White Plains-Westchester County

According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," who was seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. He recalled that, during the approach, they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up." During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended because he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the SIC's knee obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that, following the flare, he heard the propellers hit the runway and that he made the decision not to go around because of unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons, and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in visual flight rules conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy and that, during the approach, he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that, during recovery, the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main landing gear (MLG) doors, the MLG was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. The landing gear warning horn was presented by an aural tone in the cockpit and was not configured to be heard through the pilots' noise-cancelling headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual Before Landing checklist.

The pilot arrived at the fixed-base operator on the morning of the accident and requested that his airplane be brought outside and prepared for an immediate departure; this occurred 1 hour 15 minutes before his scheduled departure time. Radar data showed that the airplane departed 23 minutes later. According to air traffic control data, shortly thereafter, the ground and departure controllers contacted the tower controller and asked if the airplane had departed yet; the tower controller responded, "I have no idea. We have zero visibility." Weather conditions about the time of the accident included a 200-ft overcast ceiling with about 1/4-mile visibility. Only five radar targets identified as the accident airplane were captured, and all of the targets were located over airport property. The first three radar targets began about midpoint of the 6,500-ft-long runway, and each of these targets was at an altitude of about 60 ft above ground level (agl). The final two targets showed the airplane in a shallow right turn, consistent with the published departure procedure track, at altitudes of 161 and 261 ft agl, respectively. The final radar target was about 1/2 mile from the accident site. Witnesses reported observing the airplane impact trees in a wings-level, slightly right-wing-down attitude at high speed. Examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies of the airplane. The pilot's personal assistant reported that the pilot had an important meeting that required his attendance on the day of the accident flight. His early arrival to the airport and his request to have the airplane prepared for an immediate departure were actions consistent with self-induced pressure to complete the flight. Due to the poor weather conditions, which were expected to continue or worsen, he likely felt pressure to expedite his departure to ensure he was able to make it to his destination and to attend the meeting. This pressure may have further affected his ability to discern the risk associated with departing in low-visibility and low-ceiling conditions. As noted, the weather conditions were so poor that the local air traffic controller stated that he could not tell whether the airplane had departed. Such weather conditions are highly conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Further, the altitude profile depicted by the radar data and the airplane's near wings-level attitude and high speed at impact were consistent with the pilot experiencing a form of spatial disorientation known as "somatogravic illusion," in which the pilot errantly perceives the airplane's acceleration as increasing pitch attitude, and efforts to hold the nose down or arrest the perception of increasing pitch attitude can exacerbate the situation. Such an illusion can be especially difficult to overcome because it typically occurs at low altitudes after takeoff, which provides little time for recognition and subsequent corrective inputs, particularly in very low-visibility conditions.

The multi-engine airplane was being repositioned to its base airport, and the pilot had requested to change the destination, but gave no reason for the destination change. Radar data indicated that the airplane entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern, flew at pattern attitude, and then performed a right approximate 250-degree turn to enter the final leg of the approach. During the final leg of the approach, the airplane crashed short of the runway into a house located in a residential neighborhood near the airport. According to the airplane's pilot operating handbook, the minimum multi-engine approach speed was 95 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and the minimum controllable airspeed was 82 KIAS. According to radar data, the airplane's ground speed was about 69 knots with the probability of a direct crosswind. Post accident examination of the propellers indicated that both propellers were turning at a low power setting at impact. During a controlled test run of the right engine, a partial power loss was noted. After examination of the throttle and control assembly, two o-rings within the assembly were found to be damaged. The o-rings were replaced with comparable o-rings and the assembly was reinstalled. During the subsequent test run, the engine operated smoothly with no noted anomalies. Examination of the o-rings revealed that the damage was consistent with the o-rings being pinched between the corner of the top o-ring groove and the fuel inlet surface during installation. It is probable that the right engine had a partial loss of engine power while on final approach to the runway due to the damaged o-ring and that the pilot retarded the engine power to prevent the airplane from rolling to the right. The investigation found no mechanical malfunction of the left engine that would have prevented the airplane from maintaining the published airspeed.

On the day of the accident, the pilot was returning to his home airport, after dropping off friends at a different airport. No weather briefing or flight plan was filed with Flight Service for either flight. A witness and radar data depicted the accident airplane on a straight-in approach for runway 1, in a landing configuration, at a ground speed of approximately 120 knots. The last radar target was recorded about 1/4 mile from the runway threshold, at an altitude of approximately 150 feet agl. The wreckage was later found about 1/2 mile east of the runway threshold. Review of weather information revealed general VFR conditions along the route of flight, and at reporting stations near the accident site. Gusty winds, low-level wind shear, and moderate to severe turbulence also prevailed at the time of the accident. In addition, weather radar depicted scattered light snow showers in the vicinity of the accident site, and possibly a snow squall. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The pilot had a total flight experience of 14,000 hours, with 8,500 hours in multiengine airplanes, including 2,600 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. He also had 4,100 hours of instrument flight experience.

During the approach, the flightcrew was unable to get the right main landing gear extended and locked. After several attempts, while conferring with the checklist and company personnel, the flightcrew performed an emergency landing with the unsafe landing gear indication. During the landing, the right main landing gear slowly collapsed, and the airplane came to rest off the right side of the runway. Examination of the right main landing gear revealed that the retract actuator fitting was secured with two fasteners, a smaller bolt, and a larger bolt. The nut and cotter key were not recovered with the smaller bolt, and 8 of the 12 threads on the smaller bolt were stripped consistent with an overstress pulling of the nut away from the bolt. The larger bolt was bent and separated near the head, consistent with a tension and overstress separation as a result of the smaller bolt failure. The overstress failures were consistent with the right main landing gear not being locked in the extended position when aircraft weight was applied; however, examination of the right main landing gear down lock system could not determine any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. Further, the right main landing gear retract actuator was tomography scanned, and no anomalies were noted. The unit was then functionally tested at the manufacturer's facility, under the supervision of an FAA inspector. The unit tested successfully, with no anomalies noted.

The commercial pilot/owner was on a cross-country flight from Orlando, Florida, to Salisbury, Maryland, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The pilot stated that all five fuel tanks were topped off and verified as full before departure. The fueler, in a written statement, reported that he added 100 gallons of fuel and that the fuel tank levels were topped off. In addition to the main tanks, the airplane was equipped with two large-capacity auxiliary tanks (31.5 gallons of useable fuel each) and a locker tank, and the airplane's total useable fuel capacity was 183 gallons. As the airplane approached Maryland, the pilot requested weather for White Plains, New York (HPN) and then changed his destination to HPN. As he approached the New York area at 21,000 feet, air traffic control (ATC) instructed the pilot to fly a published arrival procedure and to maintain an altitude of 16,000 feet. The pilot stated that, due to poor weather and air traffic congestion, he became concerned about possible delays and informed ATC that he had "minimal fuel." He did not declare an emergency. ATC then issued the pilot a descent clearance, and he reduced both throttles to idle. In preparation to level off at the new altitude, the pilot increased power on both throttles, and the right engine stopped producing power. The pilot was unable to maintain the assigned altitude and told the controller that he had "lost an engine, and needed vectors to the nearest runway." The left engine stopped producing power about 2 minutes later. The pilot ditched the airplane and exited the airplane before it sank. The airplane was not recovered. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical problems with the airplane before the flight.

On approach to White Plains-Westchester County Airport, the crew noted a left main gear unsafe light. The gear was recycled and the crew agreed with ATC to perform a low pass to check the gear. Few minutes later, upon landing, the left main gear collapsed. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane had undergone routine maintenance for slow acceleration on the right engine. Maintenance records revealed the fuel controls were changed from the right engine to the left engine. The airplane was released back to the pilot for service, and he departed for his home station. Several witnesses saw the airplane after takeoff at a low altitude, and at a slow speed. The airplane turned left, and the left wing struck the ground. Two witnesses saw the airplane pass by them at a low altitude, and wrote, '...at this point we could see the left (port) engine propeller was turning very slowly. You could actually see the individual blades of the propeller turning.' A complete disassembly of both engines, revealed no discrepancies other than impact, and post impact fire damage. Disassembly of the left propeller indicated that the propeller blades were at or near feather at impact. The pilot had a total of 106 flight hours in Beech A100 aircraft, all in the 90 days prior to the accident, and 56 hours in the 30 days prior to the accident.

During an aborted takeoff, the airplane overran the 4,451 foot long runway, went down a hill, and struck a fence. According to the pilot, 'during the takeoff roll, the indicated airspeed needle climbed to approximately 60 knots, but then would go no further... My attempts to dislodge it by tapping on the face of the gauge were futile...I pulled back the throttles and applied full brakes...' The pilot reported that based on the existing conditions 'the airplane can accelerate from rest to rotation speed and back to rest in less than 3,500 feet.' The examination of the airplane revealed the pitot tube was internally obstructed with an insect and mud.

During an IFR flight the pilot executed a forced landing in a reservoir after the engines quit due to fuel exhaustion. The pilot reported that the airplane was fueled, topped off, the night before departure from Charleston. Examination of the airplane showed the outboard fuel filler port cap on the left wing was not present. The majority of the liquid drained from the main fuel sump was water. The inboard and outboard fuel filler caps were present on the right wing. All six occupants were rescued.