United States of America

The aircraft completed an instrument approach and landed hard on the runway surface first with the left gear then the right gear. The tires burst and the lower fuselage came into contact with the runway surface. After the nose gear touched down, the right main landing gear collapsed and the pilot lost control of the aircraft. It veered to the left and departed the runway, coming to rest approximately 150 to 200 yards from the point of departure. Initial touch down occurred about 12 feet from the threshold, ten feet left of centerline.

Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to cruise altitude, the pilot reported the left engine cowl assembly had come off. Witnesses observed the airplane at low altitude and noted that it was 'yawing, sputtering, and rocking back and forth.' They indicated the left engine was not running and that the airplane banked sharply to the right and disappeared behind trees before crashing. An investigation revealed the left propeller had not been feathered. The left engine cowling was found 1.8 miles from the accident site. The three primary (eyebolt) cowl fasteners on the outboard side of the left upper cowl were found unlocked & seven other cowl attaching studs (screws) were missing. The cowling had been removed 16 days before the accident to install an oil/air separator. This was the first flight since that work was performed. The mechanic, who did the work, said he noted several cowl stud fasteners were missing and that he had notified the pilot. The pilot was reported to have replied that he had some fasteners and would take care of the problem. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

A Piper PA-46-310P loss engine power and collided with a telephone pole during the forced landing. The pilot contacted the tracon and informed the facility he had a partial power loss. The airplane was about two miles east of the airport at about 3,500 feet msl heading in a southwesterly direction. The tracon instructed the pilot to turn 150° for radar vectors to runway 33. The pilot did not turn to the 150° heading, but continued on a southwesterly course. The airplane flew past the approach ends of two runways. The airplane continued westbound and crashed 2.5 miles west of the airport. The pilot indicated the airplane had 300 pounds (about 50 gallons) of fuel on board at takeoff. The pilot operating handbook for the Piper PA-34-310P is about 16 gallons per hour. The duration of the flight was about one hour. There was no evidence of fuel in the airplane's fuel system or any evidence of fuel spillage from either of the wings after the accident.

Witnesses reported that the airplane suddenly turned or rolled left until the wings were perpendicular to the ground. The airplane then fell in a nose-down attitude. Examination of the left propeller components indicated a blade angle of about 3°, while the left propeller control unit (pcu) ballscrew position was consistent with a commanded blade angle of 79.2°. Extreme wear on the pcu quill spline teeth, which normally engaged the titanium-nitrided splines of the propeller transfer tube, was found. The titanium-nitrided surface was much harder and rougher than the nitrided surface of the quill. Therefore, the transfer tube splines acted like a file and caused abnormal wear of the gear teeth on the quill. Wear of the quill was not considered during the certification of the propeller system. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all 23 occupants were killed, among them John Goodwin Tower, Senator of Texas and the astronaut Manley Sonny Carter.

Piper Aerostar 601, N3645D, was arriving as Bell 412 (helicopter), N78S, was departing. N3645D reported the aircraft's nose gear indicator light did not illuminate to verify the nose gear was down and locked. Crew of N78S heard the communication and saw N3645D as they crossed beneath N3645D's approach path. They reported N3546D's nose gear appeared to be extended. N3645D flew past the tower and tower personnel also reported the nose gear appeared to be extended. As N3645D was cleared to turn downwind, N78S offered to join for a closer look. Captain of N3645D accepted the offer. During joinup, N78S converged from left rear, then reported they would pass around the right side and look at everything as they went by. They reported that everything looked ok. Moments later, the two aircrafts collided and crashed to the ground. No mechanical reason was found that would have resulted in the accident. None of the pilots had training for flight in close proximity to another aircraft. There were indications the captain of N3645D lacked training in aircraft systems and that his employer (the operator) lacked surveillance by the FAA. The emergency procedure section of the Aerostar flight manual lacked info on emergency gear extension. All three occupants were killed as well as both pilots on board the helicopter. Four other people on the ground were injured, one seriously.

During takeoff from runway 22, the pilot reported that he had a problem, then there was no further communication from the aircraft. Several witnesses saw an object fall from the aircraft and one witness observed that a 'hood' had opened. The aircraft was maneuvered onto final approach to runway 36. A witness said that as the aircraft was lining up on final approach, it entered a steep bank and descended out of his sight. Subsequently, it collided with trees in a 27° descent, crashed and burned. A bag from the nose baggage compartment was found near the departure end of runway 22. No preimpact part failure or system malfunction of the aircraft was found. Before the flight, a ramp person observed the pilot servicing the left engine with oil, but he did not know if the pilot had secured the baggage door. An examination of the recovered door assembly failed to disclose a malfunction of the rear latch assembly. The forward latch assembly area was destroyed by fire. All three occupants were killed.

The flight departed without a flight plan or weather brief. En route deteriorating weather was encountered and an IFR flight plan was filed to a revised destination. Clearance was received for a VOR approach and the pilot was advised of 1/2 mile visibility in snow and fog. A missed approach was reported over the unicom frequency. Impact occurred with a heading of about 170° at 7,700 feet msl in mountainous terrain on the 173° radial, 7.3 miles from the VOR. The inbound course to the final approach fix was 170° with an inbound final approach course of 196°. Airport elevation was 5,914 feet msl. The airport was located on the 196° radial, 5.5 miles from the VOR final approach fix. The VOR approach to runway 21 called for a missed approach to be executed at 5.5 DME from the VOR and a minimum descent altitude of 6,600 feet. All five occupants were killed.

The pilot was on an IFR flight in IMC and received clearance to climb and maintain FL220. During climb, he informed ARTCC, '. . . We're having a problem.' When asked to say again, he began the same reply, then no further radio communication was received from the aircraft. Subsequently an inflight breakup occurred and wreckage was scattered over a wide area. The right outboard wing panel, horizontal stabilizer, elevators, right aileron and parts of the rudder were found at a distance from the main wreckage. These displayed evidence of overstress failure. No preexisting cracks or fatigue was found. Radar and weather data showed deviation from normal flight began at or near moderate convective weather echo (vip 2) as the aircraft was climbing thru 17,300 feet in freezing conditions. At that time, the rate of climb was about 200 feet/min and the ground speed was 150 to 160 knots. At 1032:18, a descent begun. During the next 2 to 3 minutes, the aircraft's altitude, heading and speed deviated. At 1035:17, other primary radar targets appeared, then radar contact was lost. Gross weight of the aircraft was estimated to be 4,311 lbs; max allowable weight was 4,100 lbs. CofG was estimated to be 1.59 inches behind the aft limit. All four occupants were killed.

After flying personnel of entertainment group to Lindbergh Field, aircraft was positioned to nearby Brown Field, since late departure was planned after noise curfew was in effect at Lindbergh. Pilot talked with FSS specialist (splst) 3 times before takeoff. He reported he did not have instruction departure procedures from airport. Splst read departure procedures on phone. On last call to FSS, pilot said he planned to depart VFR toward northeast and obtain IFR clearance after airborne (this route was toward mountains.) During call, pilot expressed concern about remaining cleared of TCA and inquired about staying below 3,000 feet. Splst agreed with pilots concerns, but after accident, splst said he thought pilot was referring to 3,000 feet agl, rather than 3,000 feet msl. Pilot had filed to takeoff at midnight, but didn't get airborne until 0141 pst. Since flight was over 1.5 hours late, IFR flight plan had 'clocked out.' As controller was reentering flight plan in computer, aircraft hit rising terrain near top of mountain, about 8 miles northeast of airport at elevation of about 3,300 feet. No deficiencies were found with aircraft or its engines. Copilot had no type rating for this aircraft, tho he reportedly had made 3 takeoffs and landings in Hawker-Siddeley HS.125. All 10 occupants were killed, among them all members of the country music 'Reba McEntire Band'.
Passengers:
Chris Austin,
Kirk Cappello,
Joey Cigainero,
Paul Kaye Evans,
Jim Hammond,
Terry Jackson,
Anthony Saputo,
Michael Thomas.

Before flight, the flight engineer (f/e) had calculated 'v' speeds and horizontal stabilizer trim setting for takeoff, but neither the captain nor the 1st officer (f/o) had verified them. During rotation for takeoff, the captain noted that the forced needed to pull the yoke aft was greater than normal and that the aircraft would not fly (at that speed). Subsequently, he aborted the attempted takeoff. Realizing the aircraft would not stop on the remaining runway, he elected to steer it to the right to avoid hitting traffic on a highway near the departure end. The aircraft struck ILS equipment; the landing gear collapsed and all 4 engines tore away. Subsequently, the aircraft was destroyed by fire. Investigations revealed the f/e had improperly computed the takeoff data. He had calculated the 'v' speeds and horizontal stabilizer trim setting for 242,000 lbs; however, the actual takeoff wt was 342,000 lbs. Rotation speed (Vr) for this weight was 28 knots above the speed that was used. Investigations revealed shortcomings in the operator's flightcrew training program and questionable scheduling of qualified (but marginally experienced) crew members for the accident flight.