Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

The aircraft was chartered by the Lokomotiv Yaroslavl ice hockey team to carry his staff to Minsk to take part to the first game of the Russian 2011-2012 championship. During the takeoff roll from runway 23 at Yaroslavl-Tunoshna Airport, the crew selected flaps down at 20° and the stabilizer in a nose-up position of 8,7°. The aircraft slowly accelerated to 165 km/h due to a residual pressure on the brake pedal. At a speed of 185 km/h and at a distance of 1,350 metres from the runway end, the nose gear lifted off. But the aircraft continued, passed the runway end and rolled for about 400 metres before it took off. Then it collided with various approach lights and the localizer antenna, lost height and eventually crashed on the shore of the Volga River, bursting into flames, 2 minutes after the takeoff roll was initiated. A passenger and the flight engineer were seriously injured while 43 other occupants were killed. Almost a week later, the passenger died from his injuries. Among the passengers were 26 players from the Lokomotiv Yaroslavl ice hockey team, Russian citizens and also Canadian, Czech, Ukrainian, German and Slovak. The Canadian coach Brad McCrimmon, his both assistants, the cameraman, three masseurs, one admin and two doctors were among the victims.

The commercial pilot departed with five passengers on an on-demand air taxi flight between two remote Alaskan villages separated by mountainous terrain. When the airplane did not reach its destination, the operator reported the airplane overdue. After an extensive search, the airplane's wreckage was discovered in an area of steep, tree-covered terrain, about 1,720 feet msl, along the pilot's anticipated flight path. The flight was conducted under visual flight rules, but weather conditions in the area were reported as low ceilings and reduced visibility due to rain, fog, and mist. There is no record that the pilot obtained a weather briefing before departing. According to a passenger who was seated in the front, right seat, next to the pilot, about 20 minutes after departure, as the flight progressed into mountainous terrain, low clouds, rain and fog restricted the visibility. At one point, the pilot told the passenger, in part: "This is getting pretty bad." The pilot then descended and flew the airplane very close to the ground, then climbed the airplane, and then descended again. Moments later, the airplane entered "whiteout conditions," according to the passenger. The next thing the passenger recalled was looking out the front windscreen and, just before impact, seeing the mountainside suddenly appear out of the fog. A postaccident examination did not reveal any evidence of a mechanical malfunction. A weather study identified instrument meteorological conditions in the area at the time of the accident. Given the lack of mechanical deficiencies with the airplane and the passenger's account of the accident, it is likely that the pilot flew into instrument meteorological conditions while en route to his destination, and subsequently collided with mountainous terrain.

The single engine aircraft was performing a taxi flight from Whitegrass Airport located on Tannu Island, to Port Vila, with six passengers and a pilot on board. While approaching Efate Island, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls and attempted an emergency landing in the garden of the Lagon Resort, south of Port Vila. On touchdown, the airplane lost its nose gear and left main gear, cartwheeled and came to rest, broken in two. All occupants were slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The Lawrence Bay Airways Ltd. float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (registration C-GUJX, serial number 1132) departed from a lake adjacent to a remote fishing cabin near Buss Lakes for a day visual flight rules flight to Southend, Saskatchewan, about 37 nautical miles (nm) southeast. There were 4 passengers and 1 pilot onboard. The aircraft crashed along the shoreline of another lake located about 2 nm southeast of its point of departure. The impact was severe and the 5 occupants were killed on impact. The emergency locator transmitter activated, and the aircraft was found partially submerged in shallow water with the right wing tip resting on the shore. There was no post-crash fire. The accident occurred during daylight hours at about 1111 Central Standard Time.

Following an uneventful flight, the flight crew briefed the arrival to the destination airport and set the calculated landing speeds. The captain and the first officer reported that during final approach, it felt like the airplane was “pushed up” as the wind shifted to a tailwind or updraft before landing near the runway number markings. Upon touchdown, the captain applied the brakes and thought that the initial braking was effective; however, he noticed the airplane was not slowing down. The captain applied maximum braking, and the airplane began to veer to the right; he was able to correct back to the runway centerline, but the airplane subsequently exited the departure end of the runway and traveled down a steep embankment. A pilot-rated passenger reported that throughout the approach to landing, he thought the airplane was high and thought that the excessive altitude continued through and into the base-to-final turn. He added that the bank angle of this turn seemed greater than 45 degrees. Recorded communication from the cockpit voice and data recorder (CVDR) revealed that during the approach to landing, the flight crew performed the landing checks, and the captain noted difficulty judging the approach. About 1 minute later, the recording revealed that the ground warning proximity system reported “five hundred” followed by a “sink rate, pull up” alert about 16 seconds later. Data from the CVDR revealed that about 23 seconds before weight-on-wheels was recorded, the airplane was at an indicated airspeed of about 124 knots and descending. The data showed that this approximate airspeed was maintained until about 3 seconds before weight-on-wheels. The recorded data further showed that the approach speed was set to 120 knots, and the landing reference speed (vREF) was set to 97 knots. Using the reported airplane configuration and the 3.5-knot headwind that was reported at the time of the approach and landing, calculations indicate that the vREF speed should have been about 101 knots indicated airspeed, which would have required a landing distance of about 3,112 feet. Utilizing the same airplane configuration and wind condition with the flight’s reported 124 knot indicated airspeed just before touchdown, the landing distance was calculated to be about 5,624 feet. The intended runway for landing was 5,132-feet long with a 1.9 percent downward slope gradient, and a 123-foot long overrun area. A postaccident examination of the airplane, including the braking system, revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot misjudged the airplane’s speed during the final approach, which resulted in runway overrun.

According to the airplane's operator, the airplane was part of a flight of four airplanes that were taking an organized tour group of revenue passengers on a sightseeing tour of southern Utah. While operating in a high density altitude environment, the pilot was flying into an airport that had a 1,000-foot cliff about 400 feet from the end of the runway he was landing on. Because of the presence of the cliff, the Airguide Publications Airport Manual stated that all landings should be made on the runway that was headed toward the cliff and that all takeoffs should be made on the runway that was headed away from the cliff. The manual also stated that a go-around during landing was not possible. During his approach, the pilot encountered a variable wind and downdrafts. During the landing flare, the airplane dropped onto the runway hard and bounced back into the air. The pilot then immediately initiated a go-around and began a turn away from the runway heading. While in the turn, he was most likely unable to maintain sufficient airspeed, and the airplane entered a stall/mush condition and descended into the ground. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The twin engine aircraft departed Valera Airport on a charter flight to San Antonio del Táchira with an intermediate stop in El Vigía, carrying five passengers and one pilot. All flight was completed under VFR mode but while descending to San Antonio del Táchira, weather conditions worsened and the pilot switched to IFR mode. Shortly later, control was lost and the aircraft crashed on the slope of Mt Laja, near Lobatera. The wreckage was found about 25 km northeast of San Antonio del Táchira Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all six occupants were killed.

The aircraft, which was operated under the provisions of Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs), departed from Queenstown Aerodrome (FAQT) at 1329Z on an instrument flight plan for Plettenberg Bay Aerodrome (FAPG). On board the aircraft were two (2) crew members and seven (7) passengers. The estimated time of arrival for the aircraft to land at FAPG was 1430Z, however the aircraft never arrived at its intended destination, nor did the crew cancel their search and rescue as per flight plan/air navigation requirements. At ±1600Z an official search for the missing aircraft commenced. The search was coordinated by the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC). The first phase of the search, which was land based, was conducted in the Robberg Nature Reserve area. Progress was slow due to poor visibility associated with dense mist and night time. A sea search was not possible following activation of the official search during the late afternoon and night time, but vessels from the National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) were able to launch at first light the next morning. Floating debris (light weight material) was picked up from the sea and along the western shoreline of the Robberg Nature Reserve where foot patrols were conducted. On 11 February 2011 the South African Navy joined the search for the missing wreckage by utilizing side scan sonar equipment to scan the sea bed for the wreckage. All the occupants on board the aircraft were fatally injured in the accident.

Shortly after take off from Sulaymaniyah Airport runway 31, while in initial climb, the aircraft stalled and crashed 2,100 metres from the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and all seven occupants were killed, among them four employees of the Iraqi communications company Asiacell. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were as follow: 1,500 metres visibility in snow falls, overcast 3,500 feet.

The flight encountered light rime icing during an instrument approach to the destination airport. The copilot was the pilot flying at the time of the accident. He reported that the airframe anti-icing system was turned off upon intercepting the instrument approach glide slope, which was shortly before the airplane descended below the cloud layer. He recalled observing light frost on the outboard wing and tip tank during the approach. The stick shaker activated on short final, and the airplane impacted left of the runway centerline before it ultimately departed the right side of the runway pavement and crossed a slight rise before coming to rest in the grass. The cockpit voice recorder transcript indicated that the pilots were operating in icing conditions without the wing anti- ice system activated for about 4 1/2 minutes prior to activation of the stick shaker. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure of the flight control system or a loss of anti-ice system functionality. A performance study determined that the airplane’s airspeed during the final 30 seconds of the flight was about 114 knots and that the angle of attack ultimately met the stick shaker threshold. The expected stall speed for the airplane was about 93 knots. The airplane flight manual stated that anti-ice systems should be turned on prior to operation in icing conditions during normal operations. The manual warned that even small accumulations of ice on the wing leading edge can cause an aerodynamic stall prior to activation of the stick shaker and/or stick pusher.