Gainesville-Lee Gilmer

On his first Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach, the pilot initially flew through the localizer course. The pilot then reestablished the airplane on the final approach course, but the airplane’s altitude at the decision height was about 500 feet too high. He executed a missed approach and received radar vectors for another approach. The airplane was flying inbound on the second ILS approach when a witness reported that he saw the airplane about 150 feet above the ground in about a 60-degree nose-low attitude with about an 80-degree right bank angle. The initial ground impact point was about 2,150 feet west of the runway threshold and about 720 feet north (left) of the extended centerline. The cloud tops were about 3,000 feet with light rime or mixed icing. The flap jack screws and flap indicator were found in the 5-degree flap position. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preimpact anomalies to the airframe, engines, or propellers. A radar study performed on the flight indicated that the calibrated airspeed was about 130 knots on the final approach, but subsequently decreased to about 95–100 knots during the 20-second period prior to loss of radar contact. According to the airplane’s flight manual, the wings-level power-off stall speed at the accident aircraft’s weight is about 91 knots. The ILS approach flight profile indicates that 20 degrees of flaps should be used at the glide slope intercept while maintaining 120 knots minimum airspeed. At least 20 degrees of flaps should be maintained until touchdown. The “No Flap” or “5 Degrees Flap Landing” flight profile indicates that the NO FLAP Vref airspeed is 115 knots calibrated airspeed minimum.

About 5 miles from the destination airport, the flight was cleared by air traffic control to descend from its cruise altitude of 5,000 feet for a visual approach. As the first officer reduced engine power, both engines "quit." The captain attempted to restart both engines without success. He then took control of the airplane, and instructed the first officer to contact air traffic control and advise them that the airplane had experienced a "dual flameout." The captain configured the airplane by extending the landing gear and flaps and subsequently landed the airplane on the runway "hard," resulting in substantial damage to the airframe. Both engines were test run following the accident at full and idle power with no anomalies noted. Examination of the airplane revealed that it was equipped with an aftermarket throttle
quadrant, and that the power lever locking mechanism pins as well as the throttle quadrant idle stops for both engines were worn. The power lever locking mechanism internal springs for both the left and right power levers were worn and broken. Additionally, it was possible to repeatedly move the left engine's power lever directly into cutoff without first releasing its power lever locking mechanism; however, the right engine's power lever could not be moved to the cut off position without first releasing its associated locking mechanism. The right throttle thrust reverser solenoid installed on the airplane was found to be non-functional, but it is not believed that this component contributed to the accident. No explicit inspection or repair instructions were available for the throttle quadrant assembly. Other than the throttle quadrant issues, no other issues were identified with either the engines or airframe that could be contributed to both engines losing power simultaneously.

The twin-engine airplane was destroyed when it impacted an earthmoving scraper and terrain in a field about 2.5 miles north of the departure airport in night visual meteorological conditions. Witnesses reported that the pilot had aborted an earlier flight when he returned to the airport and told the mechanic that he had a right engine fire warning light. The discrepancy could not be duplicated during maintenance, and the airplane departed. About 23 minutes after departure, the pilot reported to air traffic control that he needed to return to the airport to have something checked out. The pilot did not report to anyone why he decided to return to the departure airport, and he flew over four airports when he returned to the departure airport. Radar track data indicated that the airplane flew over the departure end of runway 35 at an altitude of about 1,600 feet agl, and made a descending left turn. The airplane's altitude was about 800 feet agl when it crossed the final approach course for runway 35. The airplane continued the descending left turn, but instead of landing on runway 35, the airplane flew a course that paralleled the runway, about 0.8 nm to the right of runway 35. The airplane continued to fly a northerly heading and continued to descend. The radar track data indicated that the airplane's airspeed was decreasing from about 130 kts to about 110 kts during the last one minute and fifty seconds of flight. The last reinforced beacon return indicated that the airplane's altitude was about 200 feet agl, and the airspeed was about 107 kts. The airplane impacted terrain about 0.75 nm from the last radar contact on a 338-degree magnetic heading. A witness reported that the airplane was going slow and was "extremely low." He reported that the airplane disappeared, and then there was an explosion and a fireball that went up about 1,000 feet. Inspection of the airplane revealed that it impacted the earthmover in about a wings level attitude. The landing gear handle was found to be in the landing gear UP position. The inspection of the left engine and propeller revealed damage indicative of engine operation at the time of impact. Inspection of the right engine revealed damage indicative of the engine not operating at the time of impact, consistent with an engine shutdown and a feathered propeller. No pre-existing conditions were found in either engine that would have interfered with normal operation. The inspection of the right engine fire detection loop revealed that the connector had surface contamination. When tested, an intermittent signal was produced which could give a fire alarm indication to the pilot. After the surface contamination was removed, the fire warning detection loop operated normally.

The pilots stated that approach and landing were normal. During landing rollout, about 2,000 feet down the runway, the brakes became ineffective. The aircraft continued to roll off the end of the runway, down an embankment, across a 4 lane road, and came to rest in a drainage ditch. Post-crash examination of the main landing gear brakes showed that 3 out of the 4 brake assemblies were worn beyond allowable limits and all 4 antiskid wheel generators were not producing voltage within the allowable limits. The outboard right main tire had failed during landing roll do to the antiskid becoming inoperative due to the low voltage of the wheel generator. The airplane had received an A-1 through A-6 inspection 2 days before the accident and this was the first flight since the inspection. The A-5 inspection requires inspection of the landing gear brake assemblies for wear, cracks, hydraulic leaks, and release.

The flight was executing the non-precision NDB runway 04 approach, had reported procedure turn inbound, and was cleared to change to advisory frequency. Witnesses observed the airplane descend out of the base of the overcast clouds in a 10° nose down, 45° left wing down attitude. The airplane impacted terrain about 3/4 mile south-southeast of the airport. Witnesses in the area reported that the weather was ceilings of about 100 feet and visibility of about 500 feet in light rain and fog. The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 465 feet agl. Both pilots were killed.

The pilot reported that immediately after takeoff, he had a collision with a flight of birds. He stated that the right engine immediately had a partial loss of power. He stated that he did not attempt to raise the landing gear nor the flaps following the loss of engine power, and the aircraft would not maintain altitude. Examination of the aircraft engines revealed that there was rotational scratching of the turbine housings on the right engine, and no rotational scratching on the turbine housing of the left engine.

The pic departed on a ferry flight in VFR conditions without a ferry permit. Witnesses stated they observed the airplane returning to the airport at about 150 to 500 feet. The airplane was observed to begin a left turn with the landing gear extended. A fire was observed in the vicinity of the left engine exhaust. The airplane continued in a steep descending left turn before it disappeared below the tree line and collided with the terrain. The airplane was destroyed and the pilot was fatally injured.

On the day of departure the pilot had received a 30 minutes familiarization flight upon completion of the superstar conversion. Emphasis was directed to engine gages, fuel flow and counter, and power settings. The flight was flown at 5,500 feet. The pilot then obtained a weather briefing and filed a flight plan. About 15 minutes after departure, while climbing thru FL170, the pilot radioed that he had lost both engines. The aircraft was subsequently observed descending uncontrolled out of the overcast. At about 1,000 feet agl the right aileron separated. The fuel boost pumps were found in the 'off' position. The AFM states that the boost pumps should be on during climb above 10,000 feet. The pilot had been enrolled in an Aerostar transition school the previous month during which a 2-hr combined demonstration/flight evaluation flight was conducted. The instructor pilot recommended further multi-engine training. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft crashed while on an ILS approach to the Gainsville Airport. Investigation revealed that the pilot had advised approach control that he was 'low on fuel.' After two missed approaches the pilot radioed that he was 'out of fuel.' The pilot did not have charts or approach plates aboard the aircraft, however ATC was not aware of this factor. Attempts to acquire additional information from the pilot have been unsuccessful. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries.

On final approach to Gainesville Airport, both engines failed simultaneously. The airplane lost height, struck trees and crashed in high vegetation. Both occupants were seriously injured.