Crash of an Airbus A320-216 into the Java Sea: 162 killed

Date & Time: Dec 28, 2014 at 0618 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-AXC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Surabaya – Singapore
MSN:
3648
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
QZ8501
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
156
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
162
Captain / Total flying hours:
20537
Captain / Total hours on type:
4687.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2247
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1367
Aircraft flight hours:
23039
Aircraft flight cycles:
13610
Circumstances:
The aircraft left Surabaya-Juanda Airport at 0535LT and climbed to its assigned altitude of FL320 that he reached 19 minutes later. The crew contacted ATC to obtain the authorization to climb to FL380 and to divert to 310° due to bad weather conditions. At 0617, the radio contact was lost with the crew and a minute later, the transponder stopped when the aircraft disappeared from the radar screen. At this time, the aircraft was flying at the altitude of 36,300 feet and its speed was decreasing to 353 knots. It is believed the aircraft crashed some 80 nautical miles southeast off the Pulau Belitung Island, some 200 km from the Singapore Control Area. The Indonesian Company confirmed there were 156 Indonesian Citizens on board, three South Korean, one Malaysian, one Singapore and one French (the copilot) as well. At the time of the accident, the weather conditions were marginal with storm activity, rain falls and turbulence in the area between Pulau Belitung and Kalimantan. First debris were spotted by the Indonesian Navy some 48 hours later, about 150 NM east-south-east off the Pulau Belitung Island. About forty dead bodies were found up to December 30. The tail was recovered on January 10, 2015 and the black boxes were localized a day later. On January 12 and 13 respectively, the DFDR and the CVR were out of water and sent to Jakarta for analysis and investigations.
Probable cause:
The cracking of a solder joint of both channel A and B resulted in loss of electrical continuity and led to RTLU (rudder travel limiter unit) failure.
The existing maintenance data analysis led to unresolved repetitive faults occurring with shorter intervals. The same fault occurred 4 times during the flight.
The flight crew action to the first 3 faults in accordance with the ECAM messages. Following the fourth fault, the FDR recorded different signatures that were similar to the FAC CB‟s being reset resulting in electrical interruption to the FAC‟s.
The electrical interruption to the FAC caused the autopilot to disengage and the flight control logic to change from Normal Law to Alternate Law, the rudder deflecting 2° to the left resulting the aircraft rolling up to 54° angle of bank.
Subsequent flight crew action leading to inability to control the aircraft in the Alternate Law resulted in the aircraft departing from the normal flight envelope and entering prolonged stall condition that was beyond the capability of the flight crew to recover.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-12BP in Phnom Penh

Date & Time: Oct 17, 2007 at 2100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XU-365
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Phnom Penh - Singapore
MSN:
4 026 01
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Phnom Penh-Pochentong Airport, while climbing, the crew reported technical problems and elected to return. After being cleared, the captain reduced his altitude but realizing he could not make it, he attempted an emergency landing in a rice paddy field located about 25 km west of Phnom Penh. The aircraft crash landed and came to rest, broken in several pieces. All five crew members were rescued, one of them was injured.
Probable cause:
It is believed that all four engines failed following a major hydraulic leak.

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-62F in Singapore

Date & Time: Dec 13, 2002 at 1743 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1804
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Yokota - Singapore
MSN:
45896/303
YOM:
1967
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11800
Captain / Total hours on type:
7200.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6200
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1900
Aircraft flight hours:
73500
Aircraft flight cycles:
29900
Circumstances:
The crew started their duty for the flight from Yokota, near Tokyo, Japan to Singapore at 1000 hours local time (0900 hours Singapore time) on 13 December 2002. The aircraft departed Yokota at 1125 hours local time (1025 hours Singapore time). The FO was the handling pilot for the flight. The expected flight time was about 7 hours. The departure and en route segments of the flight proceeded normally. The crew was aware of Changi Airport’s ATIS ‘Y’ weather information provided at about 1640 hours through Changi Airport’s there were thunderstorm activity, low level windshear and heavy rain in Singapore. The aircraft was given clearance to land on Runway 20R. The FO briefed the other crew members on landing on 20R. At about 7 miles from the airport, Changi Tower advised the aircraft that the wind was from 350 degrees at 5 knots, that the runway surface was wet, that the visibility from the Tower was about 1,000 metres and that landing traffic had reported the braking action at the end of Runway 20R to be from medium to poor. The approach and landing was carried out in heavy rain. The approach was stabilized and normal. Approach speed was about 148 knots. Flaps 35 were used. At about 300 feet above ground, the PIC reported having the approach lights and runway lights in sight while the FO still could not see the lights as the rain removal for the windshield on the FO’s side was not effective. According to the FO, he felt the PIC was putting his hands on the controls of the aircraft. The PIC noticed that the aircraft had drifted slightly left of the runway centreline and told the FO to make the correction back to the centerline. Although the FO made the correction, he was still unable to see the approach lights clearly at about 200 feet. The FO indicated he felt the PIC was in control of the aircraft and making corrections and so he let go of the controls. The CVR recording suggested that the PIC was aware the aircraft was floating down the runway and that the PIC informed the crew that “We are floating way down the runway.” The PIC subsequently moved the control column forward to make a positive landing. The aircraft landed at 1743 hours. The aircraft was observed by an air traffic controller to have touched down on the runway at a point roughly abeam the Control Tower and just before the turn-off for Taxiway W6, which was about 1,500 metres from the end of the runway. Two Airport Emergency Service officers of the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore also observed that while most aircraft landing on Runway 20R would touch down at a point between the turn-offs for Taxiways W3 and W4, the Arrow Air aircraft floated way beyond the normal touchdown zone. The aircraft’s speed at the time of touchdown was estimated from flight data recorder data to be about 135 knots. Upon touchdown, the PIC deployed spoilers and thrust reversers. The thrust reversers for Engines Nos. 1, 2 and 3 deployed almost immediately while that of Engine No. 4 was reportedly slow in deployment. The PIC and FO also pushed hard on the brake pedals, but they felt that there was no braking response. The aircraft did not stop before reaching the end of the runway. It veered slightly to the right as it exited the runway. The speed of the aircraft when it left the runway was about 60 knots. The aircraft rolled in mud during the overrun. The nose landing gear broke off half way during the overrun and the aircraft came to rest in a grass and soggy area at about 300 metres from the end of the runway. There was no fire. After the aircraft had come to a complete stop, the PIC stowed the thrust reversers. The crew completed the evacuation checklist and exited the aircraft from Door L1 with the assistance of the Airport Emergency Service personnel who had already arrived by then.
Probable cause:
The following significant factors were identified:
- The FO, the pilot flying the approach and landing, did not elect to go around even though he did not have the runway lights and approach lights in sight at 300 feet above ground.
- The PIC could have taken over control from the FO when the latter still could not see the approach lights and runway lights at 300 feet above ground.
- The crew landed long by about 1,300 metres on the runway.
- The crew had not made a determination of the landing distance required for the landing on Runway 20R. They had just verified using the Runway Analysis Manual that the aircraft landing weight was within limit for the landing.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Douglas DC-8-62F in Singapore

Date & Time: Feb 28, 2002 at 0044 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1808E
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
46105/494
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
APWP6L
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4300
Circumstances:
On 28 February 2002, Arrow Air flight APWP6L touched down on Runway 02L at Singapore Changi Airport at 0029 hours. The weather and visibility conditions were good (visibility in excess of 10 km). Arrow Air flight APWP6L was assigned to park at Bay 117, a remote aircraft parking bay. After APWP6L had landed, the runway controller at Changi Tower instructed the aircraft to taxi towards Bay 117. The aircraft exited the runway via rapid exit Taxiway W4. The ground movement planner at Changi Tower selected the taxiway centre line lights to guide the aircraft from Taxiway W4 onto Taxiway NC1, Taxiway WA and to Bay C7 (Bay 117 is the second parking bay after Bay C7). Due to airside construction works, there was no taxiway centre line lighting guidance on the short segment of taxi route from Taxiway WA from abeam Bay C7 to the adjacent parking Bays 117 and 118. There was a NOTAM in force that stipulated that during hours of darkness, aircraft could only be towed in to Bays 117 and 118. On reaching Bay C7, the flight crew of APWP6L did not stop but continued taxiing past Bay C7 onto a diverted portion of Taxiway WA. The taxiway centre line lights for this diverted portion of Taxiway WA were not switched on by ATC as it was not the intended route for the aircraft. At about 0037 hours, flight APWP6L called Changi Tower to indicate its position near Bay 106. Realising that flight APWP6L had missed its allocated parking position, the ground movement planner at Changi Tower routed the aircraft back to Bay 117 via Taxiways WA, SC, WP, V8 and Taxiway WA. Flight APWP6L followed the return route until it was abeam Bay 117 on the straight section of the diverted portion of Taxiway WA, just before Taxiway VY. At that location, the pilot saw the ground marshaller at Bay 117 on the aircraft’s right side. Instead of continuing to follow the assigned taxi route, the aircraft turned right. In doing so, it left the WA taxiway centre line and went onto a grass area between Taxiway WA and the parking apron. The nose gear of the aircraft went across an open drain of about 1.4 m wide and 0.8 m deep within the grass area. The aircraft came to a halt when its main landing gears went into the drain at about 0044 hours. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- The accident took place at night in clear weather.
- The flight crew members were properly licensed, qualified, medically fit, and in compliance with flight and duty time regulations.
- The flight crew had the latest revision of the Jeppesen charts showing the layout of Singapore Changi Airport, including the yellow supplementary chart showing the area near Bay 117 in greater detail.
- The flight crew was not familiar with the Terminal 1 West Apron area where Bay 117 was located.
- The flight crew was aware of the NOTAM tow-in requirement at Bay 117 during hours of darkness.
- The Apron Control duty supervisor was aware of the requirement for aircraft to be towed into Bay 117. He did not coordinate with ATC and the ground handler on towing arrangements as there was no towing procedure established for aircraft assigned to Bay 117 or 118.
- The runway controller was not aware of the requirement for aircraft to be towed into Bay 117. He instructed flight APWP6L to follow the green lights to Bay 117 in accordance with standard ATC procedures.
- The flight crew did not stop at Bay C7 to ask for instructions or guidance to get to Bay 117.
- After missing Bay 117 initially, the flight crew continued taxiing in search of the bay on their own.
- On the subsequent return towards Terminal 1 West Apron, after sighting Bay 117 and the marshaller on the right of the aircraft, the flight crew deviated from the Taxiway WA centre line marking and green centre line lights and turned the aircraft to the right directly towards Bay 117.
- The flight crew did not see a turn signal from the marshaller but believed they saw the marshaller waving a “move ahead” signal.
- The flight crew did not notice on the Jeppesen charts that there was a turf island separating Taxiway WA from the parking apron where Bay 117 was located.
- The flight crew turned right from the straight section of the diverted portion of Taxiway WA to head directly towards Bay 117 even though there was no turn signal from the marshaller, no instruction to turn from ATC and no aircraft parking bay guidance marking on the ground to indicate to the flight crew to turn right.
- The landing lights of the aircraft were turned on.
- As taxiway centre line lights were provided along Taxiway WA, according to ICAO Annex 14, there was no requirement for taxiway edge lights to be provided. However, where there is a large unmarked paved area adjacent to a taxiway, the provision of taxiway edge lights or reflective markers (in addition to taxiway centre line lights) would provide an additional cue to pilots to stay within the taxiway. This may help to prevent pilots inadvertently straying off the taxiway.
- There were no edge lights or markers to show the grass area between Taxiway WA and the parking apron where Bay 117 was located. There is no requirement in ICAO Annex 14 for edge lights or markers to show the presence of grass areas adjacent to taxiways.
- The drain located within the grass area between the diverted portion of Taxiway WA and the parking apron was outside the taxiway strip. According to ICAO Annex 14, drains located outside a taxiway strip are not required to be covered.
- The airworthiness of the aircraft was not a factor in this accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-36N near Palembang: 104 killed

Date & Time: Dec 19, 1997 at 1613 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9V-TRF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Jakarta - Singapore
MSN:
28556
YOM:
1997
Flight number:
MI185
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
97
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
104
Captain / Total flying hours:
7173
Captain / Total hours on type:
3614.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2501
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2311
Aircraft flight hours:
2238
Aircraft flight cycles:
1306
Circumstances:
On 19 December 1997, a SilkAir Boeing B737-300 aircraft, registration 9V-TRF, was on a scheduled commercial international passenger flight under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), routing Singapore – Jakarta – Singapore. The flight from Singapore to Jakarta operated normally. After completing a normal turnaround in Jakarta the aircraft departed Soekarno-Hatta International Airport for the return leg. At 08:37:13 (15:37:13 local time) the flight (MI185) took off from Runway 25R with the Captain as the handling pilot. The flight received clearance to climb to 35,000 feet (Flight Level 350) and to head directly to Palembang. At 08:47:23 the aircraft passed FL245. Ten seconds later, the crew requested permission to proceed directly to PARDI2. The air traffic controller instructed MI 185 to standby, to continue flying directly to Palembang and to report when reaching FL350. At 08:53:17, MI185 reported reaching FL350. Subsequently, the controller cleared MI185 to proceed directly to PARDI and to report when abeam Palembang. At 09:05:15.6, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) ceased recording. According to the Jakarta ATC transcript, at 09:10:18 the controller informed MI 185 that it was abeam Palembang. The controller instructed the aircraft to maintain FL350 and to contact Singapore Control when at PARDI. The crew acknowledged this call at 09:10:26. There were no further voice transmissions from MI 185. The last readable data from the flight data recorder (FDR) was at 09:11:27.4. Jakarta ATC radar recording showed that MI185 was still at FL350 at 09:12:09. The next radar return, eight seconds later, indicated that MI185 was 400 feet below FL350 and a rapid descent followed. The last recorded radar data at 09:12:41 showed the aircraft at FL195. The empennage of the aircraft subsequently broke up in flight and the aircraft crashed into the Musi river delta, about 50 km (30 nm) north-northeast of Palembang at about 09:13. The accident occurred in daylight and in good weather conditions. All 104 occupants were killed. The accident was not survivable.
Probable cause:
- The NTSC investigation into the MI 185 accident was a very extensive, exhaustive and complex investigation to find out what happened, how it happened, and why it happened. It was an extremely difficult investigation due to the degree of destruction of the aircraft resulting in highly fragmented wreckage, the difficulties presented by the accident site and the lack of information from the flight recorders during the final moments of the accident sequence.
- The NTSC accident investigation team members and participating organizations have done the investigation in a thorough manner and to the best of their conscience, knowledge and professional expertise, taking into consideration all available data and information recovered and gathered during the investigation.
- Given the limited data and information from the wreckage and flight recorders, the NTSC is unable to find the reasons for the departure of the aircraft from its cruising level of FL350 and the reasons for the stoppage of the flight recorders.
- The NTSC has to conclude that the technical investigation has yielded no evidence to explain the cause of the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-249F in Puchong: 4 killed

Date & Time: Feb 19, 1989 at 0636 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N807FT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Singapore - Kuala Lumpur
MSN:
21828
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
FT066
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Aircraft flight hours:
34000
Aircraft flight cycles:
9000
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Singapore-Changi Airport, carrying a load of textiles, computer softwares and mail as well as four crew members. Following a direct route to Kayell for an NDB approach to runway 33, the crew was cleared to 'descend two four zero zero' (2,400 feet), which was interpreted by the crew as 'to 400'. The crew continued the descent, passed below the minimum descent altitude of 2,400 feet when the aircraft struck trees and crashed on the slope of a wooded terrain located near the village of Puchong, about 14 km from the airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all four crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were reported:
- The GPWS alarm sounded in the cockpit but the crew failed to respond appropriately,
- The crew failed to adhere to the published approach procedures and approach checklist,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Lack of visibility,
- Non-standard phraseology used by ATC, causing the crew to misinterpret instructions.

Crash of a Rockwell CT-39E Sabreliner off Spratly Islands

Date & Time: Jul 12, 1988
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
158381
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Singapore – Subic Bay
MSN:
282-93
YOM:
1968
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route from Singapore to Subic Bay, the crew encountered technical problems with the navigation system. Eventually, the captain decided to ditch the aircraft in the South China Sea off the Spratly Island. The crew found refuge in a dinghy and was rescued few hours later by the crew of a Vietnamese ship. The aircraft sank and was lost.
Probable cause:
Failure of the navigation system for unknown reasons.

Crash of an Airbus A300B2-120 in Kuala Lumpur

Date & Time: Dec 18, 1983 at 1938 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OY-KAA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kuching - Singapore - Kuala Lumpur
MSN:
122
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
MH684
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
233
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
3907
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Singapore-Changi Airport, the crew started the approach to Kuala Lumpung-Subang Airport by night and poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. During an ILS approach to runway 15 with an RVR of 450 meters, the pilot-in-command was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and eventually decided to make a go-around. Four other attempts to land failed and during the sixth approach procedure, the crew descended below the MDA until the aircraft contacted trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located 1,200 meters short of runway, bursting into flames. All 247 occupants were quickly evacuated, 20 of them were injured. The undercarriage and both engines were torn off while the aircraft was partially destroyed by a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's decision to continue the approach after passing the MDA below the glide without proper visual contact with the ground/runway. Published procedures violation, lack of visibility, poor weather conditions were considered as contributing factors.

Crash of an Avro 696 Shackleton MR.2 into the Indian Ocean: 8 killed

Date & Time: Nov 4, 1967
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
WL786
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Gan - Singapore
YOM:
1953
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
While cruising at an altitude of 9,000 feet over the Indian Ocean on a flight from Gan AFB (Maldivian Islands) to Singapore-Changi Airport, the crew informed ATC that the propeller on the engine number four oversped and that he was unable to feather it. Few minutes later, the engine number four caught fire and eventually detached. The captain reduced his altitude in an attempt to make an emergency landing when control was lost. During an uncontrolled descent, the aircraft broke in three and crashed into the sea. The crew of the frigate HMS Ajax arrived on the scene six hours later and its crew was able to evacuate three survivors while eight other occupants were killed.
Those killed were:
F/Lt K. Blake, pilot,
F/O R. K. Bungay, pilot,
F/Lt K. M. Greatorex, navigator,
P/O D. Love, navigator,
F/Lt I. B. Stanley, air electric operator,
F/S R. N. Adams, air electric operator,
F/S R. G. Rees, air electric operator,
Sgt D. H. Morgan, air signaller.
Probable cause:
Due to lack of evidences, the exact cause of the accident could not be determined. However, the assumption that the engine fire was caused by the rupture of a fuel line is not ruled out.

Crash of a Vickers 607 Valetta in Singapore

Date & Time: May 12, 1958
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
WD170
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Singapore - Singapore
MSN:
499
YOM:
1951
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a local training sortie at Singapore-Changi Airport. While approaching the airfield with one engine voluntarily inoperative, the aircraft lost height. In a too low altitude, the crew did not have sufficient time to lower the landing gear so the captain attempted an emergency belly landing few km short of runway. The aircraft slid for several yards and came to rest, damaged beyond repair. Both crew members were unhurt.