Zurich-Kloten

In the afternoon, the airplane departed Paris on flight LZ130 to Sofia, carrying 39 passengers and a crew of eight. While cruising at its assigned altitude vertical to Luxeuil VOR, the captain requested to ATC the permission to divert to Zurich-Kloten Airport. The reason for this rerouting was unknown. The crew was cleared to change his route and continued over south of West Germany before starting a descent to Zurich. The approach to runway 16 at Zurich-Kloten was initiated in poor weather conditions with fog reducing the horizontal visibility to 600 meters and the vertical visibility to 60 meters. On final, the left main gear and the left wing tip struck the ground. The airplane gain a little height then struck the ground, lost its four engines and crashed in flames about 700 meters short of runway threshold, slightly out from the approach path. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and only two occupants survived the accident, the captain and a boy aged 12. All 45 other occupants were killed. The occupants were respectively 14 West German, 12 Bulgarian (among them 8 crew members), 9 French, 4 Syrians, 2 Lebanese, one Brazilian, one Dutch, one Argentinian, one Austrian, one Finnish and one British.

While descending to Zurich-Kloten Airport, the flight engineer encountered technical issues with the cabine pressure and was forced to control it manually. Focused on this problem, he failed to hear and understand the instruction of the captain to lower the gear. In such circumstances, the airplane landed on its belly on runway 16 and slid for 875 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All 20 occupants were quickly evacuated and uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Apparently, the crew failed to hear the gear alarm.

During the takeoff roll, the engine n°1 exploded. Some debris fall on the ground, bounced and struck the wing, causing the rupture of the n°2 fuel tank. The crew started an emergency braking procedure and the airplane came to a stop in flames. All 65 occupants were quickly disembarked, 23 of them were injured. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

The airplane departed Zurich-Kloten Airport runway 28 at 1314LT bound for Tel Aviv with 38 passengers and nine crew members on board. Seven minutes later, while climbing to an altitude of 14,000 feet some 41 km south of the airport, the captain contacted ATC and declared an emergency stating that a denotation occurred in the cargo compartment and that the cabin pressure was dropping. He requested an immediate return to Zurich and during the following minutes, he reported successively that smoke spread in the cabin and cockpit and that some of the instruments were unserviceable. He also reported the failure of the electrical system and asked for a radar assistance. While he was vectored to the airport, the copilot said 'smoke on board, I don't see anything' then the captain reported 'we are falling, goodbye everyone'. The airplane then completed a 180 turn, nosed down and crashed in a huge explosion in a wooded area located near the village of Würenlingen, some 22 km northwest of runway 14 threshold. The airplane totally disintegrated on impact and all 47 occupants were killed. At the time of impact, the airplane was in a nose-down attitude of 12° and at a speed of 422 knots and in a slight left bank. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with rain falls, a cloud base at 300 meters, overcast till 600 meters, visibility up to 5 km and wind 15-20 knots. Among the passengers were 15 Israelis, nine Germans, five Americans, two Canadians, two Mexicans, one Belgian, one French, one British, one Thai and 10 Swiss citizens, among them all nine crew members.

The aircraft was originally planned to fly a non-scheduled international flight from Stockholm-Arlanda to Palma de Mallorca. During the take-off run No. 4 engine did not function properly; the take-off was aborted and the aircraft was taxiied back to the apron. Inspection of the engine revealed damage to the compressor. After consultation with the Spantax Operations Department in Madrid, it was decided to ferry the aircraft on three engines to Zurich, where No. 4 engine would be changed. The technical preparation of the aircraft for the ferry flight was supervised by a ground engineer from Spantax. Meanwhile, the flight crew planned the flight. As the ATS briefing office at Arlanda was closed after 2100 hours, the co-pilot phoned the ATS flight plan to Stockholm Control Centre (ACC) . Neither when phoning the flight plan nor at the weather briefing did the crew advise that the flight was a 3-engine ferry flight. However, the Air Traffic Controller (Tower) in some other way had been informed about the nature of the flight. At 2208 hours the crew received a taxi clearance to Runway 08, but as they considered that this runway was too short for a 3-engine take-off , they requested permission to use Runway 19 and this was granted. Another advantage of using Runway 19 was that it made it possible to join the outbound track with minor heading changes. During taxiing the aircraft and the engine anti-icing system were checked according to the checklist. (After checking the engine anti-icing was switched OFF.) At 2221 hours the flight was cleared to take-off, and at 2224 hours the crew reported "Rolling". According to the pilot-in-command,maximum EPR take-off power was set on engines Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with brakes on, then, after having checked the instruments, No. 1 engine was throttled back to 85 per cent and the brakes were released. When the aircraft had rolled for 5-10 seconds the nose wheel skidded to the right and to regain heading he had to retard throttle No. 1 to 80-60 per cent. When back on the centre line he slowly opened the throttle again. Maximum EPR take-off power was set when the aircraft reached a speed of 100 kt. He rotated the aircraft at the calculated speed Vr - 134 kt (27° of flaps) and it became airborne. He retracted the gear when positive climb was indicated. Just after lift off he was blinded by the aircraft landing lights illuminating unexpectedly low clouds over the runway. Initially he kept the speed at V2 (145 kt) and noticed a rate- of-climb of 800 ft/min. He had to apply extremely hard left rudder to centre the turn indicator (ball). He did not observe any bank or turn tendency, but noted that the indicated airspeed (IAS) was not increasing normally and shortly thereafter that the rate-of-climb and speed decreased. The pilot-in-command felt they urgently needed more power, but all happened very quickly and shortly after he had noticed the speed drop the aircraft collided with the terrain. From the time take-off power had been set on the runway the throttle positions were not changed. The co-pilot stated that they had to taxi down the runway to avoid ice patches on the first part of the runway. He could not say how far they taxiied and it was not possible to determine it in any other way. During preparation for take-off he asked the pilot-in-command if they should use 10° flaps, but the decision of the pilot- in-command to uae 27° was not changed. He completed the pre-take-off instrument check and did not notice any abnormal readings. The three gyro horizons indicated no differences. When rolling he kept the control column forward, to increase the friction on the nose wheel, and gave full left aileron. Gradually he decreased the pressure on the column and reduced left aileron deflection. At V1 the pilot-in-command took mr the controls. The co-pilot kept his left hand on the throttles and verified that no changes were made on throttles Nos. 2 and 3 after takeoff power was set, but he noticed that the pilot-in-command had to vary the No. 1 throttle setting several times during the roll. After lift-off when the gear was retracted the co-pilot received a message from the tower giving the take-off time and instruction to change over to STOCKHOLM RADAR on 124.1 MHz. He never acknowledged the message but when leaning forward to select the new frequency he noticed on his horizon a banking to the right of 4 to 60. He also observed the gyro horizon of the pilot-in-command indicating o bank to the right. Zhe speed had dropped to 10 kt belau V2 and he called: "The speed, the speed". Ifc felt no buffeting in the aircraft aud noted no tendency to Dutch roll. Be also stated that he observed a power drop of about 2 per cent below EPR take-off power. Shortly after the first contact with the treetops the banking to the right had increased to 10-lSO and the co-pilot retarded the throttles. The flight and the ground engineers sitting in the cockpit observed nothing abnormal until the crash. None of them observed any indications of power changes on the instruments. No buffeting was felt in the aircraft, neither were any warning signals heard. Whilst in a right bank of 4-6° the aircraft collided with tree-tops approximately 26 m above and 1 060 m from the far end of Runway 19, or about 1 800 m from the point of lift-off, having turned through about 25 degrees from the runway heading. The aircraft came to a final stop approximately 500 m after first contact with the trees on a heading of 240°. The aircraft was destroyed and five occupants were killed while five others were injured.

The aircraft was operating Flight BA. 712 from Heathrow Airport, London to Zurich with onward routing to Sydney, Australia. In addition to the normal crew complement, a check pilot was on the aircraft for the purpose of carrying out a route check on the pilot-in-command. The aircraft became airborne from Runway 28 Left at 1527 hours GMT and 20 seconds later, just before the time for the noise abatement power reduction, the flight crew felt and heard a combined shock and bang. The thrust lever for No. 2 engine "kicked" towards the closed position and at the same time the instruments showed that the engine was running down. The pilot-in-command ordered "Engine Failure Drill" and the flight engineer began the immediate actions of that drill. Because the undercarriage was retracted, the warning horn sounded when the flight engineer fully retarded the thrust lever; the check pilot and flight engineer simultaneously went for and pulled the horn cancel switch on the pedestal whilst the co-pilot, instinctively, but in error, pressed the fire bell cancel button in front of him. The flight engineer went for the engine fire shut-off handle but he did not pull it. The lack of a flight deck voice recorder makes it impossible to establish a second by second timing of events, but at about this time the check pilot looked out of a flight deck window on the port side and reported a serious fire in No. 2 engine, adding words to the effect that a landing should be made at the earliest possible moment. No member of the flight crew recalls hearing the fire warning bell. Nevertheless, the fire warning light in No. 2 fire shut-off handle was seen to be on and the pilot-in-command ordered an "Engine Fire Drill". The check pilot suggested, and the co-pilot with the pilot-in-command's approval broadcast, a "Mayday" call. Having initially started an engine failure drill, the flight engineer changed directly to the engine fire drill. According to his evidence, having completed Phase 1 of the engine fire drill, which is required to be done by memory, he subsequently used his own copy of the checklist to complete Phase I1 of the drill, including the operation of the fire extinguisher transfer switch and pushing the discharge button for the second shot thirty seconds after the first. When the co-pilot started to read the check list the flight engineer told him the check was already completed. During this period and subsequently, according to his evidence, the check pilot directed his attention to monitoring the state of the fire on the wing and to providing the pilot-in-command with comments intended to help him position the aircraft for the landing. ATC originally offered the pilot-in-command a landing back on Runway 28L and alerted the fire services but after the "Mayday" call he was offered Runway 05 R which was accepted as it would resulting a shorter flight path. ATC ordered other landing aircraft to overshoot in order to ensure a clear approach to Runway 05 R and to clear Runway 28R for the passage of the fire vehicles. The initial notification to the Airport Emergency Services of the expected landing on Runway 28 L was also revised. About 14 minutes after the start of the fire, No. 2 engine, together with part of its pylon, became detached and fell into a waterfilled gravel pit. This was unknown to the flight crew but because of the separation the light in the fire handle would have gone out. Nevertheless, they were aware that a serious fire continued to burn. At various places along the flight path a number of engine fragments and pieces of cowling had already fallen away, but these caused no injury to persons or damage to property. At about the time the engine fell away the undercarriage was lowered and full flap selected. The undercarriage locked down normally but the hydraulic pressure and contents were seen to fall and the flaps stopped extending at 470, that is 30 short of their full range. The approach to Runway 05 R was made from a difficult position, the aircraft being close to the runway and having reached a height of about 3 000 ft and a speed of 225 kt. There is no glide slope guidance to this runway but the approach was well judged and touchdown was achieved approximately 400 yards beyond the threshold. To add to the pilot-in-command's difficulties, during the final approach the flight engineer informed him that the instruments of No. 1 engine indicated that it might fail, although it did not do so. In order to bring the aircraft to a stop in the shortest possible distance after landing, in addition to the wheel. brakes, reverse thrust from No. 1 and No. 4 engines was used down to a very low speed. The use of reverse thrust caused the flames to be deflected in towards the fuselage. The aircraft came to a stop just to the left of the runway centre line, about 1 800 yards from the threshold, on a heading of 0350M. After the aircraft came to rest the flight engineer commenced the engine shut-down drill and closed the start levers. Almost simultaneously the pilot-in-command ordered fire drill on the remaining engines. Before this could be carried out there was an explosion from the port wing which increased the intensity of the fire and blew fragments of the wing over to the starboard side of the aircraft. The pilot-in-command then ordered immediate evacuation of the flight deck. The engine fire shut-off handies were not pulled and the fuel booster pumps and main electrical supply were not switched off. There were more explosions and fuel, which was released from the port tanks, spread underneath the aircraft and greatly enlarged the area of the fire. The cabin crew had made preparations for an emergency landing and as the aircraft came to a stop opened the emergency exits and started rigging the escape chutes. The passengers commenced evacuation from the two starboard overwing exits and shortly afterwards, when the escape chutes had been inflated, from the rear starboard galley door and then the forward starboard galley door. However, because of the spread of the fire under the rear of the fuselage the escape chute at the rear galley door soon burst and, following the first explosion, the overwing escape route also became unusable. The great majority of the survivors left the aircraft via the forward galley door escape chute. The co-pilot, who could not get into the galley to help with the evacuation, left the aircraft through the starboard flight deck window by use of the escape rope at that position. The Second Officer, who helped guide the passengers in the initial stages, followed, the pilot-in-command, having assisted the stewardess to inflate the port forward chute, also left by the flight deck window after seeing the evacuation was proceeding satisfactorily. The flight engineer saw that the port forward chute had not inflated properly so he climbed down it to straighten it. However, immediately after it inflated it became unusable from heat and burst. The evacuation of passengers had been largely completed by the time the airport fire and rescue services began to provide assistance. The fire services prevented the fuel in the starboard tanks from catching fire but the rear fuselage and port wing were burned out. Four of the passengers and one stewardess were overcome by heat and smoke at the rear of the aircraft and did not escape, whilst thirty-eight passengers sustained . injuries during the evacuation. Some hours after the accident it was not known how many had escaped alive or had been injured because some survivors were quickly removed to various treatment and rest centres whilst others left the vicinity of the airport without leaving their names.

The aircraft departed Zurich-Kloten runway 28 at 0743LT on a local training mission, carrying an instructor and three student pilots. During initial climb, the captain turn slightly to the right and continued at low height when the aircraft contacted tree tops, stalled and crashed in a wooded area located in Regensberg, about 8 km northwest of the airport. Debris scattered on more than 200 meters and all four crew members were killed.

The airplane, owned by the German Industrialist Harald Quandt, was en route from Zurich to Nice. During the takeoff roll on runway 28 at Zurich-Kloten Airport, while at a speed of 132 knots, the captain realized that the rotation was impossible and decided to abort the takeoff procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 28 is 2,500 meters long), the airplane overran at a speed of 80-100 knots, went through the perimeter fence and came to rest on a road. All seven passengers were unhurt while the captain was injured. The copilot was seriously wounded and died from his injuries while being transferred to a local hospital. At the time of the accident, runway 28 was wet due to recent rain falls.

Flight SR-306 was a scheduled international flight from Zürich to Rome, with an intermediate stop at Geneva. Dense fog was existing at the time of departure and at 0600 hours the flight was informed that the RVR was 180 m for runway 34 and 60 m for runway 16, and that there was a light northerly wind (1 to 2 kt). At 0604 hours the flight was authorized to taxi to runway 34 behind an accompanying vehicle. At 0605 the crew reported that they will taxi half way down runway 34 to inspect the fog condition and then return to takeoff position. This was done, using at times considerable engine power probably in an attempt to disperse the fog: Around 0612 hours the aircraft was back to the threshold of runway 34 and permission to takeoff was granted. The flight took off at 0613 hours and started to climb to flight level 150, its cruising altitude. Four minutes later witnesses on the ground noticed a whitish trail of smoke on the left side of the aircraft and suddenly a long flame from the left wing-root. Around 0620 hours the aircraft reached an altitude of approximately 2700 m, it then began to lose height, entered a gentle left turn loosing height more rapidly and finally went into a steep dive. Parts of the aircraft became detached and at 0621 hours a "MAYDAY" message was received. At 0622 hours the aircraft crashed into the ground on the outskirts of Dürrenäsch, at an elevation of 559 m, approximately 35 km from Zürich-Kloten Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact, causing a huge crater at the point of impact and all 80 occupants were killed, among them 43 habitants of the small village of Humlikon (200 habitants in total). Farmers specialized in milk business, they were flying to Geneva to visit a milk-farm.

The airplane departed Zurich at 2043LT on 11 July. The en route part of the flight trip was uneventful. At 01:00 the aircraft contacted Sale Tower and requested weather information. The tower replied: "visibility 10 m (30 ft), ground fog, clear sky." The flight then advised it was heading for Casablanca, the alternate. At 01:06 the aircraft gave its position as 5 miles from Casablanca-Anfa (CAS), requested permission to descend and asked for landing instructions. The aircraft was asked to call when on the downwind leg. Four minutes later the flight was asked to call when on final approach and was told that he was number one for landing, the surface wind was 040°at 4 kts. The pilot replied that he would call when over the range station. The aircraft flew over the field at 01:13, and three minutes later the pilot gave his altitude as 400 m (1300 ft) and indicated a ceiling of 150 m (500 ft). The flight was advised that cloud was 7/8, ceiling 140-150 m (450 to 500 ft). Three minutes later conditions were 7/8, 100 m (330 ft). At 01:22 the aircraft requested permission to land in Casablanca-Nouasseur Airport (CMN) if possible, and the tower asked him to wait. Two minutes later the aircraft was asked how much fuel it had remaining. It replied it had enough for 90 minutes. During the time Anfa control was transmitting this request to the American authorities in Nouasseur, the aircraft crashed at 01:25, in line with runway 03 about 8 miles from its threshold.