Charlotte-Douglas

The twin-engine airplane was scheduled for a routine night cargo flight. Witnesses and radar data described the airplane accelerating down the runway to a maximum ground speed of 97 knots, then entering an aggressive climb before leveling and pitching down. The airplane subsequently impacted a parallel taxiway with its landing gear retracted. Slash marks observed on the taxiway pavement, as well as rotation signatures observed on the remaining propeller blades, indicated that both engines were operating at impact. Additionally, postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airframe or either engine. The as-found position of the cargo placed the airplane within the normal weight and balance envelope, with no evidence of a cargo-shift having occurred, and the as-found position of the elevator trim jackscrew was consistent with a neutral pitch trim setting. According to the airframe manufacturer's prescribed takeoff procedure, the pilot was to accelerate the airplane to an airspeed of 85 knots, increase the pitch to a climb angle that would allow the airplane to accelerate past 96 knots, and retract the landing gear before accelerating past 128 knots. Given the loading and environmental conditions that existed on the night of the accident, the airplane's calculated climb performance should have been 1,800 feet per minute. Applying the prevailing wind conditions about time of the accident to the airplane's radar-observed ground speed during the takeoff revealed a maximum estimated airspeed of 111 knots, and the airplane's maximum calculated climb rate briefly exceeded 3,000 feet per minute. The airplane then leveled for a brief time, decelerated, and began descending, a profile that suggested that the airplane likely entered an aerodynamic stall during the initial climb.

Aircraft experienced an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from La Guardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap held child, and 5 crew members evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged.

On January 8, 2003, about 0847:28 eastern standard time, Air Midwest (doing business as US Airways Express) flight 5481, a Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D, N233YV, crashed shortly after takeoff from runway 18R at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina. The 2 flight crewmembers and 19 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, 1 person on the ground received minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Flight 5481 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport, Greer, South Carolina, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

During landing touchdown, following a stabilized approach, the right main landing gear failed. The airplane remained controllable by the pilots and came to a stop on the runway, resting on its right wing. The DFW Fire Department arrived at the accident site in 35 seconds and, following communication between the airplane's Captain and Fire Department's Incident Commander, it was decided that an emergency evacuation of the airplane was not necessary. Examination revealed that the right main gear's outer cylinder had fractured allowing the lower portion of the gear (including the wheel assembly) to separate from the airplane. Research, examination & testing of the cylinder revealed that a forging fold was introduced into the material during the first stage of its forging process. The first stage is a hand operation, therefore the quality is highly dependent on the person performing the hand operation. Following the first landing, the forging fold became a surface breaking crack, due to the normal loads imposed during landing. Although growth of the fatigue crack was suppressed by crack blunting, high load landings resulted in growth of the fatigue crack. Subsequently, the landing gear failed when the crack had reached a critical length. Additionally, the airplane's maintenance records were reviewed and no anomalies were found.

After an approach to runway 5, and touched down at 85 knots, the airplane yawed right, exited the runway, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane nosed over. Examination of the airplane revealed that a right main wheel brake had locked up, and the landing gear had collapsed. Inspection of the right main landing gear assembly and all associated components could not provide any determination as to what caused the main wheel brake to lockup. The brake assembly was broken down into its component parts and inspected. No evidence of malfunction could be detected. No contamination of the hydraulic fluid was evident.

Following a missed approach at the destination, the pilot requested weather information for two nearby airports. One airport was 53 miles northeast with a cloud ceiling of 900 feet, and visibility 6 miles. The pilot opted for the accident airport, 21 miles southwest, with an indefinite ceiling of zero, and visibility 1/4 mile. After completing the second missed approach, the flight proceeded to the accident airport. Radar vectors were provided to the ILS runway 36L. On the final approach, the flight veered to the right of the localizer and descended abruptly. Last recorded altitude for the flight was below the decision height. Investigation revealed no anomalies with the airport navigational aids for the approach, and the airplane's navigation receivers were found to be operational. Postmortem examinations of the pilot did not reveal any pre-existing diseases, and toxicological examinations were negative for alcohol and other drugs.

The pilot reported that as he overflew the Tri-City airport, Tennessee at 9,000 feet, the right engine power slowly decreased. The airplane was in the clouds with an outside air temperature of about zero degrees Celsius. Right engine manifold heat was applied for a few seconds, with no noticeable difference in engine performance. The right magnetos were also checked with no obvious malfunctions noted. A descent for landing was initiated to the Tri-City airport and manifold heat was applied and removed several times, with no appreciable effect. On short final approach, when the landing gear was extended, the right main gear did not indicate down. There was insufficient time to perform the emergency gear extension procedure. A go-around was initiated, during which the pilot discovered that the left manifold heat control was now stuck in the 'ON' position. The pilot stated that with less than full power available on the left engine, and the right propeller unfeathered, the airplane could be climbed to about 200 feet. He flew the airplane until terrain clearance was no longer possible, then landed in a field, gear up. The airplane slid into trees and was substantially damaged.

USAir Flight 1016 was a domestic flight from Columbia (CAE) to Charlotte (CLT). The DC-9 departed the gate on schedule at 18:10. The first officer was performing the duties of the flying pilot. The weather information provided to the flightcrew from USAir dispatch indicated that the conditions at Charlotte were similar to those encountered when the crew had departed there approximately one hour earlier. The only noted exception was the report of scattered thunderstorms in the area. Flight 1016 was airborne at 18:23 for the planned 35 minute flight. At 18:27, the captain of flight 1016 made initial contact with the Charlotte Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) controller and advised that the flight was at 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The controller replied "USAir ten sixteen ... expect runway one eight right." Shortly afterward the controller issued a clearance to the flightcrew to descend to 10,000 feet. At 18:29, the first officer commented "there's more rain than I thought there was ... it's startin ...pretty good a minute ago ... now it's held up." On their airborne weather radar the crew observed two cells, one located south and the second located east of the airport. The captain said "looks like that's [rain] setting just off the edge of the airport." One minute later, the captain contacted the controller and said "We're showing uh little buildup here it uh looks like it's sitting on the radial, we'd like to go about five degrees to the left to the ..." The controller replied "How far ahead are you looking ten sixteen?" The captain responded "About fifteen miles." The controller then replied "I'm going to turn you before you get there I'm going to turn you at about five miles northbound." The captain acknowledged the transmission, and, at 18:33, the controller directed the crew to turn the aircraft to a heading of three six zero. One minute later the flightcrew was issued a clearance to descend to 6,000 feet, and shortly thereafter contacted the Final Radar West controller. At 18:35 the Final Radar West controller transmitted "USAir ten sixteen ... maintain four thousand runway one eight right.'' The captain acknowledged the radio transmission and then stated to the first officer "approach brief." The first officer responded "visual back up ILS." Following the first officer's response, the controller issued a clearance to flight 1016 to "...turn ten degrees right descend and maintain two thousand three hundred vectors visual approach runway one eight right.'' At 18:36, the Final Radar West controller radioed flight 1016 and said "I'll tell you what USAir ten sixteen they got some rain just south of the field might be a little bit coming off north just expect the ILS now amend your altitude maintain three thousand." At 18:37, the controller instructed flight 1016 to ''turn right heading zero niner zero." At 18:38, the controller said "USAir ten sixteen turn right heading one seven zero four from SOPHE [the outer marker for runway 18R ILS] ... cross SOPHE at or above three thousand cleared ILS one eight right approach." As they were maneuvering the airplane from the base leg of the visual approach to final, both crew members had visual contact with the airport. The captain then contacted Charlotte Tower. The controller said "USAir ten sixteen ... runway one eight right cleared to land following an F-K one hundred short final, previous arrival reported a smooth ride all the way down the final." The pilot of the Fokker 100 in front also reported a "smooth ride". About 18:36, a special weather observation was recorded, which included: ... measured [cloud] ceiling 4,500 feet broken, visibility 6 miles, thunderstorm, light rain shower, haze, the temperature was 88 degrees Fahrenheit, the dewpoint was 67 degrees Fahrenheit, the wind was from 110 degrees at 16 knots .... This information was not broadcast until 1843; thus, the crew of flight 1016 did not receive the new ATIS. At 18:40, the Tower controller said "USAir ten sixteen the wind is showing one zero zero at one nine." This was followed a short time later by the controller saying "USAir ten sixteen wind now one one zero at two one." Then the Tower controller radioed a wind shear warning "windshear alert northeast boundary wind one nine zero at one three.'' On finals the DC-9 entered an area of rainfall and at 18:41:58, the first officer commented "there's, ooh, ten knots right there." This was followed by the captain saying "OK, you're plus twenty [knots] ... take it around, go to the right." A go around was initiated. The Tower controller noticed Flight 1016 going around "USAir ten sixteen understand you're on the go sir, fly runway heading, climb and maintain three thousand." The first officer initially rotated the airplane to the proper 15 degrees nose-up attitude during the missed approach. However, the thrust was set below the standard go-around EPR limit of 1.93, and the pitch attitude was reduced to 5 degrees nose down before the flightcrew recognized the dangerous situation. When the flaps were in transition from 40 to 15 degrees (about a 12-second cycle), the airplane encountered windshear. Although the DC-9 was equipped with an on-board windshear warning system, it did not activate for unknown reasons. The airplane stalled and impacted the ground at 18:42:35. Investigation revealed that the headwind encountered by flight 1016 during the approach between 18:40:40 and 18:42:00 was between 10 and 20 knots. The initial wind component, a headwind, increased from approximately 30 knots at 18:42:00 to 35 knots at 18:42:15. The maximum calculated headwind occurred at 18:42:17, and was calculated at about 39 knots. The airplane struck the ground after transitioning from a headwind of approximately 35 knots, at 18:42:21, to a tailwind of 26 knots (a change of 61 knots), over a 14 second period.

Aircraft was dispatched with inoperative airframe deice system, tho an operational deice system was required for flight in known icing conditions. During descent to land, aircraft encountered light icing conditions. Capt believed aircraft could 'handle it' and continued descent. As he began ILS final approach, he noted significant increase of ice accumulation and used higher than normal approach speed. As full (50°) flaps were set, aircraft began buffet and pitched nose down. Capt corrected with full back pressure on control column, but aircraft landed hard, gear collapsed and aircraft slid about 3,600 feet to a stop. No preimpact mechanical anomaly was found, except for inoperative deice system. Investigation revealed pilots had received printout of weather from company computer system with surface observation and terminal forecast, but no area forecast (FA). Pilots and ground personnel were not aware that FA was available at company weather terminal. FA forecasted light and occasional moderate rime and mixed icing in clouds and precipitation above freezing level. Weather deteriorated, but pilots did not require inflight weather info or pireps. Flight mnl noted tailplane ice may cause nose down trim change with flap extension. There was evidence of tail plane stall, lack of company training in cold weather operations, deficiencies in use of deicing systems, and lack of FAA surveillance.

As engine power was increased for takeoff, the n°1 engine accelerated beyond target epr. Engine shut down had to be done with the fuel shut off lever. The asymmetric thrust was controlled with nose wheel steering. Before the airplane could be stopped the nose wheels separated from the landing gear. The investigation revealed that the fuel pump output spline to the fuel control had stripped. It occurred at such a time that the fuel control sensed an underspeed and increased Fuel flow. Misalignment of the spline shaft resulted from improper machining during pump modification. The nose gear inner cylinder failed in fatigue in an area of excessive grinding during overhaul. Two passengers were slightly injured.