Lae-Nadzab Tomodachi

The single engine airplane departed Wasu Airfield at 1012LT on a charter flight to Lae-Nadzab Tomodachi Airport, with an ETA at 1047LT. On board were five people, four passengers and one pilot. The passengers included a member of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) and an employee from the Housing Ministry. Few minutes after takeoff from Wasu, while cruising at an altitude of 8,000 feet, the airplane impacted trees and crashed in a wooded and hilly terrain near Sapmanga, southwest of Wasu. The wreckage was located but the access is difficult. About two days after the accident, PNG authorities confirmed that all five occupants were killed.

On 23 December 2017, at 00:10 UTC (10:10 local), a Britten Norman BN-2A Islander aircraft, registered P2-ISM (ISM), owned and operated by North Coast Aviation, impacted a ridge, at about 9,500 ft (6°11'29"S, 146°46'11"E) that runs down towards the Sapmanga Valley from the Sarawaget Ranges, Morobe Province. The pilot elected to track across the Sarawaget ranges (See figure 1), from Derim Airstrip to Nadzab Airport, Morobe Province, not above 10,000 ft. The track flown from Derim was to the northwest 6.5 nm (12 km) to a point 0.8 nm (1.5 km) westsouthwest of Yalumet Airstrip where the aircraft turned southwest to track to the Saidor Gap. GPS recorded track data immediately prior to the last GPS fix showed that the aircraft was on a shallow descent towards the ridge. The aircraft impacted the ridge about 150 m beyond the last fix. There were no reports of a transmission of an ELT distress signal. During the search for the aircraft, what appeared to be the right aileron was found hanging from a tree near the top of the heavily-timbered, densely-vegetated ridge. The remainder of the wreckage was found about 130 m from the aileron along the projected track. The aircraft impacted the ground in a steep nose-down, right wing-low attitude. The majority of the aircraft wreckage was contained at the ground impact point. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. The pilot, the sole occupant, who initially survived, was reported deceased by the rescue team on 27 December 2017 at 22:10. The pilot had made contact with one of the operator’s pilots at 16:15 on 23 December. The pilot’s time of death, recorded on the Death Certificate, was 10:40 am local on 24 December. Rescuers felled trees on the steep heavily timbered, densely vegetated slope about 20 metres from the wreckage and constructed a helipad.

On the afternoon of 13 October 2011, an Airlines PNG Bombardier DHC-8-103, registered P2-MCJ (MCJ), was conducting a regular public transport flight from Nadzab, Morobe Province, to Madang, Madang Province under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). On board the aircraft were two flight crew, a flight attendant, and 29 passengers. Earlier in the afternoon, the same crew had flown MCJ from Port Moresby to Nadzab. The autopilot could not be used because the yaw damper was unserviceable so the aircraft had to be hand-flown by the pilots. At Nadzab, the aircraft was refuelled with sufficient fuel for the flight to Madang and a planned subsequent flight from Madang to Port Moresby. MCJ departed Nadzab at 1647 LMT with the Pilot-in-Command as the handling pilot. The aircraft climbed to 16,000 ft with an estimated arrival time at Madang of 1717. Once in the cruise, the flight crew diverted right of the flight planned track to avoid thunderstorms and cloud. The Pilot-in-Command reported that communications between Madang Tower and an aircraft in the vicinity of Madang indicated a storm was approaching the aerodrome. He recalled that he had intended to descend below the cloud in order to be able to see across the sea to Madang and had been concentrating on manoeuvring the aircraft to remain clear of thunderstorms and cloud, so he had been looking mainly outside the cockpit. Because of the storm in the vicinity of the airport, he said there had been „some urgency‟ to descend beneath the cloud base to position for a right base for runway 07 at Madang, the anticipated approach. On this route, the descent to Madang was steep (because of the need to remain above the Finisterre Ranges until close to Madang) and, although the aircraft was descending steeply, the propellers were at their cruise setting of 900 revolutions per minute (RPM). Neither pilot noticed the airspeed increasing towards the maximum operating speed (VMO); the Pilot-in-Command reported afterwards that he had been „distracted‟ by the weather. When the aircraft reached VMO as it passed through 10,500 ft, with a rate of descent between 3,500 and 4,200 ft per minute, and the propellers set at 900 RPM, the VMO overspeed warning sounded. The Pilot-in-command reported that he had been about to ask the First Officer to increase the propeller speed to 1,050 RPM to slow the aircraft when this occurred. He raised the nose of the aircraft in response to the warning and this reduced the rate of descent to about 2,000 ft per minute, however, the VMO overspeed warning continued. The First Officer recalled the Pilot-in-Command moved the power levers back „quite quickly‟. Shortly after the power levers had been moved back, both propellers oversped simultaneously, exceeding their maximum permitted speed of 1,200 RPM by over 60 % and seriously damaging the left hand engine and rendering both engines unusable. Villagers on the ground reported hearing a loud „bang‟ as the aircraft passed overhead. The noise in the cockpit was deafening, rendering communication between the pilots extremely difficult, and internal damage to the engines caused smoke to enter the cockpit and cabin through the bleed air and air conditioning systems. The emergency caught both pilots by surprise. There was confusion and shock on the flight deck, a situation compounded by the extremely loud noise from the overspeeding propellers. About four seconds after the double propeller overspeed began, the beta warning horn started to sound intermittently, although the pilots stated afterwards they did not hear it. The left propeller RPM reduced to 900 RPM (in the governing range) after about 10 seconds. It remained in the governing range for about 5 seconds before overspeeding again for about 15 seconds, then returned to the governing range. During this second overspeed of the left propeller, the left engine high speed compressor increased above 110 % NH, becoming severely damaged in the process. About 3 seconds after the left propeller began overspeeding for the second time, the right propeller went into uncommanded feather due to a propeller control unit (PCU) beta switch malfunction, while the right engine was still running at flight idle (75% NH). Nine seconds after the double propeller overspeed event began, the Pilot-in-command shouted to the First Officer „what have we done?‟ The First Officer replied there had been a double propeller overspeed. The Pilot-in-command then shouted a second and third time „what have we done?‟. The First Officer repeated that there was a double propeller overspeed and said that the right engine had shut down. The Pilot-in-Command shouted that he could not hear the First Officer, who – just as the left propeller began governing again and the overspeed noise subsided – repeated that the right engine had shut down and asked if the left engine was still working. The Pilot-in-command replied that it was not working. Both pilots then agreed that they had „nothing‟. At this point, about 40 seconds after the propeller overspeed event began, the left propeller was windmilling and the left engine was no longer producing any power because of the damage caused to it by the overspeed. The right engine was operating at flight idle, although the propeller could not be unfeathered and therefore could not produce any thrust. On the order of the Pilot-in-Command, the First Officer made a mayday call to Madang Tower and gave the aircraft's GPS position; he remained in a radio exchange with Madang Tower for 63 seconds. The flight crew did not conduct emergency checklists and procedures. Instead, their attention turned to where they were going to make a forced landing. The aircraft descended at a high rate of descent, with the windmilling left propeller creating extra drag. The asymmetry between the windmilling left propeller and the feathered right propeller made the aircraft difficult to control. The average rate of descent between the onset of the emergency and arrival at the crash site was 2,500 ft per minute and at one point exceeded 6,000 ft per minute, and the VMO overspeed warning sounded again. During his long radio exchange with Madang Tower, the First Officer had said that they would ditch the aircraft, although, after a brief discussion, the Pilot-in-command subsequently decided to make a forced landing in the mouth of the Guabe River. The First Officer asked the Pilot-in-command if he should shut both engines down and the Pilot-in-command replied that he should shut „everything‟ down. Approximately 800 feet above ground level and 72 seconds before impact, the left propeller was feathered and both engines were shut down. The Pilot-in-Command reported afterwards that he ultimately decided to land beside the river instead of in the river bed because the river bed contained large boulders. The area chosen beside the river bed also contained boulders beneath the vegetation, but they were not readily visible from the air. He recalled afterwards that he overshot the area he had originally been aiming for. The aircraft impacted terrain at 114 knots with the flaps and the landing gear retracted. The Flight Attendant, who was facing the rear of the aircraft, reported that the tail impacted first. During the impact sequence, the left wing and tail became detached. The wreckage came to rest 300 metres from the initial impact point and was consumed by a fuel-fed fire. The front of the aircraft fractured behind the cockpit and rotated through 180 degrees, so that it was inverted when it came to rest. Of the 32 occupants of the aircraft only the two pilots, the flight attendant, and one passenger survived by escaping from the wreckage before it was destroyed by fire.

The twin engine aircraft departed Lae-Nadzab Airport at 0820LT on a flight to Goroka, carrying 15 passengers and two pilots. While descending in marginal weather conditions at an altitude of 8,500 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 20 km east-southeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all 17 occupants were killed, among them two Dutch citizens.

The flight departed Wewak Airport at 1000LT on a flight to Madang. En route, a warning light came on in the cockpit panel, informing the crew about technical problems. The crew experienced difficulties with testing the lift dumper and wheel brake antiskid systems. The pilot decided to divert to Lae-Nadzab which offered a longer runway and fire fighting facilities. After touchdown, the left main gear collapsed. The crew lost control of the airplane that veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a ditch. All 49 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful flight from Lae, the crew started the approach to Madang Airport runway 25. The visibility was limited by night and poor weather conditions. In heavy rain falls, the captain realized that all conditions were not met to land and decided to initiate a go-around. Following a short holding pattern, he started the approach to runway 07. The aircraft landed 300 metres past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in a ravine. Due to torrential rain, all 39 occupants preferred to stay in the aircraft and were evacuated few dozen minutes later only. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft belly landed at Lae-Nadzab Airport. It slid down the runway for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.