Southampton

The aircraft had been booked for a static display and press 'photocall' at Southampton Airport, as part of the official launch of a project known as Seawings 2000. The aircraft operator had offered some short flights, free of charge, for the event organisers to use as they felt appropriate. Initial seat allocation was to the press, and members and officers of Southampton City Council. The remaining seats were offered to individuals representing organisations assisting the running of the project. The crew consisted of two pilots and two rear crew; one of the latter was designated 'crew chief'. There were two passenger compartments separated by a central compartment which had a door in the front bulkhead. Each passenger compartment was configured with eight seats, four either side of a central aisle. The front seats in each compartment were aft facing. The seats were typical airline type and had a standard lap belt restraint; a lifejacket was stowed under each seat. There was a bench type seat in each rear blister; however, these did not have restraint belts. On land, the aircraft is normally entered/vacated via ventral stairs, however, this access is not available when on water. There is a window type hatch between the seats on the left side of the front compartment. This is hinged at the top and opens upwards and outwards. To the rear and either side of the aft compartment there are two observation blisters which open upward in an 'eyelid' fashion. All three exits can be used for emergency egress. Emergency egress from the flight deck is through a removable hatch above the co-pilot's head.

During his pre-flight preparation the commander noted that the crosswind at Guernsey would need close monitoring throughout the day as it would be close to the aircraft's crosswind limits. The aircraft departed from Guernsey at 16:10 for the first sector to Southampton, with the first officer acting as pilot flying (PF). On departure the first officer stated that the aircraft was 'difficult to keep straight' on the runway and moderate turbulence were encountered after takeoff between 500 to 1,000 feet agl but the remainder of the flight was uneventful. The aircraft departed again from Southampton at 17:23, with 50 passengers and 2 kg of freight on board, with the commander as the PF and the first officer as the pilot not flying (PNF). During the cruise the first officer obtained the latest weather for Guernsey: surface wind as 170°/19 gusting to 32 kt, visibility 5 km in rain, cloud scattered at 600 feet, broken at 800 feet, temperature 11°C, dew point 9°C, QNH of 1004 mb with turbulence and windshear below 200 feet agl. The commander briefed the first officer that he intended to carryout a 'radar vectored' ILS approach to runway 27 using 26.5° of flap, instead of the usual 40°, for greater aileron control in the crosswind conditions during the landing. He also intended to add 10 kt to the target threshold speed (TTS). In the final stages of the approach the aircraft experienced a drift angle of 25° to 30° in turbulent conditions. The aircraft was slightly above the prescribed glide path, as it crossed the threshold and the commander stated that when over the runway it was obvious to him that the aircraft would touchdown beyond the normal landing area. He therefore decided to initiate a go-around. Full power was applied and, when established with a positive rate of climb, the landing gear was selected up and the flaps retracted to 16°. The aircraft climbed to 1,500 feet, the flaps were retracted and the crew were given radar vectors for a second ILS approach to runway 27. The commander described the second approach as being more stable and on the correct 3° glide path throughout. The drift angle this time was between 30° and 40° from the inbound track. The crew had correctly calculated the TTS as 96 kt with 40° of flap and 106 kt when using 26.5° of flap. The 40° flap TTS of 96 kt was displayed on the landing data card on the flight deck. The aircraft was cleared to land by ATC approximately three minutes before the actual touchdown. The surface wind was passed as '180°/18 kt with the runway surface wet'. Nineteen seconds before touchdown ATC transmitted the surface wind as '190°/20 kt". The first officer stated that the indicated airspeed (IAS) had been 120 kt 'down the slope' and 110 kt as the aircraft crossed the threshold. The commander stated that the aircraft crossed the threshold, with 26.5° of flap selected, at the correct height with the projected touchdown point in the normal position. Both pilots stated that during the flare, at a height estimated by the commander to be between 10 to 15 feet above the runway, the aircraft appeared to float. The commander reduced the engine torques to zero. The aircraft then continued to descend and touched down, according to the commander, 'a little beyond the normal point, left main wheel first followed by the right and then the nose wheel'. Several fireman however, who were on standby in their vehicles at the airport fire station, saw the aircraft touch down. They described the touchdown point as being opposite the runway fire access road, i.e. with 750 meters to 900 meters of runway remaining. After touchdown the commander selected ground fine pitch on both engines but neither the first officer, the No 1 cabin attendant, who was seated at the rear of the aircraft, nor several of the passengers were aware of the normal aerodynamic braking noise from the propellers. The first officer selected the flaps up and, with the commander having called 'your stick', applied full left (into wind) aileron. It is normal for the PNF to then call '5 lights (indicating that both propellers were in ground fine pitch), TGTs (turbine gas temperatures) stable and flaps traveling'. The first officer can recall seeing five lights but stated that he did not make the normal call. The commander applied full right rudder and braking; applying maximum braking on the right side to keep the aircraft straight. The first officer described the commander as 'standing up in his seat' whilst applying full right rudder. As the aircraft traveled down the runway it felt to the crew as if it was 'skidding or floating with ineffective brakes'. The first officer did not assist with the braking. Sixteen seconds into the ground roll the aircraft started to turn uncontrollably to the left. Realizing that the aircraft would leave the paved surface the commander instructed the first officer to transmit a 'Mayday' message. The aircraft overran the end of the runway and entered the grass to the left of the extended center-line at a speed estimated by the crew to be 60 kt. It then impacted and crossed a narrow earth bank before stopping in an adjacent field.

The pilot departed Stapleford on a positioning flight to Southampton. He was due to pick up passengers at Southampton and fly to Cambridge where more passengers were to be collected; from Cambridge he would fly to Berlin. Heathrow Approach frequency was fairly busy but by 0653LT, G-SEAS had been identified, and been cleared direct to Ockham not above 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 mb; this clearance was acknowledged by the pilot. The radar recording confirmed the track of STL819 to Ockham and from there the aircraft made a gentle turn onto a track of approximately 185°T; all three radars confirmed the aircraft speed as approximately 160 knots and at a level altitude of 1,500 feet amsl until a few seconds before 0705LT. At that point the aircraft started a high rate of descent with increasing speed but maintaining a fairly constant southerly track. Radar contact was lost 2.6 seconds after 0705LT. The last radar contact was within 250 metres of the crash site and at that point the aircraft was at 1,000 feet amsl, the crash site is approximately 400 feet amsl.

Cessna Citation G-JETB was to fly eight passengers from Southampton (SOU) to Eindhoven (EIN). Because G-JETB had arrived at Oxford (OXF) the previous evening, the airplane had to be ferried to Southampton early in the morning. This as a regular occurrence. The co-pilot had agreed with the airport authorities at both Oxford and Southampton that the aircraft would operate outside normal hours on the understanding that no fire cover would be provided. Following the takeoff from Oxford at 05:19 the crew contacted Brize Norton ATC and agreed a Flight Information Service. They maintained VMC for the transit at 2,400 feet QNH and called Southampton ATC on their alternate radio at 05:25 when they were approximately 30 nm from Southampton. The Southampton controller was surprised at their initial call and advised them that the airport did not open until 06:00. The crew informed him that arrangements had been made for an early arrival and the controller asked them to standby while he checked this agreement. At 05:27 he called G-JETB, informed the crew that they could land before the normal opening hours and asked them to confirm that no fire cover was required. The crew confirmed this and were then told that runway 02 was in use with a wind of 020 deg./14 kt and that there was a thunderstorm right over the airport. The crew then advised Brize Norton radar that they were going to Southampton ATC and left the Brize Norton frequency. Following a further check with Southampton they were given the 0520 weather observation: "Surface wind 040 deg/12 kt, thunderstorms, 2 oktas of stratus at 800 feet, 3 oktas of cumulonimbus at 1,800 feet, temperature 12 C, qnh 1007 mb, qfe 1006 mb, the runway is very wet." At 05:30 the controller asked the crew for the aircraft type and, after being told that it was a Citation II, told the crew that the visibility was deteriorating ("Now 2,000 metres in heavy thunderstorms" ) and cleared them to the Southampton VOR at 3,000 feet QNH. After checking that they were now IFR the controller confirmed the clearance, and the QNH of 1007 mb, and informed the crew that there was no controlled airspace and that he had no radar available to assist them. Shortly afterwards the controller advised the crew that: "Entirely at your discretion you may establish on the ILS localiser for runway 20 for visual break-off to land on runway 02." The commander accepted this offer and, within the cockpit, asked the co-pilot for the surface wind. He was informed that it was 040 degrees but that earlier they had been given 020 deg/14 kt. At 05:32 the commander had positioned on the ILS for runway 20 and began his descent; the co-pilot advised Southampton that they were established. The controller acknowledged this and again passed the QNH. Shortly afterwards he asked the crew to report at the outer marker and this message was acknowledged. At 05:33 the crew called that they were visual with the runway and the controller cleared them for a visual approach, left or right at their convenience, for runway 02. As this transmission was taking place, the commander informed his co-pilot that they would land on runway 20. The commander decided this because he could see that the weather at the other end of the runway appeared very black and he had mentally computed the tailwind component to be about 10 kt. After a confirmation request from the co-pilot to the commander, the co-pilot informed the Southampton controller that they would land on runway 20. The controller then advised them that: "You'll be landing with a fifteen knot, one five knot, tailwind component on a very wet runway" ; this was immediately acknowledged by the co-pilot with: "roger, copied thank you". The crew continued with their approach, initially at 15 kt above their computed threshold speed (VREF) of 110 kt and then at a constant VREF+10 kt. Within the cockpit the commander briefed the co-pilot that if they were too fast the co-pilot was to select flap to the takeoff position and they would go-around; they also discussed the use of the speedbrake and the commander stated that he would call for it when he wanted it. The speed at touchdown was within 5 kt of the target threshold speed and touchdown was in the vicinity of the Precision Approach Path Indicators (PAPIs), according to witnesses in the Control Tower and on the airport; the commander was certain that he had made a touchdown within the first 300 feet of the runway. The PAPIs are located 267 metres along the runway. Speedbrake was selected as the aircraft touched down and, although the commander applied and maintained heavy foot pressure on the brakes, no retardation was apparent; external observers reported heavy spray from around the aircraft. At some stage down the runway the commander stated that the brakes were not stopping them and the co-pilot called for a go-around ; the commander replied : "No we can't" as he considered that a go-around at that stage would be more dangerous. He maintained brake pressure and, in an attempt to increase distance, steered the aircraft to the right edge of the runway before trying to steer back left. Initially the aircraft nose turned to the left and the aircraft slid diagonally off the right side of the runway on to the grass. It continued across the grass for a distance of approximately 233 metres while at the same time yawing to the left. However, 90 metres beyond the end of the runway there is an embankment which forms the side of the M27 motorway and G-JETB slid down this embankment on to the motorway. The aircraft continued to rotate as it descended and came to rest, having turned through approximately 150 degrees, with its tail on the central barrier. During these final manoeuvres the aircraft collided with two cars travelling on the eastbound carriageway; the aircraft and one of the cars caught fire. During the approach of the aircraft, the airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) duty officer had discussed with the duty ATC controller the imminent arrival of G-JETB. Although not all checks had been complete, the fire officer offered his two fire vehicles as a weather standby ; he did not declare his section operational but agreed with ATC that they would position themselves to the west of the runway. When the aircraft was 1/2 to 2/3 down the runway, the ATC controller considered that the aircraft would not stop in the runway available and activated the crash alarm. The fire section obtained clearance to enter the runway after G-JETB had passed their position and followed the aircraft. Assessing the situation on the move, the fire officer ordered the FIRE 2 vehicle to disperse through the crash gate to the motorway, and took his own vehicle (FIRE 1) to the edge of the embankment. On arrival, the fire section contained the fires. The occupants of the aircraft and cars escaped with minor injuries.

Completing a flight from Istanbul to Southampton, the aircraft flew a procedural ILS and landed on runway 20. The crew report that they encountered wind shear on the final approach and they increased power to compensate for a loss of 10 knot of airspeed. The aircraft landed some 500 feet into the runway and, after touchdown, maximum braking appeared to be ineffective. The crew suspected aquaplaning and activated reversed thrust but they report that correct deployment was not indicated on the flight deck and so they assumed that it was not operating. Despite weaving along the remaining 1,500 feet of runway they were unable to prevent the aircraft from over running the end. The aircraft came to rest some 75 metres into the grass area beyond. Debris, consisting of earth and stones was ingested by the engines and the right wing tank was punctured. An inspection of the runway 10 minutes previously showed that, although the runway was wet, there was no standing water. A runway friction test was carried out at 1646 hrs and this gave the friction on the first, second and third runway segments as 0.67 Mu, 0.66 Mu and 0.57 Mu respectively.

The aircraft was operating British Island Airways flight UK 185, a scheduled night passenger service from Southampton (SOU) to Guernsey (GCI). It taxied out initially at 17:49 but during the takeoff run it was noticed that the starboard engine's rpm gauge indicated 14,550 rpm instead of 15,000 and that the torque reading on the same engine was below the datum appropriate to the use of water methanol injection. The commander, who was handling the aircraft, therefore decided to abandon the takeoff when the speed had reached about 60 knots and he returned the aircraft to the apron. A ground run carried out on the starboard engine produced normal full power indications and so the passengers were re-embarked and the flight departed for the second time at 18:21. The power output from the engines during this takeoff was satisfactory but when the aircraft had reached about 200 feet a rise in the torque indication of the starboard engine was observed. Climb power was set and the flight climbed to FL80 and continued on track to Guernsey. The descent into Guernsey was started when the aircraft was about 35 nm from the airport. Power was reduced on both engines but when the fuel flow was being trimmed back the starboard engine's turbine gas temperature (TGT), torque and fuel flow gauges showed an increase in their readings and because they continued to rise the engine was shut down and the propeller feathered. Guernsey Approach Control was informed of the situation and asked to have the emergency services standing by for the landing. The aircraft continued the descent but when it was about 5 nm from the runway it was advised by ATC that the airline had requested that it should land at Jersey airport instead of Guernsey. It was therefore decided to divert to Jersey and clearance was received from ATC to proceed on course at 1,500 feet above mean sea level (amsl). The aircraft changed to the Jersey Approach Control frequency and after ensuring that ATC was aware of the emergency the commander requested permission to make an ILS approach to runway 27 although the weather at the time was clear. The commander did not consider that it was necessary to brief the co-pilot about the approach and landing to Jersey as this had already been covered during a previous approach to the airport earlier in the day and he made no special reference to the single engine approach condition. Jersey radar positioned the aircraft on the ILS localiser and it became established at a range of about 5½ nm from the runway and commenced its descent shortly afterwards. In the vicinity of the outer marker the undercarriage was lowered followed by takeoff flap (5°). ATC cleared the aircraft to land and reported the wind as 270° at 10 knots. The aircraft continued its descent flying slightly above the ILS glide path with the airspeed increasing from about 120 knots to 137 knots. Power was reduced on the port engine to a very low value and the IAS began to decay at a rate of about one knot per second. When the aircraft was between 400 and 300 feet above the runway full landing flap (30°) was selected and both pilots considered that at this stage they were correctly positioned for the approach. The co-pilot noticed that the airspeed was about 105-110 knots when he selected full flap. (The recommended speed for the final approach was 99½ knots, ie 10 knots above VATI). The aircraft became displaced to the right of the runway centre line as it approached the threshold and the commander tried to realign it with the runway by making a sidestep manoeuvre to the left. The IAS had continued to decrease at a steady rate during the final stage of the descent and that at this point it was about 89 knots. When the commander realised that he was not going to be successful in his attempt to realign the aircraft with the runway centre line he called for full power. The aircraft was now alongside the runway threshold lights. The co-pilot advanced the throttle on the port engine and believing that the commander had also called 'overshooting' he selected the undercarriage to retract. The aircraft began to yaw and roll rapidly to the right resulting in the starboard wing tip and starboard main wheels almost simultaneously striking the ground well to the right of the runway edge. The aircraft subsided on to the grass as the undercarriage retracted, spun round to the right through approximately 180° and then slid backwards until it came to rest astride a small road on the northern perimeter of the airfield. All 53 occupants were evacuated safely, four of them were slightly injured.

At approximately 2246LT the aircraft took-off from Southampton Water on a scheduled flight to Lisbon, en route for Madeira, with 50 passengers and a crew of 8. It made a normal climb and three minutes later passed a routine departure message to Southern Air Traffic Control Centre, London. At 2254LT however, the radio officer called the Aquila base at Southampton and transmitted this message: "No. 4 engine feathered. Coming back in a hurry." Approximately one minute later the aircraft crashed into the face of a quarry between Chessell and Brook on the Isle of Wight. The wreckage caught fire and, despite the efforts of people who quickly came to the scene, none of the crew and only fifteen of the passengers survived.

Before leaving Cardiff (Rhoose) Airport the pilot filed a Visual Flight Rules flight plan giving an elapsed time of 35 minutes for the flight to Eastleigh Airport, Southampton at a cruising altitude of 5,500 feet and then on to Paris. The aircraft took off at 0925LT carrying the pilot and 6 passengers. At approximately 0950LT he called London, asked for clearance to Southampton Zone and was told to call Southampton Zone. He then acknowledged this request. Shortly after 0950 the engines became unsynchronized and the aircraft vibrated. The port propeller stopped rotating and the aircraft lost height. On reaching 200 feet the port engine was restarted and the aircraft flew very low over a line of high tension cables. It continued to fly at 200 feet at low speed with increased vibration over undulating country and after climbing slightly to clear a ridge it descended into a densely wooded area. When near the tree tops it banked to the left and the port wing tip struck a tree. The aircraft then traveled 400 yards further, struck the tops of several trees and crashed, killing the pilot and seriously injuring 4 passengers.

The takeoff from Southampton was attempted by night. During the takeoff roll on the Solent, the seaplane was unstable and the captain was unable to maintain the aircraft on the right course so he decided to abandon the takeoff procedure. A float located on the left wing hit the water surface and the left wing was submerged to the outer engine. All 31 occupants were quickly rescued and were uninjured while the aircraft sank.

The aircraft was carrying 11 people (five engineers from Short Brothers and six BOAC crew members) who were performing a test flight. Upon landing in the Solent, just prior to touchdown, the seaplane was caught by strong winds, hit the water surface and sank off Netley, southeast of Southampton, Hampshire. All 11 occupants were quickly rescued while the aircraft was lost.