Brazil

Poor approach configuration on part of the flying crew who continued the approach after passing the MDA at 1,150 feet while the aircraft was not stabilized and the crew did not establish a visual contact with the obstacles on short final. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Following the first impact with trees, branches and pieces of wood entered the engines, causing a loss of power followed by a loss of speed and altitude,
- Complacency on the part of the crew,
- Pressure and stress,
- Visual perception issues,
- Violation of the standard operating procedures,
- Loss of situational awareness,
- Lack of crew resources management,
- Poor approach and landing planning,
- Poor weather conditions,
- Relative low experience of the copilot.

Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the crew did not prepare the flight according to procedures and took off with an insufficient fuel quantity on board.

Poor approach configuration on part of the crew who landed the aircraft 750 metres past the runway threshold, reducing the landing distance available. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew completed an unstabilized approach,
- Poor approach planning,
- Limited visibility due to the night and poor weather conditions,
- The braking action was low because the runway surface was wet,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure.

The following findings were identified:
- The visibility was reduced by rain falls,
- The runway surface was wet,
- The braking action was poor,
- The crew landed the aircraft too far down the runway, about 400 metres past the runway threshold, reducing the landing distance available,
- The aircraft's speed at touchdown was excessive,
- The copilot was inexperienced and did not have any training of qualification on such type of aircraft,
- Lack of crew coordination,
- Poor crew resources management,
- Uncomplete approach briefing.

The following findings were identified:
- The pilots' perception about the situation was affected by lack of specific training and procedures, which, coupled with the limited time available for action and lack of clarity in communications, influenced the time elapsed for taking corrective actions.
- Communication between the crew was not clear at the time of emergency, making the co-pilot did not understand at first, the action to be performed, which increased the time spent to disarm the CB. Such facts, however, can not be separated from the situation experienced by pilots with inadequate training for emergency and in a short time to identify the problem and take the corrective actions.
- The company had not provided a regular CRM training to pilots. Furthermore, the captain did not receive simulator training for over one year. It was impossible to determine, however, if the regular training and updating of the CRM simulator training of the pilot would have prevented the accident.
- The removal of the pilot from his seat at the time of the emergency may have increased the time spent in identifying the crash and taking corrective actions, but it was not possible to establish whether the accident would be avoided if he would have been in the cockpit. The copilot was slow to understand the situation and initiate corrective actions, although the alarm 'whooler' has sounded, also increasing the elapsed time.
- The operational testing under J IC 27-32-00 allowed the partial completion of the procedures due to lack of clarity, which allowed the release of the aircraft for flight with a defective relay.
Furthermore, although the elevator trim system has been certified, no procedure for emergency triggering of the compensator in the manuals provided by the manufacturer, no replacement intervals of the components of the elevator trim system in "Time Limits" systems normal and reserves were not independent and the system had a low tolerance for errors.

The exact cause of the accident could not be determined with certainty. However, it is believed that the accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain after the crew continued the approach in poor weather conditions and descended below the MDA until the aircraft, in a flaps and gear down configuration, impacted ground. The following contributing factors were identified:
- A difference of 70 feet in the settings was noted between both pilot's altimeters,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Complacency on part of the flying crew caused several deviations from procedures during the approach,
- Lack of crew resources management,
- The crew failed to check the altitude during the final stage of the approach,
- Poor weather conditions.

A loss of hydraulic fluids occurred on a hose separating a fitting from a pump on the right engine, causing the malfunction of the primary hydraulic system and resulting in the degradation of the mechanical system of the landing gear control command.

While cruising at FL350, the crew noticed a technical problem with the 'fuel filter' and a 'fuel pressure low' was observed on the right engine. Following a check of the flight manual, the crew reported a fuel transfer issue and attempted an emergency diversion. It was determined that both engine stopped following the rupture of a fuel line connected to the right engine, causing a major fuel leak. The disconnection of the fuel line was the consequence of the rupture of a aluminium ring.

The following factors were identified:
- The crew did not have sufficient training to enable the desired assertiveness for the correct use of aircraft resources, which would probably have prevented the accident, since, instead of applying the emergency brake, they applied reverse with the feathered props, contrary to the procedure provided for in the Aircraft Manual.
- The maintenance services were not efficient, as they did not comply with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual in relation to the dimensional adjustment of the Hub Cap Drive Clips' drive clips, and the Service Bulletin incorporated stickers to the outer doors of the main landing gear, as a reminder to the mechanic to check the clearances.
- The copilot failed to apply the reverse pitch on the propellers as they were feathered, and at that moment the emergency brake should be commanded to brake the aircraft.
- The company failed to adequately check the execution of the actions provided for in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual regarding the 'Antiskid' system and to verify the application of all service bulletins issued by the manufacturer.

It was determined that the pilot was not qualified to pilot such type of aircraft. Investigations revealed he did not have any licence nor medical documents to prove he was able to conduct such flight with such aircraft. A poor flight planning and a poor evaluation of the weather conditions were considered as contributing factors.