Crash of a De Havilland DHC-4T Caribou near Ilaga: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 31, 2016 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PK-SWW
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Timika - Ilaga
MSN:
303
YOM:
1972
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
9336
Captain / Total hours on type:
38.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3636
Copilot / Total hours on type:
17
Aircraft flight hours:
2748
Aircraft flight cycles:
5953
Circumstances:
A DHC-4 Caribou aircraft, registered PK-SWW was being operated by Perkumpulan Penerbangan Alfa Indonesia, on 31 October 2016 on an unscheduled cargo flight from Moses Kilangin Airport Timika, with intended destination to Kaminggaru Aerodrome, Ilaga Papua. On board on this flight was 4 persons consisted of two pilots, one company engineer and one flight operation officer. At 2257 UTC, the aircraft departed Timika with intended cruising altitude of 12,500 feet and estimated time of arrival Ilaga at 2327 UTC. At 2323 UTC, the pilot made initial contact with Ilaga Aerodrome Flight Information Services (AFIS) officer and reported that the aircraft position was at Ilaga Pass and informed the estimate time of arrival Ilaga would be on 2327 UTC. Ilaga Aerodrome Flight Information Services (AFIS) officer advised to continue descend to circuit altitude and to report when position on downwind. At 2330 UTC, the AFIS officer called the pilot and was not replied. The AFIS officer asked pilot of another aircraft in the vicinity to contact the pilot of the DHC-4 Caribou aircraft and did not reply. At 0020 UTC, Sentani Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) officer declared the aircraft status as ALERFA. At 0022 UTC, Timika Tower controller received information from a pilot of an aircraft that Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) signal was detected approximately at 40 – 45 Nm with radial 060° from TMK VOR (Very High Frequency Omni Range) or approximately at coordinate 4°7’46” S; 137°38’11” E. This position was between Ilaga Pass and Jila Pass. At 0053 UTC, the aircraft declared as DETRESFA. On 1 November 2016, the aircraft wreckage was found on a ridge of mountain between Ilaga Pass and Jila Pass at coordinate 4°5’55.10” S; 137°38’47.60” E with altitude approximately of 13,000 feet. All occupants were fatally injured and the aircraft destroyed by impact force.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-10 in Fort Lauderdale

Date & Time: Oct 28, 2016 at 1751 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N370FE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Memphis - Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
46608
YOM:
1972
Flight number:
FX910
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1443.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1244
Aircraft flight hours:
84589
Aircraft flight cycles:
35606
Circumstances:
On October 28, 2016, about 1751 eastern daylight time, FedEx Express (FedEx) flight 910, a McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F, N370FE, experienced a left main landing gear (MLG) collapse after landing on runway 10L at Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and the left wing subsequently caught fire. The airplane came to rest off the left side of the runway. The two flight crew members evacuated the airplane. The captain reported a minor cut and abrasions from the evacuation, and the first officer was not injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The cargo flight was operating on an instrument flight plan under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 121 and originated at Memphis International Airport (KMEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. Both flight crew members stated in post accident interviews that the departure from MEM and the en route portion of the flight were normal. About 1745, air traffic control (ATC) cleared the flight for final approach to the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 10L at KFLL. Recorder data indicate that the first officer set the flaps at 35º about 1746 when the airplane was 3,000 ft above ground level (agl). The first officer disconnected the autopilot about 1749 when the airplane was 1,000 ft agl. Both flight crew members reported that the approach was stable at 500 ft agl. At 200 ft agl, the first officer began making airspeed corrections to compensate for the crosswind. About 1750, the first officer disconnected the autothrottles, as briefed, when the airplane was at 100 ft agl. At 50 ft agl, the first officer initiated the flare. The left MLG touched down about 1750:31 in the touchdown zone and left of the runway centerline. The first officer deployed the spoilers at 1750:34, and the nose gear touched down 3 seconds later. The thrust reversers were deployed at 1750:40. According to cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, the captain instructed the first officer to begin braking about 1750:39 (the airplane was not equipped with autobrakes). FDR data indicate an increase in brake pedal position angle and increase in longitudinal deceleration (indicating braking) about 1750:41. In post accident interviews, the flight crew members reported hearing a "bang" as the first officer applied the brakes, and the airplane yawed to the left. About this time, the CVR recorded the sound of multiple thuds, consistent with the sound of a gear collapse. About 1750:48, the captain stated, "I have the airplane," and the first officer replied, "you got the airplane." The captain applied full right rudder without effect while the first officer continued braking. About 1750:53, the captain instructed the first officer to call and inform the tower about the emergency. An airport video of the landing showed that the No. 1 engine was initially supporting the airplane after the left MLG collapse when a fire began near the left-wing tip. The airplane eventually stopped off the left side of runway 10L, about 30º to 40º off the runway heading. About 1751, the flight crew began executing the evacuation checklist. The pilots reported that, as they were about to evacuate, they heard an explosion. The airport video showed a fireball erupted at the No. 1 engine. The captain attempted to discharge a fire bottle in the No. 1 engine, but it didn't discharge. They evacuated the airplane through the right cockpit window.
Probable cause:
The failure of the left main landing gear (MLG) due to fatigue cracking that initiated at a corrosion pit. The pit formed in the absence of a required protective cadmium coating the cause of which could not be determined from available evidence. Contributing to the failure of the left MLG was the operator's overhaul limit, which exceeded that recommended by the airplane manufacturer without sufficient data and analysis to ensure crack detection before it progressed to failure.
Final Report:

Crash of an Airbus A300B4-230F in Recife

Date & Time: Oct 21, 2016 at 0630 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PR-STN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
São Paulo – Recife
MSN:
236
YOM:
1983
Flight number:
STR9302
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11180
Captain / Total hours on type:
3000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
800
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful cargo service from São Paulo-Guarulhos Airport, the crew initiated the descent to Recife-Guararapes Airport. On final approach to runway 18, after the aircraft had been configured for landing, at an altitude of 500 feet, the crew was cleared to land. After touchdown, the thrust lever for the left engine was pushed to maximum takeoff power while the thrust lever for the right engine was simultaneously brang to the idle position then to reverse. This asymetric configuration caused the aircraft to veer to the right and control was lost. The airplane veered off runway to the right and, while contacting soft grounf, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest to the right of the runway and was damaged beyond repair. All four occupants evacuated safely.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors.
- Control skills - undetermined
Inadequate use of aircraft controls, particularly as regards the mode of operation of the Autothrottle in use and the non-reduction of the IDLE power levers at touch down, may have led to a conflict between pilots when performing the landing and the automation logic active during approach. In addition, the use of only one reverse (on the right engine) and placing the left throttle lever at maximum takeoff power resulted in an asymmetric thrust that contributed to the loss of control on the ground.
- Attitude - undetermined
The adoption of practices different from the aircraft manual denoted an attitude of noncompliance with the procedures provided, which contributed to put the equipment in an unexpected condition: non-automatic opening of ground spoilers and asymmetric thrust of the engines. These factors required additional pilot intervention (hand control), which may have made it difficult to manage the circumstances that followed the touch and led to the runway excursion.
- Crew Resource Management - a contributor
The involvement of the PM in commanding the aircraft during the events leading up to the runway excursion to the detriment of its primary responsibility, which would be to monitor systems and assist the PF in conducting the flight, characterized an inefficiency in harnessing the human resources available for the airplane operation. Thus, the improper management of the tasks assigned to each crewmember and the non-observance of the CRM principles delayed the identification of the root cause of the aircraft abnormal behavior.
- Organizational culture - a contributor
The reliance on the crew's technical capacity, based on their previous aviation experience, has fostered an informal organizational environment. This informality contributed to the adoption of practices that differed from the anticipated procedures regarding the management and operation of the aircraft. This not compliance with the procedures highlights a lack of safety culture, as lessons learnt from previous similar accidents (such as those in Irkutsk and Congonhas involving landing using only one reverse and pushing the thrust levers forward), have apparently not been taken into account at the airline level.
- Piloting judgment - undetermined
The habit of not reducing the throttle lever to the IDLE position when passing at 20ft diverged from the procedures contained in the aircraft-operating manual and prevented the automatic opening of ground spoilers. It is possible that the consequences of this adaptation of the procedure related to the operation of the airplane were not adequately evaluated, which made it difficult to understand and manage the condition experienced.
- Perception - a contributor
Failure to perceive the position of the left lever denoted a lowering of the crew's situational awareness, as it apparently only realized the real cause of the aircraft yaw when the runway excursion was already underway.
- Decision-making process - a contributor
An inaccurate assessment of the causes that would justify the behavior of the aircraft during the landing resulted in a delay in the application of the necessary power reduction procedure, that is, repositioning the left engine power lever.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-347 in Wamena

Date & Time: Sep 13, 2016 at 0733 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-YSY
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jayapura – Wamena
MSN:
23597/1287
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
TGN7321
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
23823
Captain / Total hours on type:
9627.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
650
Copilot / Total hours on type:
480
Aircraft flight hours:
59420
Aircraft flight cycles:
48637
Circumstances:
On 13 September 2016, a Boeing 737-300 Freighter, registered PK-YSY was being operated by PT. Trigana Air Service on a scheduled cargo flight from Sentani Airport, Jayapura (WAJJ) to Wamena Airport, Wamena (WAVV), Papua, Indonesia. Approximately 2130 UTC, during the flight preparation, the pilot received weather information which stated that on the right base runway 15 of Wamena Airport, on the area of Mount Pikei, low cloud was observed with the cloud base was increasing from 200 to 1000 feet and the visibility was 3 km. At 2145 UTC, the aircraft departed Sentani Airport with flight number IL 7321 and cruised at altitude 18,000 feet. On board the aircraft was two pilots and one Flight Operation Officer (FOO) acted as loadmaster. The aircraft carried 14,913 kg of cargo. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF) while the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM). There was no reported or recorded aircraft system abnormality during the flight until the time of occurrence. After passing point MALIO, the aircraft started to descend. The pilot observed the weather met the criteria of Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC). The pilots able to identify another Trigana flight from Sentani to Wamena in front of them. While passing altitude 13,500 feet, approximately over PASS VALLEY, the Wamena Tower controller instructed the pilot to report position over JIWIKA. When the aircraft position was over point JIWIKA, the Wamena Tower controller informed to the pilot that the flight was on sequence number three for landing and instructed the pilot to make orbit over point X, which located at 8 Nm from runway 15. The pilot made two orbits over Point X to make adequate separation with the aircraft ahead prior to received approach clearance. About 7,000 feet (about 2,000 feet above airport elevation), the pilot could not identify visual checkpoint mount PIKEI and attempted to identify a church which was a check point of right base runway 15. The pilot felt that the aircraft position was on right side of runway centerline. About 6,200 feet (about 1,000 feet above airport elevation), the PF reduced the rate of descend and continued the approach. The PM informed to the PF that runway was not in sight and advised to go around. The PF was confident that the aircraft could be landed safely as the aircraft ahead had landed. Approximately 5,600 feet altitude (about 500 feet above airport elevation) and about 2 Nm from runway threshold the PF was able to see the runway and increased the rate of descend. The pilot noticed that the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) aural warning “SINK RATE” active and the PF reduced the rate of descend. While the aircraft passing threshold, the pilot felt the aircraft sunk and touched down at approximately 125 meters from the beginning runway 15. The Flight Data Recorder recorded the vertical acceleration was 3.25 g on touchdown at 2230 UTC. Both of main landings gear collapsed. The left main landing gear detached and found on runway. The engine and lower fuselage contacted to the runway surface. The aircraft veer to the right and stopped approximately 1,890 meters from the beginning of the runway 15. No one was injured on this occurrence and the aircraft had substantially damage. Both pilots and the load master evacuated the aircraft via the forward left main cargo door used a rope.
Probable cause:
Refer to the previous aircraft that was landed safely, the pilot confidence that a safe landing could be made and disregarding several conditions required for go around.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-476 in Bergamo

Date & Time: Aug 5, 2016 at 0407 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HA-FAX
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Paris-Roissy-CDG - Bergamo
MSN:
24437/2162
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
QY7332
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9787
Captain / Total hours on type:
2254.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
343
Copilot / Total hours on type:
86
Aircraft flight hours:
65332
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport at 0254LT on a cargo flight (service QY7332) to Bergamo on behalf of DHL Airways. Upon arrival at Bergamo-Orio al Serio Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls and strong wind. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at a speed of 156 knots and landed 18 seconds later, 2,000 metres pas the runway threshold. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 28 is 2,807 metres long), the aircraft overran, went through the perimeter fence, lost its undercarriage and both engines and eventually stopped in a motorway, some 520 metres pas the runway end. Both crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The causes of the accident are mainly due to the human factor. In particular, the accident was caused by the runway overrun during the landing phase, caused by a loss of situational awareness relating to the position of the aircraft with respect to the runway itself. This loss of situational awareness on the part of the crew caused a delay in contact with the runway, which occurred, at a still high speed, in a position too far to allow the aircraft to stop within the remaining distance.
Contributing to the dynamics of the event:
- The commander's prior decision not to carry out a go-around procedure (this decision is of crucial importance in the chain of events that characterized the accident),
- Inadequate maintenance of flight parameters in the final phase of landing,
- Failure of the crew to disconnect the autothrottle prior to landing,
- Poor lighting conditions with the presence of storm cells and heavy rain falls at the time of the event (environmental factor), which may have contributed to the loss of situation awareness,
- The attention paid by the crew during the final phase of the flight, where both pilots were intent to acquire external visual references and did not realize that the aircraft crossed over the runway at high speed for 18 seconds before touchdown,
- The lack of assertiveness of the first officer in questioning the commander's decisions.
Finally, it cannot be excluded that a condition of tiredness and fatigue may have contributed to the accident, even if not perceived by the crew, which may have influenced the cognitive processes, in particular those of the captain, interfering with his correct decision making process.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain near Canaima: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 1, 2016 at 0730 LT
Operator:
Registration:
YV607T
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
La Paragua – Canaima
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The crew was performing a cargo flight from La Paragua to Canaima. While descending to Canaima in the early morning, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The airplane crashed some 34 km northeast of the intended destination, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.
Crew:
Johnny Ramirez, pilot,
José Angel Soto Zapata, copilot.

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX in Lolat

Date & Time: Jun 14, 2016 at 0758 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-RCK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wamena – Lolat
MSN:
208B-5149
YOM:
2014
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
53
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Wamena Airport at 0739LT on a cargo flight to Lolat, carrying two passengers, one pilot and a load of building materials for a total weight of 1,190 kilos. On short final to Lolat Airfield, the aircraft impacted the roof of a wooded house and crashed, bursting into flames. All three occupants of the airplane evacuated safely while three people in the house were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-11F in Seoul

Date & Time: Jun 6, 2016 at 2243 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N277UP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul - Anchorage
MSN:
48578/588
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
UPS061
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7769
Captain / Total hours on type:
6152.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4236
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3491
Aircraft flight hours:
63195
Aircraft flight cycles:
11344
Circumstances:
The crew started the takeoff procedure from runway 33L at Seoul-Incheon Airport and reached V1 speed after a course of 6,413 feet. At a speed of 182 knots, the crew heard a noise corresponding to the failure of both tires n°9 and 10 located on the central landing gear. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance of 4,635 feet (in relation with the total weight of 629,600 lbs), the airplane overran. While contacting a grassy area, the nose gear collapsed then the airplane struck various equipment of the localizer antenna and came to rest 485 meters past the runway end. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The decision of the crew to abandon the takeoff procedure at a speed slightly above V1 due to the failure of both tyres n°9 & 10 located on the central landing gear. The aircraft then overran due to the combination of the following factors:
- Limited time and information available to the crew to evaluate the situation,
- Dynamic instability of the central landing gear caused by both tyres' failure,
- Decrease of 48% of the braking performances due to the rupture of a hydraulic pipe located on the primary braking system.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-12B in Camp Dwyer: 7 killed

Date & Time: May 18, 2016 at 1407 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
4K-AZ25
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Camp Dwyer – Mary – Baku
MSN:
3 3 412 09
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
22628
Captain / Total hours on type:
3953.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4625
Copilot / Total hours on type:
836
Aircraft flight hours:
19828
Aircraft flight cycles:
9107
Circumstances:
On May 18, 2016 the crew of An-12B 4K-AZ25 aircraft operated by Silk Way Airlines including the Captain, First Officer, navigator, flight mechanic, flight radio operator and loadmaster was planned to fly via route Baku (Azerbaijan) - Bagram (Afghanistan) - Dwyer (Afghanistan) - Mary (Turkmenistan) - Baku. There were also two maintenance mechanics and an engineer on board the a/c. The preliminary training of the crew was conducted on 29.12.2015 by the Chief Navigator of Silk Way Airlines. The pre-flight briefing was conducted on 18.05.2016 by a captain-instructor and a navigator-instructor. The following has been determined so far. According to the information available at the moment the flight to Dwyer aerodrome was conducted in an acceptable way. At 09:11:27 the crew started up the engines at Dwyer aerodrome, Engine #2 was the last to be started up at 09:47:37. Before the takeoff the Captain distributed the duties within the crew, nominating the FO as the PF, and himself as PM. After the engine startup the crew initiated taxiing to perform takeoff with heading 229°. The concrete RWY of Dwyer aerodrome is measured 2439 m by 37 m. The a/c TOW and CG were within the AFM limitations. In the course of the takeoff, at 09:57:56 the flight mechanic reported an increase in MGT of Engine #3 above the acceptable level: "Engine #3, look, engine temperature over six hundred, over seven hundred", which was confirmed by the FO: "Yes, it's getting temperature" while the Captain asked to be more attentive. According to the crew reports the takeoff was performed with Flaps 15. As the checklist was being read, the Captain ordered to lock the propellers. After the Captain's order to lock the propellers a slight increase in torque-measuring device values was recorded on Engine #1 and #4, and in 17 seconds also Engine #2, which indirectly implies that propellers #1, #2 and #4 were at stops. There is no evidence that propeller of Engine #3 was locked. At 09:59:42 the crew initiated the takeoff. Before the takeoff the ATC advised the crew on the wind direction and speed on the RWY: 280° 14 knots (7 m/sec) gusting 26 knots (13 m/sec). Thus it was quartering headwind and the headwind component might have been 5 to 9 m/sec. While performing takeoff the crew first increased thrust on Engines #1 and #4 and then on Engine #2 after 10 seconds. The thrust of the three engines was about 50 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (lower than takeoff mode). The third engine was still operating in the ground idle mode, though the CVR did not record any crew callouts concerning Engine #3 operation parameters. Based on the CCTV system of Dwyer aerodrome the takeoff roll was initiated almost from the RWY threshold and was conducted to the left of the RWY centerline. No significant deviations from the takeoff course during the takeoff roll were recorded. During the takeoff roll the rudder was deflected left close to extreme. Probably the pilots were also applying differential control on Engine #2 to decrease the right torque moment. At 10:00:14 at approximately 120 km/h IAS the "Engine #3 negative thrust" signal was started to be recorded and was recorded on up to the end of the record. At that time the a/c was about 430 m away from the start of the takeoff roll. At 10:00:42 Engines #1 and #4 thrust was increased up to 63 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (consistent with takeoff mode for the actual flight conditions). At that time the IAS was about 150 km/h Engine #2 thrust was increased up to the same value only 23 seconds later at about 200 km/h IAS. At that time the a/c was about 840 m away from the RWY end. Engine #3 was still operating in ground idle mode. Approximately 260 m before the RWY end at a speed of 220 km/h IAS (maximum speed reached) the FDR recorded the start of nose up input on the control column. The a/c did not lift off After rolling all along the RWY the a/c overran the RWY onto the ground at a speed of 220 km/h While moving on the ground the aircraft sustained significant damage, which led to post-crash fire that destroyed most of the aircraft structures. Out of the nine persons on board seven were killed and two were seriously injured and taken to hospital.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-3C in Puerto Gaitán

Date & Time: Apr 6, 2016 at 0625 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-2663
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Puerto Gaitán – Villavicencio
MSN:
10210
YOM:
1945
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4058
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7934
Aircraft flight hours:
23291
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Puerto Gaitán Airport Runway 04, while on a cargo flight to Villavicencio, the left engine exploded and caught fire. As the aircraft was losing speed and height, the crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in an open field located 2,6 km southwest from the airport, bursting into flames. All three crew members escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
Failure of the left engine following the detachment of the head of a cylinder shortly after takeoff. Deficiencies in maintenance processes contributed to this situation. The crew failed to follow the emergency procedures when the left engine caught fire and exploded, reducing the power on the right engine. In such conditions, the aircraft was unable to maintain a safe altitude and the crew was forced to attempt an emergency landing.
Final Report: