Cargo

Following an uneventful cargo service from São Paulo-Guarulhos Airport, the crew initiated the descent to Recife-Guararapes Airport. On final approach to runway 18, after the aircraft had been configured for landing, at an altitude of 500 feet, the crew was cleared to land. After touchdown, the thrust lever for the left engine was pushed to maximum takeoff power while the thrust lever for the right engine was simultaneously brang to the idle position then to reverse. This asymetric configuration caused the aircraft to veer to the right and control was lost. The airplane veered off runway to the right and, while contacting soft grounf, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest to the right of the runway and was damaged beyond repair. All four occupants evacuated safely.

On 13 September 2016, a Boeing 737-300 Freighter, registered PK-YSY was being operated by PT. Trigana Air Service on a scheduled cargo flight from Sentani Airport, Jayapura (WAJJ) to Wamena Airport, Wamena (WAVV), Papua, Indonesia. Approximately 2130 UTC, during the flight preparation, the pilot received weather information which stated that on the right base runway 15 of Wamena Airport, on the area of Mount Pikei, low cloud was observed with the cloud base was increasing from 200 to 1000 feet and the visibility was 3 km. At 2145 UTC, the aircraft departed Sentani Airport with flight number IL 7321 and cruised at altitude 18,000 feet. On board the aircraft was two pilots and one Flight Operation Officer (FOO) acted as loadmaster. The aircraft carried 14,913 kg of cargo. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF) while the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM). There was no reported or recorded aircraft system abnormality during the flight until the time of occurrence. After passing point MALIO, the aircraft started to descend. The pilot observed the weather met the criteria of Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC). The pilots able to identify another Trigana flight from Sentani to Wamena in front of them. While passing altitude 13,500 feet, approximately over PASS VALLEY, the Wamena Tower controller instructed the pilot to report position over JIWIKA. When the aircraft position was over point JIWIKA, the Wamena Tower controller informed to the pilot that the flight was on sequence number three for landing and instructed the pilot to make orbit over point X, which located at 8 Nm from runway 15. The pilot made two orbits over Point X to make adequate separation with the aircraft ahead prior to received approach clearance. About 7,000 feet (about 2,000 feet above airport elevation), the pilot could not identify visual checkpoint mount PIKEI and attempted to identify a church which was a check point of right base runway 15. The pilot felt that the aircraft position was on right side of runway centerline. About 6,200 feet (about 1,000 feet above airport elevation), the PF reduced the rate of descend and continued the approach. The PM informed to the PF that runway was not in sight and advised to go around. The PF was confident that the aircraft could be landed safely as the aircraft ahead had landed. Approximately 5,600 feet altitude (about 500 feet above airport elevation) and about 2 Nm from runway threshold the PF was able to see the runway and increased the rate of descend. The pilot noticed that the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) aural warning “SINK RATE” active and the PF reduced the rate of descend. While the aircraft passing threshold, the pilot felt the aircraft sunk and touched down at approximately 125 meters from the beginning runway 15. The Flight Data Recorder recorded the vertical acceleration was 3.25 g on touchdown at 2230 UTC. Both of main landings gear collapsed. The left main landing gear detached and found on runway. The engine and lower fuselage contacted to the runway surface. The aircraft veer to the right and stopped approximately 1,890 meters from the beginning of the runway 15. No one was injured on this occurrence and the aircraft had substantially damage. Both pilots and the load master evacuated the aircraft via the forward left main cargo door used a rope.

The aircraft departed Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport at 0254LT on a cargo flight (service QY7332) to Bergamo on behalf of DHL Airways. Upon arrival at Bergamo-Orio al Serio Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls and strong wind. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at a speed of 156 knots and landed 18 seconds later, 2,000 metres pas the runway threshold. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 28 is 2,807 metres long), the aircraft overran, went through the perimeter fence, lost its undercarriage and both engines and eventually stopped in a motorway, some 520 metres pas the runway end. Both crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was destroyed.

The crew was performing a cargo flight from La Paragua to Canaima. While descending to Canaima in the early morning, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The airplane crashed some 34 km northeast of the intended destination, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.
Crew:
Johnny Ramirez, pilot,
José Angel Soto Zapata, copilot.

The single engine airplane departed Wamena Airport at 0739LT on a cargo flight to Lolat, carrying two passengers, one pilot and a load of building materials for a total weight of 1,190 kilos. On short final to Lolat Airfield, the aircraft impacted the roof of a wooded house and crashed, bursting into flames. All three occupants of the airplane evacuated safely while three people in the house were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

The crew started the takeoff procedure from runway 33L at Seoul-Incheon Airport and reached V1 speed after a course of 6,413 feet. At a speed of 182 knots, the crew heard a noise corresponding to the failure of both tires n°9 and 10 located on the central landing gear. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance of 4,635 feet (in relation with the total weight of 629,600 lbs), the airplane overran. While contacting a grassy area, the nose gear collapsed then the airplane struck various equipment of the localizer antenna and came to rest 485 meters past the runway end. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On May 18, 2016 the crew of An-12B 4K-AZ25 aircraft operated by Silk Way Airlines including the Captain, First Officer, navigator, flight mechanic, flight radio operator and loadmaster was planned to fly via route Baku (Azerbaijan) - Bagram (Afghanistan) - Dwyer (Afghanistan) - Mary (Turkmenistan) - Baku. There were also two maintenance mechanics and an engineer on board the a/c. The preliminary training of the crew was conducted on 29.12.2015 by the Chief Navigator of Silk Way Airlines. The pre-flight briefing was conducted on 18.05.2016 by a captain-instructor and a navigator-instructor. The following has been determined so far. According to the information available at the moment the flight to Dwyer aerodrome was conducted in an acceptable way. At 09:11:27 the crew started up the engines at Dwyer aerodrome, Engine #2 was the last to be started up at 09:47:37. Before the takeoff the Captain distributed the duties within the crew, nominating the FO as the PF, and himself as PM. After the engine startup the crew initiated taxiing to perform takeoff with heading 229°. The concrete RWY of Dwyer aerodrome is measured 2439 m by 37 m. The a/c TOW and CG were within the AFM limitations. In the course of the takeoff, at 09:57:56 the flight mechanic reported an increase in MGT of Engine #3 above the acceptable level: "Engine #3, look, engine temperature over six hundred, over seven hundred", which was confirmed by the FO: "Yes, it's getting temperature" while the Captain asked to be more attentive. According to the crew reports the takeoff was performed with Flaps 15. As the checklist was being read, the Captain ordered to lock the propellers. After the Captain's order to lock the propellers a slight increase in torque-measuring device values was recorded on Engine #1 and #4, and in 17 seconds also Engine #2, which indirectly implies that propellers #1, #2 and #4 were at stops. There is no evidence that propeller of Engine #3 was locked. At 09:59:42 the crew initiated the takeoff. Before the takeoff the ATC advised the crew on the wind direction and speed on the RWY: 280° 14 knots (7 m/sec) gusting 26 knots (13 m/sec). Thus it was quartering headwind and the headwind component might have been 5 to 9 m/sec. While performing takeoff the crew first increased thrust on Engines #1 and #4 and then on Engine #2 after 10 seconds. The thrust of the three engines was about 50 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (lower than takeoff mode). The third engine was still operating in the ground idle mode, though the CVR did not record any crew callouts concerning Engine #3 operation parameters. Based on the CCTV system of Dwyer aerodrome the takeoff roll was initiated almost from the RWY threshold and was conducted to the left of the RWY centerline. No significant deviations from the takeoff course during the takeoff roll were recorded. During the takeoff roll the rudder was deflected left close to extreme. Probably the pilots were also applying differential control on Engine #2 to decrease the right torque moment. At 10:00:14 at approximately 120 km/h IAS the "Engine #3 negative thrust" signal was started to be recorded and was recorded on up to the end of the record. At that time the a/c was about 430 m away from the start of the takeoff roll. At 10:00:42 Engines #1 and #4 thrust was increased up to 63 kg/sq.cm as per torque indicator (consistent with takeoff mode for the actual flight conditions). At that time the IAS was about 150 km/h Engine #2 thrust was increased up to the same value only 23 seconds later at about 200 km/h IAS. At that time the a/c was about 840 m away from the RWY end. Engine #3 was still operating in ground idle mode. Approximately 260 m before the RWY end at a speed of 220 km/h IAS (maximum speed reached) the FDR recorded the start of nose up input on the control column. The a/c did not lift off After rolling all along the RWY the a/c overran the RWY onto the ground at a speed of 220 km/h While moving on the ground the aircraft sustained significant damage, which led to post-crash fire that destroyed most of the aircraft structures. Out of the nine persons on board seven were killed and two were seriously injured and taken to hospital.

Shortly after takeoff from Puerto Gaitán Airport Runway 04, while on a cargo flight to Villavicencio, the left engine exploded and caught fire. As the aircraft was losing speed and height, the crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in an open field located 2,6 km southwest from the airport, bursting into flames. All three crew members escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

On March 9, 2016 one AN -26B aircraft belonging to True Aviation Ltd was operating a schedule cargo flight from a small domestic airport (Cox’s Bazar-VGCB) in southern Bangladesh to another domestic airport (Jessore -VGJR) in western Bangladesh, The cargo was Shrimp fries. As per the General Declaration the total cargo quantity was 802 boxes weighing 4800 kg. The airline had filled a flight plan keeping the ETD blank. The flight plan routing was CB W4 CTG W5 JSR at FL 100. All the documents except the load sheet were found properly signed and are in the possession of AAIT. According to ATC controller’s statement and recorded tape the aircraft requested for startup clearance at 0258z. As per the recordings with ATC the controller passed the visibility information of Jessore Airport as 3km. The aircraft started engines and requested for taxi. The aircraft was cleared to taxi to Runway 35 via taxiway S. The aircraft requested for takeoff clearance and was cleared for Take Off at 0305z. Immediately after airborne the pilot reported engine failure without mentioning initially which engine had failed but later confirming failure of the left engine and requested for immediate return back to Cox’s Bazar airport. He was advised by ATC to call left hand down wind. But the control tower spotted the aircraft making a right hand down wind at a very low altitude. All emergency services were made standby from the ATC. The aircraft called final and requested for landing clearance. For reasons so far unknown the aircraft made a low level Go Around. The controller in the tower saw the aircraft flying at about 400 to 500 feet. The surviving Flight Navigator also confirmed this in his statement. The ATC advised the captain to call left hand down wind. But there was no response from the crew. The ATC repeatedly kept calling the aircraft but there was no response from the crew and total communication was lost. At time 0332z the airport authority came to know through other means that the aircraft had crashed approximately 03km west of the airport.

The flight was uneventful until the start of the event, which occurred during the approach briefing in level flight at FL 330. The event started at 00:19:20 hrs during darkness without moonlight, clouds or turbulence. The lack of external visual references meant that the pilots were totally dependent on their instruments which, inter alia consisted of three independent attitude indicators. According to recorded data and simulations a very fast increase in pitch was displayed on the left attitude indicator. The pilot in command, who was the pilot flying and seated in the left seat exclaimed a strong expression. The displayed pitch change meant that the pilot in command was subjected to a surprise effect and a degradation of spatial orientation The autopilot was, most probably, disconnected automatically, a “cavalry charge” aural warning and a single chime was heard, the latter most likely as a result of miscompare between the left and right pilots’ flying displays (PFD). Both elevators moved towards nose down and nose down stabilizer trim was gradually activated from the left control wheel trim switch. The airplane started to descend, the angle of attack and G-loads became negative. Both pilots exclaimed strong expressions and the co-pilot said “come up”. About 13 seconds after the start of the event the crew were presented with two contradictory attitude indicators with red chevrons pointing in opposite directions. At the same time none of the instruments displayed any comparator caution due to the PFDs declutter function in unusual attitude. Bank angle warnings were heard and the maximum operating speed and Mach number were exceeded 17 seconds after the start of the event, which activated the overspeed warning. The speed continued to increase, a distress call was transmitted and acknowledged by the air traffic control and the engine thrust was reduced to flight idle. The crew was active during the entire event. The dialogue between the pilots consisted mainly of different perceptions regarding turn directions. They also expressed the need to climb. At this stage, the pilots were probably subjected to spatial disorientation. The aircraft collided with the ground one minute and twenty seconds after the initial height loss. The two pilots were fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed.