Jackson-Reynolds Field

A single-engine airplane was taking off from runway 15 about the same time that a multi-engine business jet landed on a nearly perpendicular runway (runway 22). The single-engine airplane, piloted by a private pilot, was departing on a local flight. The jet, piloted by an airline transport pilot, was rolling down the runway following a straight-in visual approach and landing. The single-engine airplane collided with the empennage of the jet at the intersection of the two runways. Witnesses in the airport lounge area heard the pilot of the single-engine airplane announce on the airport's universal communications (UNICOM) traffic advisory frequency a few minutes before the accident that the airplane was back-taxiing on the runway. The pilot of the jet did not recall making any radio transmissions on the UNICOM frequency and review of the jet's cockpit voice recorder did not reveal any incoming or outgoing calls on the frequency. The pilots of both airplanes were familiar with the airport, and the airport was not tower controlled. The airport had signage posted on all runways indicating that traffic using the nearly perpendicular runway could not be seen and instructed pilots to monitor the UNICOM. A visibility assessment confirmed reduced visibility of traffic operating from the nearly perpendicular runways. The reported weather conditions about the time of the accident included clear skies with 4 miles visibility due to haze. Both airplanes were painted white. It is likely that the pilot of the jet would have been aware of the departing traffic if he was monitoring the UNICOM frequency. Although the jet was equipped with a traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS), he reported that the system did not depict any conflicting traffic during the approach to the airport. Although the visibility assessment showed reduced visibility from the departing and arrival runways, it could not be determined if or at what point during their respective landing and takeoff the pilot of each airplane may have been able to see the other airplane. In addition to the known reduced visibility of the intersecting runways, both airplanes were painted white and there was reported haze in the area, which could have affected the pilots' ability to see each other.

The pilots of the business jet were conducting a cross-country positioning flight. According to the pilot flying (PF), the flight was uneventful until the landing. While completing the descent checklist and while passing through 18,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot monitoring (PM), received the automated weather report from the destination airport and briefed the PF that the wind was variable at 6 knots, gusting to 17 knots. The PF then programmed the flight management system for a visual approach to runway 7 and briefed the reference speed (Vref) as 107 knots and the go-around speed as 129 knots based on an airplane weight. The PF further reported that he knew the runway was over 4,400 ft long (the runway was 4,495 ft long) and he thought that the airplane needed about 2,900 ft of runway to safely land. During the left descending turn to the base leg of the traffic pattern, the PF overshot the final approach and had to turn back toward the runway centerline as the airplane was being “pushed by the winds.” About 500 ft above ground level (agl), both pilots acknowledged that the approach was “stabilized” while the airspeed was fluctuating between 112 and 115 knots. About 200 ft agl, both pilots noticed that the airplane was beginning to descend and that the airspeed was starting to decrease. The PF added power to maintain the descent rate and airspeed. The PF stated that, after adding power and during the last 200 ft of the approach, the wind was “gusty,” that a left crosswind existed, that the ground speed seemed “very fast,” and that excessive power was required to maintain airspeed. When the airplane was between about 75 and 100 ft agl, the PF asked the PM for the wind information, and the PM responded that the wind was variable at 6 knots, gusting to 17 knots. Both pilots noted that the ground speed was “very fast” but decided to continue the approach. Neither pilot reported seeing the windsock located off the right side of the runway. Review of weather data recorded by the airport’s automated weather observation system revealed that about 3 minutes before the landing, the wind was from 240° at 16 knots, gusting to 26 knots, which would have resulted in a 3- to 5-knot crosswind and 16- to 26-knot tailwind. Assuming these conditions, the airplane’s landing distance would have been about 4,175 ft per the unfactored landing distance performance chart. Tire skid marks were found beginning about 1,000 feet from the approach end of runway 7. The PF stated that the airplane touched down “abruptly at Vref+5 and he applied the brakes while the PM applied the speed brakes. Neither pilot felt the airplane decelerating, so the PF applied harder pressure to the brakes with no effect and subsequently applied full braking pressure. When it was evident that the airplane was going to depart the end of the runway, the PM applied the emergency brakes, at which point he felt some deceleration; however, the airplane overran the end of the runway and travelled through grass and mud for about 370 feet before stopping. Examination of the airplane revealed that the nose landing gear (NLG) had collapsed, which resulted in the forward fuselage striking the ground and the airframe sustaining substantial damage. Although the pilots reported that they never felt the braking nor antiskid systems working and that they believed that they should have been able to stop the airplane before it departed the runway, postaccident testing of the brake and antiskid systems revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation, and they functioned as designed. Given the tire skid marks observed on the runway following the accident, as well as the postaccident component examination and testing results, the brakes and antiskid system likely operated nominally during the landing. Based on the available evidence, the pilots failed to recognize performance cues and use available sources of wind information that would have indicated that they were landing in significant tailwind conditions and conduct a go-around. Landing under these conditions significantly increased the amount of runway needed to stop the airplane and resulted in the subsequent runway overrun and the collapse of the NLG.

At approximately 90 knots after liftoff from a touch-and-go the copilot, who was flying from the left seat, indicated problems with the right engine. The pilot had been observing trucks on the right side of the runway. He stated they could have set it back down except he thought they might swerve into the trucks. He was not specifically looking at the instruments because of the trucks. He took control and the aircraft settled adjacent to the runway and burst into flames. Inspection of the right engine revealed all but one of the 12 spark plugs were sooty. The plugs were installed in a new engine and the engine obtained takeoff rpm.

After takeoff from Jackson-Reynolds Field, the twin engine airplane encountered difficulties to gain height. It stalled then crashed near the runway end. The pilot was injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after a night takeoff from Jackson-Reynolds Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane banked right and crashed in flames. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot departed Jackson-Reynolds Airport on a local test flight to check the radio systems. Just after liftoff, while in initial climb, the right engine caught fire. The pilot completed a wheels-up landing in a swamp near the airport. He was slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

A Lear Jet Model 23, N804LJ, operated by the Lear Jet Corporation crashed eight miles east-northeast of Jackson, Michigan, at approximately 1935 e.s.t., on October 21, 1965. The pilot and copilot were killed. There were no passengers. The aircraft was destroyed by impact. The flight was operating in accordance with an Instrument Flight Rules flight plan from Detroit, Michigan to Wichita, Kansas, at an assigned altitude of Flight Level 250. The radar controller working the radar contact at 1933, and observed the target traveling in a southwest direction ". . . when the aircraft started a sharp turn to the right (i.e. north) (sic). As the aircraft passed through a northerly heading the beacon target disappeared from the radar." The aircraft was traversing an area of moderate to severe turbulence when it deviated from the assigned route.