United States of America

The air cargo flight had just off loaded its cargo at a remote site. Shortly after takeoff, the number two engine begin to run rough. The engine was shut down, and the propeller feathered. During the shutdown process, a fire warning light illuminated, and fire became visible near the number 2 engine. The crew activated both banks of engine fire extinguishers, but were unable to extinguish the fire. While on approach to an off-airport emergency landing site, the number two engine fell off and ignited a brush fire. The crew made a successful landing and ran away from the airplane. The airplane continued to burn and was destroyed by fire. The number 2 engine was not recovered or located.

The flight was landing under special VFR conditions. Special VFR operations are permitted with a visibility of 1 mile, and clear of clouds. The airport was the pilot's base of operations. The flight had held outside the airport surface area for 26 minutes, waiting for a special VFR clearance. While outside the airport surface area, the pilot was required to maintain 500 feet above the ground and 2 miles visibility. While holding, the weather at the airport was reported as 300 feet overcast. The visibility decreased from 4 miles to 1 mile in mist. The pilot was new to the area of operations, having worked at the company for 24 days, during which he accrued 69 hours of flight time. Four minutes after receiving clearance to enter the surface area for landing, the airplane collided with a 260 feet tall radio antenna tower at 222 feet above the ground. The tower was located 3.85 nautical miles east of the airport. The radio tower was not considered by the FAA to be an object affecting navigable airspace, but was depicted as an obstruction on the VFR sectional chart for the area. The tower was equipped with obstruction lighting for night illumination, and was painted alternating aviation orange and white for daytime marking. One minute after the collision, the overcast was reported at 200 feet, and the visibility was 5/8 mile.

The pilot took off from a 4400-foot-long gravel airstrip with a near gross weight load of cargo. He said that shortly after lift-off the airplane felt 'sluggish', and he believes the left engine began to lose power. He said the airplane would not climb, and he elected to bring both engines to idle and land on the remaining runway. The airplane touched down a short distance from the end of the runway, and continued off the end and into the woods. A fire erupted, and the airplane was destroyed by fire. The pilot is unsure if the fire occurred in the air, or shortly after the airplane went off the end of the runway. The engines were extensively damaged by fire, and were not examined. FAA inspectors on scene said there was no obvious signs of catastrophic engine failure.

The aircraft concluded an aerial survey and landed at Brown Field to clear U.S. Customs. On restart, as the left engine began running, a witness noticed two short, yellow flame bursts exit the exhaust. During taxi, the witness heard a popping sound coming from the aircraft. As power was applied to cross runway 26L, the sound went away. The aircraft stopped for a few seconds prior to pulling onto the runway; the witness did not observe or hear a run-up. Witnesses reported hearing a series of popping sounds similar to automatic gunfire and observed the aircraft between 600 and 1,000 feet above the ground with wings level and the landing gear up. The aircraft was observed to make an abrupt, 45-degree banked, left turn as the nose dipped down. Witnesses reported the nose of the aircraft then raised up toward the horizon. This was followed by the aircraft turning to the left and becoming inverted in an estimated 30-degree nose low attitude. With the nose still low, the aircraft continued around to an upright position and appeared to be in a shallow right bank. Witnesses then lost sight of the aircraft due to buildings and terrain. A May 20, 1997, work order indicated the left manifold pressure fluctuated in flight. Both wastegates were lubricated and a test flight revealed the left engine manifold pressure lagged behind the right engine manifold pressure. On June 18, 1997, the left engine differential pressure controller was noted to have been removed and replaced. This was the corrective action for a discrepancy write up that the left engine manifold pressure fluctuated up and down 2 inHg and the rpm varied by 100 in cruise. A test flight that afternoon by the accident pilot indicated the discrepancy still occurred at cruise power settings, but the engine operated normally at high and low power settings. Post accident functional checks were performed on various components. No discrepancies were noted for the left governor. The left engine differential pressure controller was damaged and results varied on each test. The left density controller was too damaged to test. The right engine density and differential pressure controllers tested satisfactory. The left and right fuel pumps operated within specifications. Both fuel servos were damaged. One injection nozzle on the left engine was partially plugged; all others flow tested within specifications.

The aircraft was transferred from the maintenance facilities to the main terminal by a technical crew when control was lost. The airplane collided with the USAir Terminal and the cockpit was destroyed.

During the initial climb after takeoff, while executing a dark-night departure, the pilot failed to maintain clearance from rising terrain about one and one-quarter mile off the end of the runway. Operator records indicated that the pilot had flown out of this airport in the past, and that the aircraft was approximately 600 pounds below maximum certificated gross weight at the time of departure. A teardown inspection of both engines revealed no pre-impact anomalies, and visual and teardown inspections of the propellers showed damage signatures consistent with ground contact in a flat pitch under significant power.

The captain reported: 'Shortly after V1...there was a loss of power to the left engine....' (FAR Part 1 defines V1 as takeoff decision speed.) However, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, stated the captain retarded power on the left engine as a training exercise. The first officer stated there was no preflight discussion of emergency procedure practice. The airplane became airborne about 3,500 feet down the runway; the crew subsequently lost control of the aircraft, and it crashed to the left of the runway, and a fire erupted. The crew escaped with minor injuries. A teardown of the left engine was performed under FAA supervision at the engine manufacturer's facilities; the engine manufacturer reported that damage found during the teardown 'was indicative of engine rotation and operation at the time of impact....' Both airspeed indicator bugs were found set 9 to 11 knots below the V1 speed on the takeoff and landing data (TOLD) card. No evidence of an aircraft or engine malfunction, to include inflight fire, was found at the accident site.

During arrival at night, the flight was being controlled by a developmental controller (DC), who was being supervised by an instructor (IC). The pilot (plt) was instructed to descend & cross the STILL Intersection (Int) at 3,000 ft. STILL Int was aligned with the localizer (loc) approach (apch) course, 10.1 mi from the apch end of runway 17 (rwy 17); the final apch fix (FAF) was 3.9 mi from the rwy. About 5 mi before reaching STILL Int, while on course & level at 3,000 ft, the plt was cleared for a Loc Rwy 17 Apch. Radar data showed the aircraft (acft) continued to STILL Int, then it turned onto the loc course toward the FAF. Shortly after departing STILL Int, while inbound on the loc course, the acft began a descent. Before the acft reached the FAF, the DC issued a frequency change to go to UNICOM. During this transmission, the IC noticed a low altitude alert on the radar display, then issued a verbal low altitude alert, saying, 'check altitude, you should be at 1,500 ft (should have said '1,800 ft' as that was the minimum crossing altitude at the FAF), altitude's indicating 1,200, low altitude alert.' There was no response from the plt. This occurred about 2 mi before the FAF. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the apch was 720 ft. The acft struck tree tops at 750 ft, about 1/2 mi before the FAF. The IC's remark 'you should be at 1,500 ft' was based on an expired apch plate with a lower FAF minimum crossing altitude; the current minimum crossing altitude at the FAF was 1,800 ft. Apch control management had not made the current plate available to the controllers. Investigation could not determine whether a current apch plate would have prompted an earlier warning by the controllers.

About three hours and twenty minutes after departing Bellingham, Washington, for Midland, Texas, the pilot contacted Klamath Falls (Oregon) Tower and told the controller of his intention to land. About 10 minutes later, while about 30 miles north of Klamath Falls, the pilot reported he was low on fuel and was not able to find the city. The tower responded with instructions that would take the pilot south to the airport. But because the pilot seemed not to be following the instructions, but was instead continuing to the west, he was switched to Seattle Center. Center provided the pilot with a southeasterly heading direct to Klamath Falls, but less than a minute later radar and radio contact with the aircraft was lost. Other pilots overheard the pilot transmit that he had lost power in one engine, and later state that he had lost power in both. Soon thereafter the aircraft was seen to descend to about 200 to 300 feet above the surface of Lake of the Woods. The aircraft then began to slow and its nose began to rise. As it was slowing, one of the engines surged back to a high power setting, and the aircraft almost immediately rolled quickly to the side and dove nearly straight down into the lake. During the post-accident inspection of the airframe, the throttle for the right engine was found retarded to idle, but the throttle for the left engine was found in the full-forward (maximum power) position. A review of the Aerostar owner's manual revealed that the Engine Failure/Restart checklist called for the throttle for a failed engine (both engines in this case) to be retarded to the 'Cracked 1/2 inch open' position. Toxicological results indicate the presence in the pilot's blood of chlordiazepoxide and three of its active metabolites, norchlordiazepoxide, nordiazepam, and oxazepam. Chlordiazepoxide (Librium) is a tranquilizer often used to treat anxiety and tension. At sufficient levels it can have significant adverse effects on judgement, alertness, and performance. It is known to cause drowsiness, mental dullness, and euphoria. The results also indicate the presence of diphenhydramine in the pilot's blood. Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine, and in sufficient quantities is known to produce drowsiness, impaired coordination, blurred vision, and reduced mental alertness.

The pilot/owner of an air tanker was dispatched to drop a load of retardant on a fire burning up a valley wall. The pilot made radio contact with the firefighters on the ground, who requested that the pilot deliver the entire load on the first drop. A helicopter pilot who was dropping water on the fire positioned himself about a mile away to allow the air tanker to make its drop. The winds were from the northwest at 15 knots and gusting to 20 knots, and the helicopter pilot reported turbulence in the area. The helicopter pilot watched as the air tanker came from the northeast, overflew the fire, and made a descending counterclockwise turn. The airplane flew towards the fire parallel to the valley ridge, and the helicopter pilot observed the air tanker drop its retardant. During the drop, the airplane flew through smoke, and its right wing impacted trees on the upslope side of the valley. The airplane then rolled 90 degrees and descended into the steeply inclined wooded terrain. A review of the pilot's FAA medical records revealed that he lacked color vision.