Crash of a Convair CV-580 in Miami

Date & Time: Dec 6, 2001 at 2258 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N582HG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nassau – Fort Lauderdale – Miami-Opa Locka
MSN:
46
YOM:
1953
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12765
Captain / Total hours on type:
1940.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2569
Copilot / Total hours on type:
271
Aircraft flight hours:
75103
Circumstances:
The airline completed weight and balance and dispatch release forms for the initial flight showed an incorrect fuel load at the time the engines were started. The first officer performed a walk-around before the first flight leg which included checking the fuel tanks. A total of 460 gallons of fuel were added to the fuel tanks, and a delay loading cargo occurred. After both engines were started to begin the first flight, the engines remained operated for between 9-10 minutes before they were secured due to a radio problem. Maintenance personnel reracked the VHF radios, and again the engines were started where the airplane remained on the ramp 3-4 minutes before taxiing to the runway. The airplane remained at the runway hold short area for between 20 and 25 minutes before returning to the ramp due to a radio problem. The engines were secured, and a new VHF radio was purchased and installed. The company did not prepare new dispatch release, or weight and balance forms for the flight taking into account the additional fuel consumed with the engines operating. The engines were started, and the airplane was taxied to the runway and departed for the planned first leg. The airplane landed uneventfully at the destination airport where the cargo was offloaded. The first officer performed a walk-around which included checking the fuel tanks; 300 gallons of fuel were added to the fuel tanks (150 gallons in each side). The flight departed to return and when near the coastline, the flight was vectored to an airport other than the planned destination due to a issue with U.S. Customs. The flight landed uneventfully, and experienced a delay clearing customs. While on the ground before departure on the accident flight, the first officer reportedly performed a walk-around which included checking the fuel tanks with the captain looking on. The first officer reported that each fuel tank had approximately 1,100 pounds of fuel, and he and the captain both agreed before takeoff as to the quantity of fuel on-board as indicated by the magna-sticks. No fuel was purchased. Following starting of both engines for the accident flight, the first officer checked the fuel quantity gauges indications against the magna-sticks indications he observed; the fuel quantity gauges indicated approximately 200 pounds more. The flight departed, proceeded eastbound, and climbed to approximately 2,100 feet msl. During a right turn from a southeast to westerly heading, the right engine experienced a loss of horsepower which decreased from 900 to zero. The right engine was secured as a precaution, and priority handling to the destination airport was requested with air traffic control. The left engine horsepower remained the same (900) for a period of 31 seconds following the right engine horsepower decrease, then increased to 2,200, and remained at that value for 1 minute 13 seconds. The left engine horsepower then began to decrease and dropped to zero. The airplane was turned to the east, then turned to the south and ditched. The captain and first officer evacuated but remained with the airplane, and made it to shore where the first officer advised his wife that something was wrong with the fuel gauges. Following recovery of the airplane, pressure testing of the left fuel tank revealed no evidence of preimpact leakage. Pressure testing of the right fuel tank revealed slight leakage past the fuel cap. Boroscope examination of the engines, and functional test of each engine ignition system, fuel control units and fuel pumps revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the installed magna-sticks revealed no evidence of preimpact failure. The left fuel tank was drained and found to contain 2 gallons of Jet A fuel, while the right fuel tank was drained and found to contain approximately 540 gallons of salt water and 1/2 gallon of Jet A fuel. Fuel consumption calculations performed by FAA personnel revealed that at the time of engine start for the accident flight, the fuel tanks contained approximately 714 pounds of fuel. According to a representative of the engine manufacturer, the amount of fuel drained from the engine components post accident was consistent with, "low residual fuel."
Probable cause:
The inadequate dispatch of the airplane by company personnel prior to the first leg of the flight due to failure of company personnel to prepare a new flight release and weight and balance after considerable time on the ground with the engines operating. Also causal, was the inadequate preflight of the airplane by the captain by which he failed to note the low level of fuel in the fuel tanks before departure resulting in total loss of engine power of both engines due to fuel exhaustion and subsequent ditching of the airplane. A finding in the accident was the inaccurate fuel quantity gauges.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Marsh Harbour: 9 killed

Date & Time: Aug 25, 2001 at 1845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N8097W
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Marsh Harbour – Miami-Opa Locka
MSN:
402B-1014
YOM:
1975
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Circumstances:
The fatal aircraft, Registration N8097W was operated by Blackhawk International Airways and the listed owner was Skystream Inc; whose corporate address was the same as Mr. Gilbert Chacón’s Pembroke Pines, Florida home address. Blackhawk International Airways was owned by Gilbert Chacón and his son Erik, who founded the company in 1991. Blackhawk International Airways was authorized by the FAA as a part 135 Single Pilot Operation. Mr. Gilbert Chacon was the only pilot authorized by the FAA for Blackhawk International Airways. Once Morales acted as pilot- in-command of the Cessna 402B aircraft, this made Blackhawk International Airways a multi pilot operation. This was a clear violation of the FAA regulations. Mr. Morales was not signed off by the FAA to fly for Blackhawk International Airways, nor was Blackhawk International Airways signed off as a multi pilot operation. There were no FAA reports of any enforcement actions or service difficulty reports against the fatal aircraft. However, the FAA did report four administrative actions against Blackhawk International Airways, three for technical violations and the most recent for maintenance failures. The agency (FAA) issued a letter of correction on April 28, 2000, citing Blackhawk's failure to comply with manufacturer’s recommended maintenance programs and FAA programs for its aircraft's engines or other parts. Blackhawk failed to have a person in charge of maintenance with an appropriate certificate and used unsanctioned techniques and equipment for repairs. The Manager of the Palm Beach County Park Airport at Lantana, Florida stated that a last minute change resulted in the accident aircraft being dispatched to Marsh Harbour, Abaco, Bahamas. The Cessna 404 aircraft which was originally scheduled to conduct this flight, was fuelled, but subsequently changed to a Cessna 402B aircraft by the owner Mr. Gilbert Chacon. This charter flight from Lantana, Florida to the island of Marsh Harbour, Abaco, in the Bahamas, was operated under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).The accident occurred on August 25, 2001 shortly after the aircraft departed Marsh Harbour International Airport for the return trip to Opa Locka, Florida (USA). The flight number was not known. At the time of the accident, Blackhawk International Airways was not authorized by the Bahamas Aviation Authority to conduct commercial operations in the Bahamas. A determination could not be made as to whether or not the pilot filed a flight plan. No records existed to verify whether radio communications were established with Air Traffic Control (ATC) during the flight from Lantana, Florida to Marsh Harbour, Abaco, Bahamas. The flight was a 165 mile journey that was estimated to take one (1) hour to complete. The aircraft was not required to have a cockpit voice recorder. Witnesses reported the pilot and members of the group being transported, argued about the number of passengers and the amount of bags to be loaded on the aircraft. Witnesses also reported seeing eight (8) passengers board the aircraft. Two of the largest passengers (believed to be weighing approximately 300 pounds each,) were observed being seated in the rear of the aircraft. One witness reported that the pilot personally loaded the aircraft. Witnesses also reported that the pilot experienced problems starting the engines. Eye witness statements placed the time of departure of the flight for Opa Locka, Florida at approximately 1845 EDT. The aircraft became airborne from the 5,000 x 50 feet runway (Runway 27) between 2,500 to 2,800 feet. It climbed in a steep nose high attitude to approximately 40 feet above the runway, banked left, pitched nose down and impacted marshy terrain in a left wing, nose low attitude. The aircraft was destroyed and all nine occupants were killed, among them the US singer Aaliyah Dana Haughton.
Probable cause:
Findings and Probable Cause:
- Aircraft overweight. Pilot did not determine if the aircraft was within operating limitations. The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope).
- Pilot Unqualified. Pilot was not qualified under Part 135 for the aircraft in which he was flying.
- Documents Falsification. Pilot falsified logbook to reflect more flight time than he actually had accumulated. Review of pilot logbook revealed in several instances, pilot added as much as 1,000 hours to his total flight and multi engine times. Hundreds of day and night landings were falsified to meet qualification requirements. Pilot falsified aircraft information (types and registration numbers) reporting them to be Cessna C402 aircraft, when FAA database clearly lists the aircraft in question as aircraft other than Cessna C402. Pilot may not have completed a weight and balance report. (No evidence existed that showed he had completed a load manifest or weight and balance and performance calculations). Pilot failed to comply with prescribed Weight and Balance and Performance limitations in Pilot’s Operating Handbook. (The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope)). Pilot may not have followed “before takeoff” checklist in Pilot’s Operating Handbook.
- Fuel Selectors: “Left Engine – Left Main Tank, Right Engine – Right Main Tank”. Field investigation immediately following the accident revealed both fuel tank selectors were found selected to the right main tank. The left fuel valve was found in the left position, though the cable was separated from the valve. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable.
- Aircraft Flight Controls (secondary control surfaces – trim tabs) were found to be out of normal range required for takeoff. The aileron trim tab was found selected all the way to the right. The rudder trim tab was found selected to the left and the elevator trim tab was found in the full nose down position. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable.
- According to Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) normal takeoff is 0˚ flaps. (The flap selector handle was selected to 15˚with the indicator at approximately the 15˚position. The wing flap push rods were bent, indicating partial extension at impact).
- Blackhawk International Airways was not authorized to assign this pilot as a pilot in command because they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Blackhawk International Airways was authorized as a single pilot operation with Mr. Gilbert Chacon as the only authorized pilot.
- Blackhawk International Airways reportedly hired Mr Morales two days prior to the fatal accident, although they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Further, they did not exercise due diligence in ensuring pilot’s qualification prior to assigning duty as pilot in command.
- There were no FAA reports of any enforcement actions or service difficulty reports against the fatal aircraft. However, the FAA did report four administrative actions against Blackhawk, three for technical violations and the most recent for maintenance failures. The agency issued a correction letter April 28, 2000, citing Blackhawk's failure to comply with manufacturer recommended maintenance programs and FAA programs for its aircraft's engines or other parts, Blackhawk failed to have a person in charge of maintenance with an appropriate certificate and used unsanctioned techniques and equipment for repairs.
- Results of disassembly report confirms that no discrepancies existed that would have precluded normal operation of both left and right engines prior to impact.
- Forensic Report showed traces of benzoylegonine (a metabolite of cocaine) in the urine and traces of ethanol in the stomach contents of the pilot.
- On July 7, 2001, Morales was arrested by the Broward Sheriff's Office in an area of Pompano Beach known for drug sales. A deputy who pulled over Morales' 1993 Volkswagen Fox for running a stop sign said he found pieces of crack cocaine and other paraphernalia in the car. According to the deputy, Morales said he was in the area to buy powder cocaine for a friend.
- In November 2000, Morales was arrested by Fort Lauderdale police after he tried to "return'' $345 worth of stolen aviation parts to a local distributor. Instead of giving Morales cash, store employees called police, who were investigating a string of airplane burglaries. Mr. Morales was charged with dealing in stolen property after detectives found that a receipt in his bag belonged to the burglary victim who actually bought the parts. An additional charge of grand theft was tacked on when detectives recovered other stolen items.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 35A in Marianna: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 5, 2000 at 0930 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N86BE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Miami - Marianna
MSN:
35-194
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
12000
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1776
Copilot / Total hours on type:
343
Aircraft flight hours:
13262
Circumstances:
The pilot canceled the IFR flight plan as the aircraft crossed the VOR and reported the airport in site. The last radio contact with Air Traffic Control was at 0935:16. The crew did not report any problems before or during the accident flight. The distance from the VOR to the airport was 4 nautical miles. Witnesses saw the airplane enter right traffic at a low altitude, for a landing on runway 36, then turn right from base leg to final, less than a 1/2-mile from the approach end of the runway. Witnesses saw the airplane pitch up nose high, and the right wing dropped. The airplane than struck trees west of the runway, struck wires, caught fire, and impacted on a hard surface road. This was a training flight for the left seat pilot to retake a Learjet type rating check ride he had failed on March 24, 2000. He failed the check ride, because while performing an ILS approach in which he was given a simulated engine failure, and he was transitioning from instruments to VFR, he allowed the airspeed to decrease to a point below Vref [landing approach speed]. According to the company's training manual, "...if a crewmember fails to meet any of the qualification requirements because of a lack in flight proficiency, the crewmember must be returned to training status. After additional or retraining, an instructor recommendation is required for reaccomplishing the unsatisfactory qualification requirements." The accident flight was dispatched by the company as a training flight. On the accident flight a company check airman was in the right seat, and the check ride was set up for 0800, April 5,2000. The flight arrived an hour and a half late. The left seat pilot's, and the company's flight records did not indicate any training flights, or any other type of flights, for the pilot from March 24, 2000, the date of the failed check flight, and the accident flight on April 5, 2000. The accident flight was the first flight that the left seat pilot was to receive retraining, and was the only opportunity for him to demonstrate the phase of flight that he was unsuccessful at during the check flight on March 24th. Examination of the
airframe and engine did not reveal any discrepancies.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while on final approach resulting in the airplane striking trees. Factors in this accident were: improper planning of the approach, and not obtaining the proper alignment with the runway.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft D18S off Bimini

Date & Time: Feb 2, 2000 at 1407 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N122V
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Miami - Nassau
MSN:
A-828
YOM:
1952
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On February 2, 2000, about 1407 eastern standard time, a Beech D18S, N122V, registered to South Florida Aircraft Leasing, Inc., operated by Florida Air Cargo, Inc., was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean, approximately 47 miles east of Bimini, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 135 non-scheduled, international, cargo flight. The airplane was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot was not injured, one passenger sustained minor injuries. The flight originated about 1305 from the Opa Locka Airport, Opa Locka, Florida. The pilot stated that the flight departed with all five fuel tanks full of fuel and departed with the left fuel selector positioned to the "main tank" position. The flight continued and approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, he switched the left fuel selector to the auxiliary position and remained on that tank for approximately 35 minutes. When the flight was approximately 20 miles east of Bimini, he switched the left fuel selector to the main tank position where it remained for 5 minutes before he added climb power. While about 45 miles east of Bimini, climbing through 2,300 feet with a good rate of climb, the left manifold pressure dropped to 27 inches and the propeller rpm dropped to 1,300. He turned to fly to Bimini, broadcast a mayday call, and reported no unusual vibration; the fuel pressure and oil pressure gauges indicated normal. He repositioned the fuel selector but the left engine would not restart. He then feathered the left propeller and secured the engine but was unable to maintain altitude with full power applied to the right engine. The airplane was ditched in a slight left wing low attitude and the left engine separated from the airframe. Both occupants exited the airplane, remained in the water for 47 minutes, then were spotted by a U.S. Coast Guard Falcon airplane. They were rescued by a pleasure boat and transported to the east coast of Florida.

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 500B off Nassau: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 12, 1999 at 0859 LT
Registration:
N6138X
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Miami - Nassau
MSN:
500-927-10
YOM:
1960
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1000
Circumstances:
The flight was on approach, and the pilot was in radio contact with approach control. For unknown reasons the pilot performed a 360-degree turn, without permission from the controller, and was then vectored to a different runway. After acknowledging the clearance to the new runway, the controller lost all contact with the flight. None of the radio communications indicated that the pilot was having mechanical or medical problems. A search was initiated by air and a debris field was located. Five yellow life jackets, 1 six man life raft, several unidentified pieces of white and gold airframe were recovered. The pilot and the wreckage were never recovered from the water. At the time of the accident the pilot's license had been suspended by the FAA.
Probable cause:
An in-flight collision with water for undetermined reasons, due to the wreckage never being recovered from the water.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft UC-45J Expeditor in Miami

Date & Time: May 2, 1996 at 1052 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N64819
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Miami - Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
5834
YOM:
1943
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8064
Captain / Total hours on type:
2245.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4254
Circumstances:
During departure, the rubber connector for the fuel supply line to the right engine oil dilution valve split at the dilution valve on the aft side of the firewall. The engine would not operate unless the electric boost pump was turned on. While returning to the departure airport, a fire erupted in the right wheel after the landing gear was extended. The cockpit filled with smoke during the landing rollout, and the pilot lost directional control do to not being able to see. The aircraft rolled into a canal and came to rest. The split rubber fuel line connector was dry and brittle and did not have any fire damage. No other sources of fuel leakage was found.
Probable cause:
Inadequate inspection of the fuel line connector by company maintenance personnel, and failure of a connector resulting in a fuel leak and fire.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 560F in Miami: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 22, 1995 at 1123 LT
Registration:
N4630W
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Miami - Miami
MSN:
560-1068-24
YOM:
1961
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The non-certificated pilot took a multiengine airplane without the owner's permission and attempted to fly around the traffic pattern. On base leg to final, the airplane was observed to stall, enter a nose down descent, and crash. The non-certificated pilot was apparently unaware that the static system ports had been taped over for avionics work.
Probable cause:
Failure of the non-certificated pilot (unqualified person) to maintain sufficient airspeed, which resulted in a stall and a collision with the ground. Factors relating to the accident were: the non-certificated pilot's unauthorized use of an airplane that had static ports taped for maintenance, and his failure to properly preflight the airplane (and ensure the static ports were clear).
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Turbo Commander 681 in Nassau

Date & Time: Jun 30, 1995 at 1400 LT
Registration:
N70RF
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Miami - Puerto Plata
MSN:
681-6013
YOM:
1970
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route from Miami to Puerto Plata, while cruising at an altitude of 13,000 feet, the pilot informed ATC about the failure of the left engine and was cleared to divert to Nassau. On final approach to Nassau Airport, the aircraft struck a fence and crashed about 300 metres short of runway threshold. All four occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Failure of the left engine in flight for unknown reasons.

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air near Okeechobee: 10 killed

Date & Time: Jan 5, 1994 at 1829 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N230TW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kissimmee - Miami
MSN:
LJ-445
YOM:
1969
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Captain / Total flying hours:
12000
Captain / Total hours on type:
130.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7072
Circumstances:
The pilot (or pilot-rated passenger) reported an 'indication' problem and said they intended to land at Okeechobee, but couldn't find the airport. They then reported engine trouble and said that they would try to land on a road. They circled the area and approached a dirt road with landing lights on. A car was proceeding on the road in the opposite direction. The plane began to climb, and it entered a left turn. It then rolled into a steep right bank, descended nose down, crashed and was consumed by fire. An exam revealed indications that both engines were operating at high rpm. A teardown revealed a right engine fuel control bearing had failed, which would have allowed improper movement of the fuel control drive shaft. The plane was last inspected on 11/25/92 and was 13 hours over a required 150 hour inspection. A service bulletin for maintenance of the fuel control bearings had not been complied with. The owner/pilot had not completed formal ground school instruction on the airplane systems and operation. The plane had 9 seats; 10 occupants were aboard.
Probable cause:
The pilot's improper remedial action concerning a right engine power anomaly, and his failure to maintain adequate airspeed during go-around from an aborted precautionary landing, which resulted in a loss of aircraft control and an uncontrolled descent. Factors related to the accident were: failure of the owner/operator/pilot to assure proper maintenance inspection of the aircraft, failure to comply with a service bulletin concerning the engine fuel controls, subsequent bearing failure in the right engine fuel control, and the pilot's lack of familiarity with this make and model of aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31P Pressurized Navajo in Miami: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 17, 1988 at 1927 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N560JB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Miami - Miami
MSN:
31-7400195
YOM:
1974
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3444
Captain / Total hours on type:
270.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1750
Circumstances:
The instructor (cfi), who survived, was flying the aircraft from the right front seat while the owner/pilot was in the left seat. The flight had progressed normally until the pilots returned to the airport to land. Clearance was received to land on runway 09L. According to the cfi, he lowered the landing gear, selected 10° of flaps and noted he needed excessive back pressure on the control yoke to keep the aircraft from descending. Also, he stated he was unable to relieve the pressure with electrical or manual trim. He asked the pilot/owner to use his electrical trim (on the left yoke), but this did not help. The cfi stated he retracted the flaps and increased power, but the aircraft continued to settle. Subsequently, it hit a tree and a pole, then impacted the ground and struck a vehicle before stopping. A fire erupted and all 3 occupants were burned while evacuating the aircraft. The pilot/owner died from his injuries. No preimpact part failure or malfunction was found during the investigation. Flight test data concerning thrust-drag ratio showed that induced drag increases rapidly below 90 knots. Witnesses said the aircraft was low/slow on final approach.
Probable cause:
Occurrence #1: in flight collision with object
Phase of operation: approach - vfr pattern - final approach
Findings
1. (c) in-flight planning/decision - improper - pilot in command (cfi)
2. Descent - inadvertent
3. (c) airspeed - not maintained - pilot in command (cfi)
4. (c) proper altitude - not maintained - pilot in command (cfi)
5. (f) object - tree(s)
6. (f) object - utility pole
----------
Occurrence #2: in flight collision with terrain/water
Phase of operation: descent - uncontrolled
Findings
7. Object - vehicle
Final Report: