United States of America

With an auxiliary fuel tank system installed, the pilot filled the tanks and departed. A few minutes later, he noticed fuel on the floor of the cabin, and tried to reach an airport. However, the fuel fumes were so strong he elected to land in an open field. After touchdown, the airplane passed through a ditch the pilot had not observed from the air. The nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane nosed over. An airborne witness reported the pilot exited the airplane after about 5 minutes, and about 5 minutes later, the airplane caught fire and burned. The post crash fire consumed the cabin. In an interview, the pilot reported that he had not initiated use of the auxiliary fuel tank system when the accident occurred. He also reported he could not see where the fuel was coming from. The investigation revealed the tank installation did not match the FAA Form 337, the instructions for use of the ferry tank system were inadequate, and the pilot had reported that the auxiliary fuel pumps were secured to a board which was not secured to the airplane.

The airplane impacted the terrain approximately 2,065 feet south of the departure end of runway 22. Damage to the cockpit section of the wreckage indicated a nose down crush angle of approximately 80 degrees. The wreckage path was on a 208 degree heading, and the distance from the initial impact to the location of the empennage was about 142 feet. The cockpit and cabin were destroyed by post impact fire. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no preexisting failures or conditions that would have prevented normal operation. The engines exhibited indications of rotation, and the witness marks on both sets of propellers were consistent with the propellers operating in the governing range at impact. Control continuity was established from the right aileron, elevator, and rudder. Witnesses reported the airplane seem to be operating normally during taxi and takeoff, but that it entered a steep left bank after clearing a 100 foot powerline located about 1,800 feet from the departure end of runway 22. After entering the steep left turn, the nose of the airplane dropped and the airplane impacted the ground. There was no evidence in the airplane's maintenance records of any annual maintenance inspection since August, 1997, although an airframe and powerplant mechanic reported that he had completed an inspection on June 30, 1999. There was no record in the airplane's maintenance records of compliance with five airworthiness directives applicable to the airplane.

During takeoff, the twin-engine airplane was observed to roll left, pitch nose down, and impact terrain shortly after the pilot reported to ATC that he had a problem. Witnesses reported that the left engine was producing black smoke during the takeoff roll. One witness stated that the airplane had slowed to approximately 60-70 mph prior to rolling to the left. A mechanic, who worked on the airplane prior to the accident, stated that the pilot reported being unable to maintain manifold pressure (MP) with the left engine. The mechanic found that the left engine's rubber interconnect boot, which routes induction air between the turbocharger controller elbow and the fuel servo, was 'gaping open.' The mechanic reseated the boot and tightened the clamp. The pilot flew the airplane and reported no problems. During a second flight, the pilot reported that the left engine was again unable to maintain MP. Prior to the accident flight, the pilot informed the mechanic that the 'hose had slid off again' and that it had been reinstalled and he 'felt sure it was o.k.' A witness stated that he saw the pilot working on the left engine the morning of the accident. At the accident site, the left engine's interconnect boot was found disconnected. The clamp securing the boot was not located. No other preimpact anomalies were found with the engines, propellers, turbochargers, or fuel servos.

The pilot was descending the airplane from 23,000 feet for an instrument approach. All communications were normal until after he acknowledged an instruction to contact approach control, when radio contact was lost. Radar contact ceased at 11,300 feet due to radar signal reception difficulties. Contact was lost almost directly over the eventual impact site, which was on the eastern side of a small valley. Witnesses on the western side of the valley had seen the airplane flying near them, at treetop level, eastbound, and clear of clouds. About the same time, on the eastern side of the valley where the airplane would impact trees, then terrain, there was heavy rain. The commercial pilot had about 1,850 total flight hours, and had completed a 'Wings III' flight proficiency program and an instrument proficiency program about two months earlier. The airplane had been on a continuous maintenance program. At the accident site, all of the airplane's control surfaces were found, and the engines and propellers displayed signatures consistent with being under power at impact. There were insufficient remains to conduct an autopsy or toxicological testing. Previously, the pilot's father, two uncles, and a male cousin had suffered fatal heart attacks.

The pilot received a preflight weather briefing and was advised of thunderstorms with tops to 45,000 feet along a portion of the route of flight. En route, the pilot was advised of significant areas of heavy precipitation to which the pilot responded, 'uh roger one nine whiskey it looks like on our radar here that uh we go straight ahead we'll be all right there.' The flight was cleared to descend to 11,000 feet and the pilot requested deviation to the right for weather avoidance. The pilot made several routine radio communications while descending at a calculated average rate of descent of approximately 2,571 fpm before encountering adverse weather. During this time while descending, the calculated calibrated airspeed increased from approximately 190 knots to approximately 265 knots (the design dive speed Vd). The flight encountered a level 5 weather echo then began a high rate of descent. Both horizontal stabilizers with elevators and both outer portions of both wings failed in a down direction. Examination of the flight control cables, fracture surfaces of the wings and horizontal stabilizers, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The pilot did not request pilot reports. The design maneuvering speed of the airplane is 169 knots indicated; the POH indicates to slow to this speed for turbulence penetration.

An aircraft mechanic stated one of the airplanes engines was making an unusual noise during takeoff. An Air Traffic Controller stated the flight used about 4,500 feet of runway before lifting off. About 1 minute after being cleared for takeoff, the pilot reported 'were coming around were losing a right engine'. The controller and a witness observed the airplane level off, sway to the left and right, and then descend. The pilot reported he was not going to make it. The airplane was lost from sight behind trees. Post crash examination of the airplane structure, flight controls, engines, and propellers showed no evidence of pre-crash failure or malfunction that would have prevented operation. The landing gear and wing flaps were found retracted. The left and right propellers were found in the low blade angle position and had similar damage. An NTSB sound study of ATC communications showed that at the time the pilot reported they were not going to make it, a propeller signature showed 1,297 rpm and another propeller signature of 2,160 rpm. The engine inoperative procedure contained in the Pilot Operating Handbook for the Cessna 421C, calls for the throttle on the inoperative engine to be closed, the mixture placed in idle cut-off, and the propeller feathered. The Pilot Operating Handbook also showed the airplane would normally use 2,000 feet of runway for takeoff under the accident conditions.

A twin-engine airplane on a scheduled passenger/cargo flight, departed a rural airport located along the north shore of the Yukon River with only the pilot aboard. The airplane appeared to depart normally, but remained low, flying over the river, about 200 feet above the ground. About five minutes after departure, the pilot contacted a local weather observation facility on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), and reported he was having a problem with the airplane, stating he may have to ditch. He did not describe the nature of the problem. The pilot then said he was clipping trees, and was attempting to return to the runway. The airplane collided with several trees located on a gravel bar in the Yukon River, separating the outboard end of the left wing. The airplane then collided with the river and sank, about 1.5 miles south of the airport. A fast river current, and silty water conditions hampered recovery efforts, but the left wing, the left engine, and the fuselage were recovered from the river. The left engine propeller appeared to be feathered. The right wing and the right engine were not recovered. Postaccident examination of the left engine disclosed no evidence that it was producing power upon impact, or any evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunction. Inspection of the airframe disclosed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunction.

The flight was executing a precautionary landing at the airport due to a reported fuel transfer problem. Witnesses described hearing engine variances and observed the aircraft roll and impact the ground nose first. There was a post crash fire mainly confined to the right wing area. Inspection of the flight control system, engines, and propellers did not reveal any preexisting anomalies with these systems. The left fuel selector and left fuel pumps passed functional tests. The right fuel selector and right fuel pumps could not be tested due to fire damage.

On June 1, 1999, at 2350:44 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 1420, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), N215AA, crashed after it overran the end of runway 4R during landing at Little Rock National Airport in Little Rock, Arkansas. Flight 1420 departed from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Texas, about 2240 with 2 flight crewmembers, 4 flight attendants, and 139 passengers aboard and touched down in Little Rock at 2350:20. After departing the end of the runway, the airplane struck several tubes extending outward from the left edge of the instrument landing system localizer array, located 411 feet beyond the end of the runway; passed through a chain link security fence and over a rock embankment to a flood plain, located approximately 15 feet below the runway elevation; and collided with the structure supporting the runway 22L approach lighting system. The captain and 10 passengers were killed; the first officer, the flight attendants, and 105 passengers received serious or minor injuries; and 24 passengers were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Flight 1420 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

During the takeoff roll and initial climb both engines were producing normal power. As the airplane climbed through 150 feet, the left engine lost power. The pilot reported that he feathered the left propeller. He further stated that following the securing of the left engine, the right engine began to 'power down.' The pilot reported that he was unable to maintain a climb attitude and was forced to land on the airport in a grassy area. The subsequent examination of the cockpit disclosed that the left engine throttle was in the full forward position, and the right throttle lever was in the mid-range position. Both propeller levers were found full forward. The left engine mixture lever was in the full forward position, and the right mixture lever full aft, or lean, position. The functional check of both engines was conducted. Initially the left engine would not start, but after troubleshooting the fuel system, the left fuel boost pump was determined to have been defective. The 'loss of engine power after liftoff' checklist requires that the pilot identify the inoperative engine and to feather the propeller for the inoperative engine.