total of 1,281.6 flight hours, with 512.4 in multi-engine airplanes and 192.9 in the accident airplane. The logbook also revealed that he had 29.7 total hours of actual instrument time, with 15.6 of those hours in the accident airplane. Of the total instrument time, he received 1 hour of instrument instruction by a flight instructor, recorded about 3 years before the accident. The accident is consistent with a loss of control in instrument conditions.

The instrument-rated private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane under instrument flight rules (IFR). As the flight neared its destination, the controller issued clearance for a GPS approach, and, shortly thereafter, the pilot informed the controller that he needed to review the approach procedure before continuing the approach. The controller acknowledged, and, after the pilot reported that he was ready to proceed with the approach, the controller again issued clearance for the GPS approach. Radar data showed that, during the approach, the airplane tracked a course that was offset about 0.5 miles right of the final approach course until it was about 1 mile from the runway threshold. The airplane then turned left towards the threshold and descended to an altitude of about 145 ft above ground level over the runway threshold before the pilot performed a missed approach. It is likely that the pilot performed the missed approach because he was unable to align the airplane with the runway before it crossed the threshold. The controller provided radar vectors for the airplane to return to the approach course and cleared the airplane a third time for the GPS approach to the runway. Radar data showed that the airplane was established on the final approach course as it passed the initial approach fix; however, before it reached the final approach fix, its airspeed slowed to about 111 knots, and it began a left turn with a 25 degree bank angle. About 18 seconds later, while still in the turn, the airplane slowed to 108 knots and began descending rapidly. The airplane's rate of descent exceeded 10,000 feet per minute, and it impacted the ground about 9 miles from the destination airport. Examination of the accident site showed that the airplane was severely fragmented and fire damaged with debris scattered for about 450 feet. Postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures; however, damage to the left engine indicated that it was not producing power at the time of the accident. The severity of impact and fire damage to the airplane and engine precluded determination of the reason for the loss of left engine power. Weather conditions present at the time of the accident were conducive to super cooled liquid water droplets, and the airplane likely encountered moderate or greater icing conditions. Several pilot reports (PIREPs) for moderate, light, trace, and negative icing were reported to air traffic control but were not distributed publicly into the national airspace system, and there was no airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) issued for icing. However, the pilot received standard and abbreviated weather briefings for the flight, and his most recent weather briefing included three PIREPs for icing conditions in the area of the accident site. Given the weather information provided, the pilot should have known icing conditions were possible. Even so, the public distribution of additional PIREPs would have likely increased the weather situational awareness by the pilot, weather forecasters, and air traffic controllers. The airplane was equipped with deicing and anti-icing systems that included wing and empennage deice boots and engine inlet heaters. Due to impact damage to the cockpit, the positions of the switches for the ice protection systems at the time of the accident could not be determined. Although the airplane's airspeed of 108 knots when the steep descent began was above its published stall speed of 77 knots, both bank angle and ice accretion would have increased the stall speed. In addition, the published minimum control airspeed was 93 knots. It is likely that, after the airplane passed the initial approach fix, the left engine lost power, the airplane's airspeed began to decay, and the asymmetric thrust resulted in a left turn. As the airspeed continued to decay, it decreased below either stall speed or minimum control airspeed, and the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent.

On 29 January 2014, at about 1100 Central Daylight-savings Time, the pilot prepared a Piper PA-31 aircraft, registered VHOFF, for a private flight from Aldinga aeroplane landing area (ALA) to Kangaroo Island, South Australia. To check fuel quantities, the pilot entered the cockpit, turned on the master switch and placed the left and right fuel selectors onto the main tank (inboard) position. The gauge for each tank showed just under half full. He then placed each fuel selector onto the auxiliary (outboard) tank position, where the gauge indicated the right and left auxiliary tanks were each about a quarter full. He did not return the selectors to the main tanks. He estimated that refuelling the main tanks would allow sufficient fuel for the flight with over an hour in reserve. He exited the aircraft while it was refuelled and continued preparing for the flight. Once refuelling was completed, the pilot conducted a pre-flight inspection, and finished loading the aircraft. The pilot and passenger then boarded. The pilot was familiar with Aldinga ALA, which is a non-controlled airport. At uncontrolled airports, unless a restriction or preference is listed for a certain runway in either the Airservices en route supplement Australia (ERSA), or other relevant publications, selection of the runway is the responsibility of the pilot. Operational considerations such as wind direction, other traffic, runway surface and length, performance requirements for the aircraft on that day, and suitable emergency landing areas in the event of an aircraft malfunction are all taken into consideration. On this day, the pilot assessed the wind to be favoring runway 14, which already had an aircraft in the circuit intending to land. However, he decided to use runway 03 due to the availability of a landing area in case of an emergency. He then completed a full run-up check of the engines, propellers and magnetos prior to lining up for departure. The pilot reported that all of the pre-take-off checks were normal. Once the aircraft landing on runway 14 was clear of the runway, the pilot went through his usual memory checklist prior to take-off. He scanned and crosschecked the flight and panel instruments, power quadrant settings and trims, but did not complete his usual final check, which was to reach down with his right hand and confirm that the fuel selector levers were on the main tanks. After broadcasting on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) he commenced the take-off. At the appropriate speed, he rotated the aircraft as it passed the intersection of the 14 and 03 runways. Almost immediately both engines began surging, there was a loss of power, the power gauges fluctuated and the aircraft yawed from side to side. Due to the surging, fluctuating gauges and aircraft yaw, the pilot found it difficult to identify what he thought was a non-performing engine. He reported there were no warning lights so he retracted the landing gear, with the intent of getting the aircraft to attain a positive rate of climb, so he could trouble shoot further at a safe altitude. When a little over 50 ft above ground level (AGL), he realized the aircraft was not performing sufficiently, so he selected a suitable landing area. He focused on maintaining a safe airspeed and landed straight ahead. The aircraft touched down and slid about another 75-100 metres before coming to rest. The impact marks of the propellers suggest the aircraft touched the ground facing north-easterly and rotated to the north-west prior to stopping. The pilot turned off the master switch and both he and the passenger exited the aircraft. After a few minutes he re-entered the cockpit and completed the shutdown. Police and fire service attended shortly after the accident.

On Friday, 10 January 2014, the airplane had flown from Trier to Shoreham, where it landed at 1456 UTC. Two pilots and two passengers were on board the aircraft. Over the weekend, the passengers wanted to participate in a hunt. On the afternoon of 11 January 2014 the PIC told the service provider, tasked by the aircraft owner with the flight planning, to prepone the scheduled return flight on Sunday, 12 January 2014, from 1400 UTC to 1015 UTC. In the ATC flight plan Trier-Föhren Airfield was the destination aerodrome and Luxembourg Airport the alternate aerodrome. According to the flight plan the change of flight rules from IFR to VFR was to occur at reporting point PITES. The handling agent at Shoreham Airport stated that the PIC and the co-pilot had arrived on Sunday at 0850 UTC. The airport made the recordings of a video camera for apron surveillance available to the BFU. These recordings show that the airplane was refuelled in the presence of the pilots. The two passengers arrived at 0936 UTC and about 11 minutes later the aircraft taxied from the apron. At 1000 UTC, the airplane took off from runway 20. At 1138:25 hrs, the co-pilot established contact with Langen Radar. At that time the airplane was in Flight Level (FL) 170. At 1142:51 hrs, after the airplane had descended to FL140, the controller issued the descent clearance to FL70. Approximately one minute later the controller said: "… proceed direct destination again and descend altitude five thousand feet … Spangdahlem QNH one zero two five." The pilot in command acknowledged the clearance. At 1145:23 hrs the PIC said: "… standing by for cancelling IFR." The controller answered: "... roger, IFR is cancelled at one zero two five, your position is one five miles northwest of your destination airfield, squawk VFR, approved to leave." According to radar data, the airplane was approximately in FL90 and continued to fly with a southern heading. At 1147:26 hrs, about 5 NM east of the omnidirectional radio beacon Nattenheim (VOR NTM), the altitude was 4,900 ft AMSL. According to the radar data at 1148:10 hrs the airplane had reached 3,500 ft AMSL. The flight path continued east until 1149 hrs when, in the area of the city of Wittlich in an altitude of 3,500 ft AMSL, the airplane turned right. The ground speed was approximately 180 kt. In the course of the right turn until 1150:30 hrs, the altitude decreased further to about 2,800 ft AMSL and the ground speed to about 160 kt. At 1151:10 hrs the aircraft turned left maintaining altitude until it had reached a southern heading. From 1151:30 hrs on it continued to descend. At the time the airplane was approximately 6.7 NM from the runway threshold and about 0.5 NM north of the extended runway centre line. Approximately 15 seconds later it reached the extended runway centre line of runway 22 while it turned right into the final approach direction. It was in about 2,300 ft AMSL and approximately 5.7 NM from the runway. From 1152:20 hrs on, at approximately 4.6 NM from the threshold, the aircraft began to leave the extended runway centre line to the south. At that time, altitude was approximately 1,600 ft AMSL and ground speed about 160 kt. The last radar target was recorded at 1152:40 hrs with an altitude indication of approximately 1,300 ft AMSL and a ground speed of about 140 kt. The attention of several witnesses, located about 600 m north-east and south-east, respectively, of the accident site in the valley of the river Salm, was drawn to the airplane by engine noise. They congruently stated that the aircraft had come from the direction of the town Esch and flown in low altitude, below the fog or cloud cover, toward the south-west. One of the witnesses estimated the altitude was 15 to 20 m above the trees bordering the river Salm, approximately the same height as the open wire located in the area. According to congruent witnesses’ statements, the engine thrust was increased and the airplane pulled up shortly before reaching a wooded escarpment rising by about 60 m, banked left and disappeared in the fog. Immediately afterwards fire had become visible and impact noises had been heard. The airplane impacted the ground in an inverted position. The occupants suffered fatal injuries and the aircraft was destroyed. The Flugleiter (A person required by German regulation at uncontrolled aerodromes to provide aerodrome information service to pilots) at Trier-Fohren Airfield stated, that on the morning of the accident day, at about 1010 hrs, he had received a phone call from the PIC. During the call the arrival of the airplane had been announced for 1230 hrs. The Flugleiter had informed the PIC about the severe fog prevailing at the airfield. He had also told him that, if at all, he expected visibility would increase after 1330 or 1400 hrs. After the phone conversation the Flugleiter assumed, that the airplane would fly to another airport. According to statements by the PIC’s wife, she had talked with her husband on the landline and then witnessed the PIC’s phone conversation on his mobile phone with the passenger, where he was asked to prepone the return flight to late morning. An unexpected appointment of the passengers was named as reason for the wish. During a phone conversation prior to departure her husband had explained that he had talked with Trier Airfield and learned that fog was prevailing there and one would fly either to Hahn or Luxembourg. The son of the passengers stated at the police that on the morning of the day of the accident his father had called him. He had told him that the airplane would probably land at Frankfurt-Hahn Airport. He stated that for his parents there was no deadline pressure. He said, that for him it is “völlig unvorstellbar (entirely inconceivable)” that his father would pressure the pilot to fly to Trier. In the past deviation to another airport had often been the case. It had never been a problem.

The pilot and passenger departed on a night personal flight. A review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript revealed that, immediately after departure, the passenger asked the pilot if he had turned on the heat. The pilot subsequently informed the tower air traffic controller that he needed to return to the airport. The controller then cleared the airplane to land and asked the pilot if he needed assistance. The pilot replied "negative" and did not declare an emergency. The pilot acknowledged to the passenger that it was hot in the cabin. The CVR recorded the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) issue 11 warnings, including obstacle, terrain, and stall warnings; these warnings occurred while the airplane was on the downwind leg for the airport. The airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain and was consumed by postimpact fire. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. During the attempted return to the airport, possibly to resolve a cabin heat problem, the pilot was operating in a high workload environment due to, in part, his maneuvering visually at low altitude in the traffic pattern at night, acquiring inbound traffic, and being distracted by the reported high cabin temperature and multiple EGPWS alerts. The passenger was seated in the right front seat and in the immediate vicinity of the flight controls, but no evidence was found indicating that she was operating the flight controls during the flight. Although the pilot had a history of coronary artery disease, the autopsy found no evidence of a recent cardiac event, and an analysis of the CVR data revealed that the pilot was awake, speaking, and not complaining of chest pain or shortness of breath; therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot's cardiac condition contributed to the accident. Toxicological testing detected several prescription medications in the pilot's blood, lung, and liver, including one to treat his heart disease; however, it is unlikely that any of these medications resulted in impairment. Although the testing revealed that the pilot had used marijuana at some time before the accident, insufficient evidence existed to determine whether the pilot was impaired by its use at the time of the accident. Toxicology testing also detected methylone in the pilot's blood. Methylone is a stimulant similar to cocaine and Ecstasy, and its effects can include relaxation, euphoria, and excited calm, and it can cause acute changes in cognitive performance and impair information processing. Given the level of methylone (0.34 ug/ml) detected in the pilot's blood, it is likely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident. The pilot's drug impairment likely contributed to his failure to maintain control of the airplane.

The twin engine aircraft was performing a flight from Abbotsford to Tofino with two people on board (a father aged 51 and his son aged 25). On approach to Tofino Airport, on Vancouver Island, the aircraft impacted ground and crashed on Vargas Island, off Tofino. The burnt wreckage was found the following day and both occupants were killed.

The pilot reported that the airplane "hesitated" during the takeoff roll due to the added weight of the passengers on board and the grass surface of the departure airstrip (Jim Finlay Farm Airstrip). He said he then added "extra" engine power at rotation, and that the left engine accelerated more quickly than the right, which resulted in an adverse yaw to the right and collision with trees along the right side of the runway. The subsequent collision with trees and terrain resulted in substantial damage to the airframe. According to the pilot, there were no mechanical deficiencies with the airplane that would have prevented normal operation.