United States of America

According to the passenger, he and the pilot had just taken off, and as they were climbing out over an open water portion of a bay, the pilot said, 'here comes a gust.' Reportedly, the pilot added engine power, and the airplane began descending. The right wing started to dip, and the nose started to drop. The pilot had the control yoke turned all the way to the left, then yelled that they were going in. The airplane crashed in the water, and the passenger exited the airplane through the windshield. He did not see the pilot. The deceased pilot was found still strapped in his seat several days later, when a portion of the wreckage was recovered.

The DC-3C took off on runway 10L and immediately executed a right turn followed by a left turn back toward the airport declaring a fire aboard. Dark night visual meteorological conditions existed. Witnesses observed 'flames' or an 'orange glow' coming from the right engine. A small number of aluminum fragments identified from the aft edge of the right engine accessory cowling were found along the ground just short of the ground impact site. These fragments displayed signs of heat distress but no significant melting. An examination of the right engine and accessory section revealed no evidence of a preimpact fire, and sooting and metal splatter on the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer was minimal. Spectral analysis of radio transmissions revealed no evidence of significant divergence of engine RPM between the two engines. Postcrash propeller examination revealed approximate blade pitch angles of 18-19° and 30-32° for the right and left propellers respectively upon impact. Propeller slash mark dimensions associated with the right propeller resulted in propeller RPM of approximately 1,750 to 2,570 over a range of 68 to 100 knots respectively. The first officer advised the PIC (broadcasting over the tower frequency) 'we're gonna stall' approximately 10 seconds before the impact. The aircraft was in a left turn back toward runways 28 left and right when the right wing struck the ground and the aircraft cartwheeled to a stop. A postcrash fire destroyed the cockpit area and inboard right wing.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot radioed the air traffic control tower declaring an emergency and stating his intent to return for landing. He stated that he had taken off with an external boarding ladder attached to the aircraft. Several witnesses reported that the aircraft's downwind leg was too close to the airport causing the aircraft to overshoot the turn to the final approach course, and that the pilot increased the aircraft's bank angle as he tried to align the aircraft with the landing runway. As the aircraft was intercepting the final approach course, it abruptly rolled inverted, the nose dropped, and the aircraft spiraled onto the roof of an industrial building. A Boeing 757 aircraft, landing on the same runway, had passed over the accident site 2 minutes and 17 seconds earlier. The B-757 was cleared to land before the accident aircraft received a takeoff clearance and was on the runway when the pilot declared the emergency and turned downwind. The local controller did not issue a wake turbulence advisory. Experienced MS760 pilots reported that the aircraft will exhibit no adverse performance or safety affects with the boarding ladder attached.

After 2 previous attempts, the pilot was cleared for a third VOR Runway 14 Approach. He was issued landing information, and he reported the airport in sight. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 1,620 ft msl. The airport elevation was 1297 ft. The airplane was observed by an ATC controller to descend, and the controller's Brite scope (radar) displayed 1,400 ft. The controller observed the airplane's landing light bob up and down, followed by the nose pitching up. At about the same time, a ground witness in the area saw the airplane at low altitude; according to this witness, the pilot tried to 'pull the plane up' just before it collided with the static cable of a power line. The cable was about 85 feet above ground level (1,382 feet MSL) and approximately 2 miles from the approach end of the runway. No preimpact malfunction of the airplane, engine, or VOR was found.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot contacted Charleston Approach Control to pick up his IFR clearance to the destination. The controller instructed the pilot to maintain VFR and he then attempted to coordinate with Washington Center for the clearance. The controller subsequently was unable to establish radar contact with the flight and he also lost radio contact with the pilot. The aircraft collided with the upslope of high terrain in weather conditions comprised of fog, sleet, and snow. The accident site was about 14 miles from the departure point. Toxicological testing of the pilot revealed benzoylecgonine.

The pilot was departing on a cargo flight. Just after takeoff, a company dispatcher attempted to contact the pilot by radio. The pilot replied, 'stand by.' No further communication was received from the pilot. The airplane was observed by ATC personnel in a left turn back toward the airport at an estimated altitude of 200 feet above the ground. The angle of bank during the turn increased, and the nose of the airplane suddenly dropped toward the ground. The airplane struck the ground in a nose and left wing low attitude about 1 mile west of the airport. The terrain around the airport was relatively flat, snow covered tundra. The airplane was destroyed. A postaccident examination of the engine did not reveal any mechanical malfunction. Power signatures in the engine indicated it was developing power. A postaccident examination of the propeller assembly revealed one of three composite blades had rotated in its blade clamp 17/32 inch; however, the propeller manufacturer indicated blade contact with the ground would try to drive the propeller from a high blade angle toward a low blade angle. Movement toward a low blade angle would compress the propeller feathering springs, while movement toward a high blade angle would result in a hydraulic lock condition as oil in the system is compressed. The propeller manufacturer indicated they had no reports of composite blade slippage in the blade clamps.

The Beechcraft 1900C, N87GL, was in its landing roll on runway 13, and the Beechcraft A90, N1127D, was in its takeoff roll on runway 04. The collision occurred at the intersection of the two runways. The flight crew of the Beechcraft 1900C had made appropriate efforts to coordinate the approach and landing through radio communications and visual monitoring; however they mistook a Cherokee pilot's transmission (that he was holding for departure on runway 04) as a response from the Beechcraft A90 to their request for the Beechcraft A90's intentions, and therefore mistakenly believed that the Beechcraft A90 was not planning to take off until after the Beechcraft 1900C had cleared the runway. The failure of the Beechcraft A90 pilot to announce over the common traffic advisory frequency his intention to take off created a potential for collision between the two airplanes.

The Beechcraft 1900C, N87GL, was in its landing roll on runway 13, and the Beechcraft A90, N1127D, was in its takeoff roll on runway 04. The collision occurred at the intersection of the two runways. The flight crew of the Beechcraft 1900C had made appropriate efforts to coordinate the approach and landing through radio communications and visual monitoring; however they mistook a Cherokee pilot's transmission (that he was holding for departure on runway 04) as a response from the Beechcraft A90 to their request for the Beechcraft A90's intentions, and therefore mistakenly believed that the Beechcraft A90 was not planning to take off until after the Beechcraft 1900C had cleared the runway. The failure of the Beechcraft A90 pilot to announce over the common traffic advisory frequency his intention to take off created a potential for collision between the two airplanes.

The non instrument-rated pilot filed an IFR flight plan, but did not request nor was given a weather briefing. Shortly after taking off into low instrument meteorological conditions, he reported he was returning to the airport, but did not give a reason why. He never declared an emergency. The last transmission was when the pilot said he had 'the problem resolved,' and was continuing on to his destination. Various witnesses said the engines were 'revvying' and 'unsynchronized,' and that the propellers were being 'cycled.' One witness said brownish-black smoke trailed from the right engine. The airplane struck one ridge, then catapulted approximately 1,000 feet before striking another ridge. There was post impact fire. Both propellers bore high rotational damage. Disassembly of the engines, propellers, turbochargers, and various components failed to disclose what may have prompted the pilot to want to return to the airport. Internal components of the right engine, however, were black and, according to a Textron Lycoming representative, were indicative of 'an excessively rich mixture.' A psychiatrist had recently treated the pilot for depression, attention deficit and bipolar disorders. The pilot also had a history of alcohol and drug abuse. Postmortem toxicology protocol disclose the presence of Fluoxetine (an antidepressant), Norfluoxetine (its metabolite), and Hydrocodone (the most commonly prescribed opiate).

The pilot was taking off with 10 jumpers onboard. At the rotation speed of 100 knots, he used elevator trim to rotate the airplane, but it did not lift off the runway. He continued moving the trim wheel violently to pitch the nose up, and attempted to pull back on the yoke, but the airplane collided with rising terrain off the end of the runway. A witness did not see any of the flight controls move during the pilot preflight inspection, and during the takeoff roll, he did not observe a nose up rotation of the airplane. The pilot reported that he removed a single pin control lock from the yoke during preflight. The Beech control lock consisted of two pins, two chains, and a U-shaped engine control lock. The pilot walked away from the wreckage after the accident. No control locks were found in the wreckage. However, the control column shaft exhibited distress signatures on the periphery of the hole where the control lock is installed. No other evidence was found of any other form of mechanical jamming, interference, or discontinuity with the flight controls. Investigators were unable to identify any potential source of interference, other than a control lock, that could have simultaneously jammed both pitch and roll control. According to the airplane's manufacturer, about 3 to 6 degree of trim would have been normal for the airplane's takeoff conditions.